The One-Sidedness of a Dialogue Between Neuroscience and Psychoanalysis

This discussant’s view is that neuroscience would be unable to provide data relevant to human experience without input from human minds, but the theory and practice of psychoanalysis, as yet, have little to learn from neuroscience in spite of extensive and fascinating neurobiological research. Gerson’s evident knowledge of that research is much appreciated.     

How Shall We Talk With Our Patients About Mortality? Response to Gerson and Shabad Discussions

In this response I discuss Shabad and Gerson’s viewpoints, not only in relation to my own but also to each other, in an effort to delineate variables at play within analytic subjectivity when we are confronted by issues concerning mortality in treatment. I suggest that our personal relationships with our own mortality, in conjunction with our analytic commitments and clinical sensibilities, determine how we will talk with patients about their having to die and/or if we will talk with them about it at all.     

DIONYSIUS AND SOME LATE MEDIEVAL MYSTICAL THEOLOGIANS OF NORTHERN EUROPE

Though the authority of Dionysius as a virtually apostolic theological source remains unchallenged in the late Middle Ages, ownership of his inheritance is much disputed, in connection with two issues of “mystical theology” principally. The first controversy (broadly between “Intellectualist” and “affectivist” readings of Dionysius' Mystical Theology) concerns whether the soul, united to God by grace, is made one with God principally by knowledge or by love. The second controversy is well exemplified by the disagreement between Jean Gerson and Denys the Carthusian as to whether Ruusbroec's account of the nature of that union of the soul with God amounts to a heretical extinction of the identity of the created soul. But both Gerson's critique of Ruusbroec and Denys the Carthusian's rebuttal of it are equally superficial, and the theologies of Eckhart and Nicholas of Cusa show why: Eckhart and Cusa retained, while Gerson and Denys had lost, their grip on the “dialectics” of “sameness” and “difference” expounded in Mystical Theology.     

Response to “Poison Cookies” Discussions

This is a response to the discussions of the case presented by this author. Responding to the discussions has allowed the author to pull together her own ideas about the case as well as about the work we do. The author sees Sheldon (Shelly) Bach's view of sadomasochism as a particular type of object relationship as informing her own point of view. Next comes a discussion centering on Steven (Steve) H. Knoblauch's emphasizing the importance of the internal symbolic world of the patient. The author makes the point that understanding the level of differentiation of the internal objects in the patient's representational world is important in thinking about the types and timing of interventions the analyst makes; for example, those which Mary-Joan Gerson describes in her comments. Finally, the author addresses Sue Grand's response, especially her emphasis on the importance of siblings in our patients’ histories and the resulting sibling transferences to the analyst.     

Why the view of intellect in De Anima I 4 is not Aristotle’s own

In De Anima I 4, Aristotle describes the intellect (nous) as a sort of substance, separate and incorruptible. Myles Burnyeat and Lloyd Gerson take this as proof that, for Aristotle, the intellect is a separate eternal entity, not a power belonging to individual humans. Against this reading, I show that this passage does not express Aristotle’s own views, but dialectically examines a reputable position (endoxon) about the intellect that seems to show that it can be subject to change. The passage’s argument for the indestructibility of intellect via an analogy to perception does not fit with Aristotle’s own views. Aristotle thinks that perception operates via bodily organs, but denies this of understanding. He also requires separability from the body for indestructibility, something this analogy rules out. However, Aristotle’s Platonist interlocutors may well endorse such an argument. My dialectical interpretation best resolves the interpretative difficulties and explains its place in the larger context, Aristotle’s discussion of Platonist views on the soul. Aristotle presents a challenge to his insistence that the soul is subject to change, dialectically resolves that challenge, and then ends by reserving the right to give a different account of the intellect.     

Applications,Implications, Complications: Reply to Reviews by Elkind,Gerson, and Levine

The author appreciates the careful reading and thoughtful reviews by Sue Elkind, Sam Gerson, and Howard Levine. Elkind's review particularly captures and articulates many of the key ideas in the book Building Bridges: The Negotiation of Paradox in Psychoanalysis and creatively applies concepts of negotiation, paradox, an inherently multiple “distributed self,” and metaphor in her own work consulting on treatment impasses. Gerson incisively focuses on the core idea of recognizing, accepting, and bridging differences and contradictions in personal, and national, perspectives; he also articulates an understanding of the attempt of relational analytic writers to bridge the intrapsychic and the interpersonal with due recognition of each. The author replies extensively to Levine's comparison of Pizer's work with that of Semrad and other “classical” analysts and challenges Levine's premise that a relational perspective, grounded as it is in a two-person contextual psychology, ignores or devalues interpretation, insight, free association, and autonomous mental functioning. Quoting from clinical material in his book, Pizer presents the outcome of a “relational” analysis in terms of the patient's increased access to internal “potential space,” unconscious experience, curiosity, and reflectiveness about the mental life of self and other, and an increased ability to value personal experience in relationship and in solitude.     

