共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Sven Walter 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(2):273-285
Epistemological approaches to mental causation argue that the notorious problem of mental causation as captured in the question
“How can irreducible, physically realized, and potentially relational mental properties be causally efficacious in the production
of physical effects?” has a very simple solution: One merely has to abandon any metaphysical considerations in favor of epistemological considerations and accept that our explanatory practice is a much better guide to causal relevance than the metaphysical
reasoning carried out from the philosophical armchair. I argue that epistemological approaches to mental causation do not
enjoy any genuine advantage over theories which treat the problem of mental causation as a genuinely metaphysical problem.
相似文献
Sven WalterEmail: |
2.
Christopher Hitchcock 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(3):391-401
Hall [(2007), Philosophical Studies, 132, 109–136] offers a critique of structural equations accounts of actual causation, and then offers a new theory of his own.
In this paper, I respond to Hall’s critique, and present some counterexamples to his new theory. These counterexamples are
then diagnosed.
相似文献
Christopher HitchcockEmail: |
3.
Hans-Ulrich Hoche 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2007,6(3):389-409
From 1990 on, the London psychologist Max Velmans developed a novel approach to (phenomenal) consciousness according to which
an experience of an object is phenomenologically identical to an object as experienced. On the face of it I agree; but unlike Velmans I argue that the latter should be understood as comparable, not to a Kantian, but rather to a noematic ‘phenomenon’ in the Husserlian sense. Consequently, I replace Velmans’s reflexive model with a complementaristic approach
in a strict sense which leaves no room for either monistic or dualistic views (including Velmans’s ontological monism and
his dual-aspect interpretation of complementarity) and hence requires us to radically reinterpret the concept of psychophysical
causation.
相似文献
Hans-Ulrich HocheEmail: |
4.
“Ontological emergence” of inherent high-level properties with causal powers is witnessed nowhere. A non-substantialist conception
of emergence works much better. It allows downward causation, provided our concept of causality is transformed accordingly.
相似文献
Michel BitbolEmail: |
5.
Jim Stone 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(2):153-160
Here is a simple counterexample to David Lewis’s causal influence account of causation, one that is especially illuminating
due to its connection to what Lewis himself writes: it is a variant of his trumping example
相似文献
Jim StoneEmail: |
6.
Sandra E. Marshall 《Res Publica》2008,14(4):253-257
Since I do not disagree with the line of argument taken by Kramer and the distinctions he draws between the different ways
rules can be ‘mind-independent’, my comments focus on some of the complexities involved in the application of his distinctions.
I suggest that law, properly understood as a system of rules/conventions is both existentially and observationally weakly mind independent, but nonetheless objective.
相似文献
Sandra E. MarshallEmail: |
7.
Charles B. Cross 《Erkenntnis》2009,70(2):173-188
In this essay I renew the case for Conditional Excluded Middle (CXM) in light of recent developments in the semantics of the
subjunctive conditional. I argue that Michael Tooley’s recent backward causation counterexample to the Stalnaker-Lewis comparative
world similarity semantics undermines the strongest argument against CXM, and I offer a new, principled argument for the validity
of CXM that is in no way undermined by Tooley’s counterexample. Finally, I formulate a simple semantics for the subjunctive
conditional that is consistent with both CXM and Tooley’s counterexample.
相似文献
Charles B. CrossEmail: |
8.
Frank Hofmann 《Erkenntnis》2007,67(2):173-182
Sydney Shoemaker has attempted to save mental causation by a new account of realization. As Brian McLaughlin argues convincingly,
the account has to face two major problems. First, realization does not guarantee entailment. So even if mental properties
are realized by physical properties, they need not be entailed by them. This is the first, rather general metaphysical problem.
A second problem, which relates more directly to mental causation is that Shoemaker must appeal to some kind of proportionality
as a constraint on causation in order to avoid redundant mental causation. I argue that, in addition, a “piling problem” arises,
since causal powers seem to be bestowed twice. Then, I try to sketch an alternative view of the relation between causal powers
and properties—a reductionist view—which fares better on some accounts. But it may have to face another and, perhaps, serious
problem, the “problem of the natural unity of properties”. Finally, I will pose a question about the relation between causal
powers and causation.
相似文献
Frank HofmannEmail: |
9.
Andrew Kania 《Philosophical Studies》2007,135(1):65-71
I discuss Gregory Currie’s taxonomy of explanations of the fictional. On the one hand, there is an important kind of relation
between internal and external explanations of some fictional truths that Currie leaves out, where both are salient and yet
in a relation of harmony with each other. On the other hand, I do not see that he has established that there is a genuine relation of tension between some pairs of internal and external explanations, and thus I question the usefulness of the category of collapse. I also consider a further kind of explanation: the exterior explanation.
相似文献
Andrew KaniaEmail: |
10.
Christian Miller 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(5):551-561
The purpose of this paper is to consider Joshua Gert’s novel view of subjective practical rationality in his book Brute Rationality. After briefly outlining the account, I present two objections to his view and then consider his own objections to a rival
approach to understanding subjective rationality which I take to be much more plausible.
相似文献
Christian MillerEmail: |
11.
Anna Mahtani 《Philosophical Studies》2008,139(2):171-180
Timothy Williamson claims that margin for error principles govern all cases of inexact knowledge. I show that this claim is
unfounded: there are cases of inexact knowledge where Williamson’s argument for margin for error principles does not go through.
