When ideology matters: Moral conviction and the association between ideology and policy preferences in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict

Do people's policy preferences toward outgroups in intractable conflict consistently correspond with political ideology? To what extent are policy‐related cleavages between the political right and left in such contexts fueled by moral conviction and emotions? Analyses of a survey of Jewish‐Israelis (N = 119) conducted immediately after a war between Israelis and Palestinians revealed little to no ideological differences in acceptance of “collateral damage,” support for retribution, or support for compromise when positions about the Israeli–Palestinian conflict were devoid of moral fervor. Those on the left and right endorsed polarized policy preferences only when their positions about the conflict were held with moral conviction. Presence or absence of guilt about harm to Palestinians mediated the effects of moral conviction on policy preferences in this context. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Hypocrisy as Either Deception or Akrasia

The intuitive, folk concept of hypocrisy is not a unified moral category. While many theorists hold that all cases of hypocrisy involve some form of deception, I argue that this is not the case. Instead, I argue for a disjunctive account of hypocrisy whereby all cases of “hypocrisy” involve either the deceiving of others about the sincerity of an agent's beliefs or the lack of will to carry through with the demands of an agent's sincere beliefs. Thus, all cases of hypocrisy can be described either as cases of deception or as cases of akrasia. If this analysis correct, then I suggest further that the moral status of all instances of hypocrisy must be reduced either to the moral blameworthiness of deception or to the moral blameworthiness of akrasia. There can be no unified account of the moral wrongness of “hypocrisy” that holds across the disjunction.     

Presidential address: Lessons from infancy: New beginnings in a changing world and a morality for health

Health care professionals working in infancy are optimistic about its development and its incentives for moral connectedness. Recent research shows that such an attitude is grounded in what I summarize under the headings of “fundamental modes of development” and a “basic morality,” features that characterize infancy when there is adequate support from an emotionally available caregiver. Early moral attainments include the infant's developing sense of rules, reciprocity, empathy, and internalized standards. Social referencing, negotiation, and the use of guidance are important processes in late infancy that occur in the context of interpersonal and intrapsychic conflict. Infancy experiences guided by these processes later become a basis for the preschooler's sharing, negotiation, and sense of fairness. These considerations provide lessons for thinking about health as a positive state. They also highlight the importance of positive emotions and shared meaning as we work to prevent and treat developmental problems. We have much to learn from infants and each other, especially as we continue our cross-cultural collaboration and research.     

Are Envy,Anger, and Resentment Moral Emotions?

Abstract

The moral status of emotions has recently become the focus of various philosophical investigations. Certain emotions that have traditionally been considered as negative, such as envy, jealousy, pleasure-in-others'-misfortune, and pride, have been defended. Some traditionally “negative” emotions have even been declared to be moral emotions.

In this brief paper, I suggest two basic criteria according to which an emotion might be considered moral, and I then examine whether envy, anger, and resentment are moral emotions.     

Emotion and Judgment: Two Sources of Moral Motivation in Mèngzǐ

David Nivison has argued that Mèngzǐ 孟子 postulates only one source of moral motivation (namely “heart” as the locus of moral emotions or feelings), whereas Mèngzǐ’s rival thinkers such as Gàozǐ 告子 or the Mohist Yí Zhī 夷之 additionally postulate “maxims” or “doctrines” that are produced by some sort of moral reasoning. In this essay I critically examine this interpretation of Nivison’s, and alternatively argue that moral emotions in Mèngzǐ, basically understood as concern-based construals, are often an insufficient source of moral action, and an additional source of moral motivation, specifically a conviction or judgment of what is the right thing to do in a certain situation in question, is often necessary for one to complete a moral action. This implies that Mèngzǐ should be interpreted to postulate two sources of moral motivation just as his rival thinkers do, namely moral emotion on one hand and judgment and practical reasoning on the other.     

Moral judgment-situation interaction as a basis for predicting prosocial behavior1

In a situation where an “ailing” confederate needed help, three experimental conditions varied the permissibility of interrupting a task to perform prosocial acts. A Situation by Moral Judgment interaction was predicted: Stage 3 and 4 subjects defining right action in accordance with conventional expectations and obligations, respectively, would not help in any of the three conditions; stage 5 subjects defining right action in accordance with human rights and contractual obligations would help in the permission condition. It was hypothesized that only within the boundaries of the permission condition would stage 5 subjects be able to resolve the conflict between their responsibility to the welfare of the “ailing” person and their obligation to maintain a contractual agreement with the experimenter to continue working on the task. Results supported the prediction. The greatest incidence of helping, both in terms of responding to the “ailing” person's distress and providing active help, occurred among stage 5 subjects in the permission condition. Implications of a situational interaction approach for the study of moral action/moral behavior relationship are discussed.     

