Healthy happiness: effects of happiness on physical health and the consequences for preventive health care

Is happiness good for your health? This common notion is tested in a synthetic analysis of 30 follow-up studies on happiness and longevity. It appears that happiness does not predict longevity in sick populations, but that it does predict longevity among healthy populations So, happiness does not cure illness but it does protect against becoming ill. The effect of happiness on longevity in healthy populations is remarkably strong. The size of the effect is comparable to that of smoking or not.If so, public health can also be promoted by policies that aim at greater happiness of a greater number. That can be done by strengthening individual life-abilities and by improving the livability of the social environment. Some policies are proposed. Both ways of promoting health through happiness require more research on conditions for happiness.     

Happiness is not Well-Being

This paper attempts to explain the conceptual connections between happiness and well-being. It first distinguishes episodic happiness from happiness in the personal attribute sense. It then evaluates two recent proposals about the connection between happiness and well-being: (1) the idea that episodic happiness and well-being both have the same fundamental determinants, so that a person is well-off to a particular degree in virtue of the fact that they are happy to that degree, and (2) the idea that happiness in the personal attribute sense can serve as a “proxy” for well-being, i.e., that a person’s degree of deep or robust happiness approximates their degree of well-being. It is argued that happiness in both these senses is conceptually, metaphysically, and empirically distinct from well-being. A new analysis of welfare, well-being as agential flourishing, can explain welfare’s real connection to happiness in both the episodic and personal attribute senses. It predicts that such happiness is only directly beneficial when it is valued, when it is a form of valuing, or when it underwrites (i.e., serves as the causal basis for) the disposition to realize one’s values. It is therefore a necessary—but not sufficient—condition for especially high levels of well-being. This analysis of welfare integrates many insights from the eudaimonic tradition of welfare and happiness research in psychology, and also addresses common criticisms of these eudaimonic models.     

Science and Morality: Mind the Gap, Use Happiness as a Safe Bridge!

In 2002 Sissela Bok re-published her book “Common Values”, first published in 1995, about her search for a minimal set of values to be respected all over the world. In her view such a set of values is needed to facilitate international communication and cooperation. Values already recognized in every society can be included as a starting point. In her book “Exploring happiness”, published in 2010, she explains why she finds happiness unfit to be included. She observes that there are discordant claims about what happiness is. Any particular vision can lead to practical choices that either adhere or violate the values she prefers. In my view subjective happiness should be included, because there are no discordant claims about the meaning of subjective happiness, and subjective happiness is simultaneously attractive as a moral value and as an object of scientific research. Subjective happiness can function as a bridge between science and morality. The only discordant claims are about ‘objective’ happiness, as a wider interpretation of well-being in the context of some specific morality or ideology.     

Greater Happiness for a Greater Number: Some Non-controversial Options for Governments

There are dramatic differences in average happiness across nations ranging from 3.24 in Togo to 8.00 in Denmark on a 0–10-points scale. These differences are an indication that collective conditions in nations are important for happiness. Can governments play a role in the creation of such conditions? This question is addressed in an analysis of average happiness in 131 nations in 2006. The following sub-questions are considered. (1) Is there a positive correlation between average happiness in nations and the quality or the size of governments? (2) Can we explain a positive correlation in terms of causality? (3) Can we specify causality by discerning direct and indirect effects? (4) What about governments and inequality in happiness? (5) What can governments do to increase happiness intentionally? The conclusion is that the technical quality of governments is an important cause for average happiness in nations, and this causality can be specified to some extent. Good governments also reduce inequality of happiness in nations eventually. The implication is that governments can increase average happiness, and in due time reduce inequality in happiness, and that they have some non-controversial options to do so on purpose.     

