Training Observers to Detect Deception Effects of Self-Monitoring and Rehearsal

It was predicted that trained observers would detect deception more accurately than untrained observers. More specifically, it was predicted that the highest deception detection accuracy would be found among trained observers judging the veracity of low self-monitors and unrehearsed liars, whereas the lowest detection accuracy would be found among untrained observers judging the veracity of high self-monitors and rehearsed deceivers. It also was hypothesized that the discrepancy between observers‘actual ability to detect deception and their certainty in the accuracy of their judgments would be smaller for trained observers than for untrained observers. Observers trained to detect deception used six behavioral cues based on research by deTurck and Miller (1985): (a) message duration, (b) response latency, (c) adaptors, (d) pauses, (e) nonfluencies, and (f) hand gestures. Results confirmed both hypotheses.     

Why Koreans Are More Likely to Favor “Apology,” While Americans Are More Likely to Favor “Thank You”

Two studies investigated whether apologies or thanks are preferred in asking favors in the United States and Korea, and how this relates to perceptions of reduction in positive and negative face threats. In the first study (n = 224), participants composed an e‐mail message where a favor was asked. In the second (n = 807), participants completed questionnaires including a prototypical e‐mail for the situation described in Study 1, as well as measures of negative and positive face threats. Findings showed that (a) Koreans more frequently included apologies in favor‐asking messages, while Americans more frequently included thanks; and (b) Americans considered repeated thanks to reduce the threat to hearers' negative and positive face, but Koreans considered repeated apologies to reduce the threat to speakers' positive face.     

Secrets and Disclosures: How Young Children Handle Secrets

The authors examined the influence of content and verbal cues on young children's understanding of secret information and of its disclosure. Participants were 209 5- and 6-year-old children in an experiment where a puppet, named Zinc, was the protagonist. Children were asked to whom Zinc would disclose a list of pieces of information, some of which are considered secrets. Children could choose between Zinc's friend, a nonfriend, both friend and nonfriend, or nobody. Participants were divided in 2 experiment groups: In the first group a prior verbal cue was given to the participants that some information might be secret, whereas in the second group no prior cue was presented. Results showed that young children, similar to older individuals, differentiated between secrets and nonsecrets partly on the basis of content, and chose to withhold secrets more than nonsecrets or to share secrets more with friends than with nonfriends, following the restrictive self-disclosure pattern. In contrast, young children did not withhold nonsecret information, but they shared it with friends and nonfriends. However, when given verbal cues regarding potential secrecy of the information, young children chose more restrictive disclosure patterns for all types of content.     

Base Rates,Deception Detection,and Deception Theory: A Reply to Burgoon (2015)

This essay continues a debate about the relative scientific merits of the Park‐Levine Model (PLM) and Interpersonal Deception Theory (IDT) with regard to accuracy in deception detection. Key points of disagreement include (a) the degree to which message recipients are sensitive to sender veracity and (b) the extent to which interactivity moderates the veracity and base‐rate effects specified by PLM. According to PLM, people are truth‐biased, truth‐bias makes people insensitive to deception, and as a consequence, base rates affect accuracy regardless of interactivity. IDT, in direct contrast, holds that people are sensitive to the veracity of other's communication and that interactivity is a key moderator. Consistent with PLM, data repeatedly show that people are insensitive to other's veracity and that this insensitivity is general across media affordances including interactivity. This rejoinder uses Burgoon's (2015) own interactive data to demonstrate the empirical superiority of PLM over IDT.     

Young Children's Updating and Recall of Impressions: Effects of Informativeness and Deception

Sixty-five children between the ages of 3 and 6 years of age were tested on their recollection of changed impressions. It was found that impressions updated with determinate information were easier to recall than impressions updated with indeterminate information; impressions changed when trickery was involved were easier to recall than impressions changed when it was not; and although younger children recalled less than older ones did, overall, the effects of informativeness and trickery on recall were similar in both age groups. These findings cannot be accounted for fully by the proposal that younger children have more difficulty than older ones in representing 1 item in 2 different ways simultaneously. Instead, they support the argument that children's degree of success in recalling outdated impressions depends on the means available to distinguish an initial from an updated impression and order the 2 correctly with respect to each other, temporally. This interpretation of the findings draws attention to an aspect of early cognitive development that entails temporal memory processes and is implicated in performance on a variety of tasks.     

