Winnicott's rejection of the basic concepts of Freud's metapsychology1

In this paper, the author attempts to show how Winnicott rejected the basic concepts of Freud's metapsychology, namely the concepts of Trieb(instinct/drive), psychical apparatus and libido. To that purpose, he first elucidates what metapsychology is, according to Freud. Freud describes metapsychology as a speculative superstructure of psychoanalysis in which the aforementioned concepts correspond to the dynamic, topographical and economic viewpoints. The author then presents an explanation of what metapsychology means in Winnicott's view, and examines his criticism of this kind of speculative theorization in psychoanalysis, as well as his suggested substitute for each of those basic concepts. Subsequent analysis shows that Winnicott replaced the main concepts of the metapsychological theory, which have no correlation whatsoever in the phenomenal world, with a set of other, non‐speculative concepts, thereby favouring a factual theorization.     

Freud's metapsychological speculations1

In this paper, the author seeks to analyse the nature and function of metapsychological theory in Freudian psychoanalysis. He shows that Freudian psychoanalytic theory is composed of an empirical part‐the psychology of clinical facts‐and a speculative part‐metapsychology. Freud considers this latter part as being a speculative superstructure of value that is only heuristic, capable of being supplanted by other superstructures of the same type. The author sustains the idea that this metapsychology is the fruit of speculative method, whose foundations were elaborated by philosophers and epistemologists before Freud, including Immanuel Kant and Ernst Mach. He concludes with considerations regarding the future of metapsychological theorisation, presenting criticisms of Freudian metapsychology offered by both philosophers and psychoanalysts, and pointing to the perspective opened by Donald W. Winnicott of a psychoanalysis without metapsychology.     

Winnicott’s foundation for the basic concepts of Freud’s metapsychology?1

In a recent paper, Fulgencio shows how Winnicott rejected the basic speculative concepts of Freud’s metapsychology – Trieb, psychical apparatus and libido – and replaced them with non-speculative concepts that promoted a factual theorization. In this paper, the author examines some of Winnicott’s concepts and attempts to demonstrate how, rather than replacing Freud’s concepts, he provides a factual foundation for the metapsychology in the double dependence of the infant in care. Freud never actually disregards the necessity of early mothering but he takes it for granted. By differentiating between ego needs and id needs, ego-relatedness and id-relatedness, object-mother and environment-mother, Winnicott attempts to theorize what Freud takes for granted: the function of the holding environment as a framework for id-experiences and the function of object-presenting as a condition of reality-testing. Furthermore, by differentiating between pure male and pure female elements, he is also able to construct a highly speculative theorization in order to distinguish two basic principles: doing and being. Although the death drive is clearly rejected, this rejection follows from his theorization of double dependence. Consequently, the author suggests that Winnicott did not discard metapsychological concepts but theorized the conditions for using both these and the intrapsychic topography.     

Early and deep: two independent paradigms?

Did Winnicott replace or transform Freud's metapsychology? The author's aim is to explore more deeply the views developed in a previous paper based solely on Winnicott. Here the author draws on other studies to respond to two questions recently posed by Fulgencio concerning the meaning of the term metapsychology and the existence of a new topography in Winnicott's work. For many authors, Winnicott does not reject Freudian metapsychology and says nothing new in this field; in the field of paediatric anthropology, however, he focuses on dependence, and in the field of the living embodiment of the drives on being and self as different from ego. But Green notes the existence of a third topography, that of self/object, and also examines the vicissitudes of being by isolating the concept in Winnicott's work. For the author, however, being seems in continuity with his whole anthropological and ontological perspective; and when Winnicott introduces environmental factors of which the infant is unaware, he also introduces a heuristic distinction between early and deep: there is thus neither a rejection nor a reformulatation of the metapsychological theorization, but rather a coexistence of two paradigms.     