Introduction

This introduction outlines a paper by Rina Lazar and discussions by Anthony Bass, Sam Gerson, and Stephen Seligman. The target paper, an extensive clinical case, is described: a case where regression, countertransference dilemmas and opportunities, and intergenerational trauma are all in play. I consider the contribution of the discussants: their unique interpretations of relational work, the distinct focus on intersubjectivity, shifting self states (Bass), intergenerational trauma (Gerson), and regression and the role and status of development (Seligman).     

Ethics,Brain Injuries,and Sports: Prohibition,Reform, and Prudence

Abstract

In this paper, we explore the issue of the elimination of sports, or elements of sports, that present a high risk of brain injury. In particular, we critically examine two elements of Angelo Corlett’s and Pam Sailors’ arguments for the prohibition of football and Nicholas Dixon’s claim for the reformation of boxing to eliminate blows to the head based on (a) the empirical assumption of an essential or causal connection between brain injuries incurred in football and the development of a degenerative brain disease known as chronic traumatic encephalopathy (CTE); and (b) John Stuart Mill’s rejection of consensual domination (ie voluntary enslavement). We present four arguments to contest the validity of Corlett, Dixon’s and Sailor’s positions. Specifically, we argue that (i) certain autonomy-based arguments undermine paternalist arguments for reform; (ii) the nature of the goods people pursue in their lives might justify their foregoing (degrees of) future autonomy; (iii) Mill’s argument against consensual domination draws on ambiguous and arbitrary distinctions; (iv) the lack of consensus and empirical evidence regarding CTE arising from brain injuries in sport underdetermines calls for reform. We conclude that these proposals for reforming or eliminating sports with high risks of brain injuries are not well founded.     

任务难度与老化对大脑激活的影响——以线索记忆编码为例

以汉语名词双字词对为材料,采用了两种性质、三种难度水平的线索回忆任务对12名老年被试和15名年轻被试的项目记忆编码过程进行fMRI扫描,考察在编码阶段大脑激活受任务难度变化和老化的影响。行为研究结果发现:年龄的主效应、难度的主效应以及难度与年龄交互作用均显著,即,随着任务难度的增加,老年人的成绩更加明显地低于年轻人。神经成像研究结果发现:(1)当词对的相关性降低时,大脑激活的增强主要表现为面积的增加,而当词对的频率降低时,主要表现在激活强度的增加上。(2)任务难度和大脑激活面积、强度之间均不存在对应的递增变化关系。(3)仅当词对的相关性降低时,老年人比年轻人调用了更多的额叶脑区。     

“[G]azing into the synaptic chasm”: the Brain in Beckett’s Writing

This paper argues that Samuel Beckett’s interest in functions of the brain is not only evidenced in his notebooks, taken from a number of psychology and psycho-physiognomy texts in the early 1930s, but is also explored and expanded in his fiction and drama. This paper investigates Beckett’s fascination with the limits of “cerebral consciousness” and the brain’s failure to consciously perceive certain bodily modifications especially when processing emotion. Like Antonio Damasio’s definition of emotion as essentially the bodily modifications that include chemical changes, Beckett often exploits the idea of emotion as sorely a bodily phenomenon by creating characters who are unable to consciously perceive and process their emotion. For example, when talking about his own weeping, the narrator of The Unnamable attributes the tears to the malfunctioning of the brain, “liquefied brain”, denying, displacing or making physical the feeling of sadness. By examining the ways in which Beckett emphasizes a somatic dimension of emotion and its relation to the brain function and perception in his writing, this paper reveals how he explores the idea of the self and extends the idea to what he calls the “impenetrable self” that cannot be consciously recognized. I argue that if, for Joseph LeDoux, the “notion of synapses as points of communication between cells is […] essential to our efforts to understand who we are in terms of brain mechanisms”, for Beckett to expose such unconscious biological mechanisms and “gaps” becomes his own artistic challenge.     