The problematic cases are those where the value of the relevant parameter is fixed across close cases. I explore and reject
two responses to my objection, before concluding that Williamson’s account of inexact knowledge is not compelling.
相似文献
Anna MahtaniEmail: |
12.
Rolf Loeber Dustin A. Pardini Alison Hipwell Magda Stouthamer-Loeber Kate Keenan Mark A. Sembower 《Journal of abnormal child psychology》2009,37(6):777-791
Relatively little is known about the factor structure of disruptive behavior among preadolescent girls. The present study
reports on exploratory and confirmatory factor analyses of disruptive girl behavior over four successive data waves as rated
by parents and teachers in a large, representative community sample of girls (N = 2,451). Five factors were identified from parent ratings (oppositional behavior/conduct problems, inattention, hyperactivity/impulsivity,
relational aggression, and callous-unemotional behaviors), and four factors were identified derived from teacher ratings (oppositional
behavior/conduct problems/callous-unemotional behaviors, inattention, hyperactivityimpulsivity, and relational aggression).
There was a high degree of consistency of items loading on equivalent factors across parent and teacher ratings. Year-to-year
stability of factors between ages five and 12 was high for parent ratings (ICC = 0.70 to 0.88), and slightly lower for teacher
ratings (ICC = 0.56 to 0.83). These findings are discussed in terms of possible adjustment to the criteria for children's
disruptive behavior disorders found in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders.
相似文献
Rolf Loeber (Corresponding author)Email: |
Dustin A. PardiniEmail: |
Alison HipwellEmail: |
Magda Stouthamer-LoeberEmail: |
Kate KeenanEmail: |
Mark A. SembowerEmail: |
13.
Stewart Cohen 《Philosophical Studies》2009,144(1):121-125
I raise several objections to Sosa’s account of knowledge as aptness. I argue that aptness is neither necessary nor sufficient
for knowledge. I also raise some objection to Sosa’s treatment of dreaming skepticism.
相似文献
Stewart CohenEmail: |
14.
Daniel E. Flage 《Philosophia》2009,37(3):379-380
This note is a reply to some of Giovanni Grandi’s comments on my paper “Berkeley’s Contingent Necessities.”
相似文献
Daniel E. FlageEmail: |
15.
David Braun 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(2):243-262
I criticized Jeffrey King’s theory of complex demonstratives in “Problems for a Quantificational Theory of Complex Demonstratives.”
King replied in “Complex Demonstratives as Quantifiers: Objections and Replies.” I here comment on some of King’s replies.
相似文献
David BraunEmail: |
16.
Yujin Nagasawa 《Sophia》2007,46(1):65-67
I provide a further response to Jason A. Beyer’s objections to the alleged inconsistency between God’s omniscience and His
other attributes.
相似文献
Yujin NagasawaEmail: |
17.
Ishtiyaque Haji 《Erkenntnis》2008,68(1):1-19
The Direct Argument for the incompatibility of determinism and moral responsibility is so christened because this argument allegedly circumvents
any appeal to the principle of alternate possibilities – a person is morally responsible for doing something only if he could
have avoided doing it – to secure incompatibilism. In this paper, I first summarize Peter van Inwagen’s version of the Direct
Argument. I then comment on David Widerker’s recent responses to the argument. Finally, I cast doubt on the argument by constructing
counterexamples to a rule of inference it invokes.
相似文献
Ishtiyaque HajiEmail: |
18.
Shamik Dasgupta 《Philosophical Studies》2009,145(1):35-67
We naturally think of the material world as being populated by a large number of individuals. These are things, such as my laptop and the particles that compose it, that we describe as being propertied and related
in various ways when we describe the material world around us. In this paper I argue that, fundamentally speaking at least,
there are no such things as material individuals. I then propose and defend an individual-less view of the material world
I call “generalism”.
相似文献
Shamik DasguptaEmail: |
19.
Ira Newman 《Philosophia》2008,36(1):43-54
Philosophers have often applied a distinctively epistemic framework to the question of how moral knowledge can be derived
from fictional literature, by considering how true propositions, or their argumentative support, can be the cognitive fruits
of reading works of fiction. I offer an alternative approach. I focus not on whether readers fail to assent to the truth of
a proposition or fail to provide it rational support. Instead, I focus on how readers fail to accord a truth (which they already
accept) adequate importance in their web of beliefs about living a good human life. This is a form of ignorance, but in the
form of neglect, or failure to pay proper regard – which is one sense of the term ‘forgetfulness’. I argue that works of fictional
literature may, at times, stimulate audience members to overcome their own particular forms of forgetfulness in this respect.
And I use Tolstoy’s The Death of Ivan Ilyich as a case in point.
相似文献
Ira NewmanEmail: |
20.
Jeffrey C. King 《Philosophical Studies》2008,141(2):209-242
In “Complex Demonstratives: A Quantificational Account” (MIT Press 2001) (henceforth CD), I argued that complex demonstratives
are quantifiers. Many philosophers had held that demonstratives, both simple and complex, are referring terms. Since the publication
of CD various objections to the account of complex demonstratives I defended in it have been raised. In the present work,
I lay out these objections and respond to them.
相似文献
Jeffrey C. KingEmail: |