自我肯定研究述评

自我肯定是指通过肯定与威胁信息无关领域的自我价值,来维持自我整体性,从而降低防御反应。它可以通过完成自我价值观量表、描述重要的个人价值等方式来进行实验操纵。经过自我肯定的个体能更加客观、公正地处理威胁自我认同和群体认同的信息,促进个体的成长。这些作用可能是通过系统地思考说服信息的中央路径的认知加工来实现的。在未来的研究中,对个体最重要价值威胁情况下的自我肯定效应、自我肯定效应的多种机制的共同作用、自我肯定效应与群体肯定效应的区分以及自我与群体肯定效应的跨文化比较等方面还有待进一步的研究。     

特质敬畏对亲社会倾向的正向预测：自我超越和共情的多重中介作用

敬畏对内能影响个体的精神世界,实现自我超越,对外能使个体更多地关注他人;且自我超越也能促进个体对他人的共情关注。但目前还未有实证研究探讨敬畏是否能通过共情以及自我超越−共情的中介预测亲社会倾向。为检验这一假设,本研究招募了1347名大学生并测量了其敬畏特质、自我超越、共情和亲社会倾向。结果显示：（1）敬畏、自我超越、共情和亲社会倾向各维度两两相关显著;（2）敬畏直接预测亲社会倾向各维度,也能通过自我超越和共情的多重中介间接预测,且自我超越的中介效应最大。本研究从内、外因素进一步深化了对敬畏与亲社会倾向关系的认识,频繁的敬畏体验有助于提升个体的自我超越及对他人的共情关注,促进亲社会倾向。     

特质自我控制及其策略对主观幸福感的影响

探讨特质自我控制对主观幸福感的影响机制。多重中介模型揭示自我控制策略在特质自我控制(TSC)与主观幸福感(SWB)之间的作用。对924名大学生进行问卷调查,结果表明:情境选择、注意分配、认知重评均为TSC与SWB之间的中介变量。结论:解释了高特质自我控制个体SWB高的内在机制,也为自我控制过程模型提供实证支持。     

朋友支持与大学生幸福感：自我效能感的中介与社会比较倾向的调节

为探讨朋友支持与幸福感的关系,并重点关注自我效能感和社会比较倾向在其中所起的作用,该研究采用总体幸福感量表、一般自我效能感量表、社会比较观念量表和朋友支持评价量表对776位大学生进行施测。结果表明：（1）朋友支持正向预测大学生幸福感;自我效能感在两者间起中介作用;（2）社会比较倾向调节了社会支持→自我效能感→幸福感的后半段,即相对于高社会比较倾向的大学生而言,自我效能感对低社会比较倾向大学生的幸福感促进作用更强。该结果揭示了朋友支持影响大学生幸福感的内在机制：朋友支持和大学生幸福感之间是有调节的中介关系,朋友支持通过自我效能感影响幸福感,社会支持对间接效应起调节作用。     

大学生勇气与主观幸福感的关系:一个有调节的中介模型

在健全人格理论基础上构建有调节的中介模型,探讨勇气影响大学生主观幸福感的中介机制及其调节因素。采用整群抽样法选取重庆市550名18～28岁大学生为调查对象,让其自我报告勇气、主观幸福感、社会取向自我价值感等情况。多元回归分析表明：（1）大学生勇气对主观幸福感有显著正向预测作用。（2）大学生勇气通过社会取向自我价值感的中介作用间接影响主观幸福感。（3）该间接效应受到性别的调节,即女生的间接效应比男生更显著。研究结果验证了中国文化背景下大学生勇气具有预测主观幸福感的功能,并一定程度上揭示了二者关系背后可能的作用机制。     

自传体叙事中的自我欺骗:个体的自我认同策略

自传体叙事中的自我欺骗是一种从个体内角度理解的自我欺骗,是无人际压力情况下个体自我建构过程中所使用的一种认同策略。这种自我欺骗发生在自传体叙事过程中,个体通过叙事语言拉开"新我"和"旧我"的叙事距离,建立新的目标追求并实现,最终构建新的叙事认同。在这个过程中,个体在维持正性自我概念的动机驱动下,采用有偏差的信息加工方式叙述自我故事,满足情绪体验与情绪评价一致性的需要,进而影响个体的自我意识,引发自我改变。未来研究可以探讨自传体叙事中自我欺骗在临床中的行为表现与治疗策略,考察其认知神经机制,并探讨不同社会文化背景下自我欺骗的特点与影响因素。     