Deception Meets Enlightenment: From a Viable Theory of Deception to a Quirk About Humanity's Potential

This article seeks to further suggestions made by C. West Churchman (1979) Churchman, C. W. 1979. The systems approach and its enemies, New York: Basic Books.  [Google Scholar] that a full inquiry into human systems requires a viable theory of deception. It argues that such a theory of deception requires an understanding of deception, a recognition of errors in perception, and an ability to see simultaneously from competing points of view. The intent here is to provide some insights that are useful in our understanding of deception, and thereby contributing to a viable theory of deception. Insights are used from what Huxley (1944) Huxley, A. 1944. The perennial philosophy, New York: Harper and Row.  [Google Scholar] calls the “perennial tradition,” found particularly within the esoteric traditions of the Buddhist, Sufi, and Taoist esoteric teachings, as well as many other spiritual traditions of the world. The perennial tradition emphasizes the role and continual presence of deception, alongside enlightenment, within human experience. In accord with C. West Churchman's view, this tradition suggests that, by a simultaneous recognition of both our enlightenment and our deception in any given situation, we have the proper perspective to meet the problems we face. A thought experiment, using insights from the perennial tradition, is offered as a challenge to all involved in human systems inquiry.     

Completing Coyne's Cycle: Dysphorics' Ability to Detect Deception

We tested the prediction, derived from Coyne's (1976b) interpersonal model of depression, that dysphoric individuals would be more sensitive than nondysphoric individuals to false reassurances and phoniness. In Part 1 of a two-part study, dysphoric and nondysphoric individuals watched videotapes of discussants talking about paintings they liked and disliked with an art student who had created some of the paintings herself. As predicted, the dysphorics were more accurate than the nondysphorics at discerning when the discussants really did like the paintings only when the discussions were about disliked paintings that were the art student's own work. The Part 2 stimuli were audiotaped lies and truths conveyed by men and women to attractive same-sex and opposite-sex targets. The dysphorics tended to be more accurate than the nondysphorics at identifying the truths and lies told to opposite-sex targets, and they were significantly more accurate at identifying the opposite-sex communications than the same-sex ones.     

Liability to Deception and Manipulation: The Ethics of Undercover Policing

Does undercover police work inevitably wrong its targets? Or are undercover activities justified by a general security benefit? In this article I argue that people can make themselves liable to deception and manipulation. The debate on undercover policing will proceed more fruitfully if the tactic can be conceptualised along those lines, rather than as essentially ‘dirty hands’ activity, in which people are wronged in pursuit of a necessary good, or in instrumentalist terms, according to which the harms of undercover work are straightforwardly overcome by its benefits. This article motivates the ‘liability view’ and describes its attractions, challenges, and implications.     

Spatial and Temporal Details in Intentions: A Cue to Detecting Deception

Research into lying about intentions is relatively new. Studies have suggested that lying about intentions can be detected with statement analysing methods. This article describes two experiments. The first experiment investigates how much spatial and temporal detail is given by people who are discussing a true or false intention in a 26‐question interview. The results showed that those with a true intention gave more spatial and temporal details. The second experiment examines these details in a one‐question interview and whether the amount of temporal detail given can be manipulated by the phrasing of the question. The results showed that the amount of detail is much lower in these short interviews, but can be increased with specific phrasing. The theoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Early versus Late Disclosure of Evidence: Effects on Verbal Cues to Deception,Confessions, and Lie Catchers' Accuracy

The strategic use of evidence (SUE)—a method of using case information to elicit different verbal responses from guilty and innocent suspects—has been shown to increase cues to deception and lie detection accuracy. This study manipulated the timing of evidence presentation to determine its effect on cues to deception, lie detection accuracy, and confession rates. Liars were less consistent with the evidence, and SUE was associated with higher lie detection accuracy. Results showed no difference between early and late disclosure of evidence on suspects' confession rates, nor on the diagnosticity of the confessions. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Cognitive Lie Detection: Response Time and Consistency of Answers as Cues to Deception

