Cassirer’s critique of culture

My purpose in this paper is to look at Cassirer’s relation to critical philosophy from a new perspective. Most discussions concerning Cassirer’s Kantianism have so far centered on his relation to neo-Kantianism and the Marburg school. My focus will not be on neo-Kantianism but on Cassirer’s notion of a “critique of culture.” In an often cited paragraph from the introduction to The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, Cassirer says that his aim is to broaden Kant’s critical approach to all various forms of culture, to language as well as myth and art, and thus to transform the “critique of reason” into the “critique of culture.” I will explore Cassirer’s concept of the “critique of culture” and suggest that it can best be understood by placing it in the context of early twentieth century German philosophy. More precisely, I will aim to show that Cassirer’s critique can be seen as an effort to find a middle path between Lebensphilosophie and the positivism of the Vienna Circle.     

The Death of a Pet: Implications for Loss and Bereavement Across the Lifespan

Abstract

Companion animals play a distinct role in our lives and for many, they are a part of the family and not simply just a pet. Today, in the United States, there is an increasing emphasis placed on the relationships that we build with our pets. A healthy relationship with our pets also lends to translate into a healthier lifestyle. However, we usually learn at a fairly young age that these beloved creatures do not live as long as we do. The loss of a pet in childhood is frequently our first face-to-face encounter with death and often affects how we will grieve as adults. Particularly within the field of psychology, the way we mourn our animal friends has gained increasing importance. This article looks at the literature concerning bereavement across the adult lifespan and focuses on the similarities between the way we grieve for our loved ones, both human and animal. We address some of the controversies associated with euthanasia and the treatment and support available to those in mourning. Finally, recommendations are offered to address some of the methodological problems in current bereavement research along with suggestions for further work in this area     

Husserl’s Phenomenology of Animality and the Paradoxes of Normality

In this article, I will discuss the Husserlian phenomenology of animality, by focusing on several texts of the 1920s in which the animal is determined as an abnormal variation of the human being. My aim is to address the question of the abnormality of the animal by reintegrating it in its original context, which is Husserl’s theory of normality. I will sketch the general framework of this theory, its articulations and strata, in order to eventually raise some paradoxical issues, specifically in relation to how the question of animality is interpreted through the couple normality/abnormality.     

Physician-assisted suicide and euthanasia: German Protestantism, conscience, and the limits of purely ethical reflection.

In this essay I shall describe and analyse the current debate on physician assisted suicide in contemporary German Protestant church and theology. It will be shown that the Protestant (mainly Lutheran) Church in Germany together with her Roman Catholic sister church has a specific and influential position in the public discussion: The two churches counting the majority of the population in Germany among their members tend to "organize" a social and political consensus on end-of-life questions. This cooperation is until now very successful: Speaking with one voice on end-of-life questions, the two churches function as the guardians of a moral consensus which is appreciated even by many non-believers. Behind this joint service to society the lines of the theological debate have to be ree-discovered. First it will be argued that a Protestant reading of the joint memoranda has to be based on the concept of individual conscience. The crucial questions are then: Whose conscience has the authority to decide? and: Can the physician assisted suicide be desired faithfully? Prominent in the current debate are Ulrich Eibach as a strict defender of the sanctity of life, and on the other side Walter Jens and Hans Kung, who argue for a right to physician assisted suicide under extreme conditions. I shall argue that it will be necessary to go beyond this actual controversy to the works of Gerhard Ebeling and Karl Barth for a clear and instructive account of conscience and a theological analysis of the concepts of life and suicide. On the basis of their considerations, a conscience-related approach to physician assisted suicide is developed.     

