What are the cognitive costs of racism? A reply to Gendler

Tamar Gendler argues that, for those living in a society in which race is a salient sociological feature, it is impossible to be fully rational: members of such a society must either fail to encode relevant information containing race, or suffer epistemic costs by being implicitly racist. However, I argue that, although Gendler calls attention to a pitfall worthy of study, she fails to conclusively demonstrate that there are epistemic (or cognitive) costs of being racist. Gendler offers three supporting phenomena. First, implicit racists expend cognitive energy repressing their implicit biases. I reply, citing Ellen Bialystok’s research, that constant use of executive functioning can be beneficial. Second, Gendler argues that awareness of a negative stereotype of one’s own race with regard to a given task negatively affects one’s performance of that task. This phenomenon, I argue, demonstrates that those against whom the stigma is directed suffer costs, but it fails to demonstrate that the stigmatizers suffer cognitively. Finally, Gendler argues that racists are less competent when recognizing faces of other races than when recognizing faces of their own race because, in the first instance, they encode the race of the face (taking up cognitive space that could have been used to encode fine-grained distinctions), whereas in the second instance they encode no race. I argue that in-group/out-group categorization rather than racism is the cognitive cost. I conclude that Gendler has failed to demonstrate that there are cognitive costs associated with being a racist.     

Is vision continuous with cognition? The case for cognitive impenetrability of visual perception

Although the study of visual perception has made more progress in the past 40 years than any other area of cognitive science, there remain major disagreements as to how closely vision is tied to cognition. This target article sets out some of the arguments for both sides (arguments from computer vision, neuroscience, psychophysics, perceptual learning, and other areas of vision science) and defends the position that an important part of visual perception, corresponding to what some people have called early vision, is prohibited from accessing relevant expectations, knowledge, and utilities in determining the function it computes--in other words, it is cognitively impenetrable. That part of vision is complex and involves top-down interactions that are internal to the early vision system. Its function is to provide a structured representation of the 3-D surfaces of objects sufficient to serve as an index into memory, with somewhat different outputs being made available to other systems such as those dealing with motor control. The paper also addresses certain conceptual and methodological issues raised by this claim, such as whether signal detection theory and event-related potentials can be used to assess cognitive penetration of vision. A distinction is made among several stages in visual processing, including, in addition to the inflexible early-vision stage, a pre-perceptual attention-allocation stage and a post-perceptual evaluation, selection, and inference stage, which accesses long-term memory. These two stages provide the primary ways in which cognition can affect the outcome of visual perception. The paper discusses arguments from computer vision and psychology showing that vision is "intelligent" and involves elements of "problem solving." The cases of apparently intelligent interpretation sometimes cited in support of this claim do not show cognitive penetration; rather, they show that certain natural constraints on interpretation, concerned primarily with optical and geometrical properties of the world, have been compiled into the visual system. The paper also examines a number of examples where instructions and "hints" are alleged to affect what is seen. In each case it is concluded that the evidence is more readily assimilated to the view that when cognitive effects are found, they have a locus outside early vision, in such processes as the allocation of focal attention and the identification of the stimulus.     

Confusions about context in the judgment of facial expression: A reply to “the contempt expression and the relativity thesis”

A recent study of the effect of context in the judgment of contempt facial expression (Russell, 1991) was flawed by several confusions about what constitutes context. We argue that the context used should have ecological validity, through the use of many, rather than a few, facial expressions, which are spontaneous rather than posed, and which are judged by carefully selected judgment tasks, using clearly defined or well-understood emotional terms. The confusion in Russell's work between accuracy studies and agreement studies is also addressed.Paul Ekman's work is supported by a Research Scientist Award from the National Institute of Mental Health (MH 06092). David Matsumoto's research is supported by a grant from the National Institute of Mental Health (MH 42749).     

“Rules” of language: A reply

Philosophical Studies -     

Russellizing Russell: A reply to his “A critique of Lehrer's coherentism”

Conclusion Russell's attempt to demonstrate the insufficiency and nonnecessity of Lehrer's epistemology fails on both counts. His modified Nogot example does not constitute a counterexample to Lehrer's theory, though it does establish the insufficiency of (RTK). The relevant versions of both of his counterexamples to necessity occasion radically conflicting intuitions and, as a result, are far from decisive. Moreover, if they work against Lehrer's theory, and it is by no means obvious that they do, then they also demonstrate the nonnecessity of Russell's theory. In the final analysis, we may conclude that if Russell's three counterexamples demonstrate anything, they demonstrate that Lehrer's epistemology is superior to (RTK).     

