Communicating a Protesting Protestant Heritage

This article opens by wondering, as many critics did during and after World War II, why a tradition named for its protesting impetus is today often marked by complacency and quietism. In conversation with political theorist William Connolly and Rev. Dr. William Barber's activism, this article suggests that Luther's unique articulation of the communicatio idiomatum might offer a compelling and coherent model for Lutheran ethical‐political agency that can provide an alternative to—rather than reinforcing—the modern isolated subject cum homo economicus often associated with idealized images of Luther's protest before the Diet of Worms.     

Projective identification fifty years on: A personal view

Since its introduction by Melanie Klein in 1946 the concept of projective identification has inspired, baffled, rankled, but always mesmerized its adherents and opponents alike. I offer in this paper a brief outline of the concept's development over the past fifty years by way of some thoughts on a personal journey of discovery surrounding its meaning and clinical usefulness to my work as a child therapist. I would like to suggest that definitions in current use seem to be derived more from adult work than from work with children, which has sometimes skewed the debate surrounding the concept in a particular direction. In both its conceptual guises, namely, as an unconscious 'phantasy' and as an interpersonal feature of the transference, projective identification is a logical extension of certain aspects of Klein's work with small children. In child work too the developmental status of the concept comes more into focus.     

The functional independence of trait self-knowledge: Commentary on Sakaki (2007)

In a recent paper, Sakaki (2007) proposed that Klein and Loftus's conclusion that semantic and episodic trait self-knowledge are functionally independent (e.g., Klein, Babey, & Sherman, 1997; Klein & Loftus, 1993a; Klein, Loftus, Trafton, & Fuhrman, 1992b) was based on questionable assumptions and not supported by the available evidence. In this paper we show that Sakaki (2007) has misinterpreted our position on the independence of self-knowledge, omitted mention of large portions of the relevant research at odds with her contention, and conducted her studies with procedures we explicitly warned against due to interpretive ambiguities associated with their use.     

RETHINKING THE ROLE OF SMALL‐GROUP COLLABORATORS AND ADVERSARIES IN THE LONDON KLEINIAN DEVELOPMENT (1914–1968)

The authors historically situate the London Kleinian development in terms of the small‐group collaborations and adversaries that arose during the course of Melanie Klein's career. Some collaborations later became personally adversarial (e.g., those Klein had with Glover and Schmideberg); other adversarial relationships forever remained that way (with A. Freud); while still other long‐term collaborations became theoretically contentious (such as with Winnicott and Heimann). After the Controversial Discussions in 1944, Klein marginalized one group of supporters (Heimann, Winnicott, and Riviere) in favor of another group (Rosenfeld, Segal, and Bion). After Klein's death in 1960, Bion maintained loyalty to Klein's ideas while quietly distancing his work from the London Klein group, immigrating to the United States in 1968.     

Interpretation as Freud's specific action,and Bion's container‐contained

This is a paper showing how a concept central to the work of Wilfred Bion, and one of Klein's important recommendations concerning the practice of analysis with adults and small children, can both be seen in the light of Freud's earliest formulation of the origin of anxiety and the mother's first responses to her infant in distress. In the paper I suggest that these clinically influential concepts of Klein and Bion show an underlying consistency and affinity with Freud's early ideas about the management of anxiety in the mother‐infant relationship, described in two of his pre‐psychoanalytic writings, How Anxiety Originates (1894b), and The Project for a Scientific Psychology (1950 [1895]). The specific mode of operation of psychoanalytic interpretation is clarified by the comparisons made, with no attempt to suggest that Klein or Bion based their concepts upon these particular early formulations of Freud's.     

On Peter Klein's Concept of Arbitrariness

According to Peter Klein, foundationalism fails because it allows a vicious form of arbitrariness. The present article critically discusses his concept of arbitrariness. It argues that the condition Klein takes to be necessary and sufficient for an epistemic item to be arbitrary is neither necessary nor sufficient. It also argues that Klein's concept of arbitrariness is not a concept of something that is obviously vicious. Even if Klein succeeds in establishing that foundationalism allows what he regards as arbitrariness, this does not yet mean that he confronts it with a sound objection.     