On the need of fundaments in psychoanalytic thinking

The questions concerning the foundations of psychoanalytic knowledge have been pressing from the beginning. Beside as a therapeutic practice, Freud conceived psychoanalysis as a science, maintaining that like other sciences psychoanalysis should have sound empirical and conceptual fundaments. Freud claimed that there is an inseparable bond (ein Junktim) between cure and acquiring knowledge in psychoanalysis. One of his aims in developing a metapsychology (analogously to metaphysics) was to explicate the conceptual structure of psychoanalytic knowledge. After Freud psychoanalysts have not reached a consensus in the questions concerning the foundations. What kind of foundations does psychoanalytic knowledge need? Are they to be found from the psychoanalytic practice and research on the couch, or rather from metapsychological constructions? In what way should psychoanalysis rely on external scientific research? The article addresses these questions, arguing that even though psychoanalytic work and knowledge do gain justification from various external sources, in the end psychoanalysis stands on its own foundations. It is further argued that especially under the prevailing plurality of theoretical and clinical approaches, psychoanalysis does not have – and does not need – a foundation that could not be further questioned. Thus a coherentist picture of psychoanalysis is defended.     

INCENTIVES FOR A RECONSIDERATION OF THE DEBATE ON METAPSYCHOLOGY3

With a view to establishing an area of metapsychological common ground, the author examines the attempts made by G. S. Klein, Gill and Brenner to interpret Freud's conception of metapsychology. Quoting liberally from the correspondence with Fliess and from works composed at all stages of Freud's career, the author shows that the versions put forward by Klein and Gill do not stand up to scrutiny; the economic aspect on which Freud himself insisted and which Brenner upholds is also found wanting. It is argued that, if the Freudian ‘co‐ordinates’ of metapsychology are to have an epistemological function, they must have a solid foundation in the representational world to which the psychoanalytic process affords access. Whereas this is the case with the topographical, dynamic and structural viewpoints, it is not true of the economic aspect. Energies are stated to exist in the representational world only in the form of affects, so that the economic aspect should, in the author's opinion, be abandoned in favour of an affective one. In the context of the endeavour to obtain pleasure and avoid unpleasure adduced by Freud, this viewpoint would concentrate on the relations between affects and the other key elements of the representational world to which the other metapsychological parameters relate.     

Psychoanalysis and Epistemology: The Interrelation Between Clinical Work,Culture and Metapsychology

The paradigmatic theory of modern epistemology holds psychoanalysis in its scientific statute. Even if there is no explicit epistemology in the Freudian writings, it is undeniable that the genesis of psychoanalysis has a rigorous dialetic between theorization and clinical observation. Metapsychology is an organized and consistent set of concepts, capable of explaining and coordinating the analytical experience. It is through metapsychology that clinical work encounters the possibility of universalization, while metapsychology finds the possibility of fulfillment in clinical work. Clinical experience also confirms the interrelation between psychopathology and culture. Modern times have brought about new versions for psychopathological symptoms, which, in turn, have special effects on the narcisistic personalities and the manifestations of anxiety, giving place to different neurotic configurations.     

Infant observation and the French model

Psychoanalytic training in the French Societies belonging to the International Psychoanalytic Association does not grant any place to the observation of babies as it exists in certain societies of other countries. Infant observation is even the object of sharp critiques by eminent French theoreticians. The reasons given for condemning infant observation and refusing to give it any place in the training programme lie in theoretical positions concerning the very nature of the Freudian discovery and its interpretation, which is more idealistic than empirical. The author discusses these reasons while drawing attention to the frequent confusion between a reference to empiricism and a reference to the experimental. The fear of a psychologizing deviation of metapsychology and of a denial of psychic reality leads, in the French model, to placing the emphasis on personal analytic experience during the candidate's psychoanalysis, prolonged by supervisions. It excludes any academic teaching of metapsychology or of related disciplines. The confusion between the empiricism of Esther Bick's method and the recourse to experimental procedures in developmental research stands in the way of making a place for infant observation and of recognizing its training value, not so much for the acquisition of new knowledge or the validation of metapsychological models, as for its usefulness in developing a mode of psychoanalytic observation and an increase in the candidates' containing capacities.     