Happiness on the Political Agenda? PROS and CONS

This paper provides a critical analysis of the application of happiness research into policy domains. An overview of the current debate on the politics of happiness is elaborated by focusing on its promising perspectives as well as the potential problems it raises. Arguments of proponents and opponents are confronted with each other in discussing the following central issues in the debate: (1) the state of progress of the happiness research; (2) the value of happiness and its promotion by political means; (3) the possibility of promoting happiness; (4) paternalism versus autonomy and (5) a fair distribution of happiness. It is concluded from this that pragmatic issues do not pose insurmountable obstacles for the realization of a politics of happiness, although further research is definitely recommendable. The ideological or ethical issues however require further debate and research before the actual realization of a politics of happiness is possible. More specifically, the science of happiness needs to give more attention to analyzing the value of happiness and the desirability of increasing happiness by political means. Also the weighing of the value of happiness against other values and goals is an important issue to be put on the agenda. This paper thus explicates the moral choices and challenges that politicians would be confronted with if they want to put the increase of happiness on the political agenda.     

Happiness and Stock-Market Participation: Empirical Evidence from China

Using the data from the China Household Finance Survey in 2011, we study the relation between happiness and stockholding. We find that a household’s propensity of investing in stocks or mutual funds, as well as household asset shares invested in stocks or mutual funds, is strongly associated with happiness. Moreover, empirical results suggest that among the three potential channels we propose, the association between happiness and stockholding is driven by trust (or social capital), rather than households’ risk preference or optimism level.     

Forgiveness and happiness. the differing contexts of forgiveness using the distinction between hedonic and eudaimonic happiness

The aim of the present study was to examine the relationship between forgiveness and happiness using a two-dimensional model of happiness (hedonic and eudaimonic happiness). 224 United Kingdom students were administered the Enright Forgiveness Inventory, The Depression–Happiness Scale and the Oxford Happiness Questionnaire – Short-form. The present findings suggest that forgiveness accounts for statistically significant variance, albeit quite low, in both hedonic and eudaimonic happiness and the relationships may vary depending on which aspect of happiness is being considered. In terms of shorter-term hedonic happiness, the present findings suggest it is important not to engage in negative cognitions about the transgression. In terms of maintaining eudaimonic happiness, engaging in positive behaviours and feelings may lead to, be the result of, or be very much part of longer-term happiness.     

Happiness and well-being: shifting the focus of the current debate

The point of departure of this paper is the recently emphasised distinction between psychological theories of happiness, on the one hand, and normative theories of well-being, on the other. With this distinction in mind, I examine three possible kinds of relation that might exist between (psychological) happiness and (normative) well-being; to wit, happiness may be understood as playing a central part in (1) a formal theory of well-being, (2) a substantive theory of well-being or (3) as an indicator for well-being. I note that, in the relevant literature, happiness is mostly discussed in terms of either (1) or (2). In this paper, I attempt to motivate a shift of focus away from such accounts of happiness and towards (3), i.e. its epistemic role. When examined in connection to (normative) well-being, (psychological states of) happiness and unhappiness should be understood as psychological states that inform individuals about the contribution of various activities, pursuits, or situations to their well-being or ill-being.     

Happiness and Domain Satisfaction in Taiwan

Happiness and life satisfaction are two empirically correlated but nobreak conceptually different measures of well-being. As an emotional state, happiness is sensitive to sudden changes in mood, whilst satisfaction is regarded as a cognitive or judgmental state. Using estimations from two empirical models, the aim of this study is to examine the determinants of happiness and satisfaction amongst nobreak Taiwanese people in a number of life domains. First of all, we attempt to investigate the individual characteristics of happiness by using an ordered probit model. Secondly, using ordinary least squares, we include an individual's value or attitude variables as nobreak determinants of the level of satisfaction with different life domains.Our results suggest that higher income is associated with a higher level of subjective well-being. Measures of comparison income are significantly negatively correlated with the reported level of happiness and job satisfaction, which supports the hypothesis that well-being depends on income relative to a reference group. Consistent with the results from other countries, married people report a higher degree of happiness and satisfaction, whilst the past experience of unemployment significantly reduces subjective well-being. There is little gender difference in happiness or satisfaction with different domains. Furthermore, individual's personal values have strong effects on both marital satisfaction and job satisfaction. The findings of this paper confirm that the effects of personal characteristics are fundamentally different in terms of happiness and satisfaction with specific domains of life.     

