On inferring one's beliefs from one's attempt and consequences for subsequent compliance

D. J. Bem (1967, 1972) has suggested that a person may infer his or her beliefs from his or her actions. With his information-processing viewpoint, D. J. Bem proposed that individuals, by observing their past behaviors, may draw information for assessing their beliefs about themselves. There is a question, however, about the mechanism of self-perception when there is inconsistency between one's attempt to realize an intended goal and the outcome of the action. In a series of field studies, participants who had unsuccessfully tried to help a stranger were more willing to comply with a relatively large request made later. Implications for self-perception theory as well as for enhancing susceptibility to influence techniques are discussed.     

Estimating one's own and one's relatives' multiple intelligence: a study from Argentina

Participants from Argentina (N = 217) estimated their own, their partner's, their parents' and their grandparents' overall and multiple intelligences. The Argentinean data showed that men gave higher overall estimates than women (M = 110.4 vs. 105.1) as well as higher estimates on mathematical and spatial intelligence. Participants thought themselves slightly less bright than their fathers (2 IQ points) but brighter than their mothers (6 points), their grandfathers (8 points), but especially their grandmothers (11 points). Regressions showed that participants thought verbal and mathematical IQ to be the best predictors of overall IQ. Results were broadly in agreement with other studies in the area. A comparison was also made with British data using the same questionnaire. British participants tended to give significantly higher self-estimates than for relatives, though the pattern was generally similar. Results are discussed in terms of the studies in the field.     

Recognizing one's own face

We report two studies of facial self-perception using individually tailored, standardized facial photographs of a group of volunteers and their partners. A computerized morphing procedure was used to merge each target face with an unknown control face. In the first set of experiments, a discrimination task revealed a delayed response time for the more extensively morphed self-face stimuli. In a second set of experiments, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) was used to measure brain activation while subjects viewed morphed versions of either their own or their partner's face, alternating in blocks with presentation of an unknown face. When subjects viewed themselves (minus activation for viewing an unknown face), increased blood oxygenation was detected in right limbic (hippocampal formation, insula, anterior cingulate), left prefrontal cortex and superior temporal cortex. In the partner (versus unknown) experiment, only the right insula was activated. We suggest that a neural network involving the right hemisphere in conjunction with left-sided associative and executive regions underlies the process of visual self-recognition. Together, this combination produces the unique experience of self-awareness.     

Age-related differences in responses to thoughts of one's own death: mortality salience and judgments of moral transgressions

Two experiments explored age differences in response to reminders of death. Terror management research has shown that death reminders lead to increased adherence to and defense of one's cultural worldview. In Study 1, the effect of mortality salience (MS) on evaluations of moral transgressions made by younger and older adults was compared. Whereas younger adults showed the typical pattern of harsher judgments in response to MS, older adults did not. Study 2 compared younger and older adults' responses to both the typical MS induction and a more subtle death reminder. Whereas younger adults responded to both MS inductions with harsher evaluations, older adults made significantly less harsh evaluations after the subtle MS induction. Explanations for this developmental shift in responses to reminders of death are discussed.     

An examination of how one's attitudes toward women are reflected in one's defensiveness and self-esteem

The Berger Self-Esteem Measure, the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale, and Spence's (1972) Attitudes Toward Women Scale (AWS) were used to test 96 undergraduates. Subjects were divided according to sex and median split scores on the personality measures. Analysis of variance revealed a significant main effect for sex and defensiveness and approached significance for the sex × self-esteem effect (p<.10). Males and females were found to respond significantly differently on the AWS scale. Highly defensive males were more discriminating toward women and self-concept appeared to be an influential variable. However, self-esteem alone did not seem to have any significant effects.     

