Blurring two conceptions of subjective experience: Folk versus philosophical phenomenality

Philosophers and psychologists have experimentally explored various aspects of people's understandings of subjective experience based on their responses to questions about whether robots “see red” or “feel frustrated,” but the intelligibility of such questions may well presuppose that people understand robots as experiencers in the first place. Departing from the standard approach, I develop an experimental framework that distinguishes between “phenomenal consciousness” as it is applied to a subject (an experiencer) and to an (experiential) mental state and experimentally test folk understandings of both subjective experience and experiencers. My findings (1) reveal limitations in experimental approaches using “artificial experiencers” like robots, (2) indicate that the standard philosophical conception of subjective experience in terms of qualia is distinct from that of the folk, and (3) show that folk intuitions do support a conception of qualia that departs from the philosophical conception in that it is physical rather than metaphysical. These findings have implications for the “hard problem” of consciousness.     

Using phenomenal concepts to explain away the intuition of contingency

Humans can think about their conscious experiences using a special class of “phenomenal” concepts. Psychophysical identity statements formulated using phenomenal concepts appear to be contingent. Kripke argued that this intuited contingency could not be explained away, in contrast to ordinary theoretical identities where it can. If the contingency is real, property dualism follows. Physicalists have attempted to answer this challenge by pointing to special features of phenomenal concepts that explain the intuition of contingency. However no physicalist account of their distinguishing features has proven to be satisfactory. Leading accounts rely on there being a phenomenological difference between tokening a physical-functional concept and tokening a phenomenal concept. This paper shows that existing psychological data undermine that claim. The paper goes on to suggest that the recalcitrance of the intuition of contingency may instead by explained by the limited means people typically have for applying their phenomenal concepts. Ways of testing that suggestion empirically are proposed.     

Internalism, active externalism, and nonconceptual content: the ins and outs of cognition

Active externalism (also known as the extended mind hypothesis) says that we use objects and situations in the world as external memory stores that we consult as needs dictate. This gives us economies of storage: We do not need to remember that Bill has blue eyes and wavy hair if we can acquire this information by looking at Bill. I argue for a corollary to this position, which I call 'internalism.' Internalism says we can acquire knowledge on a need-to-know basis by consulting portable, inner analogues of the world. This, however, leads to a dilemma. If the knowledge was stored in memory, it is difficult to see how we could have acquired it by consulting inner analogues, for it would seem that we knew it already. Moreover, if it was stored in memory, we lose the economies of storage that provide much of the rationale for external memory stores and hence for their inner analogues. If, on the other hand, the knowledge was not stored in memory, it is difficult to see how we could have acquired it by consulting inner analogues, for it was not there to be acquired. I propose a solution to this problem that turns on the concept of nonconceptual content, and I relate the solution to Stephen Kosslyn's (1994) architecture of perception and visual mental imagery. Viewed in a broader context, the solution shows that the world leaks into the mind, as well as mind leaking into the world.     

How to solve the problem of phenomenal unity: finding alternatives to the single state conception

The problem of phenomenal unity (PPU) consists in providing a phenomenological characterization of the difference between phenomenally unified and disunified conscious experiences. Potential solutions to PPU are faced with an important challenge (which Tim Bayne calls the “explanatory regress objection”). I show that this challenge can be conceived as a phenomenological dual to what is known as Bradley’s regress. This perspective (i) facilitates progress on PPU by finding duals to possible solutions to Bradley’s regress and (ii) makes it intelligible why many characterize phenomenal unity in terms of the existence of a single global conscious state. I call this latter view the “single state conception” (SSC). SSC is superficially attractive, because it seems to provide a solution to the phenomenological dual to Bradley’s regress, but should still be rejected, because (1) it does not solve PPU; (2) instead, it creates more problems; (3) these problems can be avoided by alternative conceptions of phenomenal unity.     

The global workspace theory,the phenomenal concept strategy,and the distribution of consciousness

Peter Carruthers argues that the global workspace theory implies there are no facts of the matter about animal consciousness. The argument is easily extended to other cognitive theories of consciousness, posing a general problem for consciousness studies. But the argument proves too much, for it also implies that there are no facts of the matter about human consciousness. A key assumption is that scientific theories of consciousness must explain away the explanatory gap. I criticize this assumption and point to an alternative strategy for defending scientific theories of consciousness, one that better reflects the ongoing scientific practice. I argue there are introspectable inferential connections from phenomenal concepts to functional concepts that scientists can use to individuate the global workspace in terms of capacities that animals and humans share.     