Transparent emotions? A critical analysis of Moran's transparency claim

I critically analyze Richard Moran's account of knowing one's own emotions, which depends on the Transparency Claim (TC) for self-knowledge. Applied to knowing one's own beliefs, TC states that when one is asked “Do you believe P?”, one can answer by referencing reasons for believing P. TC works for belief because one is justified in believing that one believes P if one can give reasons for why P is true. Emotions, however, are also conceptually related to concerns; they involve a response to something one cares about. As a consequence, acquiring self-knowledge of one's emotions requires knowledge of other mental attitudes, which falls outside the scope of TC. Hence, TC cannot be applied to emotions.     

A Unified Account of the Moral Standing to Blame

Recently, philosophers have turned their attention to the question, not when a given agent is blameworthy for what she does, but when a further agent has the moral standing to blame her for what she does. Philosophers have proposed at least four conditions on having “moral standing”: 1. One's blame would not be “hypocritical”. 2. One is not oneself “involved in” the target agent's wrongdoing. 3. One is warranted in believing that the target is indeed blameworthy for the wrongdoing. 4. The target's wrongdoing is some of “one's business”. These conditions are often proposed as both conditions on one and the same thing, and as marking fundamentally different ways of “losing standing”. Here I call these claims into question. First, I claim that conditions (3) and (4) are simply conditions on different things than are conditions (1) and (2). Second, I argue that condition (2) reduces to condition (1): when “involvement” removes someone's standing to blame, it does so only by indicating something further about that agent, viz., that he or she lacks commitment to the values that condemn the wrongdoer's action. The result: after we clarify the nature of the non‐hypocrisy condition, we will have a unified account of moral standing to blame. Issues also discussed: whether standing can ever be regained, the relationship between standing and our “moral fragility”, the difference between mere inconsistency and hypocrisy, and whether a condition of standing might be derived from deeper facts about the “equality of persons”.     

Development and validation of the Moral Outcomes of Relationship Aggression Scale: A measure of moral distress following intimate partner violence perpetration

Research with military veterans has established that distress may arise in response to perpetrating violent behaviors that violate individuals' moral beliefs. To date, no studies have similarly examined morally-related cognitive and emotional responses specifically among intimate partner violence (IPV) perpetrators. However, research on moral cognitions and emotions in response to IPV perpetration may inform understanding of the behavior and potential mechanisms for intervention. In the current series of four studies, we used classical test theory to develop a measure of moral distress following IPV perpetration that focuses on thoughts about the actions (assimilated cognitions), thoughts about the self due to one's actions (accommodated cognitions), and emotions experienced due to one's actions (moral emotions). Items were developed and tested among two samples of undergraduate students, and psychometric properties of the final measure were confirmed among two community samples. The final measure consists of three subscales consisting of five items each. Results demonstrate support for internal consistency and test–retest reliability, convergent, discriminant, and incremental validity, and factor structure. This measure can be used in future research designed to examine how individuals respond to their IPV perpetration, and to study the implications this may have for long-term outcomes and behavioral change.     

Being Emotional about the Past: On the Nature and Role of Past‐Directed Emotions*

We sometimes experience emotions which are directed at past events (or situations) which we witnessed at the time when they occurred (or obtained). The present paper explores the role which such “autobiographically past‐directed emotions” (or “APD‐emotions”) play in a subject's mental life. A defender of the “Memory‐Claim” holds that an APD‐emotion is a memory, namely a memory of the emotion which the subject experienced at the time when the event originally occurred (or the situation obtained) towards which the APD‐emotion is directed. On this view, APD‐emotions might play an important role in our acquiring knowledge about our own past emotions, which renders the view rather attractive. However, as I show in the present paper, none of the various possible versions of the Memory‐Claim are tenable. This leaves us with the “Universal‐New‐Emotion‐Claim”, according to which all APD‐emotions are new emotional responses to the past events (or situations) towards which the relevant APD‐emotions are directed. Further consideration of the “Universal‐New‐Emotion‐Claim” shows that while APD‐emotions do not play the epistemological role they could have played had some version of the Memory‐Claim turned out to be true, a subject's APD‐emotions nevertheless do play a vital role in a subject's mental life: they help the subject to develop a balanced sense of self.     