Melanie Klein’s letters addressed to Marcelle Spira (1955–1960)1

Between 1955 and 1960, Melanie Klein wrote some 45 hitherto unpublished letters to Marcelle Spira, the Swiss psychoanalyst living at that time in Geneva. In 2006, after Spira’s death, these letters were deposited with the Raymond de Saussure Psychoanalysis Centre in Geneva. They are the only known letters that Klein addressed to her psychoanalyst colleagues. Several topics are mentioned in them: (1) the meetings between the two women in Geneva and London; (2) Spira’s contribution to Boulanger’s translation into French of The Psychoanalysis of Children, which Klein herself carefully revised; (3) the papers that Klein was at that time working on, including Envy and Gratitude; (4) Spira’s own work; (5) the difficulties that Spira, a Kleinian psychoanalyst who trained in Buenos Aires, was encountering in her attempt to be admitted to the Swiss Psychoanalytical Society; and (6) a few items of personal and family news. In addition to the invaluable historical information that these letters provide, they offer us a very moving epistolary self‐portrait of Melanie Klein, enabling us to discover her personality in the final years of her life – she died in September 1960, just two months after writing her last letter to Spira.     

Melanie Klein and Envy: A Static Totalitarian Script or a Sample of our Protean Theories? Commentary on Paper by Joye Weisel-Barth

I agree with Joye Weisel-Barth's main point. But I regret her impression that Klein “monopolized” envy. In the world of ideas, a concept cannot be appropriated as if it has been bought. We acknowledge the originator, but the concept belongs to our collective heritage. It is open at all hours and there is no entry fee. Quite apart from this, Klein's concept is not simple. I have discussed elsewhere the conflicting currents in her paper on envy and questioned traditional views. But even for Klein herself, envy is never isolated. It is always in a dynamic conflict with love. To my mind, Klein's envy was loaded with a further responsibility: to remind us of the worst in our nature. If we accept the full humanity of our patients, we must remain receptive to their cruelty as well as their love. In my own thinking, envy has a subtle relationship with admiration and is ever shifting on a spectrum, from a point of positive emulation to a point of destructive attack. Lastly, I enjoyed Joye's clinical work. But I expressed deep concern about the paedophilic activities disclosed by the patient.     

Learning and teaching the theories of Melanie Klein

I shall attempt to bring together here thoughts of experienced clinicians and teachers who have taught Melanie Klein's theories to child psychotherapists. However, most of the contributors have also taught Klein to clinical trainees in adult psychoanalytic work and to different groups abroad and, in some cases, to already trained psychotherapists or psychoanalysts. Klein's theories are introduced at different stages in the different child psychotherapy programmes in London. For instance, the students at the Tavistock are introduced to Klein's theories before they are necessarily in their own psychoanalysis, while other trainings introduce her theories in the introductory years of the clinical training.

William Halton is one of the longest-running teachers of Klein in the Tavistock Child Psychotherapy Training and brings his 'framework' culled from many years of experience. Maria Rhode has taught the Narrative to students at the Tavistock for many years. Elizabeth Spillius, psychoanalyst, writer and teacher, brings her experiences teaching Klein to non-Kleinians. Karen Proner teaches at the Tavistock, in Italy and the United States.