The relationship between marital interaction behaviors and affective reactions to one's own and one's spouse's self-evaluation needs

A recent extension (Beach, & Tesser, 1993) of Tesser's self-evaluation maintenance model (SEM: Tesser, 1988) proposed that a person's motivation to feel good about the self, and his or her concern for the partner's need to feel good about the self, can affect the couple's interaction behavior. In the present study, individual differences in the motivation to maintain one's own and one's partner's SEM needs are used to predict the couple's problem-solving discussion behaviors. Fifty-three married couples were videotaped for 20 minutes while discussing an important relationship issue on which there was disagreement. From these video records, husbands' and wives' favorable and unfavorable discussion behaviors were coded. During a subsequent session, couples reported their affective reactions to a number of SEM scenarios recalled from memory, which were used to create an individual difference measure representing the strength in motivation to maintain one's own and one's partner's self-evaluation needs. In general, husbands' and wives' responsiveness to their partners' SEM needs was associated with favorable interaction behavior, whereas responsiveness to one's own SEM needs was associated with unfavorable interaction behavior. The results of this study suggest that the extended SEM model provides an experimental framework that incorporates research directed at both the elucidation of individual differences and the examination of the couple as a unit.     

Estimating one's own personality and intelligence scores

One hundred and eighty‐seven university students completed the full NEO‐PI‐R assessing the five super‐traits and 30 primary traits, and the Wonderlic Personnel Test of general intelligence. Two months later (before receiving feedback on their psychometric scores), they estimated their own scores on these variables. Results at the super‐factor level indicated that participants could significantly predict/estimate their own Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Conscientiousness scores. The correlation between estimated and psychometrically measured IQ was r=.30, showing that participants could, to some extent, accurately estimate their intelligence. In addition, there were a number of significant correlations between estimated intelligence and psychometrically assessed personality (particularly Neuroticism, Agreeableness and Extraversion). Disagreeable people tended to award themselves higher self‐estimated intelligence scores. Similarly, stable people tended to award themselves higher estimates of intelligence (even when other variables were controlled). Regressing both estimated and psychometric IQ scores onto estimated and psychometric personality scores indicated that the strongest significant effect was the relationship between trait scores and self‐estimated intelligence.     

Awareness of one's body as subject and object

Abstract

This paper rejects Hume's famous claim that we never perceive our selves, by arguing that, under conditions specified, our perception of our bodies is perception of our selves. It takes as its point of departure Quassim Cassam's defence of a position to a similar effect but puts a different interpretation on the distinction between perceiving the body as an object, having spatial attributes, and perceiving it as a self or subject of experiences.     

Remembering information related to one's self

How does memory for an incident vary depending on whether, and how, the person relates the information to himself? Trait adjectives are better remembered if they were judged in reference to oneself rather than judged for meaning or sound. Our first experiment found a similar mnemonic advantage of referring a described episode or object to some event from one's life. Pleasant events were remembered better than unpleasant ones. A second experiment found incidental memory for trait adjectives was equally enhanced by judging each directly in reference to one's self-concept or indirectly by retrieving an episode either from one's life or from one's mother's life. Contrariwise, memory was poorer when traits were judged in reference to a less familiar person. Thus, good memory depends on relating the inputs to a well-differentiated memory structure.     

On being forgotten and forgetting one's self.

This paper assumes that evocative constancy, the ability to evoke reliably good-enough images of self and object in times of stress, underlies not only self and object constancy, but also the development of memory and the symbolic processes. It is suggested that a crucial element in this development is the mother's ability to construct and retain a vivid, cohesive, and reliable memory of her child, and to engage--in a multitude of implicit ways--in a process of mutual holding in memory. Where this process is deficient, the child, and later the adult, may experience discontinuities of the self, which find expression in profound anxieties, phobias, and problems of memory and learning. As these discontinuities are revived in the transference and the countertransference, both patient and analyst must work together to keep each other reliably alive in memory.     

Imagined spatial transformation of one's body

This study examined two related phenomena: (a) the judgment of whether a human body part belongs to the left or right half of the body and (b) the imagined spatial transformation of one's body. In three experiments, observers made left-right judgments of a part of a body whose orientation differed from their own by a rotation about one of 13 axes. To do so, they imagined themselves passing to the orientation of the stimulus. Time for (a) left-right judgments and (b) accompanying imagined spatial transformations depended on the extent of the orientation difference (OD) between the observer and stimulus. More important, time for phenomena (a) and (b) depended strongly, and in the same way, on the direction of OD. Further results showed that the rate of imagined spatial transformations can vary strongly for different axes and directions of rotation about an axis. These and other results (e.g., Parsons, 1987a) suggest that temporal and kinematic properties of imagined spatial transformations are more object-specific than could be previously assumed.