EVOLUTION,NATURALISM, AND THE WORTHWHILE: A CRITIQUE OF RICHARD JOYCE'S EVOLUTIONARY DEBUNKING OF MORALITY

Abstract: In The Evolution of Morality, Richard Joyce argues there is good reason to think that the “moral sense” is a biological adaptation, and that this provides a genealogy of the moral sense that has a debunking effect, driving us to the conclusion that “our moral beliefs are products of a process that is entirely independent of their truth, … we have no grounds one way or the other for maintaining these beliefs.” I argue that Joyce's skeptical conclusion is not warranted. Even if the moral sense is a biological adaptation, developed moralities (such as Aristotelian eudaimonism) can “co‐opt” it into new roles so that the moral judgments it makes possible can come to transcend the evolutionary process that is “entirely independent of their truth.” While evolutionary theory can shed much light on our shared human nature, moral theories must still be vindicated, or debunked, by moral arguments.     

Winch on Moral Dilemmas and Moral Modality

Peter Winch's famous argument in “The Universalizability of Moral Judgments” that moral judgments are not always universalizable is widely thought to involve an essentially sceptical claim about the limitations of moral theories and moral theorising more generally. In this paper I argue that responses to Winch have generally missed the central positive idea upon which Winch's argument is founded: that what is right for a particular agent to do in a given situation may depend on what is and is not morally possible for them. I then defend the existence of certain genuine moral necessities and impossibilities in order to show how certain first‐person moral judgements may be essentially personal.     

Negative Affect and Health: The Importance of Being Earnest

Research on emotion and health has tended to focus on the negative consequences of “negative” emotions. An emerging literature has begun to explore the positive aspects of negative affect, suggesting that emotion be treated in a more differentiated way by recognising the components and intensity that can promote or harm health. For example, short bursts of emotion-associated sympathetic activation can stimulate parts of the immune system, whereas more chronic activation can cause “wear and tear” on the cardiovascular system. Anxiety and guilt have been associated with preventive health behaviours and care-seeking, whereas distress and depression increase symptom sensitivity, accuracy of illness perception, and can facilitate care-seeking and receipt of support. However, intense and chronic negative affects may lead individuals to engage in risky health behaviours, such as substance abuse, overeating, and high risk sex, as a coping mechanism to regulate negative emotion. They may also undermine social support systems, leading to a self-perpetuating cycle of conflict and isolation. Future research must address the parameters defining “healthy” and “unhealthy” negative emotion.     

The origins of social emotions and self-regulation in toddlerhood: New evidence

In recent years, there has been increased attention to the development of “moral,” “social”, or “self-conscious” emotions, such as embarrassment, shame, and pride, in 2- and 3-year olds. In the present study, 17-month-olds' behaviours in several contexts were observed; and observations of behaviours of their parents were obtained. Results indicated that toddlers did react appropriately to the situations, and their behaviours in the semi-naturalistic situations cohered as three factors: a guilt factor, an embarrassment factor, and an anxiety/inhibition factor. Embarrassed behaviour included a smile accompanied by indications of embarrassment (gaze aversion, lip press, lip bite, and/or body touching/self-adaptors). Moreover, parental behaviours systematically predicted children's behaviour patterns, but self-recognition was unrelated to most behaviours. Implications and suggestions for further research are discussed.     

Respect in Mengzi as a Concern-based Construal: How It Is Different from Desire and Behavioral Disposition

Previous scholars seem to assume that Mengzi’s 孟子 four sprouts are more or less homogeneous in nature, and the four sprouts are often viewed as some sort of desires for or instinctive inclinations toward virtues or virtuous acts. For example, Angus Graham interprets sìduān 四端 as “incipient moral impulses” to do what is morally good or right, or “spontaneous inclinations” toward virtues or moral good. However, this view is incompatible with the recently proposed more sound views that regard Mengzi’s four sprouts as a particular type of emotions or feelings having some “cognitive” or “rational” aspects. In this essay I develop this new approach to Mengzi’s four sprouts, and specifically argue that respect in Mengzi should be considered neither as a moral desire nor as a behavioral tendency to do deferential acts but as some sort of ethical sensibility that is responsive to the relevant features of a worthy person.     

Moral motivation in early 18th century moral rationalism

In the modern debate in metaethics and moral psychology, moral rationalism is often presented as a view that cannot account for the intimate relation between moral behaviour on one hand and feelings, emotions, or desires on the other. Although there is no lack of references to the classic rationalists of the 18th century in the relevant discussions, the works of these writers are rarely ever examined detail. Yet, as the debate in Kant scholarship between “intellectualists” and “affectivists” impressively shows, a more thorough analysis of what the classic rationalists actually have to say about moral motivation is suited to cast serious doubts on the idea that moral rationalism must crucially neglect the affective–conative side of human psychology. The aim of this paper is to analyse the conceptions of moral motivation that were embraced by Kant's rationalist predecessors—Clarke, Wolff, Burnet, Balguy, and Price—which have not attracted a similar amount of attention by specialists so far. The claim I will defend is that none of those early rationalists actually embraces the motivational thesis that is often taken to be characteristic of moral rationalism, a thesis I shall refer to as strong rationalism about (moral) motivation.     