“面子”定义探新

面子研究是中国国民性研究的基础性内容。通过面子现象的要素归纳和面子行为的归因分析,借鉴面子既有定义的合理思想,给出了全新的面子定义。面子是个体藉由行为或社会性资源展现其自我价值,寻求他人的确认且受到意外的认同时,凸现于个体内心的自我价值感与相应体验。面子实质上是个体对自我在他人心中的价值与地位的关注,自我价值是面子的内核,社会性资源是面子的象征。自我价值的认同诉求与回应的冲突即评价冲突是面子产生的直接诱因。个体在交往中表现“相符行为”或允许他人利用自己的社会性资源是赢得面子的基本途径。确认个体价值的“他人取向”是面子现象的社会根源。     

家庭仪式与大学生幸福感的关系：社会联结与自我控制的链式中介作用

研究探讨了家庭仪式对大学生幸福感的影响及其机制。基于自我控制理论,研究构建了以社会联结和自我控制为链式中介的家庭仪式影响幸福感的假设模型,并采用修订的家庭仪式问卷、社会联结量表、自我控制量表和幸福感量表对675名大学生进行了问卷调查。结果发现,家庭仪式与社会联结、自我控制、幸福感呈显著正相关,社会联结与自我控制在家庭仪式促进幸福感的关系中发挥链式中介作用。     

吉登斯的现代性自我认同品格思想研究

自我认同品格是吉登斯用来指称现代性社会主体应该具有的保障人的本体性安全的基本能力,这种能力可以应对并化解断裂、风险等晚期现代性社会造成的对人的安全威胁。由于人的本体安全所植根的自我认同机制,正在由过去更多地指向外部的传统转向了指向自我内部,因此,认识自我认同品格的一般性生成结构、这种结构与自我互构的社会情境之间的关系以及体现主体社会充分性的身份媒介,共同构成了自我认同品格塑造的主要内容,而自我认同的能力或要素更是建构自我认同品格独特性的关键。自我认同品格蕴含了自我与外部世界联系的社会实践或实践能力,架起了本体安全与自我实现的桥梁,是自我认同实现机制的能力要素和特殊性的缘由。     

全纳教育教师职业使命感对工作幸福感的影响：自我效能感的中介效应

为探讨全纳教育教师职业使命感对工作幸福感的影响机制,采用整群抽样方法选取京津冀地区的全纳教育教师共378名为被试,使用职业使命感量表、自我效能感量表和工作幸福感量表进行问卷调查。研究发现：（1）职业使命感、自我效能感和工作幸福感之间均呈显著正相关;（2）职业使命感对工作幸福感有显著的正向影响;（3）全纳教育教师的自我效能感在职业使命感对工作幸福感的影响中起部分中介作用。研究表明,积极塑造全纳教育教师的职业使命感,提升自我效能感,可以有效提升全纳教育教师的工作幸福体验。     

重大突发事件下价值观与幸福感的变化:基于潜变量增长和交叉滞后模型

对1495名被试的价值观与幸福感进行了三个时间点的追踪研究,通过潜变量增长模型和交叉滞后回归模型,考察重大突发事件下价值观与幸福感的变化及其相互作用。结果发现:(1)T1到T3民众的自我超越价值观显著下降,保守和开放价值观显著上升;(2)T2到T3民众的幸福感显著下降;(3)T2自我超越价值观正向预测T3幸福感,T2自我增强价值观负向预测T3幸福感;(4)T2幸福感正向预测T3自我超越和保守价值观,负向预测T3自我增强和开放价值观。该结果为今后重大突发事件下的价值观引导提供了实证依据。     

National Valuing of Character Strengths and Indicators of National Development: A Pilot Study