Deciding in the best interest of clients with dementia: the experience of public guardians

We conducted an in-depth interview study of public guardians in three local jurisdictions in the state of Maryland to explore the decision-making process utilized by court-appointed public guardians making medical and EOL care decisions on behalf of their clients with dementia. Overall, public guardians appeared to make their decisions in the context of relevant ethical principles and relevant case law and state statute, and the basis upon which they made informed decisions was dependent on their training and experience. The stated goal of public guardians is to make decisions that they believe are in the best interest of their clients. In the case of a healthcare decision, their goal is to maximize quality of life; and in the case of an EOL care decision, their goal is to minimize pain and suffering. In general, public guardians gathered information in order to identify previous preferences of their now-incapacitated clients, so that they could develop a preference profile to assist both an initial decision on whether an individual ought to have a court-appointed public guardian, and with healthcare and EOL decisions once an appointment was made. When guardians were unable to develop a preference profile for a particular client, they relied on past decisions in similar situations. Healthcare and EOL decisions were most often triggered by a recommendation by the client's healthcare provider. Once a decision-point was identified, the public guardian considered the risks and benefits of the proposed intervention in light of the client's current condition. At times the guardians reviewed informational resources such as textbooks and the Internet. In addition, most guardians sought advice from a medical consultant who is available to all public guardians in Maryland. Some guardians sought the advice of this medical consultant only when faced with more complex decisions. Guardians challenged physicians' recommendations when they believed the physicians were recommending an intervention that was not in the best interest of the client--that is, they advocated against either overtreatment or undertreatment. Ultimately, guardians took particularly difficult issues to the court and obtained a judge's opinion.     

On Why There is a Problem of Supererogation

How can it be that some acts of very high moral value are not morally required? This is the problem of supererogation. I do not argue in favor of a particular answer. Instead, I analyze two opposing moral intuitions the problem involves. First, that one should always do one’s best. Second, that sometimes we are morally allowed not to do our best. To think that one always has to do one’s best is less plausible, as it makes every morally best act obligatory. I argue that, despite its implausibility, this is the main ingredient in a traditional outlook I call ‘morality of law,’ which conceives of morality as impartial, impersonal, rule-based and obligation-based. My main point is that supererogation will always be seen as problematic if the background theory is a morality of law. This is because supererogation encapsulates a view of morality-outside-obligation, whereas morality of law centers upon obligation as its main instrument of curbing a supposedly natural human selfishness.

     

How Does the Bible Refer to Christ? Interacting with Augustine the Allegorist

Abstract: Traditional Christianity teaches that the Bible's primary referent is Jesus Christ, the Messiah, and Christians have long looked for ways to connect every passage in the Bible to the Christ. One venerable strategy is the allegorical or figurative approach of creatively interpreting any unit of biblical meaning, sometimes down to the individual words, as referencing Christ. Alternatively, we might take the biblical narrative itself as referencing Christ and find the connection of smaller units of meaning to Christ through their place in that narrative. My article clarifies this topic through interaction with an exemplary practitioner of the strategy of figurative reading, the Church Father Augustine. I will first explain Augustine's reasons for his hermeneutics, which stem largely from his focus on smaller units of reference such as the word and the sentence. Then I will argue that his reasons are not persuasive if indeed the Bible does refer to Christ at a broader level, the level of narrative.     

Mindfulness,Mysticism, and Narrative Medicine

Mindfulness based interventions (MBIs) are rapidly emerging in health care settings for their role in reducing stress and improving physical and mental health. In such settings, the religious roots and affiliations of MBIs are downplayed, and the possibilities for developing spiritual, even mystical, states of consciousness are minimized. This article helps rebalance this trend by using the tools of medical humanities and narrative medicine to explore MBI as a bridge between medical and spiritual approaches to health related suffering. My narrative medicine method draws insights from the arts and humanities that are rarely used in standard clinical research but are increasingly common among medical humanities and narrative medicine scholars. The specific path I take will be to work through historical, linguistic, and philosophic dimensions of mindfulness and mysticism as relevant to illness, suffering, death, and dying. I close with two case examples in which mindfulness is used as an intentionally spiritual practice for health concerns.     

