The question of the other in French phenomenology

I would like to show how with Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Levinas, we have to do with three different ways of understanding the experience of the other. For Sartre it is a visual experience, the experience of being looked at by the other, so that the experience of the other is understood as a confrontation; for Merleau-Ponty, the experience of the other necessarily implies coexistence and what he calls “intercorporeality,” so that for him the other is never to be found in front, but instead beside me, in reciprocity with me; for Levinas, the experience of the other is the experience of a non-reciprocity, of an assymetrical relation, because the experience of the other is for him an ethical and not an ontological experience, and because this experience of the face of the other is the experience of a speaking and not in the first place corporeal presence. There are consequently three different ways of finding an access to the other : the look for Sartre, intercorporeality for Merleau-Ponty and the face for Levinas.     

Remotely Close Associations: Openness to Experience and Semantic Memory Structure

Openness to experience—the enjoyment of novel experiences and ideas—has many connections to cognitive processes. People high in openness to experience, for example, tend to be more creative and have broader general knowledge than people low in openness to experience. In the current study, we use a network science approach to examine if the organization of semantic memory differs between high and low groups of openness to experience. A sample of 516 adults completed measures of openness to experience (from the NEO Five‐Factor Inventory‐3 and Big Five Aspect Scales) and a semantic verbal fluency task. Next, the sample was split into half to form high (n = 258) and low (n = 258) openness to experience groups. Semantic networks were then constructed on the basis of their verbal fluency responses. Our results revealed that the high openness to experience group's network was more interconnected, flexible, and had better local organization of associations than the low openness to experience group. We also found that the high openness to experience group generated more responses on average and provided more unique responses than the low openness to experience group. Taken together, our results indicate that openness to experience is related to semantic memory structure. © 2018 European Association of Personality Psychology     

OAKESHOTT ON THE CHARACTER OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE: NEED THERE BE A CONFLICT BETWEEN SCIENCE AND RELIGION?

Michael Oakeshott reflected on the character of religious experience in various writings throughout his life. In Experience and Its Modes (1933) he analyzed science as a distinctive “mode,” or account of experience as a whole, identifying those assumptions necessary for science to achieve its coherent account of experience in contrast to other modes of experience whose quests for coherence depend on different assumptions. Religious experience, he thought, was integral to the practical mode. The latter experiences the world as interminable tension between what is and what ought to be. The question, Is there a conflict between science and religion? is, in Oakeshott's approach, the question, Is there a conflict between the scientific mode of experience and the practical mode? Insofar as we tend to treat every question as a practical one, these questions seem to make sense. But Oakeshott's analysis leads to the view that scientific experience and religious experience are categorically different accounts of experience abstracted from the whole of experience. They are voices of experience that may speak to each other, but they are not ordered hierarchically. Nor can either absorb the other without insoluble contradictions.     

Talking About a Gracious God: Speaking of God out of Experience

Talking about a gracious God in a meaningful way calls for a recognition of one's experience. Discovering a gracious God changed Luther's way of doing theology, and demonstrates how Luther's theology was shaped by his experience. Feminist theologians have made a conscious appeal to women's experience, particularly their experience of violence within a patriarchal social structure. This particular experience has to shape how we talk about a gracious God to victims/survivors of violence against women.     

The particularity and phenomenology of perceptual experience

I argue that any account of perceptual experience should satisfy the following two desiderata. First, it should account for the particularity of perceptual experience, that is, it should account for the mind-independent object of an experience making a difference to individuating the experience. Second, it should explain the possibility that perceptual relations to distinct environments could yield subjectively indistinguishable experiences. Relational views of perceptual experience can easily satisfy the first but not the second desideratum. Representational views can easily satisfy the second but not the first desideratum. I argue that to satisfy both desiderata perceptual experience is best conceived of as fundamentally both relational and representational. I develop a view of perceptual experience that synthesizes the virtues of relationalism and representationalism, by arguing that perceptual content is constituted by potentially gappy de re modes of presentation.     

Attitudes towards cancer as a function of experience with the disease: A test of three models

Abstract

The present study develops and tests three models that can account for the relationship between cancer attitudes and experience with the disease. Individuals were classified according to the extent of their experience with cancer: personal experience, familial experience and minimal experience. In three studies, each using a different sample and different method of attitude measurement, it was found that those with personal cancer experience held the most positive attitudes towards cancer, while those with familial cancer experience held the most negative attitudes. These findings are consistent with the predictions of the proposed dual process model. Results are discussed in terms of the importance of understanding the impact that cancer attitudes have on the physical and emotional management of the disease.     

THE VARIETIES OF NON‐RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

I want to consider the suggestion that certain essential components of human experience are by their nature distinctively religious, and thus that the atheist is either debarred from participating fully in such experiences, or fails to understand their real nature. I am going to look at five kinds of experience:

• ? the experience of the moral ‘ought’;
• ? the experience of beauty;
• ? the experience of meaning conferred by stories;
• ? the experience of otherness and transcendence;
• ? the experience of vulnerability and fragility.

