德里达和现象学

该文希望通过对德里达和现象学的关系的梳理和探讨,分析德里达思想从胡塞尔现象学开始而又从一开始就与之“偏离”(或可说“延异”)的由来和发展,试图指出德里达对现象学运动是有贡献的,对于德里达从现象学出发的哲学反思和由此展开的独特的跨学科的哲学质疑的探讨和研究,有助于我们深入理解当代西方思想的诸多问题的实质和内涵,是非常有意义的事情。文章主要通过对德里达早期著作的分析,从起源问题及其解决途径入手探讨德里达与现象学的关系。现象学在德里达的著述中处处留下踪迹而又处处被“偏离”,这构成了德里达解构思想的一个重要特点,也恰恰是德里达对现象学运动本身的贡献。     

Derrida on Language and Philosophical Education

Studies in Philosophy and Education - The relationship between national languages and schooling is a recurring theme in Derrida’s writings on education, playing an important role in the...     

德里达对我们究竟意味着什么？——关于10月10日《纽约时报》刊登德里达逝世讣告的风波

通过关于德里达逝世一份意味深长的讣告,2004年10月下旬,以《纽约时报》为载体,引发了一场关于德里达的哲学对我们这个世界究竟意味着什么的讨论.这场讨论的实质在于,德里达的解构精神究竟是一种一味摧毁形而上学的力量,还是通过对这种形而上学传统的分析,指出"一分为二"式的"二元论"的片面性,以致所导致的,从古至今绵延不断的一种固执的思维定式.德里达试图告诉我们,形而上学和古典辩证法传统在把一对和多对范畴相互对应、提升、同化过程中,势必排除或遗漏掉许多可能是更为重要的要素,因为这些要素可能是使事物得以出场和传播的更为真实的方式.解构不是破坏,不是摧毁,不是在消灭一个旧世界的基础上建立一个新世界.应该把解构理解为事物在出场或传播过程中其结构的某种实际上的变形,一种实际效果.     

Theology After Derrida

It has recently been argued that Derrida's work is thoroughly atheistic, which seems to put any dialogue between Derrida and theology out of play. However, such arguments forget that to forbid the impossible outright is as much to be a slave to metaphysics as to presume that one could attain to it in language. Here I revisit the relationship between deconstruction and negative theology, and reconsider utilising Derrida to think God as the impossible. Arguing that thinking God in the absolute future still cannot sustain theology, I suggest how Derrida's work might nevertheless open onto the possibility of revelation.     

Differentiating Derrida and Deleuze

Repetition plays a significant, productive role in the work of both Derrida and Deleuze. But the difference between these two philosophers couldn't be greater: it is the difference between negation and affirmation, between Yes and No. In Derrida, the productive energy of repetition derives from negation, from the necessary impossibility of supplementing an absence. Deleuze recognizes the kind of repetition which concerns Derrida, but insists that there is another, primary form of repetition which is fully positive and affirmative. I will argue that there is nothing in Derrida's philosophy to match the affirmative, primary form of repetition articulated by Deleuze. Moreover, it is precisely this difference that accounts for the most exciting features of Deleuze's work: the possibility of breaking through to the other side of representation, beyond authenticity and inauthenticity, becoming-becoming.     

Husserl vs. Derrida

This paper was presented as the Aaron Gurwitsch Memorial Lecture, sponsored by the Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology, Inc., at Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, October 1988.     

Derrida and Education Today

Studies in Philosophy and Education -     

这个时代最有想象力的哲学家——德里达

J.德里达是他所在的这个时代最富有想象力的哲学家.他的自信和知识分子的勇气使他能做真正原创性的工作.人们记住德里达不是因为他发明了"解构"的方法,而是因为他使人们的想象力获得了解放.     

Derrida on teaching: The economy of erasure

This article explores Derrida's claim that teaching is a deconstructive process. In order to explore this claim, the Derridean concept of "erasure" is explored. Using the concept of erasure, this article examines two important aspects of teaching: the name that teachers establish for themselves, and, teaching against social power from a Derridean (erasure-oriented) perspective. Ultimately, the paper confirms Derrida's claim that teaching is indeed a deconstructive practice.

德里达：翻译与解构

德里达认为,自柏拉图以来的西方理性主义有一个根本的错误,即都在寻找某些“超验所指”(在任何语言中的任何时间都表达同样概念的所指),并以它们为中心,建构起具有等级秩序的逻各斯中心主义。要解构逻各斯中心主义,必须先解构其赖以生存的“可译性”基础。这样,解构问题转化为翻译问题。翻译,特别是语际翻译,见证、展现和诠释了能指与所指的分裂、所指/概念/意义自身的分裂、语言的(内部的和外部的)分裂以及文本的(内部的和外部的)分裂。在这一切发生的同时,翻译也撕裂了自身。它不再担“翻译”的名,而蜕化为无限暧昧的“变形”(transformation)概念,德里达用莎士比亚名剧《威尼斯商人》中的一句话“when mercy seasonsjustice”(情理兼顾)揭示了其内涵。     

What Truth Depends on

What kinds of sentences with truth predicate may be inserted plausibly and consistently into the T-scheme? We state an answer in terms of dependence: those sentences which depend directly or indirectly on non-semantic states of affairs (only). In order to make this precise we introduce a theory of dependence according to which a sentence φ is said to depend on a set Φ of sentences iff the truth value of φ supervenes on the presence or absence of the sentences of Φ in/from the extension of the truth predicate. Both φ and the members of Φ are allowed to contain the truth predicate. On that basis we are able define notions such as ungroundedness or self-referentiality within a classical semantics, and we can show that there is an adequate definition of truth for the class of sentences which depend on non-semantic states of affairs.