Turn of Fortune in Psychoanalysis: The 1924 Rank Debates and the Origins of Hermeneutic Psychoanalysis

The history of psychoanalysis can be characterized by conflicts that besides their personal content meant a closure and an opening in the development of the theorecial and practical (self )understanding of the discipline. The 1923-24 conflict that resulted in the separation of Rank from the movement and showed the first signs of uneasiness against the mainstream of psychoanalysis in Ferenczi's approach is relatively less known. However, its theoretical, or more general: discoursive impact on psychoanalysis was enormous.The debate took place among the top leaders of the movement, Rank and Ferenczi on one side, Jones, Abraham, Sachs on the other. In the center of the discussion there were two books, The Trauma of Birth by Rank and the The Development of Psychoanalysis by Ferenczi and Rank. With the help of documents I try to show that Freud first supported his Vienna-Budapest friends, later changed over to the other camp. As a general effect, I suggest that this debate resulted in the withdrawal from the earlier more hermeneutic-dialogical, therapy centered psychoanalysis toward a medical, objective, systematic and metapsychology oriented discipline. Besides the general theoretical change the power centers of psychoanalysis shifted toward West, Vienna and Budapest was substituted first by Berlin, later by London and New York.     

With Ferenczi,The Contemporary Psychoanalyst is <Emphasis Type="Italic">Other</Emphasis>

Ferenczi's main interests centered on the clinical situation, and through them he felt the need to reformulate, discard and expand many aspects of existing theory to the extent that, in my opinion, he succeeded in constructing a specifically Ferenczian metapsychological conception. After briefly outlining the essentials of Ferenczi's theoretical concepts-highlighting above all the importance given to the interaction with others in psychic configuration and functioning-I go the opposite way, in a "mutatis mutandis" game, "deducing", as though they did not already exist and had to be invented, the technical and clinical approaches implied by this said metapsychology once it is constructed. One conclusion is that a psychoanalysis in tune with Ferenczi's conceptions is different from the one that ruled in the last century and in which a preferably solipsistic reading of Freud was dominant. Moreover, due to reasons that I will attempt to explain, today's psychoanalyst must stop thinking of himself as an absence (this is how I see the so-called "cure type" and others similar to it), and operate as a true other in a vivid relation with the patient.     

A development of Freudian metapsychology for schizophrenia

The author states that psychoanalysis has much to contribute to schizophrenia. Beginning with a development of Freudian metapsychology, he addresses the in‐depth psychopathological study of a session (the first on the couch) with a schizophrenic patient who hears voices and feels that he is being watched. Since the symptoms appear at the level of the heard word and the visual image – key to Freudian metapsychology – he delineates a circuit for the word and one for the image, describing a blockage in both and the consequences of these. Furthermore, with regard to the patient's progress, he demonstrates first a quantitative improvement in symptoms, and later qualitative changes in his functioning. He shows how, over a time, functioning is improved in a once‐a‐week on‐the‐couch setting after two years of face‐to‐face treatment.     

Affect and the therapeutic action of psychoanalysis1

In connection with controversial IJP articles by Stern et al. and Fonagy on the interpretation of the repressed and the recovery of past memories, the author maintains that the affect that is inherent in positive transference is at the heart of therapeutic action. Points of view put forward in the controversy (based on neurobiological knowledge) are related to Freudian metapsychology, as well as to their precursors whose scope was necessarily limited by a lack of access to more recent scientific discoveries. The author demonstrates metapsychological elements of therapeutic action inherent in the intersubjective relationship, especially identification, manifested in introjection and empathy. He describes cognitive development as spontaneously blossoming from the affective nucleus, and he explains the neuroscientic bases of this step forward. The classic (interpretative) psychoanalytic method makes up the cognitive superstructure necessary for the organisation of the mind that has sprung from the affective substructure. As a primary factor in psychic change, interpretation is limited in effectiveness to pathologies arising from the verbal phase, related to explicit memories, with no effect in the pre‐verbal phase where implicit memories are to be found. Interpretation the method used to the exclusion of all others for a century is only partial; when used in isolation it does not meet the demands of modern broad‐spectrum psychoanalysis, as the clinical material presented illustrates.     