Purpose  The purpose of this study was to test a new cognitive lie detection method, time restricted integrity confirmation (Tri-Con), which uses response time and inconsistencies across answers as cues to deception. Design/methodology/approach   Data were obtained from two samples of students enrolled in psychology classes (n = 96 for Experiment 1, n = 99 for Experiment 2). The experimental task required students to lie or tell the truth to questions probing biodata under time restriction. The foci of questions (such as Academics or Employment History) were chosen because of their relevance to participants’ lives. Findings  Tri-Con was able to distinguish between truth tellers and liars after controlling for individual differences. In one experiment, liar-truth teller classification accuracies reached 89%. Mean response times and answer consistency can be used to distinguish those who lie from those who tell the truth. Implications  Research on cognitive-based lie detectors, such as Tri-Con, hold the potential for developing reliable and valid methods of screening out employees likely to engage in misconduct and providing deceptive answers to screening questions. A cognitive lie detector would constitute a paradigm shift away from the polygraph, and could be used in tandem with integrity tests. Originality/value   This study was a preliminary test of a cognitive lie detection method based on a model of cognitive events (the Activation-Decision-Construction model) when people answer questions deceptively. It constitutes a step in translating laboratory-based cognitive research into applied technologies for the real world detection of lying, including lying that occurs during pre-employment screening. Received and reviewed by former editor, George Neuman.     

Deception research involving children: ethical practices and paradoxes

This commentary draws on the thoughtful contemplation and innovative procedures described in the special section articles as well as current professional codes and federal regulations to highlight ethical practices and paradoxes of deception research involving children. The discussion is organized around 4 key decision points for the conduct of responsible deception research involving children: (a) evaluating the scientific validity and social value of deception research within the context of alternative methodologies, (b) avoiding and minimizing experimental risk, (c) the use of child assent procedures as questionable ethical safeguards, and (d) debriefing as both remedy and risk.     

Deception in psychotherapy: Frequency,typology and relationship

Deception in therapy has been documented anecdotally through various narratives of therapists. The investigation of its occurrence within therapy has largely been overlooked. We explored the reported frequency of deception within psychotherapy, the types of deception used within therapy, the likelihood of people lying to a therapist compared to other groups of people, and client perceptions of the types of deception that therapists use. Ninety‐one participants were provided with a series of deception examples, asked questions about the use of these types of deception within therapy, and asked generally about their use of deception in therapy. We found that a majority of the participants had been deceptive in therapy, and a majority were willing to be deceptive in future therapeutic contexts. Participants were more likely to use white lies than other forms of deception in therapy. Lastly, participants were less likely to lie to therapists compared to strangers and acquaintances. Implications for research and practice are discussed.     

Secrets to Creating Effective and Interesting Educational Experiences: Tips and Suggestions for Clinical Educators

Genetic Counselors (GCs) spend years learning about genetics and practicing counseling techniques in classroom environments. From the learner perspective, teaching may seem straightforward: provide appropriate information, develop tests or assignments and submit grades. When asked to teach for the first time, however, clinicians suddenly realize that there is a lot more to education than standing in front of a class and talking. This article introduces clinical educators to strategies and learning principles that help make the teaching/learning process more interesting and successful for faculty and students alike. The instructional concepts presented here are useful across the entire spectrum of learning situations; a 1 hour discussion with a lay audience, a 3 hour workshop at a professional meeting, a 15 week graduate course, or a series of courses culminating in an advanced degree. The article offers suggestions for writing course competencies, selecting instructional approaches, embedding learning engagement options, leveling course content and choosing evaluation strategies.     

Where the Motivation Resides and Self‐Deception Hides: How Motivated Cognition Accomplishes Self‐Deception

How do people remain blind to the motives underlying their flattering self‐construals, attitudes, and social judgments? This paper explores how motivated cognition accomplishes the goal of self‐deception. It proposes that self‐serving conclusions are produced although the influence of such distortions remains hidden from conscious awareness because of the ubiquitous presence and specialized nature of motivated cognition. I will discuss how motivations infiltrate four stages of cognitive processing, including information gathering and the creation of filters, the deployment of attention, information processing, and memory. In doing so, I will suggest that perhaps it is precisely because of this multicomponent system of checks and balances, the efficiency of motivational biases, and the specialized neural pathways used by motivated cognition that self‐deception is successful.