Kierkegaard and Psychology as the Science of the “Multifarious Life”

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate the actuality of some considerations around psychology made by the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855). According to him psychology is about the “multifarious” life, which is a term that pinpoints the challenges psychology still have when it comes to including changes and genetic perspectives on its understanding of actual living. Yet Kierkegaard discusses psychology in relationship to metaphysics, which is an almost forgotten perspective. His understanding opens up for narrowing the definition of psychology down to the science of subjectivity, which at the same time elevates psychology to being the only science that focuses on the actual human life. Yet Kierkegaard’s most important contribution to psychology is to maintain a radical distinction between subjectivity and objectivity, and in this respect the psychology of today is challenged.     

Exploring the Promise of Eudaimonic Well-Being Within the Practice of Health Promotion: The “How” is as Important as the “What”

A brief historical and philosophical analysis suggests that the biomedical model and prevention have been the pillars of health promotion practices with the underlying assumption that these concepts provide answers to people’s health woes. Another observation resulting from this analysis is that biomedical, prevention, and more recently, wellness, do not differ much from each other paradigmatically (e.g., instrumental rationality) and, hence, are severely restricted in their short- and long-term effectiveness for helping people with healthy living and quality of life. It is proposed that eudaimonic well-being—if explored, understood, and implemented in a manner that holds true to the purity of the concept—offers significant promise for shifts in health promotion practices that may lead to transformative health experiences and enhanced quality of life.     

Fairness as “Appropriate Impartiality” and the Problem of the Self-Serving Bias

Garrett Cullity contends that fairness is appropriate impartiality (See Cullity (2004) Chapters 8 and 10 and Cullity (2008)). Cullity deploys his account of fairness as a means of limiting the extreme moral demand to make sacrifices in order to aid others that was posed by Peter Singer in his seminal article ‘Famine, Affluence and Morality’. My paper is founded upon the combination of (1) the observation that the idea that fairness consists in appropriate impartiality is very vague and (2) the fact that psychological studies show the self-serving bias is especially likely to infect one’s judgements when the ideas involved are vague. I argue that Cullity’s solution to extreme moral demandingness is threatened by these findings. I then comment on whether some other theories of fairness are vulnerable to the same objection.     

From Woman as Hasid to Woman as “Tsadik” in the Teachings of the Last Two Lubavitcher Rebbes

The paper deals with some of the ways in which the last Lubavitcher Rebbe, Menahem Mendel Schneerson, radicalized the legacy of his predecessor, Yosef Yitshak Schneersohn, who was the first hasidic leader to mobilize women as active members of the Habad constituency. In the teachings of Menahem Mendel Schneerson, women were invested for the first time with the sense of being full-fledged female hasidim in their own right. Moreover, unlike his predecessor, whose mobilization of women never became an integral element of his apocalyptic messianism, Menahem Mendel Schneerson consistently framed the empowerment of women in terms of kabbalistic eschatology, anticipating in the present the inverted gender hierarchy of the messianic future, which was, as he declared, just about to unfold. In this context, he applied to women some of the classical hasidic formulations of the doctrine of the tsadik, depicting them as a channel that mediates between Heaven and earth, and as the trigger that releases from Heaven the flow of material prosperity expressed in terms of the traditional tsadik’s blessing for sons (offspring), life (health), and food (secure livelihood).     

“Scaffolding” and “affordance” as integrative concepts in the cognitive sciences

There are (at least) two ways to think of the differences in basic concepts and typologies that one can find in the different scientific practices that constitute a research tradition. One is the fundamentalist view: the fewer the better. The other is a non-fundamentalist view of science whereby the integration of different concepts into the right abstraction grounds an explanation that is not grounded as the sum of the explanations supported by the parts. Integrative concepts are often associated with idealizations that can successfully set the stage for different phenomena to be compared or for explanations of different phenomena to be considered as jointly increasing our understanding of reality beyond that which each explanation provides separately. In this paper, our aim is to argue for the importance of the notions of an “affordance” and “scaffolding” as integrative concepts in the cognitive sciences. The integrational role of the concept of affordance is closely related with the capacity of affordances to generate the scaffoldings leading to the integration. The capacities of affordances that turn them into (stable) scaffoldings explain why such notions are often used interchangeably (as we shall see). On this basis, we aim to show that the concepts of affordance and scaffolding provide the sort of epistemic perspective that can overcome common complaints about the limits and unity of the cognitive sciences once claims about extended cognition are taken seriously.     

Death as “benefit” in the context of non-voluntary euthanasia

Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics - I offer a principled objection to arguments in favour of legalizing non-voluntary euthanasia on the basis of the principle of beneficence. The objection is that...     

Gateways—just as important as standards: How the internet won the “religious war” over standards in Scandinavia

This article concerns the Nordunet project and its “plug.” It is a history about how the Internet “won” the “religious war” about computer communication protocol standards in Scandinavia. It teaches us important lessons about how the Nordic countries (except Denmark) became the leading ones in the adoption and use of the Internet. On a more general level this story also teaches us an important lesson about the importance of gateways in the design and establishment of large scale computer networks and information infrastructures. It is a universal truth that the development of such technologies requires standards. And that gateways are equally important. The main conclusion drawn is that what matters in the development of such technologies is to combine and balance the use of gateways and standards in a proper way. Originally trained as a computer scientist his research focuses mainly on the interplay between social and technical issues in the development and use of large-scale information systems and infrastructures—including their standards. He has worked most of his professional career within applied research institutions and industry and before moving into academia in 1997.     