Nietzsche on Art and Freedom

There are passages in Nietzsche that can be read as contributions to the free will/determinism debate. When read in that way, they reveal a fairly amateurish metaphysician with little of real substance or novelty to contribute; and if these readings were apt or perspicuous, it seems to me, they would show that Nietzsche's thoughts about freedom were barely worth pausing over. They would simply confirm the impression—amply bolstered from other quarters—that Nietzsche was not at his best when addressing the staple questions of philosophy. But these readings sell Nietzsche short. He had next to no systematic interest in metaphysics, and his concern with the question of freedom was not motivated by metaphysical considerations. Rather—and as with all of Nietzsche's concerns—his motivations were ethical. He was interested, not in the relation of the human will to the causal order of nature, but in the relation between freedom and the good life, between the will and exemplary human living. Read from this perspective, Nietzsche's remarks about freedom actually add up to something. And what they add up to is one aspect of his attempt to understand life after the model of art. Beauty, for Kant, was an image of the moral. ¹ For Nietzsche, by contrast—and the contrast can be hard to spell out—art was an image of the ethical. ² My hope here is to begin to explain why Nietzsche might have thought that the issue of freedom was relevant to that. In sections 1–3, I attempt to show why Nietzsche is not best read as a participant in the standard free will/determinism debate; in sections 4–6, I try to spell out the ethical conception of freedom that he develops instead.     

EBION AT THE BARRICADES: MORAL NARRATIVE AND POST‐CHRISTIAN CATHOLIC THEOLOGY

My task in this article is to explore the question of the “place” of moral questions—questions of good and evil—in Christian faith, “faith” here being considered particularly as the content or narrative of belief. The thesis I will argue is that Christianity offers no substantial account or explanation of the origin(s) and nature of evil, that in a fundamental way Christianity is not concerned with offering such accounts, and that when the task of supplying accounts of the origin(s) and nature of evil is made central to the content or narrative of Christian faith that faith is made false: it is misunderstood.     

Lessons We Learned: Stories of Volunteer–Patient Communication in Hospice

As our population ages, the questions of how to care for and communicate with the dying have become increasingly important areas for research. This study identifies hospice volunteers as both important members of the hospice team and as an underresearched source of wisdom regarding end-of-life communication. This article presents preliminary findings from a longitudinal, ethnographic study of volunteer–patient relationships in hospice. Three themes related to volunteer–patient communication are described using stories from hospice volunteers. The article concludes with reflections on end-of-life communication as experienced by the volunteers, and suggests that narrative ethnography is an appropriate and effective research method for the study of hospice and end-of-life care.     

Putting your best pet forward: Language patterns of persuasion in online pet advertisements

This paper evaluates persuasion dynamics of animal adoption using text data from a large archive of online pet advertisements. In Study 1, 184,805 adoption profiles from Petfinder indicated how long a pet will remain online and unadopted. Consistent with evidence from related persuasion settings such as peer-to-peer lending, pets spent less time online if profile writers had an analytic thinking style and advertisements contained few peripheral processing cues such as social words. Study 2 (N = 676,004 adoption profiles) replicated Study 1 patterns and found that adopted pet profiles contained more markers of analytic thinking and fewer social words than unadopted pet profiles. In an experiment (Study 3, N = 987), participants read an adoption advertisement typical of adopted or unadopted pets. Participants self-reported that they would be more likely to adopt a pet and visit its shelter after reading a more analytic and less social adoption profile (indicators of adopted pets) than a less analytic and more social profile (indicators of unadopted pets). Finally, Study 4 (N = 3,245 Tweets) demonstrated that more analytic and less social word patterns relate to increased engagement online, such as likes and retweets. These data suggest pet adoption that begins online is a social and psychological process, enhanced by messages with markers of complex thinking and few humanizing references. Advances to persuasion theory are discussed, underscored by the implications for pet adoption and how language patterns in online advertisements can reflect influence at scale.     

