Relationship Between Discrete Emotions and Moral Content Judgment in Sport Settings

The purpose of the present study was to provide new knowledge on the relation between emotions and morality by investigating the relation between discrete emotions and moral content judgment in sports. The participants were 363 athletes (179 male, 184 female) who were involved in competitive sport at the time of data collection. Their age ranged from 18 to 23 years (M = 20.01, SD = 1.38). All participants were undergraduate sport-science students at a Greek university and were involved in several sports. The subjects filled in two questionnaires: Moral Content Judgment in Sport Questionnaire and Sport Emotion Questionnaire. The results supported a rather vague relationship between discrete emotions and moral content judgment.     

The Dual Moral Self: Moral Centrality and Internal Moral Motivation

In this study, the relationship between two aspects of the moral self, moral centrality and internal moral motivation, was analyzed. It is argued that these 2 aspects are conceptually distinct but nonetheless empirically related. Based on a cross-sectional study of 205 adolescents (M age = 14.83 years, SD = 2.21 years) it was found that moral centrality and internal moral motivation, even though substantially correlated, interacted in predicting moral emotion expectancies. Even though moral centrality was unrelated to adolescents’ age it predicted a longitudinal increase in internal moral motivation over a 1-year interval. Overall, the findings call for a differentiation of moral centrality and internal moral motivation as 2 distinct but interrelated aspects of moral self-development that follow different developmental trajectories and are differentially related to age. At the same time, the study points out that adolescence may be less important for the development of the moral self than commonly assumed.     

从具身视角看道德判断

道德判断是个体对于某类行为的善恶好坏和是非对错所进行的评价及判断。随着具身认知理论的兴起, 道德判断的具身研究随之展开。道德判断具身性的研究主要围绕身体清洁、厌恶, 身体温度及身体动作这3个维度展开。从皮亚杰及维果茨基的心理发展观, 概念隐喻理论和进化心理学3个角度对道德判断具身效应进行了理论解释和探讨。考虑到身体变量会通过情绪、认知因素进而影响道德判断, 今后具身认知视角下的道德判断应与道德判断中已有的理论进行整合, 同时对其与道德直觉的关系需要深入探讨, 并需进一步考察具身效应发生的时效性和动态性问题, 探讨道德判断具身效应的调节变量及个体差异, 同时要对道德判断具身效应进行跨文化比较。     

Mapping Moral Motivation

In this paper we defend a version of moral internalism and a cognitivist account of motivation against recent criticisms. The internalist thesis we espouse claims that, if an agent believes she has reason to A, then she is motivated to A. Discussion of counter-examples has been clouded by the absence of a clear account of the nature of motivation. While we can only begin to provide such an account in this paper, we do enough to show that our version of internalism can be defended against putative counter-examples. All theories of motivation which take what motivates to be a psychological state run foul of the following plausible constraint: the reason why you ought to do an action and the reason why you do it can be the same. In our view, however, while what motivates is a reason (which is a fact) the state of being motivated is a cognitive stage, viz. the belief that one has reason to act. In cases where the agent's relevant beliefs are false, then she has no reason to act, but nontheless her action can be explained in other ways.     

道德情绪：道德行为的中介调节

道德情绪是心理学的一个重要研究主题。道德情绪是个体根据一定的道德标准评价自己或他人的行为和思想时所产生的一种情绪体验。它是一种复合情绪, 主要包括厌恶、移情、内疚, 羞耻等。道德情绪影响下人类会产生某些典型行为, 这主要包括道德洁净行为和道德补偿行为。心理学研究道德情绪的实验范式很多, 主要有行为回忆范式、实物或图片刺激范式、情境设置范式等。有关道德情绪的未来研究主要应注重于探讨正性道德情绪在道德发展中的作用, 探讨道德情绪对群体行为的影响, 以及探讨道德情绪在不同文化背景下的价值意义。     

弱势群体判断对不同价值语义启动下道德判断的调节效应研究

通过行为实验探讨了公平正义和人文关怀这两种基本道德价值的语义启动对涉及弱势群体的道德两难问题判断的影响。研究结果表明,不同道德价值语义启动对道德判断有显著影响,具体表现为：在公平正义启动状态下,人们的道德判断不会对弱势者有明显的道德宽容偏向。当个体处于恻隐关怀启动状态时则会出现明显的道德判断弱势者效应,即对弱势群体的道德判断存在显著的宽容偏向。进一步的检验表明弱势群体判断在道德价值语义启动与道德判断中起着显著的调节作用。本研究不仅从实证的角度证实了道德价值语境在道德判断中的重要性。同时文章还指出在面对重大社会负性事件时,政府、社会媒体、学术界应该呈现怎样的道德价值语境是一个既具有突出现实性和重要理论性的问题。     