Self as a second-order object: Reinterpreting the Jamesian “Me”

Existing definitions of the self can be lumped into three groups: self as self-reflectivity, self as self-concept, and self as the individual. This article traces current disagreements over the definition of the self to a crucial ambiguity in William James's original delineation of the “Me.” Implicit in James's delineation was a distinction between first-order objects and second-order objects: while first-order objects are things as they are, independent of the perception of a knowing subject, second-order objects are things as perceived by a knowing subject. This article makes this distinction explicit and argues that the self is a second-order object associated with the first-person or “emic” perspective. Defined as the empirical existence of the individual (first order) perceived by the individual as “me” or “mine” (second order), the self is distinguished from the “I” which is the mental capacity for self-reflection; the self-concept which is the mental representation of the individual's existence; and the individual which is the empirical referent of the self-concept. As a second-order object, the “Me,” i.e., the self, is the unity of the existence and perception of the individual.     

Yearning for certainty and the critique of medicine as “science”

A debate has simmered concerning the nature of clinical reasoning, especially diagnostic reasoning: Is it a “science” or an “art”? The trend since the seventeenth century has been to regard medical reasoning as scientific reasoning, and the most advanced clinical reasoning is the most scientific. However, in recent years, several scholars have argued that clinical reasoning is clearly not “science” reasoning, but is in fact a species of narratival or hermeneutical reasoning. The study reviews this dispute, and argues that in a theoretical sense, the dispute rests upon a naïve—but very popular—caricature of what constitutes “science reasoning.” But, if the dispute rests upon just such a caricature, why is it so persistent? The study concludes by suggesting that we, as patients and as physicians, have deep psychological tendencies that incline us to adopt the very naïve “science” concept/model of diagnostic reasoning, even if (or when) we understand its inaptness.     

Nietzsche on morality as a “sign language of the affects”

Abstract

This article argues that Nietzsche’s meta-ethics is basically a form of sentimentalism (as opposed to cognitivism), but a form of sentimentalism that includes cognitive components in the sentiments that are involved. The article also ascribes to Nietzsche the more original position that the moral sentiments in question vary dramatically between historical periods, cultures, and even individuals, sometimes indeed to the point of becoming inverted between one case and another. Finally, the article also attributes to Nietzsche a hermeneutic insight into certain problems that this situation causes for the accurate interpretation of other people’s (moral) viewpoints. Along the way, the article in addition argues that Nietzsche’s positions on all these issues were molded not only by such well-known influences as Paul Rée and Hume, but also, and indeed more strongly, by Herder (and Hegel), and it develops some grounds for thinking that the positions in question are highly plausible ones.     

Good to the last drop? Millikan stories as “canned” pedagogy

In recent literature, the famous Millikan oil-drop experiment appears as a case of “good scientific judgment” on the one hand, and scientific misconduct on the other. This article discusses different interpretations of the fact that Nobel laureate Robert Millikan’s notebooks show that he eliminated a number of oildrops in his published 1913 paper on the charge of the electron, while reporting that he had included all the drops. Starting with the common source of all Millikan stories, historian of physics Gerald Holton’s 1978 paper, I discuss recent “canned” versions of Millikan-as-misbehaver in books on scientific fraud. Then I examine some versions of Millikan-as-good-scientist, particularly the reconstruction by historian of physics Allan Franklin, and the views of some practicing physicists. Finally, we have an instructive head-on collision between the two standard treatments of Millikan. The problem with canned stories is not only insufficient information; we also lack a realistic evaluation of the role of ethics in science. As a fundamentally knowledge-seeking enterprise, science may harbor an inherent, perhaps irresolvable, conflict between scientific and ethical concerns. The author’s special interests include standards for “good science”, science and values, and social psychology.     

Beliefs About the Outcomes of Extramarital Sexual Relationships as a Function of the Gender of the “Cheating Spouse”

A person perception experiment was conducted toexamine people's beliefs about the outcome of anextramarital sexual relationship involving ahypothetical single friend and a married person. Twohundred and eleven undergraduate students (80 males and129 females; most of whom were Caucasian) were theparticipants in the experiment. The married person inthe vignette was presented as either a man or a woman (and always the opposite gender of the singlefriend) and as having low or high investments in themarriage (as indicated by number of children and yearsmarried). Results indicated that the participants' perceptions of the outcome of this type ofextramarital relationship depended on the gender of themarried person/single friend. Participants were morelikely to believe that the married person loved the extramarital partner, was committed to theextramarital relationship, and would marry theextramarital partner, if the married person was a womanrather than a man. The investment manipulations had noeffect on participants' perceptions of therelationship. The results were discussed as they relateto other beliefs about male vs. femalesexuality.     

Beyond the “Delivery Problem”: Why There is “No Such Thing as a Language”

In “Practical Knowledge of Language”, C.-h. Tsai criticizes the arguments in “Swimming and Speaking Spanish” (this issue, pp. 331–341), on the grounds that its account of knowledge of language as knowledge-how is mistaken. In its place, he proposes an alternative account in terms of Russell’s concept “knowledge-by-acquaintance”. In this paper, I show that this account succeeds neither in displacing the account in Swimming and Speaking Spanish nor in addressing Tsai’s main concern: solving the “delivery problem”.