The contribution of facial regions to judgements of happiness and trustworthiness from dynamic expressions

What expressive facial features and processing mechanisms make a person look trustworthy, relative to happy? Participants judged the un/happiness or un/trustworthiness of people with dynamic expressions in which the eyes and/or the mouth unfolded from neutral to happy or vice versa. Faces with an unfolding smile looked more trustworthy and happier than faces with a neutral mouth, regardless of the eye expression. Unfolding happy eyes increased both trustworthiness and happiness only in the presence of a congruent unfolding smiling mouth. Nevertheless, the contribution of the mouth was greater for happiness than for trustworthiness; and the mouth was especially visually salient for expressions favouring happiness more than trustworthiness. We conclude that the categorisation of facial happiness is more automatically driven by the visual saliency of a single feature, that is, the smiling mouth, while perception of trustworthiness is more strategic, with the eyes being necessarily incorporated into a configural face representation.     

Economy, Values and Happiness in Norway

Why has the level of happiness in the Norwegian population not risen in parallel with the substantial increases in income and possessions in the period 1985–2001? An answer is sought by analysing data from a series of large representative surveys of the Norwegian population. Individual level correlations between indicators of health or family situation and happiness indicate that the measure of happiness is valid, and that happiness is not fully determined by personality traits, but affected also by changes in the circumstances of an individual. Several aspects of a person's economic situation turn out to have significant effects on happiness, in particular how the situation is subjectively experienced. Even if the development for some of these subjective indicators does not reflect the improvement in objective economic conditions, there is sufficient positive change to expect an increase in the level of happiness. The stability in aggregate happiness means that counteracting influences must have been present. One such factor is value orientation. An increasing tendency for Norwegians to give priority to income and material possessions appears to have had an adverse effect on happiness towards the end of the last millennium.     

Ignoring Easterlin: Why Easterlin’s Correlation Findings Need Not Matter to Public Policy

Many believe that the lack of correlation between happiness and income, first discovered by Richard Easterlin in 1974, entails the conclusion that well-being policies should be made based on happiness measures, rather than income measures. I argue that distinguishing between how well-being is characterized and how that characterization is measured introduces ways of denying the conclusion that policies should be made based on happiness measures. It is possible to avoid the conclusion either by denying that well-being hedonism is true or by denying that happiness measures are a better way of operationalizing hedonism than income measures are. By making these possibilities explicit, we find that less hinges on whether income and happiness are correlated than is often thought.     

Prioritizing Happiness has Important Implications for Mental Health,but Perhaps Only if you Already are Happy

Happiness is frequently posited as an important outcome of quality of life and characteristic of well-adjusted and functioning individuals. Happy individuals are less likely to report adverse mental health. Understanding the importance that individuals place on happiness is less clearly articulated and inconsistent. Valuing or placing higher importance of happiness appear to confer both benefits and risk for mental health outcomes. The primary aim of this study was to examine the relationship between the importance of happiness and mental health outcomes and whether the relationship between happiness and mental health is moderated by the importance individuals place on happiness. We utilised data from two studies, a university student sample (n = 413) and a community sample (n = 248) to examine the study aims. Mental health was operationalised in terms of psychological distress and symptoms of depression and anxiety. Happiness and the level of importance individuals ascribed to happiness were associated with adverse mental health outcomes. In multi-variate analyses, level of happiness was more strongly related to mental health. Interactions between happiness and the importance of happiness revealed that the effect of happiness was moderated by the importance that individuals placed on happiness. Overall happiness and to a lesser extent, the importance of happiness, are significantly associated with mental health outcomes. Happiness was most strongly related to mental health amongst those who rated the importance of happiness more highly.

     

Happiness,Rationality, Autonomy and the Good Life

The paper starts with a general discussion of the concepts of happiness and the good life. I argue that there is a conceptual core of happiness which has to do with one’s life as a whole. I discuss affective and attitude or life satisfaction views of happiness and indicate problems faced by those views. I introduce my own view, the life plan view, which sees happiness as the ongoing realizing of global desires of the person. I argue that on such a view one’s life could be happy without a high level of rationality or a high level of autonomy; such rationality and autonomy are not built into the concept of happiness. So while happiness is a final value, and good for the person, it is not the only final value. Rationality and autonomy are also final values and, where they exist, are good as ends for the person, part of the good life.     