These seem to me to be integral features of any meaningful human life. They are aspects of what it is to be human. Some theists would simply agree with that statement. Others, however, would say that though essentially human they are also essentially religious, and that the secular humanist's participation in such experiences is in some way defective. That is the claim which I want to consider and contest.     

Sense and Sensibility Educated: A Note on Experience and (Minimal) Empiricism

Abstract

McDowell’s minimal empiricism holds that experience, understood as providing conceptually articulated contents, plays a role in the justification of our beliefs. We question this idea by contrasting the role of perceptual experience in moral and non-moral judgments and conclude that experience per se is irrelevant in the former case and should also be so in the latter one: only with the help of adequate beliefs experience can provide a connection with the world. We conclude with some remarks concerning the importance of experience.     

Pragmatism and Radical Empiricism

A rational reconstruction of James's doctrine of pure experience is attempted, showing how it can be formulated in terms of a Ramsey sentence so that its credibility is comparable to contemporary functionalism about the mind. Whereas functionalism treats only mental predicates as theoretical terms and quantifies over physical objects, Jamesian 'global-functionalism' treats both mental and physical predicates as theoretical terms and quantifies over pure experience. Rehabilitated in this way, the doctrine of pure experience is a fit partner for Jamesian pragmatism. When James says that pragmatism guides us in the course of our experience, this 'experience' must be understood as ultimately pure experience. Pure experience is just what appears , pre-conceptually, and Ramsey-sentence analysis shows how James's employment of the pre-conceptual demonstrative that can refer to pure experience with conditions of identity given by its physical or mental properties, while being itself 'colourless', neither mental nor physical. It is concluded that functionalists about the mind have reason to be global-functionalists about mind and body, in just the way that James's doctrine of pure experience lays out; and Jamesian pragmatists should also accept his radical empiricism.     

Experience and Distribution of Attention: Pet Exposure and Infants’ Scanning of Animal Images

Although infants’ cognitions about the world must be influenced by experience, little research has directly assessed the relation between everyday experience and infants’ visual cognition in the laboratory. Eye-tracking procedures were used to measure 4-month-old infants’ eye movements as they visually investigated a series of images. Infants with pet experience (N = 27) directed a greater proportion of their looking at the most informative region of animal stimuli—the head—compared with infants without such experience (N = 21); the two groups of infants did not differ in their scanning of images of human faces or vehicles. Thus, infants’ visual cognitions are influenced by everyday experience, and theories of cognitive development in infancy must account for the effect of experience on development.     

Sensibility and the otherness of the world: Levinas and Merleau-Ponty

Sensibility has traditionally been defined as a relation with the world’s exteriority. However, a certain post-husserlian phenomenology tends to reverse this definition and to redefine sensibility as an internal relation that takes place from within the world. This article focuses on this phenomenological concept of “sensibility” in Levinas and Merleau-Ponty and intends to show that this concept rests upon the presupposition of an alternative according to which we would have whether a sensible experience of identity, or an acosmic experience of otherness—whether a wordly experience of the same or a worldless experience of otherness. Yet, by reducing sensibility to the experience of the world’s interiority and rejecting otherness beyond any worldly experience, this conception fails to account for a significant dimension of sensibility—namely, sensibility as the experience of the world’s own otherness, foreignness or exteriority. It is our hope that, from the critical exposition of this alternative, will eventually appear in conclusion the significant part of this forgotten dimension of sensibility.

     

Renewing the senses: conversion experience and the phenomenology of the spiritual life

In his discussion of conversion experience, in The Varieties of Religious Experience, William James draws attention to a variety of experience which has not been much investigated in the philosophy of religion literature, but which seems to be of some importance religiously??namely, an experience which consists in a re-vivification of the sensory world as a whole. In this paper, I develop four accounts of the nature of this kind of experience, and I show how the experience can inform our conception of the spiritual life, considered as a world-directed mode of experience and practice.     

A Philosophical Audacity: Barth's Notion of Experience between Neo‐Kantianism and Nietzsche

This article addresses Barth's dialectical notion of experience in the 1920s. I argue that the theoretical problem raised by recent studies on Barth's notion of experience after his break with liberalism (i.e. the apparent inconsistency between Barth's move towards an increasingly neo‐Kantian understanding of experience and his emphasis on the existential and psychological dimensions of experience) can be solved by the hypothesis of a Nietzschean influence on Barth's epistemology in the 1920s. I defend not only the historical plausibility but also the conceptual fecundity of such a hypothesis, which casts a new light on Barth's relation to philosophy and the notion of experience, and lays the basis for a consistent Barthian theology of experience.     

Perceiving subjectivity in bodily movement: The case of dancers

This paper is about one of the puzzles of bodily self-consciousness: can an experience be both and at the same time an experience of one′s physicality and of one′s subjectivity? We will answer this question positively by determining a form of experience where the body′s physicality is experienced in a non-reifying manner. We will consider a form of experience of oneself as bodily which is different from both “prenoetic embodiment” and “pre-reflective bodily consciousness” and rather corresponds to a form of reflective access to subjectivity at the bodily level. In particular, we argue that subjectivity is bodily expressed, thereby allowing the experience of the body′s subjectivity directly during perceptual experiences of the body. We use an interweaving of phenomenological explorations and ethnographical methods which allows validating this proposal by considering the experience of body experts (dancers).     

