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1.
    
《Philosophical Psychology》2012,25(4):569-588
A popular argument form uses general theories of cognitive architecture to motivate conclusions about the nature of moral cognition. This paper highlights the possibility for modus tollens reversal of this argument form. If theories of cognitive architecture generate predictions for moral cognition, then tests of moral thinking provide feedback to cognitive science. In certain circumstances, philosophers' introspective attention to their own moral deliberations can provide unique data for these tests. Recognizing the possibility for this sort of feedback helps to illuminate a deep continuity between the disciplines.  相似文献   

2.
    
《Philosophical Psychology》2012,25(3):409-432
Dewey's ethical naturalism has provided an exemplary model for many contemporary naturalistic treatments of morality. However, in some recent work there is an unfortunate tendency to presuppose a moral faculty as the alleged source of what are claimed to be nearly universal moral judgments. Marc Hauser's Moral minds (2006) thus argues that our shared moral intuitions arise from a universal moral organ, which he analogizes to a Chomskyan language faculty. Following Dewey's challenge to the postulation of the idea of universal instincts, I argue that Hauser's moral faculty account is (1) contrary to results from recent cognitive science, (2) unnecessary for explaining our moral understanding and reasoning, and (3) counterproductive to the correct project of a non-transcendent, empirically-grounded theory of moral understanding and problem-solving. I provide a sketch of an alternative account of what such an ethical naturalism would involve.  相似文献   

3.
    
Is there a cognitive faculty dedicated to the moral domain? Mark Johnson has developed a number of arguments against the existence of such a faculty. I claim that these arguments are not persuasive and that there may be a moral faculty.  相似文献   

4.
    
While the extended cognition (EC) thesis has gained more followers in cognitive science and in the philosophy of mind and knowledge, our main goal is to discuss a different area of significance of the EC thesis: its relation to philosophy of science. In this introduction, we outline two major areas: (I) The role of the thesis for issues in the philosophy of cognitive science, such as: How do notions of EC figure in theories or research programs in cognitive science? Which versions of the EC thesis appear, and with which arguments to support them? (II) The potentials and limits of the EC thesis for topics in general philosophy of science, such as: Can naturalism perhaps be further advanced by means of the more recent EC thesis? Can we understand “big science” or laboratory research better by invoking some version of EC? And can the EC thesis help in overcoming the notorious cognitive/social divide in science studies?  相似文献   

5.
    
This paper attempts to specify the conditions under which a psychological explanation can undermine or debunk a set of beliefs. The focus will be on moral and religious beliefs, where a growing debate has emerged about the epistemic implications of cognitive science. Recent proposals by Joshua Greene and Paul Bloom will be taken as paradigmatic attempts to undermine beliefs with psychology. I will argue that a belief p may be undermined whenever: (i) p is evidentially based on an intuition which (ii) can be explained by a psychological mechanism that is (iii) unreliable for the task of believing p; and (iv) any other evidence for belief p is based on rationalization. I will also consider and defend two equally valid arguments for establishing unreliability: the redundancy argument and the argument from irrelevant factors. With this more specific understanding of debunking arguments, it is possible to develop new replies to some objections to psychological debunking arguments from both ethics and philosophy of religion.  相似文献   

6.
关于道德唤起与道德行为关系的实验研究   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
本文通过一个关于测验作弊的实验研究,揭示了道德唤起与道德行为之间存在的一定关系,即不同的道德唤起水平会对道德行为产生一定的影响。通过实验后的个别访谈,我们分析了道德认知、道德情感与道德唤起之间的关系。最后,我们提出了本实验研究的不足之处和可能存在的后续研究。  相似文献   

7.
    
《Philosophical Psychology》2012,25(3):281-304
Recent work in various branches of philosophy has reinvigorated debate over the psychology behind moral judgment. Using Marc Hauser's categorization of theories as “Kantian,” “Humean,” or “Rawlsian” to frame the discussion, I argue that the existing evidence weighs against the Kantian model and partly in favor of both the Humean and the Rawlsian models. Emotions do play a causal role in the formation of our moral judgments, as the Humean model claims, but there are also unconscious principles shaping our moral judgments, as the Rawlsian model predicts. Thus, Hauser's tripartite division of possible models of moral psychology is inadequate. Drawing on research in cognitive neuroscience, clinical and behavioral psychology, and psychopathology, I sketch a new, developmental sentimentalist model of moral psychology. I call it a “Mencian” model, after the Confucian philosopher Mencius. On this model, moral judgments are caused by emotions, but because of the way emotions are mapped onto particular actions, moral judgments unconsciously reflect certain principled distinctions.  相似文献   

8.
    