TEACHING MELANIE KLEIN William Halton 10 Lincoln Road London N2 9DL     

INCENTIVES FOR A RECONSIDERATION OF THE DEBATE ON METAPSYCHOLOGY3

With a view to establishing an area of metapsychological common ground, the author examines the attempts made by G. S. Klein, Gill and Brenner to interpret Freud's conception of metapsychology. Quoting liberally from the correspondence with Fliess and from works composed at all stages of Freud's career, the author shows that the versions put forward by Klein and Gill do not stand up to scrutiny; the economic aspect on which Freud himself insisted and which Brenner upholds is also found wanting. It is argued that, if the Freudian ‘co‐ordinates’ of metapsychology are to have an epistemological function, they must have a solid foundation in the representational world to which the psychoanalytic process affords access. Whereas this is the case with the topographical, dynamic and structural viewpoints, it is not true of the economic aspect. Energies are stated to exist in the representational world only in the form of affects, so that the economic aspect should, in the author's opinion, be abandoned in favour of an affective one. In the context of the endeavour to obtain pleasure and avoid unpleasure adduced by Freud, this viewpoint would concentrate on the relations between affects and the other key elements of the representational world to which the other metapsychological parameters relate.     

On ‘the fear of death’ as the primary anxiety: How and why Klein differs from Freud

It is well known that Melanie Klein held the view that ‘fear of death’ is the primary source of anxiety and that her position is explicitly opposed to that of Sigmund Freud, who maintained that that fear cannot in any way or form be a source of anxiety. In a previous article on Freud's Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (Blass, 2013), the author argued that, counter to what is commonly portrayed in the literature, Freud's considerations for rejecting the fear of death as a source of anxiety were based on relational and experiential factors that are usually associated with Kleinian psychoanalysis. In light of this affinity of Freud with Klein a question arises as to the actual source of their differences in this context. The present paper offers an answer to this question. The author first presents some of her earlier findings on what led Freud to reject the fear of death as a source of anxiety and then turns to investigate Klein's considerations for accepting it. This takes us beyond her explicit statements on this matter and sheds new light on the relationship of her views regarding death and anxiety and those of Freud. In turn this deepens the understanding of the relationship of Freud and Klein's conceptualizations of the psyche and its internal object relations, pointing to both surprising common ground and foundational differences.     

Introduction to Nina Farhi's “Hands of the Living God: ‘Finding the Familiar in the Unfamiliar’”

In this Introduction we set the project in a particular moment of mourning. We describe the experience of engaging with Nina Farhi to publish her paper, recounting and reworking an early and famous analysis conducted by Marion Milner. Farhi's unexpected and untimely death just at the point of developing this extended project has cast a pall over the subsequent work. We detail the history of Farhi and Milner's contribution; her influences from Winnicott, Klein, and Ghent; and her radical extension of Milner's own ideas. We survey, in this Introduction the dialogue, in two iterations, of Jeanne Wolff Bernstein, Dodi Goldman, and Avgi Sekatepoulou. We describe the distinct but interwoven dialogues among these three writers, each concerned in different ways with aspects of Farhi's and, earlier, of Milner's project. We record also the work of Jean White, who stakes out a less mournful and more celebratory aspect of Nina Farhi's and Marion Milner's work and the tradition in psychoanalysis that they represent.     

Unconscious phantasy as a structural principle and organizer of mental life: The evolution of a concept from Freud to Klein and some of her successors

Starting with Freud's discovery of unconscious phantasy as a means of accessing his patients’ internal world, the author discusses the evolution of the concept in the work of Melanie Klein and some of her successors. Whereas Freud sees phantasy as a wish fulfilling imagination, dominated by primary process functioning and kept apart from reality testing, Klein understands phantasies as a structural function and organizer of mental life. From their very beginnings they involve object relations and gradually evolve from primitive body‐near experiences to images and symbolic representations. With her concept of projective identification in particular, Klein anticipates the communicative function of unconscious phantasies. They are at the basis of processes of symbolization, but may also be put into the service of complex defensive operations. The author traces the further evolution of the concept from the contributions of S. Isaacs, the theories of thinking proposed by W.R. Bion and R. Money‐Kyrle, Hanna Segal's ideas on symbolization and reparation all the way to the latest approaches by R. Britton, J. Steiner and others, including the understanding of transference and counter‐transference as a ‘total situation’. Points of contact with Freud are to be found particularly in connection with his concept of ‘primal phantasies’. In the author's view, the idea of the transmission and communicative potential of unconscious phantasies enabled these authors to overcome the solipsistic origins of drive theory in favour of a notion in which unconscious phantasies both set down the coordinates of the inner world and form and reflect the matrix of inter‐subjective relations.     

