Wicked incarnations: Jesus,intra-action,climate change

To take incarnation seriously, Creation Care Christians, such as Douglas and Jonathan Moo, focus on Jesus’ divinity in incarnation. If the divine Jesus was fully flesh, then creation must be good. And if we do not take care of it, we are sinning, they reason. Laurel C. Schneider's promiscuous view of incarnation insists on a porous flesh, one that is materially entangled with the world. This is beyond Sallie McFague's model of the world as God's body. Applying Schneider's promiscuous incarnation, Mary-Jane Rubenstein claims that the world is God's body, and, as such, God does not transcend matter as Ernest Simmons suggests. For Catherine Keller, unknowable divine interdependence must move us to civic action. In the middle of this conversation, I offer the term wicked incarnations to make explicit the intra-action of divinity and the world in its incarnations. To take incarnation seriously is to acknowledge incarnations as a dynamism of divine and material forces, neither of which pre-exist their relationship. I join Keller in hoping that this moves us to care about and for the material world, its changing climate, and our intra-active relationship with nonhuman, divine presence.     

Cur deus caro: Jesus and the Cosmos Story

Abstract

There seems to be a vast gulf between the grand-scale story of the world of creation, cosmic in scope and pitiless in its operations, and the small-scale story of Jesus as embodying divine empathy. The concept of deep incarnation offers a bridge by arguing that God's own Logos or Wisdom, when assuming the particular life story of Jesus, also conjoins the material conditions of God's world of creation at large (“all flesh”), shares the fate of all biological life forms (“grass and lilies”), and experiences the pains of all sentient creatures (“sparrows and foxes”). Incarnation is thus the story of God's reach into the very tissue of material and biological existence. In the embodied Logos, the “flesh” of Jesus Christ is co-extensive with his divinity. Otherwise, the incarnation would be skin deep, confined to a historical figure of the past, or merely an external appendix to divine life.     

Sexless Piety or a Man's Man? Notes on the cinematic representation of Jesus

The cinematic representation of Jesus reflects issues current in both popular piety and contemporary theology. However most critiques fail to engage with the portrait of Jesus that arises if one considers and takes seriously the notion of Jesus as ‘leading man’. This article seeks to engage with three issues that arose out of teaching a ‘Jesus at the Movies’ course: What does the choice of ‘Jesus actor’ signify? Does he succeed as a traditional ‘leading man'? How do you represent the incarnation? These three issues are discussed in relation to the five films studied and the problem of ‘representing Jesus’ is critiqued.     

Battle Christologies as a risky act of resistance à la Jesus: A South African perspective

This study depicts African “battle Christologies” as a risky act of resistance à la Jesus, that is, concomitant of Jesus’ own life in terms of their modus operandi. Their christic features are discussed in contradistinction to the mainstream Western christological tradition. Only by probing the dynamics of power and difference inherent in the cultural appropriations of Jesus can their specific performative consequences be accurately captured. In light of the study, some methodological considerations are being offered with regard to the way in which prophetic theology should be done in post‐apartheid South Africa and the Global South in general.     

God Takes our Place: A Religious-Philosophical Approach to the Concept of Stellvertretung

What does it mean to say, theologically, that God takes our (human beings') place (Stelle)? In himself becoming human (the incarnation), does God enter into joys and needs, into the possibilities and the limitations of the human, in such a way as to take them all to himself? Or does he, specifically, take the blame of all people? Or only that of those who believe? Or is it something else again that is meant? What does it mean to say that ‘God stands up for us’ is the event of salvation– a claim which the church has in mind with its central dogma of the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ? How is human Stellvertreten, occurring in different forms, connected with the divine Stellvertreten? What does the word ‘Stelle’ (of humans) mean at all?     

The Extended Body: The Social Body of Jesus according to Luke1

Abstract : Informed by body phenomenology and contemporary concepts of the social body, this article aims to interpret the particular movements and transformations of Jesus’ body as presented in the Gospel of Luke. From the outset Jesus’ body is inscribed in a Jewish genealogy. Likewise, the Gospel depicts the character of Jesus via the various landscapes he passes through as well as through the social interactions of which he is a part. While Jesus’ body is initially described as being energized by the mobile presence of the Spirit, it increasingly closes in and, at the end, simply disappears. Luke describes Jesus’ ascension and resurrection as radical transformations of Jesus’ body, by which Jesus’ body‐and‐mind (Leib) extends into a social body, at home in God as well as among his followers. This social body also crosses the genetic and cultural boundaries between Jews and Gentiles. Only through this extensiveness can Jesus’ body become accessible worldwide.     

THE IMAGO DEI AS THE MIND OF JESUS CHRIST

In this essay I examine David Clough's interpretation of the imago Dei and his use of “creaturely” language in his book On Animals: Volume 1, Systematic Theology. Contrary to Clough, I argue that the imago Dei should be interpreted as being uniquely human. Using a neuroscientific approach, I elaborate on my claim that while Jesus is the image of God perfected, the imago Dei is best understood as having the mind of Christ. In regards to language, I make the case that using terms such as “creature” when referring to nonhuman animals is problematic in that it can serve to alienate human beings from their capacity to image God. In addition I argue that “creaturely” language raises concerns for the African American community given Western Christianity's history as it relates to their valuation of black bodies and human enslavement.     