Parental refusals of medical treatment: the harm principle as threshold for state intervention

Minors are generally considered incompetent to provide legally binding decisions regarding their health care, and parents or guardians are empowered to make those decisions on their behalf. Parental authority is not absolute, however, and when a parent acts contrary to the best interests of a child, the state may intervene. The best interests standard is the threshold most frequently employed in challenging a parent's refusal to provide consent for a child's medical care. In this paper, I will argue that the best interest standard provides insufficient guidance for decision-making regarding children and does not reflect the actual standard used by medical providers and courts. Rather, I will suggest that the Harm Principle provides a more appropriate threshold for state intervention than the Best Interest standard. Finally, I will suggest a series of criteria that can be used in deciding whether the state should intervene in a parent's decision to refuse medical care on behalf of a child.     

From method to hermeneutics: which epistemological framework for narrative medicine?

The past 10 years have seen considerable developments in the use of narrative in medicine, primarily through the emergence of the so-called narrative medicine. In this article, I question narrative medicine’s self-understanding and contend that one of the most prominent issues is its lack of a clear epistemological framework. Drawing from Gadamer’s work on hermeneutics, I first show that narrative medicine is deeply linked with the hermeneutical field of knowledge. Then I try to identify which claims can be legitimately expected from narrative medicine, and which ones cannot be. I scrutinize in particular whether narrative medicine can legitimately grasp the patient’s lived experience of his or her illness. In the last section of this article, I begin to explore the potential usefulness of this epistemological clarification. This analysis allows for a further understanding of what is really at stake with narrative medicine, and thus to identify when it may be convenient, and when it may not. Furthermore, this clarification opens up promising new possibilities of dialogue with critics of the field. I conclude that narrative medicine finds its proper place as a possible tool available to mediate dialogue, which is at the heart of the clinical encounter in medical practice.     

Bildung and Decline

My point of departure is the idea that Wittgenstein's work, especially his later work with its explicit emphasis on practices, seeks to engage a reader who is likely to come to philosophy with a certain cast of mind that includes unexamined commitments from a particular cultural context. I show how a substantial number of remarks by Wittgenstein in which he addresses cultural topics bring out the importance of the quite specific connections he saw between the philosophical problems with which he grappled and the historical cultural context in which those problems have arisen. Not only is a grasp of this aspect of his writing integral to a proper understanding of Wittgenstein as a thinker, bringing out these connections serves to put these remarks into a coherent conceptual framework. In assessing the relation of Wittgenstein's cultural concerns to his engagement with metaphysics, I show how his development of Spengler's thought is an important connecting link. Particularly important for this analysis will be my discussion of Wittgenstein's understanding and employment of the concept of a Betrachtungsform , as well as a few closely related concepts. I then offer an interpretation of what I believe to be the significance of the connection in his later thought between his philosophical activity and his views about the modern West.     

非形式逻辑与演绎主义

非形式逻辑出现于上个世纪70年代,它首先是一种寻求更好的大学逻辑教学方式的努力。进而,非形式逻辑学者们逐渐开始触及和探讨越来越多的理论议题,即发展不依赖于形式逻辑的关于论证以及好论证的理解方式。在1998年世界哲学大会上,布莱尔和我阐释了非形式逻辑为哲学所带来的理论后果,其中一点我们称之为“演绎主义的终结”。那时我们并未给出演绎主义的定义,而只是把它等同于麦金泰尔的那个精炼的说法：“任何推理,不是演绎的,就是有缺陷的。”但现在看来,我们在当时就作出“演绎主义的终结”这一论断,显然是有点为时过早了。因为演绎主义似乎至今都还很有生命力,甚至在那些倾向于非形式逻辑的学者那里它也能得到支持：恩尼斯长期以来都辩护演绎主义是一种论证重构策略,格罗尔克更是致力于辩护它是一种论证评价理论。在本文中我将论证,非形式逻辑最好被理解为一种不诉诸于演绎技巧和演绎规范的逻辑研究。当我们意识到演绎和演绎主义已经如何深深地扎根于我们的哲学发展史中,并且牢牢地控制了我们关于逻辑研究的理解,我们就能明白非形式逻辑这一理论努力是多么的困难和重要。我将首先澄清“演绎主义”的意思,然后再分别考察那些赞成和反对演绎主义的论证,最后,我将表明非形式逻辑是从演绎主义中挽救逻辑的理论尝试。     

