The effects of curvature on haptic judgments of extent in sighted and blind people

A series of experiments was carried out to examine the effect of curvature on haptic judgments of extent in sighted and blind individuals. Experiment 1 showed that diameters connecting the endpoints of semicircular lines were underestimated with respect to straight lines, but failed to show an effect of visual experience on length judgments. In experiment 2 we tested are lengths. The effects of curvature on perceived path length were weaker, but were still present in this experiment. Visual experience had no effect on path length judgments. Another experiment was performed to examine the effect of repeated tracing (1, 5, 9, or unlimited number of traces) on judgments of the lengths of straight lines and diameters of semicircles. Judgments of extent were more accurate when subjects engaged in larger numbers of traces. There was no effect of number of traces on curve-height judgments, suggesting that subjects were not using height estimates to judge diameters of semicircles. In a further experiment we tested the effect of number of traces on curves that varied in height. Restricting subjects to a single trace magnified the effect of path length on judgments of the distance between the endpoints of curves. Additional experiments showed that curvature effects on diameter judgments were not eliminated when stimuli were in the frontal plane or when the curves were explored with the use of two hands. Arm support had no effect on judged length in experiment 7. A final experiment showed a robust horizontal vertical illusion in haptic perception of convex curves, with overestimation of the heights of the curves compared with their widths. The practical and theoretical implications of the results are discussed.     

Simultaneous utilization of multiple cues in judgments of learning

There is much evidence that metacognitive judgments, such as people’s predictions of their future memory performance (judgments of learning, JOLs), are inferences based on cues and heuristics. However, relatively little is known about whether and when people integrate multiple cues in one metacognitive judgment or focus on a single cue without integrating further information. The current set of experiments systematically addressed whether and to what degree people integrate multiple extrinsic and intrinsic cues in JOLs. Experiment 1 varied two cues: number of study presentations (1 vs. 2) and font size (18 point vs. 48 point). Results revealed that people integrated both cues in their JOLs. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the two word characteristics concreteness (abstract vs. concrete) and emotionality (neutral vs. emotional) were integrated in JOLs. Experiment 3 showed that people integrated all four cues in their JOLs when manipulated simultaneously. Finally, Experiment 4 confirmed integration of three cues that varied on a continuum rather than in two easily distinguishable levels. These results demonstrate that people have a remarkable capacity to integrate multiple cues in metacognitive judgments. In addition, our findings render an explanation of cue effects on JOLs in terms of demand characteristics implausible.     

Interrelation of the effects of binocular disparity and perspective cues on judgments of depth and height

The effects of binocular disparity (aniseikonia) and perspective cues operating together on judgments of depth and height were studied, both when these stimulus variables operated in the same direction and when they were in conflict. Both depth cues were effective upon the perception of depth and height. The effects of binocular disparity and perspective cues upon perceived depth were found to be additive. The effects of these depth cues upon perceived height showed some interaction in the sense that, operating together, the effect of the perspective cue was stronger than the separate effect of the perspective cue, both when binocular disparity and perspective cues operated in the same direction and when they were in conflict. This interactive effect increased with increasing strength of the perspective cues. The size-distance invariance hypothesis was confirmed under the present experimental conditions. By a causal analysis of inference, this invariant relation could be explained in the following way: both the perceived depth and the perceived height of the sides of the patterns were directly determined by binocular disparity and perspective cues, but the perceived height was also indirectly determined through change of perceived depth. A direct causal relation between perceived depth and perceived height was found.     

Occlusion cues contribute to orientation judgments of occlusion-defined contours

Occlusion cues defining a contour in a 2-D stimulus pattern were shown to contribute to the accuracy of orientation judgments of that contour. The stimulus pattern was altered so that the occlusion cues became ambiguous, by introducing a textured background suggesting transparency of the stimulus pattern. Orientation judgments then became significantly less accurate. This finding shows that occlusion cues in 2-D patterns can be behaviorally relevant, in addition to generating the subjective percept commonly known as an illusory contour. The disruptive effect of the textured background on orientation judgments remained when no texture elements were present in the vicinity of the contour. This suggests that the generation of occlusion-defined contours relies as much on an evaluation of the surfaces at either side of the contour as being opaque as it does on local encoding of occlusion cues close to the contour. Finally, orientation sensitivity measured with contours defined by other than occlusion cues was not altered after the introduction of a textured background.     