No watershed for overflow: Recent work on the richness of consciousness

A familiar and enduring controversy surrounds the question of whether our phenomenal experience “overflows” availability to cognition: do we consciously see more than we can remember and report? Both sides to this debate have long sought to move beyond naïve appeals to introspection by providing empirical evidence for or against overflow. Recently, two notable studies—Bronfman, Brezis, Jacobson, and Usher (2014) and Vandenbroucke, Sligte, Fahrenfort, Ambroziak, and Lamme (2012)—have purported to provide compelling evidence in favor of overflow. Here I explain why the data from both studies are wholly consistent with a “no overflow” interpretation. Importantly, when framed purely in representational or informational terms, this “no overflow” interpretation agrees with the interpretations respectively offered by both Bronfman et al. (2014) and Vandenbroucke et al. (2012). The difference only emerges when additional assumptions are made concerning which representations correspond to elements in conscious experience. The assumptions made by overflow theorists are contentious and poorly motivated. However, challenging them simply reopens the original controversy. The upshot is a sobering moral: we still do not know how to move beyond appeals to naïve introspection in establishing the nature and limits of our ordinary experience.     

On the generality of experience: a reply to French and Gomes

Philosophical Studies - According to phenomenal particularism, external particulars are sometimes part of the phenomenal character of experience. Mehta (J Philos 111:311–331, 2014) criticizes...     

Knowing what we can do: actions,intentions, and the construction of phenomenal experience

How do questions concerning consciousness and phenomenal experience relate to, or interface with, questions concerning plans, knowledge and intentions? At least in the case of visual experience the relation, we shall argue, is tight. Visual perceptual experience, we shall argue, is fixed by an agent’s direct unmediated knowledge concerning her poise (or apparent poise) over a currently enabled action space. An action space, in this specific sense, is to be understood not as a fine-grained matrix of possibilities for bodily movement, but as a matrix of possibilities for pursuing and accomplishing one’s intentional actions, goals and projects. If this is correct, the links between planning, intention and perceptual experience are tight, while (contrary to some recent accounts invoking the notion of ‘sensorimotor expectations’) the links between embodied activity and perceptual experience, though real, are indirect. What matters is not bodily activity itself, but our practical knowledge (which need not be verbalized or in any way explicit) of our own possibilities for action. Such knowledge, selected, shaped and filtered by the grid of plans, goals, and intentions, plays, we argue, a constitutive role in explaining the content and character of visual perceptual experience.     

Restating the role of phenomenal experience in the formation and maintenance of the Capgras delusion

In recent times, explanations of the Capgras delusion have tended to emphasise the cognitive dysfunction that is believed to occur at the second stage of two-stage models. This is generally viewed as a response to the inadequacies of the one-stage account. Whilst accepting that some form of cognitive disruption is a necessary part of the aetiology of the Capgras delusion, I nevertheless argue that the emphasis placed on this second-stage is to the detriment of the important role played by the phenomenology underlying the disorder, both in terms of the formation and maintenance of the delusional belief. This paper therefore proposes an interactionist two-stage model in which the phenomenal experience of the Capgras patient is examined, emphasised, and its relation to top-down processing discussed.

An experience sampling approach to emotion regulation: Situational suppression use and social hierarchy

Whereas past research has examined the use of emotion regulation strategies in terms of individual differences or responses to experimental manipulations, this research takes a naturalistic and repeated-measures approach to examine suppression use in specific situations. Using an experience sampling design, we find evidence across two samples (total N = 215) that (1) there was substantial within-person variation in suppression use, (2) the situational use of suppression was explained by situational differences in extraversion and social hierarchy, and (3) when used in contexts in which people felt they were low in social hierarchy, the negative relationship between suppression and well-being was attenuated. These findings suggest there are contexts in which suppression use may not be maladaptive, and demonstrate the benefits of studying emotion processes in real-life.     