《Philosophical Psychology》2012,25(8):1114-1127
One approach to science treats science as a cognitive accomplishment of individuals and defines a scientific community as an aggregate of individual inquirers. Another treats science as a fundamentally collective endeavor and defines a scientist as a member of a scientific community. Distributed cognition has been offered as a framework that could be used to reconcile these two approaches. Adam Toon has recently asked if the cognitive and the social can be friends at last. He answers that they probably cannot, posing objections to the would-be rapprochement. We clarify both the animosity and the tonic proposed to resolve it, ultimately arguing that worries raised by Toon and others are uncompelling.  相似文献   

9.
It is often said that our moral experience, broadly construed to include our ways of thinking and talking about morality, has a certain objective-seeming character to it, and that this supports a presumption in favor of objectivist theories (according to which morality is a realm of facts or truths) and against anti-objectivist theories like Mackie’s error theory (according to which it is not). In this paper, I argue that our experience of morality does not support objectivist moral theories in this way. I begin by arguing that our moral experience does not have the uniformly objective-seeming character it is typically claimed to have. I go on to argue that even if moral experience were to presuppose or display morality as a realm of fact, we would still need a reason for taking that to support theories according to which it is such a realm. I consider what I take to be the four most promising ways of attempting to supply such a reason: (A) inference to the best explanation, (B) epistemic conservatism, (C) the Principle of Credulity, and (D) the method of wide reflective equilibrium. In each case, I argue, the strategy in question does not support a presumption in favor of objectivist moral theories.
Don LoebEmail:
  相似文献   

10.
    
《Philosophical Psychology》2012,25(5):567-587
Recent findings in neuroscience, evolutionary biology and psychology seem to threaten the existence or the objectivity of morality. Moral theory and practice is founded, ultimately, upon moral intuition, but these empirical findings seem to show that our intuitions are responses to nonmoral features of the world, not to moral properties. They therefore might be taken to show that our moral intuitions are systematically unreliable. I examine three cognitive scientific challenges to morality, and suggest possible lines of reply to them. I divide these replies into two groups: we might confront the threat, showing that it does not have the claimed implications for morality; or we might bite the bullet, accepting that the claims have moral implications, but incorporating these claims into morality. I suggest that unless we are able to bite the bullet, when confronted by cognitive scientific challenges, there is a real possibility that morality will be threatened. This fact gives us a weighty reason to adopt a metaethics that makes it relatively easy to bite cognitive scientific bullets. Moral constructivism, in one of its many forms, makes these bullets more palatable; therefore, the cognitive scientific challenges provide us with an additional reason to adopt a constructivist metaethics.  相似文献   

11.
    
Empirical research in the field of moral cognition is increasingly being used to draw conclusions in philosophical moral psychology, in particular regarding sentimentalist and rationalist accounts of moral judgment. This paper calls for a reassessment of both the empirical and philosophical conclusions being drawn from the moral cognition research. It is proposed that moral decision making is best understood as a species of Kahneman and Frederick's dual-process model of decision making. According to this model, emotional intuition-generating processes and reflective processes operate in an integrated way in moral deliberation, and metacognition is assigned an essential role in the monitoring and shaping of moral intuitions. In combination with observations from philosophical moral psychology, this proposal cautions against endorsing simple sentimentalism or rejecting rationalist accounts on the basis of the moral cognition research.  相似文献   

12.
政治文明的伦理分析   总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3  
政治明不是一种孤立的明,它与道德明有着十分密切的关系,它们有着共同的契合机制和互补机制;从西方政治明的发展来看,始终没有离开理性主义、制度主义、个体主义等伦理精神;政治要真正实现明,必须使政治意识要宽容、政治制度的制衡、政治行为要有序。  相似文献   

13.
    