Cognitive processes involved in blame and blame-like judgments and in forgiveness and forgiveness-like judgments

Experiment 1 compared the cognitive processes involved in blame and forgiveness judgments under identical experimental conditions. Experiment 2 was a replication of Experiment 1 with 4 judgment scales: willingness to prosecute, willingness to avenge, resentment level, and willingness to make up. Participants were presented with 32 scenarios in which a doctor made a medical error. These situations contained 5 items: the degree of proximity with the doctor (e.g., a family doctor known since childhood), the degree of negligence, the severity of consequences, apologies or contrition, and cancellation of consequences. Functional cognitive analysis grouped judgments into 2 categories: blame-like judgments (blame, prosecution, and revenge) and forgiveness-like judgments (resentment, forgiveness, and reconciliation). Blame-like judgments were characterized by additive integration rules, with negligence followed by apologies as the 2 main cues. Forgiveness-like judgments were characterized by an interactive integration rule, with apologies followed by negligence as the 2 main cues.     

Contextual effects in difference judgments

Manipulating stimulus spacing, stimulus frequency, or stimulus range usually affects intensity judgments. In six experiments, I investigated the locus of analogues of these contextual effects in a “difference” estimation task. When all stimuli elicited the same taste quality, stimulus distribution affected the scale values only when water was included in the stimulus set (Experiments 1–3). When the subjective ranges of two taste qualities were manipulated, different scale values were obtained for the separate qualities in the two conditions (Experiment 4). Manipulation of the expected response distribution did not affect the scale values or the responses (Experiments 5–6). It is concluded that shifts in stimulus distributions or stimulus ranges result in shifts in subjective scale values. The contextual effects can be interpreted as relative shifts of a number of gustatory continua, with water lying on a separate continuum. Proposed is a model for context-dependent judgments, consisting of four stages: stimulus classification, stimulus placement, continuum placement, and continuum projection.     

Judging trustworthiness from faces: Emotion cues modulate trustworthiness judgments in young children

By adulthood, people judge trustworthiness from appearances rapidly and reliably. However, we know little about these judgments in children. This novel study investigates the developmental trajectory of explicit trust judgments from faces, and the contribution made by emotion cues across age groups. Five‐, 7‐, 10‐year‐olds, and adults rated the trustworthiness of trustworthy and untrustworthy faces with neutral expressions. The same participants also rated faces displaying overt happy and angry expressions, allowing us to investigate whether emotion cues modulate trustworthiness judgments similarly in children and adults. Results revealed that the ability to evaluate the trustworthiness of faces emerges in childhood, but may not be adult like until 10 years of age. Moreover, we show that emotion cues modulate trust judgments in young children, as well as adults. Anger cues diminished the appearance of trustworthiness for participants from 5 years of age and happy cues increased it, although this effect did not consistently emerge until later in childhood, that is, 10 years of age. These associations also extended to more subtle emotion cues present in neutral faces. Our results indicate that young children are sensitive to facial trustworthiness, and suggest that similar expression cues modulate these judgments in children and adults.     

Sequential effects in absolute judgments of loudness

The effects of preceding stimuli on the judgments of current stimuli were examined in a study using absolute judgments of loudness with feedback. It was found that the response on a given trial was dependent on the stimuli in the preceding sequence of at least five trials. Both assimilation and contrast effects were observed. The form of the dependency of a response on a prior stimulus was a function of the ordinal position of the stimulus in the preceding sequence of trials. The stimulus on the immediately preceding trial had an assimilative effect on the response and preceding stimuli two to five trials removed all showed a contrast effect on a given response. The extent to which these preceding stimuli contributed to the contrast effect was an increasing function of their recency. The reversal of the dependency of the response, from assimilation to the stimulus one trial back, to contrast with the stimuli two and more trials back, indicates a unique function of the immediately preceding stimulus in this task. Since there was a reduction in the variance of responses to those stimuli similar in value to the immediately preceding stimulus, it is proposed that the stimulus and feedback on the last trial were remembered and used asa standardin judging the presented stimulus. A model is presented in which it is assumed that the memory of the magnitude of the immediately preceding stimulus is contaminated in specified ways by prior stimuli in the series. The empirical findings of assimilation and contrastare expected consequences of the proposed memorial processes.     