Narrative and the Stability of Intention

This paper addresses a problem concerning the rational stability of intention. When you form an intention to φ at some future time t, you thereby make it subjectively rational for you to follow through and φ at t, even if—hypothetically—you would abandon the intention were you to redeliberate at t. It is hard to understand how this is possible. Shouldn't the perspective of your acting self be what determines what is then subjectively rational for you? I aim to solve this problem by highlighting a role for narrative in intention. I'll argue that committing yourself to a course of action by intending to pursue it crucially involves the expectation that your acting self will be ‘swept along’ by its participation in a distinctively narrative form of self‐understanding. I'll motivate my approach by criticizing Richard Holton's and Michael Bratman's recent treatments of the stability of intention, though my account also borrows from Bratman's work. I'll likewise criticize and borrow from David Velleman's work on narrative and self‐intelligibility. When the pieces fall into place, we'll see how intending is akin to telling your future self a kind of story. My thesis is not that you address your acting self but that your acting self figures as a ‘character’ in the ‘story’ that you address to a still later self. Unlike other appeals to narrative in agency, mine will explain how as narrator you address a specifically intrapersonal audience.     

The flesh of the forest: Wild being in Merleau-Ponty and Werner Herzog

The history of the sublime within aesthetics has tended to focus on the natural world. Within this history, the sublime has been a category reserved for awe-inspiring and overwhelming experiences, in which the finite subject is dwarfed by a more expansive force. Despite subjectivity being foremost in this topic, what has been overlooked, is the role the body plays in being the centre of aesthetic experience. In this paper, I will turn the tide on this omission and thematize the role of the body within the experience of the sublime. My plan for reconsidering this movement is to unite Werner Herzog’s Aguirre, Wrath of God (1972) with the late thought of Merleau-Ponty, especially his enigmatic notion of "flesh" (Merleau-Ponty, 1968). In both Herzog and Merleau-Ponty, a philosophy of nature exists which challenges the dichotomy between the autonomous self encountering the objective realm of wilderness. In each case, an ambiguity undercuts the idea of wilderness existing "there" while human subjectivity remains placed "here." I will "read" the film as an instant of the chiasmatic relation between nature and humanity. Doing so, I will suggest that the reversibility between the body and the environment can be seen as an amplification of Merleau-Ponty’s notion of "wild being" (l’etre sauvage).     

Human‐Animal Bonds II: The Role of Pets in Family Systems and Family Therapy

The vast majority of pet owners regard their companion animals as family members, yet the role of pets in family systems and family therapy has received little attention in research, training, and practice. This article first notes the benefits of family pets and their importance for resilience. It then examines their role in couple and family processes and their involvement in relational dynamics and tensions. Next, it addresses bereavement in the loss of a cherished pet, influences complicating grief, and facilitation of mourning and adaptation. Finally, it explores the ways that clients' pets and the use of therapists' companion animals in animal‐assisted therapy can inform and enrich couple and family therapy as valuable resources in healing.     

Free Will,Determinism, and the Possibility of Doing Otherwise

I argue that free will and determinism are compatible, even when we take free will to require the ability to do otherwise and even when we interpret that ability modally, as the possibility of doing otherwise, and not just conditionally or dispositionally. My argument draws on a distinction between physical and agential possibility. Although in a deterministic world only one future sequence of events is physically possible for each state of the world, the more coarsely defined state of an agent and his or her environment can be consistent with more than one such sequence, and thus different actions can be “agentially possible”. The agential perspective is supported by our best theories of human behaviour, and so we should take it at face value when we refer to what an agent can and cannot do. On the picture I defend, free will is not a physical phenomenon, but a higher‐level one on a par with other higher‐level phenomena such as agency and intentionality.