Few theorists would challenge the idea that affect and emotion directly influence decision-making and moral judgment. There is good reason to think that they also significantly assist in decision-making and judgment, and in fact are necessary for fully effective moral cognition. However, they are not sufficient. Deliberation and more reflective thought processes likewise play a crucial role, and in fact are inseparable from affective processes. I will argue that while the dual-process account of moral judgment set forth by Craigie (2011) has great merit, it fails to appreciate fully the extent to which affective and reflective processes are not only integrated, but also mutually interdependent. Evidence from psychopathy indicates that when reflective processes are not assisted adequately by what I will call ‘affective framing’, and moral cognition is of the “cooler,” less emotionally-informed variety, what results is not effective cognitive functioning, but rather psychopathology. My proposed account of affective framing aims to make sense of the way in which affect plays a strictly necessary and integral role not just in intuitive moral responses, but also in reflective moral judgments, so that moral cognition is accomplished by the joint operation of affective processes and reflective reasoning processes.  相似文献   

14.
目前对青少年社会责任感缺失原因的分析多从社会、家庭、时代等方面着手,对学校范围内进行责任感教育并无多大帮助。本文从认知维度分析了青少年责任感缺失的三种情形及其原因,并以此为基础阐明了学校范围内责任感教育的合理性,提出在学校范围内开展的应是以责任知识、责任思维和责任实践为主要内容的责任感教育。  相似文献   

15.
Saul Smilansky 《Metaphilosophy》1997,28(1-2):123-134
People do good or bad things, and get or do not get good or bad credit for their actions, depending (in part) on knowledge of their actions. I attempt to unfold some of the interconnections between these matters, and between them and the achievement of moral worth. The main conclusion is that the heights of moral worth seem to appear in the oddest places.  相似文献   

16.
L.D. Keita 《Metaphilosophy》1997,28(1-2):81-101
Neoclassical economic theory in its pretensions to scientific status is founded on one of the variants of a now discredited positivism. Neoclassical economic theory claims that there are two distinct areas of economic research: positive economics and normative economics. The former is assumed to deal with the cognitive as scientific content of economics while the later focuses on welfare or equity issues. I argue that the reliance of the whole theoretical structure of economics on the normative postulate of rationality renders neoclassical economics a normative discipline. I also argue that neoclassical economics should thus be viewed as an instance of applied ethics rather than as applied mathematics, say. Finally, it is suggested that neoclassical economics, if its scientific pretensions are to be taken seriously, should be absorbed theoretically into general anthropology.  相似文献   

17.
Book Reviews     
《Metaphilosophy》1997,28(1-2):156-179
Scruton, Roger Modern Philosophy: An Introduction and Survey
Fraser, Nancy and Bartky, Sandra Lee (eds) Revaluing French Feminisms: Critical Essays on Difference, Agency and Culture
Friedman, Marilyn What are Friends For? Feminist Perspectives on Personal Relationships and Moral Theory  相似文献   

18.
Should connectionists abandon the quest for tractably computable cognitive transition functions while retaining syntactically structured mental representations? We argue, in opposition to Horgan, that it should not. We argue that the case against tractably computable functions, based upon the claimed isotropic and Quinean character of cognition, fails since cognition is not as isotropic and Quinean as Fodor and Horgan contend. Moreover, we illustrate how current research in both connectionism and cognitive neuroscience suggests that tractability can be preserved through division of overall computations into modular sub-processes, each of which is tractable. As to syntactically structured representations, we argue that they are unneeded for most cognitive tasks organisms confront, and that when they are needed, they may be provided by external representational media such as natural language. Moreover, we note that increasingly cognitive linguistics has become the ally of connectionism and that the research program of cognitive linguistics suggests that abilities to use natural languages may be developed without requiring syntactically structured mental representations to exist prior to natural language.  相似文献   

19.
科技对社会的影响日益加强的同时,人们也逐渐意识到科学的发展不能脱离人们对价值和伦理的判断。本质上,管理科学或运筹学仍然是一种人文科学。事实上,许多管理科学家都提倡伦理主义,主张把社会的和伦理的关注纳入传统的“理性”技术和管理决策。通过联合两者进行分析,可以拉近管理科学或运筹学和商业伦理的关系。  相似文献   

20.
Connectionism and the Philosophical Foundations of Cognitive Science   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
This is an overview of recent philosophical discussion about connectionism and the foundations of cognitive science. Connectionist modeling in cognitive science is described. Three broad conceptions of the mind are characterized, and their comparative strengths and weaknesses are discussed: (1) the classical computation conception in cognitive science; (2) a popular foundational interpretation of connectionism that John Tienson and I call "non-sentential computationalism"; and (3) an alternative interpretation of connectionism we call "dynamical cognition." Also discussed are two recent philosophical attempts to enlist connectionism in defense of eliminativism about folk psychology.  相似文献   

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