Mathematics has a front and a back

It is explained that, in the sense of the sociologist Erving Goffman, mathematics has a front and a back. Four pervasive myths about mathematics are stated. Acceptance of these myths is related to whether one is located in the front or the back.     

On Being a Feminist and a Psychotherapist

No abstract available for this article.     

Mindfulness as a concept and a process

The use of mindfulness meditation as a therapeutic intervention has been strongly promoted in the last few years. to date there has been limited opportunity for open discussion and sharing of knowledge in relation to theory, practice or outcomes. The purpose of this paper was to provide psychologists with an understanding of the theoretical underpinning and evidence base for incorporating mindfulness practice into their lives and work. Primarily, mindfulness is presented as a cognitive style that facilitates development of a heightened sense of awareness of thought processes and emotions, and utilisation of this awareness to cultivate the ability to engage actively in being rather than reacting or doing. Further, it is noted that the learning of mindfulness meditation is believed to empower the individual to find release from depressive rumination, anxiety and stress in their lives. Current limitations, potential implications and contraindications of utilising mindfulness meditative practice are also discussed.     

The counselor is a man and a woman

Recent research portrays the counselor as not only tender, gentle, loving, and passive-receptive in a Farsonian sense but also active and assertive, and able to confront and interpret immediacy when appropriate. Functional definitions of masculinity and femininity would suggest that the counselor initiates communication and is action-oriented as well as responsive and facilitative. Those counselors who offer the highest levels of facilitative dimensions also offer the highest levels of action-oriented dimensions.     

Privacy as a value and as a right

Conclusions Knowledge of others, then, has value; so does immunity from being known. The ability to extend one's knowledge has value; so does the ability to limit other's knowledge of oneself. I have claimed that no interest can count as a right unless it clearly outweighs opposing interests whose presence is logically entailed. I see no way to establish that my interest in not being known, simply as such, outweighs your desire to know about me. I acknowledge the intuitive attractiveness of such a position; but my earlier discussion concluded that the value of privacy is ease, and the value of knowledge is understanding - and it's not obvious that either outweighs the other. Nor is it obvious that the freedom and autonomy which result from the power to limit what others know is more significant than the freedom and autonomy which result from the power to extend one's knowledge. I believe the intuitive attractiveness of the belief that privacy values outweigh knowledge values lies in the entirely correct belief that a society without any privacy would be unpleasant. But a society without mutual knowledge would be impossible.I conclude therefore that there is no right to privacy nor to control over it. Nevertheless, each of these things is a good, and a good made possible (given the presence of other people) by social structures. A desirable society will provide both privacy and control over privacy to some extent. Nothing in my analysis helps determine what the proper extent is, nor what areas of life particularly deserve protection. Those who would argue that privacy and control over it are entailed by respect for persons should, I think, choose instead some particular areas central to being a person, to counting as a person, and then show how one is less likely to exercise one's capacities there fully without privacy or without control over it. Although Gerstein's attempt fails because he inaccurately defines intimacy as a kind of absorption and incorrectly opposes absorption with publicity, I think it is the kind of attempt which must be made. Furthermore, he has probably chosen the right area of life - if anything has a special claim to privacy it is probably the union between people who care for one another. The value of being together alone may be more significant than the value of being alone, if only because words and actions are public while thoughts are not. But I will not try to develop that argument here.In any case both privacy and control over it are social goods; on egalitarian grounds they should, ceteris paribus, be equally available to everyone. This helps explain the dehumanizing effect of institutions which provide no privacy at all- prisons and some mental institutions. It is not so much that the inmates are totally known; it is rather that those who know them are not so fully known by them; further, that the staff has a great deal of control over what they disclose of themselves, and the inmates very little. The asymmetry of knowledge in those institutions is one aspect of the asymmetry of power; the completely powerless are likely to feel dehumanized.My analysis also helps account for the wrongness of covert observation. It is not simply that the observer violates the wishes of the observed, for the question is whose wishes trump. The observer is violating the justified expectations of the observed: expectations supported by weighty social conventions. These have more moral weight than simple desires do. The peeping torn is violating a convention which structures the distribution of knowledge, a convention from which he benefits. Without it his own activities might well be impossible. He might be more easily caught; or his victim, less trusting, might choose houses without windows. More deeply, the thrill of what he is doing depends on the existence of the convention. Even morally permissible excitement - the suggestiveness of some clothing- would disappear without conventions about nudity. Presumably, too, there are elements of his own personal life for which he values his privacy. He is on grounds of justice obligated to observe the rule which makes his benefits possible.(Some claims to privacy result from personal predilections, rather than from convention. Parent describes a person who is extremely sensitive about being short, for instance, and does not want his exact height to be common knowledge. The grounds for these claims are obviously different from those I've been discussing. The grounds are the moral obligation not to cause needless pain, or, if the information was given in confidence, to keep one's promises.)Although there is no right to privacy or to control over it as such, there is a right to equality of consideration and to a just distribution of benefits and burdens. To put it another way: there is no natural human right to privacy or to control over it; but a good society will provide some of each, and justice requires that the rules of a good society be observed.

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Caveats on a process-tracing measure and a remedy

In process-tracing studies, a frequently used index describes whether information selection behavior is attribute — or alternativewise. The performance of this index is investigated under the assumption that subjects select information in a random fashion. The results show that the index may lead to inaccurate conclusions regarding the information-acquisition strategy of a subject. In addition, a Monte Carlo study is conducted that examines the sensitivity of the index to strategy changes. An alternative index is derived and a latent-class model is proposed for a parsimonious representation of individual differences in information acquisition.     

Oculomotor control and occipital alpha activity: a review and a hypothesis

Findings relating occipital alpha rhythm with the visual system appear to be difficult to interprete. This is due to the fact that the discrimination between oculomotor control monitored by visual input and monitored by other factors — a distinction which is independent of the presence or absence of visual stimulation — has been widely neglected. A review of the available evidence leads to the conclusion that the inflow of visual information itself has no relation with occipital alpha activity. Blocking occurs only when such information serves also as a monitoring principle in oculomotor position control. Some implications of this hypothesis especially in relation to the concept of alertness and arousal in tasks demanding a high level of visual attention, such as car driving, are discussed.     

Intersubjectivity as a practical matter and a problematic achievement

I want to thank Professor George Psathas, Editor ofHuman Studies, for the opportunity to put together this special issue; the Society for Phenomenology and the Human Sciences for providing the stimulating intellectual setting that called forth these papers; and the contributors, who responded so graciously to my suggestions, requests, and pressures. I also want to thank Erica Cavin and Greg Smith, who provided helpful references, and Christina Papadimitriou and Norman Waksler, who offered suggestions on an earlier draft.