Immanuel Kant's mind and the brain's resting state

The early philosopher Immanuel Kant suggested that the mind’s intrinsic features are intimately linked to the extrinsic stimuli of the environment it processes. Currently, the field faces an analogous problem with regard to the brain. Kant’s ideas may provide novel insights into how the brain’s intrinsic features must be so that they can be linked to the neural processing of extrinsic stimuli to enable the latter’s association with consciousness and self.     

Materialism and ‘the soft substance of the brain’: Diderot and plasticity

ABSTRACT

Materialism is the view that everything that is real is material or is the product of material processes. It tends to take either a ‘cosmological’ form, as a claim about the ultimate nature of the world, or a more specific ‘psychological’ form, detailing how mental processes are brain processes. I focus on the second, psychological or cerebral form of materialism. In the mid-to-late eighteenth century, the French materialist philosopher Denis Diderot was one of the first to notice that any self-respecting materialist had to address the question of the status and functional role of the brain, and its relation to our mental life. After this the topic grew stale, with knee-jerk reiterations of ‘psychophysical identity’ in the nineteenth-century, and equally rigid assertions of anti-materialism. In 1960s philosophy of mind, brain–mind materialism reemerged as ‘identity theory’, focusing on the identity between mental processes and cerebral processes. In contrast, Diderot’s cerebral materialism allows for a more culturally sedimented sense of the brain, which he described in his late Elements of Physiology as a ‘book – except it is a book which reads itself’. Diderot thus provides a lesson for materialism as it reflects on the status of the brain, science and culture.     

Polger on the Illusion of Contingent Identity

Abstract

Thomas Polger has argued in favour of the mind–brain type‐identity theory, the view that mental states or processes are type‐identical to states of the central nervous system. Acknowledging that the type‐materialist must respond to Kripke’s modal anti‐materialist argument, Polger insists that Kripke’s argument rests on dubious assumptions concerning the identity conditions of brain states. In brief, Polger claims that one knows that x and y are non‐identical when one knows the identity conditions for both x and y. Replace x and y with ‘brain states’ and ‘sensations’ and it follows that one can know that brain states and sensations are non‐identical only if one knows the identity conditions for brain states. But according to Polger, we do not know the identity conditions for brain states. Hence, we should not be so confident that brain states and sensations are non‐identical after all. But Polger’s account is terribly flawed. Ironically, if Polger’s scepticism is warranted, then Polger himself has no good reasons to be a type‐materialist. But more importantly, Polger’s scepticism regarding the identity conditions of brain states is deeply defective. We do, I submit, understand the identity conditions of brain states. In the end, I submit, Kripke is safe from Polger.     

语言对知觉的影响—— 来自颜色范畴知觉研究的证据

介绍了近年来语言和颜色范畴知觉关系研究的新进展, 特别是颜色范畴知觉效应的偏侧化、婴幼儿颜色范畴知觉的特点等。同时指出了今后需要进一步研究的问题, 如颜色范畴知觉效应偏侧化与语言的关系、右脑语言优势者颜色范畴知觉的特点、颜色加工脑区和语言加工脑区之间的关系以及婴幼儿颜色范畴知觉特点的追踪研究等。     

Functional Brain Connectivity Using fMRI in Aging and Alzheimer’s Disease

Normal aging and Alzheimer’s disease (AD) cause profound changes in the brain’s structure and function. AD in particular is accompanied by widespread cortical neuronal loss, and loss of connections between brain systems. This degeneration of neural pathways disrupts the functional coherence of brain activation. Recent innovations in brain imaging have detected characteristic disruptions in functional networks. Here we review studies examining changes in functional connectivity, measured through fMRI (functional magnetic resonance imaging), starting with healthy aging and then Alzheimer’s disease. We cover studies that employ the three primary methods to analyze functional connectivity—seed-based, ICA (independent components analysis), and graph theory. At the end we include a brief discussion of other methodologies, such as EEG (electroencephalography), MEG (magnetoencephalography), and PET (positron emission tomography). We also describe multi-modal studies that combine rsfMRI (resting state fMRI) with PET imaging, as well as studies examining the effects of medications. Overall, connectivity and network integrity appear to decrease in healthy aging, but this decrease is accelerated in AD, with specific systems hit hardest, such as the default mode network (DMN). Functional connectivity is a relatively new topic of research, but it holds great promise in revealing how brain network dynamics change across the lifespan and in disease.     