Is happiness the supreme good? Some philosophical objections

Modern philosophy is characterised by various objections to the Aristotelian conception of happiness as the supreme good of human life. In this paper, I focus on the objections raised by two key thinkers of the modern period, namely Blaise Pascal and Friedrich Nietzsche. Both philosophers formulate important counter- arguments to the teleological claim that happiness is the highest good towards which all human beings naturally direct their efforts. Their target is not any specific definition of happiness as a particular kind of activity, or a particular kind of good. Instead, they express a more fundamental scepticism about the very possibility of happiness being the ultimate end of human life. As I show, Pascal's and Nietzsche's radical point is that, since reason alone can never answer for certain the question of whether or not happiness is the ultimate aim of human existence, philosophy should not concern itself with the question of happiness. The paper has three parts. I first sketch an outline of Pascal's sceptical argument with regard to happiness, and then present his positive definition of happiness, after which I do the same for Nietzsche. The third part is devoted to a critical assessment of their positions in light of an alternative argument developed by John Cottingham.     

Do you feel happy when other members look happy? Moderating effect of community-level social capital on interconnection of happiness

One's happiness is expected to be affected by the happiness of surrounding others. This socio-psychological nature of happiness, however, has not been fully examined in the literature of social psychology. The current study examined if this “psychological interconnection of happiness” occurs when (i) individuals have strong personal social capital and/or (ii) individuals belong to a community where other members have strong social capital. We analysed a large social survey dataset sampled from 408 communities in Japan (N = 7295). The psychological interconnection of happiness was measured by calculating the correlation between individual happiness and perceived community happiness. The multilevel analyses revealed that the psychological interconnection of happiness was moderated by community-level social capital above and beyond individual-level social capital, while individual-level social capital did not have a significant moderation effect.     

Is Reported Happiness Five Years Ago Comparable to Present Happiness? A Cautionary Note

In the United States reported happiness five years ago is not comparable to present happiness. The improvement in happiness over the last five years obtained by differencing current reports of happiness today and happiness five years ago is not significantly related to the actual improvement in happiness over the same period. The currently reported five-year change in happiness is highly sensitive to current economic conditions, varying inversely with both the inflation and unemployment rates.Ordinarily, happiness five years ago as currently reported is less than present happiness, but the worse the current economic conditions are, the better the past looks relative to the present. If current economic conditions get bad enough, past happiness will be rated higher than present. Reports of happiness five years ago are not telling us about the utility respondents actually experienced at that time; they are telling us, instead, about respondents' current decision utility–which situation, today's or that five years ago, they would opt for if given the choice today.     

Are you talking to me?! Separating the people from the problem when expressing emotions in negotiation

Emotions such as anger and happiness have pervasive interpersonal effects in negotiations. We propose that the nature of the effects depends on the target of the emotion, that is, whether the emotion is directed toward a person or a specific behavior. In a computer-mediated negotiation (N = 87), participants received either angry or happy messages from a simulated opponent, which were either behavior-oriented or person-directed. Behavior-oriented anger elicited larger concessions than behavior-oriented happiness, whereas person-directed anger elicited smaller concessions than person-directed happiness. This reversal could be attributed to the strategic value of the emotional expression, which was higher in the behavior-oriented condition than in the person-directed condition. These findings show that the interpersonal effects of anger and happiness depend critically on the target of the emotion.     

Complete Virtue and the Definition of Happiness in Aristotle

In this paper, I challenge the standard reading of complete virtue (ἀρετή τελεία) in those disputed passages of Nicomachean Ethics and Eudemian Ethics. I argue that, for Aristotle, complete virtue is neither (i) wisdom nor (ii) a whole set of all virtues. Rather, it is a term used by Aristotle to denote any virtue that is in its complete or perfect form. In light of this reading, I offer a pluralist interpretation of Aristotelian happiness. I argue that for Aristotle, the life-long exercise of a predominant virtue—as long as it is exercised in its complete or perfect form—will suffice for human happiness. The so-called inclusivist and intellectualist notions of Aristotelian happiness, thus understood, are merely two forms (viz. the composite and the non-composite form) of the pluralist notion of Aristotelian happiness. And if I am right, my pluralist interpretation provides an alternative, if not better, solution to the long-standing problem of “dual happiness” in Aristotle.