Character strengths are personal qualities that have communal value and have been linked to personal happiness and well-being. Little research has investigated the degree to which strengths are valued across nations. Similarly, while certain strengths have been associated with indicators of well-being on an individual level, it is yet to be explored which strengths are associated with indicators of national development and well-being. The present study examined the relationship between perceived national valuing of character strengths and key national indicators. A sample of 2119 adults from 84 countries were asked to rate the extent to which each of 24 character strengths is valued by their country. Strength ratings were then compared to indices of national functioning: happiness, freedom, corruption, and gross domestic product per capita measured at purchasing power parity (GDP). The strengths the participants perceived as valued by their countries differed from their self-evaluations of their character strengths. Bravery was the most valued strength across all geographic regions and countries, and humility was the least. Valuing of humor was most consistently and strongly related to happiness. GDP was associated with less prudence, kindness, fairness, and honesty, and more bravery, perseverance, and spirituality. Greater honesty was reflective of less corruption. Freedom was inconsistently related to valuations of strengths. This study should be considered a pilot given its limitations, but it suggests the degree to which a society values certain socially important person variables does not appear to affect individual expression of character strengths, but may be related to national functioning.

     

Can seeking happiness make people unhappy? [corrected] Paradoxical effects of valuing happiness

Happiness is a key ingredient of well-being. It is thus reasonable to expect that valuing happiness will have beneficial outcomes. We argue that this may not always be the case. Instead, valuing happiness could be self-defeating, because the more people value happiness, the more likely they will feel disappointed. This should apply particularly in positive situations, in which people have every reason to be happy. Two studies support this hypothesis. In Study 1, female participants who valued happiness more (vs. less) reported lower happiness when under conditions of low, but not high, life stress. In Study 2, compared to a control group, female participants who were experimentally induced to value happiness reacted less positively to a happy, but not a sad, emotion induction. This effect was mediated by participants' disappointment at their own feelings. Paradoxically, therefore, valuing happiness may lead people to be less happy just when happiness is within reach.     

How successfully can we measure well-being through measuring happiness?

Happiness is currently the topic of a wide range of empirical research, and is increasingly becoming the focus of public policy. The interest in happiness largely stems from its connection with well-being. We care about well-being – how well our lives are going for us. If we are happy it seems that, to some extent, we must be doing well. This suggests that we may be able to successfully measure well-being through measuring happiness. The problem is that both happiness and well-being are elusive and their measurement is far from uncontroversial. What exactly does information about happiness tell us about well-being? Is there more to well-being than happiness? If so, to what extent is happiness connected to well-being? These are controversial questions, but answers to them must be given if we are to make progress in the measurement of well-being. I argue that we should view happiness as an indicator of changes in well-being. I call this the Indicator View. According to this view, someone can be doing badly yet be happy insofar as their well-being is improving (and vice versa). More precisely, the Indicator View is the view that happiness is a defeasible indicator of local changes in well-being. Thus, we can successfully measure an important aspect of well-being through measuring happiness. I argue in favour of this view on the basis of an understanding of well-being that is widely acceptable. The Indicator View, therefore, has the potential to unite divided opinion over what happiness research can tell us about well-being.     

Happiness is not Well-Being

This paper attempts to explain the conceptual connections between happiness and well-being. It first distinguishes episodic happiness from happiness in the personal attribute sense. It then evaluates two recent proposals about the connection between happiness and well-being: (1) the idea that episodic happiness and well-being both have the same fundamental determinants, so that a person is well-off to a particular degree in virtue of the fact that they are happy to that degree, and (2) the idea that happiness in the personal attribute sense can serve as a “proxy” for well-being, i.e., that a person’s degree of deep or robust happiness approximates their degree of well-being. It is argued that happiness in both these senses is conceptually, metaphysically, and empirically distinct from well-being. A new analysis of welfare, well-being as agential flourishing, can explain welfare’s real connection to happiness in both the episodic and personal attribute senses. It predicts that such happiness is only directly beneficial when it is valued, when it is a form of valuing, or when it underwrites (i.e., serves as the causal basis for) the disposition to realize one’s values. It is therefore a necessary—but not sufficient—condition for especially high levels of well-being. This analysis of welfare integrates many insights from the eudaimonic tradition of welfare and happiness research in psychology, and also addresses common criticisms of these eudaimonic models.     