Psychic Truth and the In-Session Work of the Analyst

I seek to address one of the issues most affected by the postmodern culture, such as the crisis of rationality and truth, and try to reformulate its place within the psychoanalytic clinic using the contributions of Freud and Ferenczi, who drew the matrix of a passionate dialogue about the truth and the analyst work that has nurtured many contemporary theoretical developments. Essentially, the major influences of postmodern thought in psychoanalysis are to emphasize the importance of the patient–analyst interaction, the role played by the analyst in the patient’s transference and the rejection of the model of the analyst as a distant observer who interprets without having anything to do with whatever happens within the mind of the patient. Consequently, because both postmodernism and psychoanalysis are concerned with human subjectivity and love for truth, although indeed understanding them from different perspectives, both schools of thought become easily interrelated. I conclude that psychoanalysis, committed as it is with the search for truth, cannot ignore the influence of postmodern thought, as well as the postmodernist movement should not disregard all theoretical consistency provided by psychoanalytic theory and metapsychology.     

Out of the consulting room and into the world: hermeneutic dialogue, phronesis, and psychoanalytic theory as practice

One of the relics of positivism has been an underappreciation of the moral and ethical dimensions of psychoanalytic theory and practice. In a positivist metapsychology, cure and therapeutic gain were often defined instrumentally, with relatively little consideration given to aspects of human experience (e.g., moral, cultural, spiritual) that did not fit within a positivist framework. Conceptual and paradigmatic shifts in psychoanalysis have occurred, in part, because of the inability of the classical model to provide a language that adequately captures deeply felt human values and beliefs. Aided by hermeneutic and postmodern influences, many contemporary psychoanalytic theories are beginning to focus greater attention on the notion that analytic therapy is empowered by a set of ethical convictions, beliefs, and commitments, which are tied to a certain understanding of the good life. Along these lines, the author argues that developing a fresh understanding of the moral and ethical dimensions of psychoanalysis requires elaborating a new ontology of human subjectivity and social life. The author offers a sketch of how this gargantuan task might be started by integrating psychoanalysis within a hermeneutic perspective on dialogue, by suggesting that it would be helpful to view psychoanalysis as promoting Aristotelian practical wisdom or phronesis, and by rethinking psychoanalytic theory and interpretation as a form of practice.     

Innen, Außen, Zwischen

The so-called “intersubjective turn” (or “relational turn”) in psychoanalysis is closely associated with the work of Winnicott. It was him who added a new dimension to the psychoanalytic theories of a separate inner world, a dimension focussing on the mediating processes between the separate spheres of psychic and external reality: a space between subject and object, drive and civilisation, Ego and reality — the “potential space” that unconsciously connects our self to the Other as well as to a shared physical and social world we live in. Winnicotts paradoxical notions of the self are traced in this paper and unwrapped from their often enigmatic, developmentally and epistemologically confusing veils: the infant who does not exist without a holding mother; who is not aware of his/her being held because of its evidence, and only has an experience when falling; who him-/herself creates that reality which is already there; who must destroy the object in order to use it; who can only be alone when another person is present. The author, starting from apparently narcissistic phenomena of the media society, rehabilitates the term of “in-between” in contemporary psychoanalytic discussion which for a long time was considered as suspect, as being part of a “non-psychoanalytic” superficial social psychology (as the intersubjective, the interpersonal or the interactive). Under the strong influence of Winnicott, and overarching the different schools, contemporary psychoanalysis is focussing on intersubjectivity and relationality. The paper is an appeal for reformulating classical intrapsychic concepts — including the theory of the unconscious—in intersubjective terms, thus unfolding a relational approach inherent in Freud’s metapsychology.     