Mental Health and Mental Disorder: A Sociological Approach,edited by Arnold M. Rose

This paper presents a model of group analysis based on Aristotle's causal notions. Aristotle's concept of man as a social animal provides a philosophical rationale for an interpersonal treatment forum. His causal theory supplies an encompassing atheoretical model for examining, understanding, and changing “things which have in themselves the source of their changing or staying unchanged.”

Attention to the four causal foci is suggested as the basis for a full-ranging group analysis. Material cause examines: “what” makes a thing what it is. Efficient cause investigates “how” various behaviors and emotions are set in motion. Final cause searches out “where” behavior is aimed. Formal cause traces “why” behaviors take particular forms.

It is suggested that a “cause for pause,” in the ongoing group process, is the emergence of a powerful and specifiable trend, whether a transference, poignant interaction, or groupwide conflict. The “pause to cause” is examined in detail, as each causal foci is elaborated. A sequential analysis moving from “what > how > where > why” is suggested at three levels of possible intervention: individual, interpersonal, and group as a whole. In conclusion, the timing, advantages, and restrictions of such a causal approach are considered.     

Impartial Morality and Practical Deliberation as First‐Personal

Bernard Williams questioned whether impartial morality “can allow for the importance of individual character and personal relations in moral experience.” Underlying his position is a distinction between factual and practical deliberation. While factual deliberation is about the world and brings in a standpoint that is impartial, practical deliberation is, he claims, radically first‐personal; it “involves an I that [is] intimately the I of my desires.” While it may be thought that Williams's claim implies an unpalatable Humean subjectivism, the present article argues that this does not follow: That first‐person practical deliberation is directed both by the “I of my desires” and by the world. Drawing on Peter Winch's argument against the universalizability of moral judgments and D. H. Lawrence's Lady Chatterley's Lover, the article argues that practical deliberations involve discovering value in the world, but that what is revealed about the world depends constitutively on the first‐person deliberations and decisions of particular agents.     

Wittgenstein,Ethics and Basic Moral Certainty

Alice Crary claims that “the standard view of the bearing of Wittgenstein's philosophy on ethics” is dominated by “inviolability interpretations”, which often underlie conservative readings of Wittgenstein. Crary says that such interpretations are “especially marked in connection with On Certainty”, where Wittgenstein is represented as holding that “our linguistic practices are immune to rational criticism, or inviolable”. Crary's own conception of the bearing of Wittgenstein's philosophy on ethics, which I call the “intrinsically‐ethical reading”, derives from the influential New Wittgenstein school of exegesis, and is also espoused by James Edwards, Cora Diamond, and Stephen Mulhall. To my eyes, intrinsically‐ethical readings present a peculiar picture of ethics, which I endeavour to expose in Part I of the paper. In Part II I present a reading of On Certainty that Crary would call an “inviolability interpretation”, defend it against New Wittgensteinian critiques, and show that this kind of reading has nothing to do with ethical or political conservatism. I go on to show how Wittgenstein's observations on the manner in which we can neither question nor affirm certain states of affairs that are fundamental to our epistemic practices can be fruitfully extended to ethics. Doing so sheds light on the phenomenon that I call “basic moral certainty”, which constitutes the foundation of our ethical practices, and the scaffolding or framework of moral perception, inquiry, and judgement. The nature and significance of basic moral certainty will be illustrated through consideration of the strangeness of philosophers' attempts at explaining the wrongness of killing.     

Is guilt an emotion?

Abstract

When unequivocal examples of emotion adjectives occur in the linguistic context of “being” (e.g. being angry) they can be seen to refer to emotions as readily as when they occur in the linguistic context of “feeling” (e.g. feeling angry). This is not true of poor 'or non-examples of emotion words. A psycholinguistic analysis of this phenomenon is proposed, in the light of which it is suggested that words such as “abandoned” and “guilty” do not refer to emotions. The possibility that the word “guilty” has a distinct emotional sense meaning “feeling guilty” is discussed, and the implications of this proposal for theories of emotions are examined. Also discussed are the implications of the inclusion of poor or non-examples of emotions in lists of “basic” emotions. Data are presented indicating that many of the states that emotion theorists have included as emotions, and in some cases as “basic” emotions, are not generally rated as such, and that they fail to exhibit the patterns using the feel-be test that characterise unequivocal examples. It is suggested that a problem in delimiting the domain of theories of emotions may reside in a confusion between emotions on the one hand, and their typical causes and concomitants on the other.