镜像神经元的发现及其对身心二元论的超越

镜像神经元是意大利帕尔玛大学Rizzolatti等人在恒河猴大脑腹侧运动前皮层F5区发现的一种神经元。这种神经元在猴子操作和观察同一个指向某种目标的动作时(如伸手抓食物)皆被激活,似乎这种神经元映射了其它个体的动作,因此被命名为“镜像神经元”。镜像神经元通过具身的模拟把动作的执行和动作的知觉结合在一起,把观察过程与身体运动过程相融合,克服了二元论在身心之间所设置的障碍,为人们正确认识身心关系开辟了新的视角。     

The Limitations and Potential of Neuroimaging in the Criminal Law

Neuroimaging showing brain abnormalities is increasingly being introduced in criminal court proceedings to argue that a defendant could not control his behavior and should not be held responsible for it. But imaging has questionable probative value because it does not directly capture brain function or a defendant’s mental states at the time of a criminal act. Advanced techniques could transform imaging from a coarse-grained measure of correlations between brain states and behavior to a fine-grained measure of causal connections between them. Even if this occurs, bias and other attitudes may unduly influence jurors’ interpretation of the data. Moreover, judges’ decisions about whether neuroimaging data is legally relevant and admissible are normative decisions based on more than empirical evidence. Advanced neuroimaging will better inform assessments of criminal responsibility but will not supplant or explain away the psychological and normative foundation of the criminal law.     

The Freedom of Thought: Patočka on Descartes and Husserl

Pato?ka highlights the central role of Cartesianism in our tradition of thinking. Yet, today, brain scientists often claim to have overcome Cartesian dualism. In this paper, I argue that the Cartesian conceptions of human nature and sensory perception remain presuppositions of brain science, where perception is largely equated with thinking. Equating perception and thinking means that thinking is a determined process, which leads to an erosion of critique. Critique, and the freedom of thought it entails, is essential to Descartes, Husserl and Pato?ka. I examine the differences, as well as the relationship, between Descartes method of doubt, Husserl’s phenomenological epochē and Pato?ka’s universalization of the epochē. I also show how Descartes’, Husserl’s and Pato?ka’s way into critique present different ways to understand self, things and the world. In conclusion, I suggest that Pato?ka presents a promising way to critique mechanistic understandings of thinking by rethinking both subject and object.     

The self and depression: Four psychological theories and their potential neural correlates

We review theory and research pertaining to psychodynamic, social, humanistic, and ethological models of the self and depression and examine research into the neurobiological bases of the self and depression. We provide a narrative review of classic and recent empirical evidence pertaining to these four models of the relation of the self to depression as well as exemplar relevant neurobiological research. Evidence stemming from each of the four theories reviewed here shows a robust relationship between deficits in the sense of self and depressive symptoms, as well as increases in depressive symptoms over time. A smaller body of literature has linked one’s sense of self to onsets of depressive episodes. A growing body of literature has linked self-relevant variables to functioning in various prefrontal and cortical midline brain regions as well as emotion and reward processing brain regions which have in turn been linked to depression. Evidence has therefore converged across all four theories and confirmed that a deficit in one’s sense of self confers risk for depression and that there is substantial overlap in the brain areas associated with one’s sense of self and depression.     

Auditory detection and optimal response biases

Rats were trained to detect a signal consisting of an increment in the intensity of a random noise. The procedure was analogous to the yes-no method of human psychophysics, in that one response was defined as correct and reinforced with brain stimulation if the signal was presented, and another response was correct and reinforced if the noise alone was presented. Incorrect responses produced periods of time-out. Bias functions showing how the animals’ response probabilities varied as the signal intensity was reduced were obtained in two ways. In Experiment 1, the probability of presenting the signal was varied over four values between 0.4 and 0.6. In Experiment 2, the number of brain stimulations consequent upon a correct response in the presence of the signal was varied over four values between 3:1 and 1:2. Differences of 0.10 and 0.05 in the signal probability, and unit differences in the ratio of brain stimulations, resulted in distinctly different bias functions. Accuracy of detection increased with the signal intensity, and was independent of the animals’ response biases. When the signal probability was varied, the animals optimized the number of correct trials, and hence the number of brain stimulations obtained. When the ratio of brain stimulations was varied, the animals compromised between optimizing the number of correct trials and optimizing the number of brain stimulations obtained.