自我意识情绪：人类高级情绪

自我意识情绪是个体在具有一定自我评价的基础上,通过自我反思而产生的情绪。自我意识情绪与基本情绪既有区别又有联系。自我表征、自我觉察、自我评价过程的卷入是自我意识情绪产生的重要条件。对个体行为进行自我调节、服务于人际交流、人际互惠和个体心理内部需要是自我意识情绪具有的主要功能。自我意识情绪是随着认知的发展而逐渐形成和发展的,并会受到文化的影响。自我报告、非言语行为编码技术、言语报告和行为编码、神经成像技术是自我意识情绪的主要研究方法。自我意识情绪的普遍性和特殊性需要进一步跨文化研究的验证     

I Think,Therefore I Persist

Suppose that you're lying in bed. You just woke up. But you're alert. Your mind is clear and you have no distractions. As you lie there, you think to yourself, ‘2?+?2 = 4.’ The thought just pops into your head. But, wanting to be sure of your mathematical insight, you once again think ‘2?+?2 = 4’, this time really meditating on your thought. Now suppose that you're sitting in an empty movie theatre. The lighting is normal and the screen in front of you is blank. Then at some point an image of a peach is flashed on the screen. The image isn't up there for long. In fact, it's only on the screen for what seems like an instant—just long enough for you to see it. These two scenarios are a bit mundane. But, as I will show, reflection on them can yield significant results concerning the nature of persons and their persistence through time. First I will show that thought and perception have temporal constraints whereby your thinking or perceiving in the above scenarios implies that you exist through a temporally extended interval. Then I will argue that this allows us to rule out several prominent theories of personal identity.     

What's in a function?

In this paper we argue that Revision Rules, introduced by Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap as a tool for the analysis of the concept of truth, also provide a useful tool for defining computable functions. This also makes good on Gupta's and Belnap's claim that Revision Rules provide a general theory of definition, a claim for which they supply only the example of truth. In particular we show how Revision Rules arise naturally from relaxing and generalizing a classical construction due to Kleene, and indicate how they can be employed to reconstruct the class of the general recursive functions. We also point at how Revision Rules can be employed to access non-minimal fixed points of partially defined computing procedures.I thank Nuel Belnap, Rich Thomason, Ken Manders, and Jamie Tappenden for much helpful advice given while I was trying to get clear on the ideas presented here. I also thank two anonymous referees for helpful comments and criticisms on an earlier version of this paper.     

Personality disorder and Axis I psychopathology: the problematic boundary of Axis I and Axis II

The confusion of personality disorders with Axis I disorders can be traced in part to inadequacies of assessment instruments and diagnostic criterion sets. However, it also reflects the absence of adequate conceptualization. If Axis I continues to include early onset, chronic impairments that characterize everyday functioning, then there is unlikely to be a clear or meaningful distinction. Inherent and unique to personality disorders is that they concern a person's sense of self and identity. They are disorders of everyday functioning. Personality disorders have an early onset, characterize everyday functioning, and relate closely to personality functioning evident within the general population; Axis I disorders, in contrast, have an onset throughout adult life, are episodic, and are readily distinguishable from normal personality functioning.     

The I: A dimensional account

Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences - I have a clear idea of what it means that I have experiences in the past or future, and it does not seem to mean that experiences take place that possess...     

‘I hope that I get old before I die’: ageing and the concept of disease

Ageing is often deemed bad for people and something that ought to be eliminated. An important aspect of this normative aspect of ageing is whether ageing, i.e., senescence, is a disease. In this essay, I defend a theory of disease that concludes that ageing is not a disease, based on an account of natural function. I also criticize other arguments that lead to the same conclusion. It is important to be clear about valid reasons in this debate, since the failure of bad analyses is exploited by proponents of the view that ageing is indeed a disease. Finally, I argue that there could be other reasons for attempting to eradicate senescence, which have to do with an evaluative assessment of ageing in relation to the good life. I touch on some reasons why ageing might be good for people and conclude that we cannot justify generalized statements in this regard.     

What’s up in mental rotation?

We report two experiments on the influence of head tilt on mental rotation. In Experiment I, subjects decided whether dot patterns were or were not repeated about a line. Their reaction times (RTs) were consistent with the interpretation that they mentally rotated the patterns so that the line was subjectively vertical before making their decisions. When the subjects tilted their heads, the RT functions shifted in the direction of the tilt, indicating that the subjective vertical lay closer to the retinal than to the gravitational vertical. In Experiment II, subjects decided whether singly presented alphanumeric characters in various orientations were standard or backward (mirror-reversed). Again, analysis of their RTs suggested mental rotation to the standard upright, but the function was unaffected by head tilt; in this case, the subjects operated in subjective gravitational rather than retinal coordinates. The choice of retinal or gravitational coordinates may depend on whether the stimuli are interpreted egocentrically or as part of the external world.     

Multiple aspects in the sense of agency

Recent significant research in a number of disciplines centers on the concept of the sense of agency. Because many of these studies cut across disciplinary lines there is good reason to seek a clear consensus on what ‘sense of agency’ means. In this paper I indicate some complexities that this consensus might have to deal with. I also highlight an important phenomenological distinction that needs to be considered in any discussion of the sense of agency, regardless of how it gets defined. Finally, I suggest that the sense of agency has an ambiguous phenomenology and I offer some critical comments on current models that fail to notice this ambiguity.     

Does the repugnant conclusion have any probative force?