Schizophrenic speech,slips of the tongue,and jargonaphasia: A reply to Fromkin and to Lecours and Vanier-Clément

Chaika (1974, Brain & Language, 1, 257–276) raised the possibility that speech judged “schizophrenic” by researchers results from an intermittent, cyclical aphasia. Fromkin (1975, Brain and Language, 2, 498–503) judged such speech as no different from normal error and even as proof of intactness of linguistic competence. These claims are examined. Lecours and Vanier-Clément (1976, Brain and Language, 3, 516–565), on the other hand, found it not normal, but different from jargonaphasia, a claim not wholly substantiated. Schizophrenic speech is found to be different from that of normals on both formal and intuitive grounds, contributing to new understanding of the differences between normal, pathological, and artistic language.     

Componentman as vice-president: A reply to Pellegrino and Lyon's analysis of “the components of a componential analysis”

In a recent issue of Intelligence (1979, 3, 169–186), Pellegrino and Lyon provided a general review and critique of a set of methods for studying intelligence that have been referred to collectively as “componential analysis.” The present article contains a response to this critique as formulated by a shadowy character named “Componentman” (who of course wears a cape with a “C” on it) and as dictated to Robert Sternberg.     

Conflicting interests and the creation of a “third space”; reply to commentary

This paper addresses how to be an available and responsive therapist to a controlling and narcissistically vulnerable young girl. It presents an overview of the treatment relationship and specific vignettes from sessions. The paper describes an impasse that posed a quandary: how to find a balance between staying in control of the treatment while being responsive to the kind of object the child needs the therapist to be—being empathic without being intrusive—and meeting her aggression without getting into a power struggle. The author discusses how asserting her subjectivity by playfully role-playing aspects of the patient, by spontaneously using humor, and by surviving her destructiveness allows the treatment to move forward. Trial and error, reflection on practice, and informed intuition contributed to the author's understanding of the child and of the transference. Various theoretical perspectives influenced the work.     

A “visual” explanation of facial vision

Summary The existence of facial vision has been doubted, perhaps because of its identification with dermo-optical perception. To determine whether more credence should be granted to this alleged phenomenon, we studied both blind and sighted people. Ninety-two percent of the partially blind people reported experiencing facial vision, but only 30% of the totally blind people reported the experience. Eighty-five percent of the sighted people also reported experiencing facial vision when a shadow moved across their eyelids. In response to a questionnaire asking about subjective visual experiences, 43% of the sighted people reported seeing as though through a window on their face. The boundaries of two monocular fields mapped by apparent locations of pressure phosphenes agreed with the boundary of the area in which facial vision is experienced. The findings indicate that facial vision can be experienced by both blind and sighted persons and that it can be explained in part by the principles of visual direction.This research was supported by grant no. A0296 from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada and a Canada Summer Internship Grant. The authors wish to thank S. Anstis. I. Howard, M. Komoda, M. Steinbach, N. Wade, J. Codd, and those associated with our laboratory for their helpful comments on an earlier version of this paper. The authors would also like to thank Joanne Gallagher for her help in collecting data; Milan Tytla, at the Toronto Hospital for Sick Children, for testing the blind participants; and the Canadian National Institute for the Blind, for their assistance in recruiting blind participants     

On short‐selling the investment theory of creativity: A reply to Runco

In creativity, there is scant evidence of significant racial and gender differences, and when such differences are found, there is no consistency regarding which groups perform best. There has been little work focusing on racial and gender biases and/or stereotypes within creativity assessment. It is study these issues by using a modified version of the Consensual Assessment Technique in which the judges are provided with information about the creators' gender and/or race. A total of 455 undergraduates assigned ratings for creativity, writing ability, and enjoyment to 60 poems downloaded from a poetry Web site. These poems either had no attribution or had (fictional) stereotypical Black, White, and Crossover names for each gender. Results suggest that novice raters using CAT methodology display little evidence of bias in their ratings of creativity, writing ability, and poem enjoyment. Very slight preference was found for poems assigned names of White females.     

A Review of: “A Guide to the Books of James Hollis”

This article provides a small, personal glimpse of what occurs in a barroom subculture, both negative and positive (e.g., the camaraderie of my Friday night “family members”). I look at life in a barroom from different angles and perspectives, ultimately discovering a great deal of sadness as I try to connect barroom life to my own personal background.     

Adaptation to displaced vision: Variations on the “prismatic-shaping” technique

Adaptation to displaced vision was measured, using three variations on Howard’s (1968) “prismatic shaping technique.” Over a series of 40 trials, a lateral displacement of 11.3 deg was introduced either gradually or suddenly. Both the amount of adaptation (negative aftereffect) and the accuracy of target localization at the completion of 40 trials were found to be directly related to the “suddenness” with which the displacement was introduced.     

Platonism and laws: A reply to Demetra Sfendoni‐Mentzou

This paper is a reply to Demetra Sfendoni‐Mentzou; it defends a realist—indeed a platonist—account of laws of nature.