Contrast effects in judgments of health hazards

Researchers commonly use 2 models to explain contrast effects (CEs): the standard-of-comparison model and the set-reset model. The 2 models focus on the role of categorization to predict when a CE (instead of an assimilation effect) will happen, while minimizing the role of knowledge accessibility and relevance in determining whether any effect will occur. A 3rd model, the selective-accessibility model (F. Strack & T. Mussweiler, 1997), focuses on knowledge accessibility and relevance, but it is a model of assimilation effects in the anchoring bias. In the present study of CEs, the authors tested 3 predictions implied by the selective-accessibility model. The authors found a CE only when anchor- and target-rating dimensions matched and only in the 1st of multiple targets rated. The CE required a minimum amount of attention to the anchor. These results support the account that selective knowledge accessibility and relevance play an important role in CEs.     

Semantic congruity effects in judgments of loudness

This research uses comparative judgments of the relative loudness of sounds to make a critical test of one theory of the mental representation of continuous physical attributes. The first two experiments find a semantic congruity effect, which is an interaction such that subjects can pick the louder of two loud sounds faster than the softer, and the softer of two quiet sounds faster than the louder. According to the theory under test, physical quantities are stored as points on a representational continuum, with a variance as well as a mean placement on it. The theory predicts the semantic congruity effect by assuming that the variance of placement of intensities on the representational continuum is a function of the direction of judgment: a soft sound will have less variance than a loud one when judged for softness and more when judged for loudness. Since the speed of making a judgment increases as variance decreases, the theory predicts a semantic congruity effect. However, for loudness, it can be shown that variance does not change in the manner assumed. The finding of a semantic congruity effect therefore disconfirms the theory. Alternative models are discussed. This research was supported by NSF Grant BNS 78-17442.     

The effects of familiar size on judgments of size and distance: An interaction of viewing attitude with spatial cues

Two hypotheses about the effects of familiar size on judgments of size and distance, the cue-conflict hypothesis and the viewing-attitude hypothesis, were examined. In Experiment 1, observers estimated the size and distance of familiar targets with apparent or assumptive instructions under three different spatial cue conditions. In Experiment 2, observers performed tasks similar to those of Experiment 1 with no specific instructions. The main results were: (1) Assumptive instructions facilitate the effects of familiar size in both size and distance judgments, but reducing spatial cues does not, and (2) viewing attitude changes from the apparent to the assumptive when available spatial cues are reduced. Thus, it was concluded that the viewing-attitude hypothesis gives a better account of the effects of familiar size, but that the cue-conflict hypothesis cannot be abandoned, because the number of conflicting cues contributes to the formation of viewing attitude.     

Response competition effects insame-different judgments

An account ofsame-different discriminations that is based upon a continuous-flow model of visual information processing (C. W. Eriksen & Schultz, 1979) and response competition and inhibition between the responses by which the subject signifies his judgment is presented. We show that a response signifyingsame will on the average be executed faster due to less priming or incipient activation of the competing response,different. In the experiment, the subjects matched letters on the basis of physical identity. The degree of priming ofdifferent responses on same trials and ofsame responses ondifferent trials was manipulated by an extraneous noise letter placed in the display. Latency for judgments onsame trials increased as the feature overlap of noise and target letters decreased. Latencies were shorter ondifferent trials when the noise letter was dissimilar to either target letter than when the noise letter was the same as one of the targets. These results were consistent with the response-competition interpretation.