Iterated Non‐Refutation: Robert Lockie on Relativism 1

Abstract

I argue that an experience’s sensuous elements play an ineliminable role in our being intentionally directed upon an entity through perception. More specifically, I argue that whenever we appreciate a sensuous element in experience, we appreciate an intrinsic and irreducibly phenomenal aspect of experience that I call phenomenal presence – an aspect of experience that I show is central to its presentational character – and that the appreciation of phenomenal presence is necessary for perceptual intentionality. If an experience is to possess intentionality, the experience itself must make an entity available as an object of perceptually-based singular beliefs and the experiencing subject, by virtue of undergoing the experience, must in some sense be able to appreciate that it has done so. Phenomenal presence is necessary for perceptual intentionality because it plays an ineliminable role in making an entity available to its subject in this way.     

Do I Look Like Someone Who Cares? Recruiters’ Ratings of Applicants’ Paid and Volunteer Experience

Despite the widespread use of resumes, little is known about whether recruiters value applicants’ volunteer experience, and if they value some kinds of volunteer experience more than others. Based on a sample of recruiters (n = 135) who each rated a series of resumes with different amounts and types of paid and volunteer experience, our results suggest that recruiters prefer resumes with relevant experience, and resumes with a combination of volunteer and paid experience. Our results did not suggest significant differences in the ratings given to paid or volunteer experience. We discuss the implications of these findings for researchers and practitioners, with specific advice for human resource professionals and applicants.     

Introspection and Primacy of Perception: A Critical Reflection on Naïve Realism

A fundamental issue in philosophy of perception is to understand the nature of experience and the relation of the experience with objects or states of affairs that is experienced. A prominent philosophical issue here is posed by the possibility of hallucinatory experiences, which are subjectively indistinguishable from veridical perception for the experiencer. The philosophical views in this matter can be grouped into three major positions on the basis of the nature of the subjective experience and relation of the subjective experience with the object. These are the sense-data theories—which consider that the objects of perception are mental entities; the representative theories—according to which perception is a representation of the objects in the external world; and the naïve realist theories—which proclaim that the external objects are constitutive of the very perceptual experience and not a representation of it. Naïve realism claims it is the defence of common-sense notion regarding experience i.e. how experience seems to the experiencer upon introspective reflection on it. This position has a growing number of proponents in philosophy especially in the last two decades. But it also entails radical departure of established philosophical views regarding the nature of experience, the phenomenal character of experience, and the experiencer–object relation. In this paper, we critically examine naïve realism from two crucial aspects pertaining to it—the question of introspection being basis of naïve realist thesis, and the notion of primacy of perception over non-veridical forms of experiences. We find that there are significant problems which weaken the naïve realist thesis.

     

The Concept of Experience by John Dewey Revisited: Conceiving, Feeling and ��Enliving��

The concept of experience by John Dewey revisited: conceiving, feeling and ??enliving??. Dewey takes a few steps towards a differentiation of the concept of experience, such as the distinction between primary and secondary experience, or between ordinary (partial, raw, primitive) experience and complete, aesthetic experience. However, he does not provide a systematic elaboration of these distinctions. In the present text, a differentiation of Dewey??s concept of experience is proposed in terms of feeling, ??enliving?? (a neologism proposed in this paper) and conceiving. Feeling refers to the basic mode of experience where action, emotion, cognition and communication constitute an original unity. Enliving, aesthetic experience, constitutes the lifeworld, as a person-in-world experience. Even though enliving is holistic and relational, a certain distance emerges between action, emotion and cognition which allows contemplation and choice. Conceiving, on the other hand, refers to the isolating and abstracting understanding of the world with even greater distance between action, emotion and cognition. Such a differentiation provides a clearer understanding of the scope of education. It avoids the risks of regressive tendencies in the concept of experience, and it helps to include conceiving within the realm of experience.     

体验购买与实物购买：概念、测量及其与快乐的关系

体验购买是指为了获得生活经历或经验而进行的购买, 与其相对应的是实物购买, 指的是为了拥有物质类商品而进行的消费行为。这两种购买类型对于个体的快乐有着不同的影响, 体验购买比实物购买更让人感到快乐和愉悦, 其中的原因存在于以下5个方面：体验随时间的推移而改善, 变得越来越美好; 体验与自我的联系更为紧密; 体验购买不易引起社会比较; 体验能够满足基本心理需要, 尤其是关系需要; 体验易于分享。未来研究可以从以下3个方面着手：(1) 探索购买类型对快乐感的长期影响以及对不同取向幸福感的作用, 体验优先的适用范围; (2) 改进现有回忆和想象的研究范式, 提高生态效度; (3) 结合我国实际情况开展购买类型与快乐感的本土化研究。