Psychoanalysts and money

It is suggested that many of the rules of technique about handling questions of money in analysis have been adopted more because they are self-serving for the analyst than because they genuinely aid the therapeutic process. Examples are given of gross deviations that appear to have enhanced the process rather than interfered with it. The idea is that analysis should be a corrective emotional experience.     

Kantian Morals and Humean Motives

The idea that moral imperatives are categorical is commonly used to support internalist claims about moral judgment. I argue that the categorical quality of moral requirements shows at most that moral motivation need not flow from a background desire to be moral. It does not show that moral judgments can motivate by themselves, or that amoralism is impossible.     

论大众道德

大众道德是指既满足个人自身的基本心理需求、价值需要和个人正当利益诉求,同时主观上没有损害他人、社会的故意,客观上没有造成他人、社会的损害后果的行为方式,在某种程度上该行为方式也常常是对他人和集体有利的。大众道德是时代的需要,也是道德榜样的基础。它非常重视道德义务与道德权利有效整合,并将其融汇在个体的工作和生活之中。     

以德治国与社会稳定

以德治国与社会稳定有着极为密切的关系.为了改革和社会主义现代化建设的顺利进行,我们必须维护社会的稳定.社会稳定不仅需要法治,而且也离不开德治.今年年初以江泽民为核心的党中央提出了"以德治国"的重要治国方略,这对维持社会的稳定将产生深远的影响.本文力求阐明以德治国在维护当代中国社会稳定中的地位和功能,旨在从理论和实践的结合上探讨把社会稳定问题进一步纳入国家道德控制的机制.     

道德是朴素的

本文结合历史伦理文化资源的分析对道德话语的平实质朴、道德以社会公利为目标的朴素原理等问题进行了探讨,并分析了其借鉴启示意义。     

道德资本与企业创新

企业创新是我国“十一五”发展规划的重要课题之一。在企业创新过程中,道德资本起着十分重要的作用：它可以引导企业创新的合理方向,提供企业创新所需的精神生产力,为企业创新成果赢得更多的社会认可。推动企业创新的道德资本主要有两种：一是以承担环保责任和消费者权益为主要内容的责任型道德资本,一是以企业员工的创新精神、企业内部的团队精神以及企业与外界的良好关系为主要内容的效率型道德资本。要积累更多的道德资本,推动企业创新发展,必须提高企业员工的道德观念,改善企业的组织制度,并推动公众道德权利意识的发展。     

摹仿与原始社会中的伦理道德

摹仿在人类原始文化中的作用和功能是什么 ?传统的解释多集中在美学领域。从文化人类学的角度 ,探讨摹仿在原始社会物质生产和精神生产中的巨大作用及其在原始社会伦理道德意识的起源、形成和传承中作用是有重要意义的。     

道家道德的普世情怀

众所周知,在中国传统文化中,除儒家以外,还有道家等其他学派.因此,合理利用古代一切思想资源来丰富人们的精神世界,从而在世界舞台上展示中国文化的整体内涵,是一项刻不容缓的工程,而道家道德的普世情怀就是这一视域里的思考.     

Navajo Morals and Myths,Ethics and Ethicists

Over a century ago a Western observer recognized an effective morality among Navajo Indians in the American Southwest, yet could not locate its expression, except in mythology recounting contradictory behaviors. Through the 1900s scholars delineated contours of Navajo moral values, myths, and taxonomies upon which moral traditions were based, and situations in which Navajos have engaged in ethical decision‐making. Recently individual Navajos have manifested their role as ethical agents, not merely as recipients of moral lore. A contemporary Navajo storyteller, Sunny Dooley, enunciates narrative ethical judgments, grounded in traditional Navajo mythology and its religious milieu, as she addresses the present conditions of her people. Thus she probes the contradictions that are inherent to life. Her stories testify to the insoluble conflicts within the human condition, ultimate and immediate conundrums that must be faced, even though they surely will not be resolved.     

III. Morals,Moore, and Maclntyre

Maclntyre's claim that contemporary moral language is, by traditional standards, merely chaotic somewhat exaggerates our chaos, and traditional order. He accuses. Moore and his disciples in particular of using moral language merely as propaganda, failing, like other critics, to reckon with the Platonic context of Moore's argument and the reasons why Goodness is an idea that rational inquiry should not abandon. Genuine moral action is done as the right thing, that produces more that is good than any alternative. Plato's model of the threefold structure of human motivation, and his image of the cave, locates moral action at a higher level than action from desire or social prejudice. We discover our real selves, distinct from our physical and social natures, in seeing what Goodness requires. This neo‐Platonism is a better bet than Maclntyre allows, and an answer to the barbarian puppeteers he rightly condemns.     

Frankfurt-Pairs and Varieties of Blameworthiness: Epistemic Morals

I start by using “Frankfurt-type” examples to cast preliminary doubt on the “Objective View” - that one is blameworthy for an action only if that action is objectively wrong, and follow by providing further arguments against this view. Then I sketch a replacement for the Objective View whose core is that one is to blame for performing an action, A, only if one has the belief that it is morally wrong for one to do A, and this belief plays an appropriate role in the etiology of one's A-ing. I next defend this core against recently advanced objections and then show how it helps with defusing a skeptical challenge from the direction of causal determinism against blameworthiness. Finally, I exploit the core to isolate an analogous epistemic core for nonmoral but “normative” varieties of blameworthiness. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Ministerial money on mars

Pastoral Psychology -