Beyond the hedonic treadmill: revising the adaptation theory of well-being

According to the hedonic treadmill model, good and bad events temporarily affect happiness, but people quickly adapt back to hedonic neutrality. The theory, which has gained widespread acceptance in recent years, implies that individual and societal efforts to increase happiness are doomed to failure. The recent empirical work outlined here indicates that 5 important revisions to the treadmill model are needed. First, individuals' set points are not hedonically neutral. Second, people have different set points, which are partly dependent on their temperaments. Third, a single person may have multiple happiness set points: Different components of well-being such as pleasant emotions, unpleasant emotions, and life satisfaction can move in different directions. Fourth, and perhaps most important, well-being set points can change under some conditions. Finally, individuals differ in their adaptation to events, with some individuals changing their set point and others not changing in reaction to some external event. These revisions offer hope for psychologists and policy-makers who aim to decrease human misery and increase happiness.     

Subjective Well-Being and Policy

This paper analyses whether the aggregation of individual happiness scores to a National Happiness Index can still be trusted once governments have proclaimed their main objective to be the pursuit—or even maximization—of this National Happiness Index. The answer to this investigation is clear-cut: as soon as the National Happiness Index has become a policy goal, it can no longer be trusted to reflect people’s true happiness. Rather, the Index will be systematically distorted due to the incentive for citizens to answer strategically and the incentive for government to manipulate the Index in its favour. Such a distortion would arise even if the measurement of subjective well-being correctly reflected actual happiness before the intervention of government. Governments in a democracy should establish the conditions enabling individuals to become happy. The valuable and important results of happiness research should be introduced into the political process. Each person should be free to pursue happiness according to his or her preferences. This process is supported by obedience to the rule of law, human rights and free media, as well as by extended political participation rights, decentralized public decision-making, an open and effective education system fostering upward mobility and the possibility to find suitable employment.     

Happiness and well-being: shifting the focus of the current debate

The point of departure of this paper is the recently emphasised distinction between psychological theories of happiness, on the one hand, and normative theories of well-being, on the other. With this distinction in mind, I examine three possible kinds of relation that might exist between (psychological) happiness and (normative) well-being; to wit, happiness may be understood as playing a central part in (1) a formal theory of well-being, (2) a substantive theory of well-being or (3) as an indicator for well-being. I note that, in the relevant literature, happiness is mostly discussed in terms of either (1) or (2). In this paper, I attempt to motivate a shift of focus away from such accounts of happiness and towards (3), i.e. its epistemic role. When examined in connection to (normative) well-being, (psychological states of) happiness and unhappiness should be understood as psychological states that inform individuals about the contribution of various activities, pursuits, or situations to their well-being or ill-being.     

Area-Level Income Inequality and Individual Happiness: Evidence from Japan

In this study, we investigated how area-level income inequality is associated with an individual’s assessment of happiness, based on micro-level data sourced from nationwide surveys in Japan. It was confirmed from our analysis using logit models that individuals who live in areas of high income inequality tend to report themselves as being less happy, even after controlling for various individual and area-level factors. The association between inequality and happiness is modestly significant, regardless of the choice of covariates at an individual level, and stronger at a lower level of perceived happiness. Moreover, sensitivity to inequality differs substantially according to certain individual attributes. Among others, an important implication for social policy is that those with unstable occupational status are more sensitive to inequality. Given that these people tend to be less happy than others, this result indicates the risk that area-level inequality further reduces the well-being of those with unfavorable employment conditions.     

Impact of psychoeducational content delivered online to a positive psychology aware community

Happiness-increasing interventions demonstrate significant variation in outcomes, suggesting that the people who use them might be as important as the interventions themselves to determine efficacy. In light of this, instructive interventions might not be necessary to increase happiness given a population with knowledge of happiness-increasing strategies. We recruited 270 participants with knowledge of positive psychology to receive six weeks of online psychoeducation. We explored participants’ use of the website, reported use of happiness strategies, and changes in well-being. Those who spent more time on the website reported smaller changes in well-being than those who spent less time on the website. Conversely, those who reported employing more happiness strategies reported greater increases in well-being than those who used fewer strategies. This shows that for those already familiar with positive psychology, information, rather than instruction, might increase well-being. This has implications for studies evaluating the efficacy of happiness-increasing interventions more broadly.