关于儿童道德情绪判断的研究进展

该阐释了道德情绪的基本概念,论述了关于儿童道德情绪判断的近期研究结论及其影响因素。3～10岁儿童的道德情绪判断经历了一个从不高兴到高兴再到不高兴的发展过程,这一进程受到儿童的内在社会认知能力(儿童能否理解愿望是一种主观的心理特性、考虑道德因素的能力、观点采择能力,对犯过人格特质的理解等)及其所处的外在情境因素(所面临情境或事件的性质、情境的不一致性等)的影响。最后,作对该领域的研究趋向做出了展望。     

集体道德情绪研究述评

作为社会中存在的个体,无时无刻不在与各类人群交互作用,并在此过程中产生一系列与这些群体有关的情绪反应,也就是所谓的集体情绪。随着道德情绪研究的发展,集体情绪的研究逐渐与道德相联系。文中侧重探讨道德领域中的集体情绪,梳理了集体道德情绪的产生以及主要的集体道德情绪（集体内疚、集体羞愧）等的研究现状,指出未来的道德情绪研究应该在纵向研究、神经生理学研究以及积极情绪研究等方面进一步努力。     

道德理论的新进展--道德判断的社会直觉模式

道德判断的研究一直遵循皮亚杰和柯尔伯格的理性主义模式．但随着人们对认知双重过程论的逐渐认可,传统的道德判断理论受到了挑战。本文介绍了道德判断的一种新的理论模式——道德判断的社会直觉模式。该理论认为,道德判断是由迅速、自动的评价(直觉)所导致。     

恐惧管理对道德五基准及道德判断的影响

本研究探讨恐惧管理理论对道德五种基本准则以及道德判断的影响。85名被试随机分配到实验组与控制组。全部被试首先完成道德五基准问卷。实验组被试接受死亡凸显提示后观看短片并完成一系列道德两难问题的判断;控制组接受一般负性事件提示。研究结果显示,相对于控制组而言,实验组被试倾向于作出直觉而非理性判断,并且死亡凸显对道德直觉判断的影响受到厌恶情绪的中介作用。同时,当故事情节发生转换时,实验组被试倾向于作出与原有道德直觉规范相一致的道德判断。本研究从恐惧管理理论出发,为道德判断的情理之争提供了启示。     

道德判断中心理状态和事件因果关系的作用:兼对道德判断双加工过程理论的检验

考察青少年儿童和成人在道德判断中利用心理状态和事件因果关系信息的差异,并验证道德判断双加工过程理论.以道德判断中“行为坏的”程度和“应担负的道德责任程度”作为判断问题类型,共有10～11岁和13～15岁的青少年儿童及大学生各120名,完成道德判断测试任务.结果表明在不同的道德判断问题类型下,事件中他人愿望和信念、因果关系信息的作用模式是不同的,支持道德判断双加工过程理论.10～11岁儿童和13～15岁青少年在判断行为坏的程度时,利用心理状态信息和因果关系信息与成人类似.在判断应担负的道德责任程度时,10～11岁儿童更注重行为结果,并且不能综合应用心理状态信息和事件的因果关系信息.13～15岁青少年的道德判断中心理状态信息和事件因果关系信息的作用与成人的情况类似,但在进行应担负的道德责任程度判断时,还不能融合信念与因果关系信息进行道德判断.研究结果为道德判断双加工过程理论提供了支持,而且表明从儿童青少年到成人,利用心理状态和因果关系信息进行道德判断存在不断发展和成熟的过程.     

A Cognitive Prototype Model of Moral Judgment and Disagreement

Debates about moral judgments have raised questions about the roles of reasoning, culture, and conflict. In response, the cognitive prototype model explains that over time, through training, and as a result of cognitive development, people construct notions of blameworthy and praiseworthy behavior by abstracting out salient properties that lead to an ideal representation of each. These properties are the primary features of moral prototypes and include social context interpretation, intentionality, consent, and outcomes. According to this model, when the properties are uniform and coherent, they depict a promoral or immoral prototype, relative to the orientations of the properties. A promoral prototype is represented by an action that is supported by the culture, intentionally benevolent or other-regarding, consensual, and resulting in positive outcomes. An immoral prototype is an action that is condemned by the culture, intentionally malevolent or self-serving, lacking consent, and resulting in negative outcomes. It is hypothesized that moral prototypes will result in a high level of agreement and require effortless processing. Alternatively, when properties conflict or the situation deviates from the prototype, a nonprototype will result. It is hypothesized that nonprototypical situations will act as a source of moral disagreement and may require more effortful processing.     