Being there when it happens: A novel approach to sampling reflectively observed experience

Examining a number of recently developed methods for acquiring first-person data on consciousness, we detect a lack of sensitivity for distinguishing the experiential moments in which the experiencing person was reflectively attending to her ongoing experience. In order to address this gap, we introduce a novel research format for obtaining data on lived experience, combining random sampling of experience with a subsequent retrospective examination of acquired samples in the form of dialogical phenomenological inquiry. The proposed approach aims at the examination of reflectively observed experiential moments and is based on researchers’ iterative cultivation of the phenomenological attitude. Drawing upon results from a longitudinal study of the potential of meditation as a tool for examining consciousness, we address the epistemological and methodological challenges of the proposed approach, discuss its applicability and research potential, as well as examine the characteristics and validity of phenomenal data thus acquired.     

Playing for time: A psychotherapist's experience of counselling young people

This article describes the experience of a psychotherapist working for several years with adolescents and young adults at a centre offering weekly psychoanalytic psychotherapy. It describes some of the pressures placed on the therapist by young people engaging in considerable degrees of acting out and the difficulties in holding on to a sense of valuable work in the face of different attacks.     

Understanding the dynamic relationships among personality, mood, and job satisfaction: A field experience sampling study

This study investigated the within-individual relationship between mood and job satisfaction, and examined the role of personality characteristics in moderating this relationship. The design of the study involved an experience sampling methodology (ESM); 27 employees completed mood and job satisfaction surveys at four different times during the day for a period of four weeks, resulting in a total of 1907 observations. Results showed that within-individual variance comprised 36% of the total variance in job satisfaction, and mood explained 29% of the within-individual variance in job satisfaction. Second, mood and job satisfaction were related both within and across individuals. Third, two personality traits—Neuroticism and Extraversion—were associated with average levels of mood. Fourth, within-individual variability in mood was significantly related to within-individual variability in job satisfaction, and variability in both mood and job satisfaction was predicted by Neuroticism. Finally, personality impacted the degree of association between mood and job satisfaction within individuals.     

A lost horizon: the experience of an other and school bullying

To date, research on bullying has largely employed empirical methodologies, including quantitative and qualitative approaches. Through this research we have come to understand bullying as both a dyadic and peer group phenomenon, primarily situated in the heads (thinking) of those involved, or in a lack of skill or expertise, or in the delinquency of a bully who needs to be reformed. This research has largely directed its strategies toward problem students using individual and peer group approaches. And yet school bullying continues to be a crucial educational issue affecting millions of students each year. In this project I introduce a missing philosophical perspective. Analyzing the work of Hans-Georg Gadamer I am led to conclude that typical anti-bullying strategies at times simply train bullies to be better at bullying (i.e., learning to bully more covertly, more expertly so as to inflict the same devastation without adult detection). Gadamer invites us to think about bullying in new ways. While certainly involving the thinking and skills of the bully and the victim, Gadamer contends that bullying does not fundamentally result from a problem within the participants, but is fostered by certain spaces between them; terrains that cultivate specific experiences of an "other". Generally, this project stems from an interest in the ways that domination develops in this "space between". Specifically in this paper I ask: What is the nature of "hermeneutic" experience as conceptualized by Gadamer? What kinds of experiences of an other does bullying exemplify? What kinds of experience of an other do non-bullying relations exemplify and what kinds of relational spaces foster such experience? This paper opens up significant new territory for anti-bullying work, expanding our focus to include the space between students which fosters certain inter-personal experiences - experiences situated in domination and stymied growth or, alternatively, experiences of reciprocity which open the possibility of human growth and transformation.     

Function and feeling machines: a defense of the philosophical conception of subjective experience

Philosophers of mind typically group experiential states together and distinguish these from intentional states on the basis of their purportedly obvious phenomenal character. Sytsma and Machery (Phil Stud 151(2): 299–327, 2010) challenge this dichotomy by presenting evidence that non-philosophers do not classify subjective experiences relative to a state’s phenomenological character, but rather by its valence. However we argue that S&M’s results do not speak to folk beliefs about the nature of experiential states, but rather to folk beliefs about the entity to which those experiential states are attributed. In two experiments, we demonstrate that ordinary attributions of subjective experiences (of smell and felt emotions) to a simple robot are not sensitive to valence, but instead respond to functional assumptions about the entity to which the states are (or are not) attributed.