Emotions as practice: Anna Freud's child psychoanalysis and thinking–doing children's emotional geographies

The paper introduces Anna Freud's early writing from the perspective of the theory and practice of children's emotional geographies. Discussing especially Freud's view on the theory of defence mechanisms and her early arguments with Melanie Klein about the nature of the child's mind, it explores how children's emotions can be approached beyond children's own representational accounts of their emotional experiences. The paper advocates an engagement with Anna Freud's work and psychoanalysis that would account for different forms of knowledge produced in the intersubjective processes of research and for the significance of the relationships with child participants.     

More than a feeling: Wittgenstein and William James on love and other emotions

One of the most significant features of Wittgenstein's Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology (written after he had completed most of the Philosophical Investigations) is his reflections on emotions. Wittgenstein's treatment of this topic was developed in direct response to his reading of William James’s chapter on emotions in his 1890 masterpiece, The Principles of Psychology. This paper examines the competing views of emotions that emerge in these works, both of which attempt to overcome the Cartesian dualist conception in different ways. The main point of disagreement concerns the relation between emotions and their bodily expression (e.g. the relation between grief and weeping). My interpretation focuses on Wittgenstein's remarks on the emotion of love because, I argue, it is a particularly problematic case. To elucidate his largely unexplored view of love, I draw on his remarks on understanding and criteria in the Philosophical Investigations. I argue that by examining the examples of complex emotions like love, we can arrive at a more accurate characterization of Wittgenstein's general view of mental concepts and mental phenomena.     

Elements of the Oedipus complex: A Kleinian account1

The author discusses and illustrates the place in current Kleinian practice of the analysis of the Oedipus complex. He outlines the development of the concept of the Oedipus complex by Freud and by Klein and later writers in the Kleinian tradition. Because the child's exclusion from his parents' sexual relationship represents such a fundamental aspect of reality for the child, analysis of the patient's responses to the oedipal situation constitutes the central task of analysis. Despite the Oedipus complex being in this way central, it is sometimes hard to discern because what is most visible are the patient's defensive responses to the oedipal situation. The emergence of meaning in analysis is often understood unconsciously as the product of the parental intercourse, represented by the work of the patient with the analyst, or of the analyst's or the patient's mind. The analysis of the patient's characteristic reactions to moments of meaningfulness in analysis is therefore an especially fruitful focus for the analysis of the Oedipus complex. The author illustrates these ideas by three clinical examples, from a 3½‐year‐old child, a borderline psychotic patient and a more neurotic patient.     

Individuals and their environments

While affirming Craig Martin's analysis of how the language of spiritual freedom celebrates individual agency in a way that deflects attention from the institutional conditions that produce individuals, this essay wonders whether there are useful distinctions to be made among people who Martin reads as sharing uncritical appraisals of capitalist individualism. On the question of the relationship between individuals and social contexts, for example, William James's assessment of the role played by social and natural environments might distinguish him from contemporary subjects who describe themselves as "spiritual but not religious" and who seek to transcend institutional constraints to gain personal freedom. Different responses to alienation suggest that there might be some role for individual creativity and criticism as resources for imagining institutional change.     

Reading between the lines: The child's fear of meaning

This paper explores the emotional factors that lie behind a child's failure to read. My observations are based on work as an educational therapist employed in a child guidance unit. In trying to understand the reasons for the child's neurotic reluctance to learn, the following sources have proved helpful: Klein on envy; Bowlby on the effect on the child of a relationship with an untrustworthy adult; and Bettelheim's Learning to Read. In conclusion some ways are examined in which the child can be helped to overcome his fear of the meaning of words.