In engaging with the repugnant conclusion many contemporary philosophers, economists and social scientists make claims about what a minimally good life is like. For example, some claim that such a life is quite good by contemporary standards, and use this to defend classical utilitarianism, whereas others claim that it is not, and use this to uphold the challenge that the repugnant conclusion poses to classical utilitarianism. I argue that many of these claims—by both sides—are not well-founded. We have no sufficiently clear sense of what a minimally good life is like. It is a result of this that the repugnant conclusion doesn’t license us in drawing any interesting conclusions.     

Neuroscience and Whitehead I: Neuro-ecological Model of Brain

Neuroscience has made enormous progress in understanding the brain and its various neuro-sensory and neuro-cognitive functions. However, despite all progress, the model of the brain as well as its ontological characterization remain unclear. The aim in this first paper is the discussion of an empirically plausible model of the brain with the subsequent claim of a neuro-ecological model. Whitehead claimed that he inversed or reversed the Kantian notion of the subject by putting it back into the ecological context of the world, the so-called reformist subjectivist principle. Based on empirical evidence about the experience-dependence of the brain’s spontaneous activity, I argue for an analogous inversion or reversion with regard to the model of brain: empirical evidence is well compatible with a neuro-ecological model which extends beyond and integrates both Humean neuro-sensory and Kantian neuro-cognitive models. I conclude that a neuro-ecological and process-based model of brain and its relationship to the world may offer a novel model of brain that carries major ontological implications as they shall be discussed in the second paper.     

The context principle and Wittgenstein's criticism of Russell's theory of types

In this paper, I try to uncover the role played by Wittgenstein's context principle in his criticism of Russell's theory of types. There is evidence in Wittgenstein's writings that a syntactical version of the context principle in connection with the theory of symbolism functions as a good reason for his dispensing with the theory of types.I would like to thank Michael Wrigley (UNICAMP) and Gottfried Gabriel (Universität Konstanz) as well as an anonymous journal referee for their valuable comments on a previous version of this paper.     

Contextual influences on the sequential congruency effect

The sequential congruency effect (SCE) refers to the reduction in the size of the congruency effect following incongruent, relative to congruent, trials. Prior evidence indicated that the SCE does not generalize across tasks or different conflict-producing feature dimensions. We present results from a Stroop task showing that when the local list context is such that all colors and words appear in the same proportion of congruent trials, the SCE is present, but when those same items vary in the proportions congruent, the SCE is absent. We suggest that if stimuli are sufficiently consistent in the informativeness of their dimensions for the responses, individuals will attempt to track such information and weight the dimensions accordingly. In this way, the SCE reflects sequential adjustments to the weights given to individual stimulus dimensions in an attempt to track this information.     

On wisdom

This article explores some of the features involved in making wise decisions in couples and family therapy. Delineating what qualities are involved in making wise decisions in life--so as to live the "good life" in the polis, and the necessary contributions of life experiences in this task--was first discussed by Aristotle. A major problem that therapists face today is that our society offers many different ways of living well--or for that matter, badly--and our theories do the same. Family therapy theories are not value free. I clarify that different family theories embody different values: clear boundaries, good attachments, the ability to communicate, and so on. If our theories foster certain values, then, as Isaiah Berlin has made clear, seeking to achieve a particular value leads to placing less value on another. The article concludes with some thoughts about values that therapists could appropriately follow in their work.     

A Closer Look at the Mechanisms of Perceived Job Discrimination: ‘How I think you think about us’

Anderson (2011) provides a rich conceptual framework describing the factors that may affect perceived job discrimination in selection. Although this framework presents a detailed agenda for future research, it is currently less clear how these factors are assumed to lead to perceived job discrimination. To advance our theoretical understanding of the mechanisms involved, I propose that research on perceived job discrimination might benefit from drawing on the social psychological literature on metastereotypes. In the current commentary, I briefly describe the concept of metastereotypes, summarize factors that have been found to affect metastereotypes and delineate potential counterintuitive implications of activated metastereotypes for dealing with perceived job discrimination and complaints in selection.     

The good I will,I do not

For I do not do the good I want, but the evil I do not want is what I do-Now if I do what I do not want, it is no longer I that do it, but sin which dwells within me. (Romans 7:19–20)A sermon delivered on November 16, 1958, in James Memorial Chapel. Reprinted by permission from Union Seminary Quarterly Review.     

Gamete donation and parental responsibility

Abstract Unlike surrogacy and cloning, reproduction via gamete donation is widely assumed to be morally unproblematic. Recently, a number of authors have argued that this assumption is mistaken: gamete donors, they claim, have parental responsibilities that they typically treat too lightly. In this paper I argue that the 'parental neglect' case against gamete donation fails. I begin by examining and rejecting the view that gamete donors have parental responsibilities; I claim that none of the current accounts of parenthood provides good reason for ascribing parenthood to gamete donors. I then argue that even if gamete donors do have parental responsibilities for 'their' children, it is not clear that they treat these responsibilities too lightly. I conclude the paper by examining the wider question of just what kind of responsibilities gamete donors might have towards the children that they have a role in creating.     

When the Frame Doesn't Fit the Picture

I reconsider the function and construction of the psychoanalytic frame from an intersubjective, relational perspective. The analytic frame is meant to create and stand for, both practically and symbolically, a therapeutic structure with clear and safe boundaries in which the process of therapy unfolds. From my perspective, the establishment of the frame is, at the same time, an integral part of the process itself and reflects conscious and unconscious aspects of both patient and analyst. I explore this paradox and its implications for both practice and theory. In theorizing the functions of the frame, I draw on Goffman's frame theory, Bateson's anthropological and ethological studies, Ferenzci's perspective on the elasticity of technique, and a number of contemporary relational theorists. Several clinical vignettes are presented as illustrative of a new perspective on the analytic frame as cocreated and contextual, reflecting the variability of the psychoanalytic situation and the uniqueness of each dyad.