Commentary: Psychodynamics and Social Cognition—Notes on the Fusion of Psychoanalysis and Psychology

ABSTRACT Interest in linking psychoanalysis with scientific psychology waxes and wanes. In part, the difficulties have been caused by the preference of psychoanalysts for Freud's clinical theory (and its emphasis on narrative truth) as opposed to his metapsychology (with its requirement for historical truth). Even though contemporary scientific psychology evolved largely independently of psychoanalysis, the articles on object relations, transference, and defense published in this special issue show that the theory remains a source of inspiration, observations, and hypotheses.     

PSYCHOANALYSIS AS APPLIED AESTHETICS

The question of how to place psychoanalysis in relation to science has been debated since the beginning of psychoanalysis and continues to this day. The author argues that psychoanalysis is best viewed as a form of applied art (also termed applied aesthetics) in parallel to medicine as applied science. This postulate draws on a functional definition of modernity as involving the differentiation of the value spheres of science, art, and religion. The validity criteria for each of the value spheres are discussed. Freud is examined, drawing on Habermas, and seen to have erred by claiming that the psychoanalytic method is a form of science. Implications for clinical and metapsychological issues in psychoanalysis are discussed.     

Life within death: Towards a metapsychology of catastrophic psychic trauma

In this paper the author offers a phenomenology and a metapsychology for the effects on the mind of catastrophic psychic trauma, defined as the reaction of the psyche to an utterly external event, which the person is helpless to resist, and against which there is no possible defense. The author affirms that the experience of 'infinite affliction' produces a radical break in being which disarticulates the psyche and causes a headlong descent to the most primitive levels of psychic functioning. When there is a complete surrender to the process of disarticulation, it continues until it extinguishes even the most basic level of mental activity, contact with sensation, producing psychic and then psychogenic death. The author then offers a phenomenological and metapsychological analysis of how the process of disarticulation is stopped so that the state of survival is assured, affirming that, faced with this situation of utter emergency, the survival urge instantly mobilizes the organism in furious activity to preserve life and regenerates psychic activity by sensing the ongoing existence of the psychesoma. Then anguish precipitates on to the body and is sensed as psychophysical pain, which diverts conscious attention from the infinite destruction of utter affliction which is thus encapsulated so that, as an experience, it is no longer present to the mind. This assures survival, but it leaves the psyche in a state of non-integration and begins the unending battle for mastery over the deadly inner object which ceaselessly threatens to become present. This constitutes the precariousness of the state of survival.     

A practitioner's notes on the free-associative method as existential praxis

Freud's pre-1914 texts demonstrate why he consistently asserted that his free-associative method was the sine qua non of his discipline. Prior to 1914, Freud's theorizing was intimately and inextricably connected to his lived experience with the discovery of this method. After 1914, he became more speculative in this thinking and writing; his models of the “mental apparatus” and its functioning drew increasingly on conceptual sources other than his experience with free association. The four fundamental coordinates of his discipline (the methodical disclosure that self-consciousness is repressive, the nonlinear “time of the mind,” the significance of our sensual embodiment or libidinality, and the formation of the repression barrier by the incest taboo) are all closely tied to free-associative experience. By contrast, post-1914 theoretical preoccupations (from object relations to the structural-functional model, and other formulations generated after Freud's life) are comparatively divorced from such experience. These conceptual edifices imply a conventional depiction of the theory–practice relationship, which is radically challenged by free-associative discourse. The notion of praxis is introduced as contesting the prevailing depiction of practice as an application of theory, and as serving to rescue psychoanalysis from the somewhat “sterile debates” over its scientific status and over the relevance of metapsychological speculation to clinical treatment. Against the normative ideology of theory and practice, the lived experience of free-associative discourse, with its potential for change and healing, can only be understood in terms of this notion of praxis, and this justifies Freud's claim to have initiated “a critical new direction in science.”