厌恶与道德判断的关系

来自问卷调查和认知神经科学的证据表明,厌恶与道德判断可能存在密切关系,但是研究者对两者之间的关系是一般性的还是特异性的尚无定论。有若干证据表明厌恶影响一般的道德判断,也有研究认为厌恶主要影响人们对纯洁领域的道德判断。未来研究需要明确界定厌恶的类别,区分厌恶与道德厌恶两种不同的构念,从疾病防御的角度理解厌恶的进化根源,以及测量厌恶启动之后人们对不同道德冒犯的内隐态度。     

社会距离知觉对道德判断的影响研究

理论上,人们对不同个体行为是否违背道德的判断是完全一致的。本研究提出,人们对社会距离线索的知觉会影响对道德行为的判断。研究设计了两个实验,分别从社会距离直接启动和社会距离线索启动的角度对这一假设进行了检验。结果发现,较近的社会距离启动及社会距离线索都能促使个体采取更温和的道德判断,功利主义的色彩比较浓厚,而较远的社会距离启动促使个体采用更加严格的道德判断,表现出道义论倾向。文章最后讨论了这一结果对未来研究的意义。     

Effects of Accuracy Motivation and Anchoring on Metacomprehension Judgment and Accuracy

The current research investigates how accuracy motivation impacts anchoring and adjustment in metacomprehension judgment and how accuracy motivation and anchoring affect metacomprehension accuracy. Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions produced by the between-subjects factorial design involving accuracy motivation (incentive or no) and peer performance anchor (95%, 55%, or no). Two studies showed that accuracy motivation did not impact anchoring bias, but the adjustment-from-anchor process occurred. Accuracy incentive increased anchor-judgment gap for the 95% anchor but not for the 55% anchor, which induced less certainty about the direction of adjustment. The findings offer support to the integrative theory of anchoring. Additionally, the two studies revealed a “power struggle” between accuracy motivation and anchoring in influencing metacomprehension accuracy. Accuracy motivation could improve metacomprehension accuracy in spite of anchoring effect, but if anchoring effect is too strong, it could overpower the motivation effect. The implications of the findings were discussed.     

Affect,Desire, and Judgement in Spinoza's Account of Motivation

Two priority problems frustrate our understanding of Spinoza on desire [cupiditas]. The first problem concerns the relationship between desire and the other two primary affects, joy [laetitia] and sadness [tristitia]. Desire seems to be the oddball of this troika, not only because, contrary to the very definition of an affect (3d3; 3 General Definition of the Affects), desires do not themselves consist in changes in one's power of acting, but also because desire seems at once more and less basic than joy and sadness. The second problem concerns the priority of desires and evaluative judgements. While 3p9s and 3p39s suggest that evaluative judgements are (necessarily) posterior to desires, Andrew Youpa has recently argued that passages in Ethics 4 indicate that rational evaluative judgements can give rise to, rather than arise out of, desires. I aim to offer solutions to these problems that reveal the elegance and coherence of Spinoza's account of motivation. Ultimately, I argue that whereas emotions and desires stand in a non-reductive, symmetrical relationship to one another, evaluative judgements must be understood as asymmetrically dependent on, and reducible to, emotions or desires. This interpretation sheds light on our understanding of Spinoza's cognitivist account of emotion. For Spinoza, while emotions are representational, they are not underpinned by evaluative judgements. Rather than inflating emotions to include evaluative judgements, he deflates evaluative judgements, treating them as emotions, or valenced representations, and nothing more.     

Leibniz's Twofold Gap Between Moral Knowledge and Motivation

Moral rationalists and sentimentalists traditionally disagree on at least two counts, namely regarding the source of moral knowledge or moral judgements and regarding the source of moral motivation. I will argue that even though Leibniz's moral epistemology is very much in line with that of mainstream moral rationalists, his account of moral motivation is better characterized as sentimentalist. Just like Hume, Leibniz denies that there is a necessary connection between knowing that something is right and the motivation to act accordingly. Instead, he believes that certain affections are necessary for moral motivation. On my interpretation, then, Leibniz is an externalist about judgements and motivation: he is committed to a gap between the judgement that something is morally right and the motivation to act accordingly. As a matter of fact, I will argue that there are two gaps. The first and less controversial one has to do with the fact that Leibniz reconciles his psychological egoism with ethical altruism through his account of love. The second gap between moral judgements and motivation is a more fundamental one: Leibniz denies that there are any necessary connections between beliefs and motivation, or even more generally, between perceptions and appetitions.     

道德判断的社会直觉模型述评

传统的理性主义模型认为,道德判断是一系列理性推理的结果;而当前的社会直觉模型认为,道德判断包括直觉系统和推理系统两种加工,很多时候人们的道德判断更多的是一种直觉和情感的结果。近期神经心理学研究的一些成果证实了社会直觉模型的理念。     

Emotional Reactions and Moral Judgment: The Effects of Morally Challenging Interactions in Military Operations

This study explores the association between different types of morally challenging interactions during military deployment and response strategies (e.g., moral justification), as well as the mediating role of moral emotions. Interviews with Dutch servicemen who participated in military operations (e.g., in Afghanistan, Angola; N = 45) were content coded. We found a relationship between local-cultural and team-related interactions and moral justification; these effects were mediated by other-condemning emotions. Similarly, other-condemning emotions mediated the relationship between local-cultural interactions and relativism. This study points at the importance of other-condemning emotions in shaping military reactions to frequently occurring morally challenging interactions.