“Make no provision for the flesh”: recognizing the incarnation in and after Augustine

This article argues for the importance of the intelligibility of the sexed body to incarnational theology. Building on Mark Jordan's reading of Augustine, I focus on the paradox of the incarnation as both the bodily sign (signa) of God and God Godself as the thing that the sign signifies (res). Through an analysis of the debates around Leo Steinberg's work on the meaning of Christ's genitals in Renaissance art, I explore the ways in which depicting the incarnation is a paradoxical exercise of depicting God's fully human body. I argue that attention to the paradox of the incarnation as both sign and thing can disrupt ideologies of sexual difference that force bodies to be intelligible as unambiguously sexed, while the question of sexual difference can work within incarnational theology to disturb the equivalence of full humanity and unambiguous maleness.     

ASTROBIOLOGY AND ASTROCHRISTOLOGY

Astrochristology, as a subfield within the more comprehensive astrotheology, speculates on the implications of what astrobiology and related space sciences learn about our future space neighbors. Confirmation of the existence of extraterrestrial intelligent civilizations living on exoplanets will force Christian theologians to decide on two issues. The first issue deals with the question: should Christians expect many incarnations, one for each inhabited exoplanet; or will the single incarnation in terrestrial history suffice? The second issue deals with the question: why is there an incarnation in the first place? Does the divine presence in the historical Jesus mark a divine attempt to fix a broken creation or does it mark a divine self‐communication that would occur with or without creation's fall into sin and death? Sorting these issues out is one task for astrochristology. My own position is to affirm both a single incarnation on Earth valid for cosmic redemption from the brokenness of creation in its present state.     

From body to body: A post‐gender politics for the cosmic homo1

This article engages in establishing some common ground, some human and humane politics for the global Luther, in contradistinction to the focus in much recent scholarship on difference/s as an almost hegemonic way of understanding human life. The aim is to move beyond feminist, poststructuralist, and postcolonial theories to a post‐gender politics by employing Judith Butler's concepts of performativity and “abject” bodies. Homo, the human being, will be the hermeneutical key for examining Luther's understanding of God's creation and incarnation as well as of baptism, the Lord's Supper, and the church. The aim is that of searching out Luther's differing performances of body, from the carnal body of the incarnate Christ and the human body to the spiritual body of church and community, and how these matter, materialize and intersect in the body of Christ as one body/homo.     

Incarnation Deep and Wide: A Response to Niels Gregersen

Abstract

This paper responds to Professor Niels Gregersen's theology of deep incarnation by doing three things. Section 1 summarizes and defines the idea of deep incarnation, with particular reference to what is intended by the key adjective “deep.” Section 2 engages Gregersen's proposal critically in relation to traditional options within the Christian doctrine of the incarnation. If Gregersen's language of “incarnation” is to be taken seriously as a proposal that is grounded in but goes beyond traditional ideas, its best chance for success lies in being as clear as possible about relationship with its traditional sources. Finally, Section 3 offers a few suggestions concerning the promise of deep incarnation for contemporary theology, especially for theology informed in part by serious engagement with the natural sciences.     

‘There is no brute world,only an elaborated world’: Merleau-Ponty on the intersubjective constitution of the world

In his later works, Merleau-Ponty proposes the notion of ‘the flesh’ (la chair) as a new ‘element’, as he put it, in his ontological monism designed to overcome the legacy of Cartesian dualism with its bifurcation of all things into matter or spirit. Most Merleau-Ponty commentators recognise that Merleau-Ponty's notion of ‘flesh’ is inspired by Edmund Husserl's conceptions of ‘lived body’ (Leib) and ‘vivacity’ or ‘liveliness’ (Leiblichkeit). But it is not always recognised that, for Merleau-Ponty, the constitution of the world of perception, the problem of embodiment or incarnation, is at the very same time one with the problem of the experience of others in what Husserl called Einfühlung or Fremderfahung and indeed one with the problem of the constitution of the commonly shared world ‘for all’. As Merleau-Ponty put it in his late essay ‘The Philosopher and His Shadow’ in Signs, ‘the problem of Einfühlung, like that of my incarnation, opens on the meditation of sensible being, or, if you prefer, it betakes itself there’. In other words, the problem of the apprehension of the other is part of the overall apprehension of the transcendent world. In this paper I want to meditate on the relations between embodiment, experience of others, and experience of the world in Merleau-Ponty's philosophy. I will take particular note, as in the title of this presentation, of the claim made by Merleau-Ponty in The Visible and the Invisible that ‘there is no brute world, only an elaborated world’ (il n'y a pas de monde brut, il n'y a qu'un monde élaboré).     

Deep Incarnation and Kenosis: In,With, Under,and As: A Response to Ted Peters

In this response to Ted Peters, I relate the proposal of deep incarnation to Luther's theology of the real presence of the humanity of Christ in creation. Based on a typology of four distinctive models of kenosis, I furthermore argue that a kenotic view of incarnation and divine creativity does not necessarily imply a divine absence and withdrawal from creation, as presupposed by Professor Peters. Deep incarnation is consistent with a compatibilist view of kenosis, but not with ideas of divine abdication, or metamorphosis. Finally I situate the view of deep incarnation to Scandinavian creation theology and to research programs at the Centre for Naturalism and Christian Semantics, Copenhagen University.     

Faith and belief in The Anti-Christ: A re-evaluation of Nietzsche’s relation to Jesus

This paper re-evaluates the significance of Jesus for Nietzsche by looking at The Anti-Christ. Specifically we will ask whether a re-evaluation of this relation can shed new light on Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity. And we will do this first by surveying the standard interpretations of this issue, as well as the existing literature on The Anti-Christ. Arguing that the latter picks out nothing new regarding a critique of Christianity, we nonetheless suggest that a new criticism can be developed via the discussion of Jesus there. Further, this can be done by looking at the account given of faith and belief in that text. That is, we will explore the status of Jesus for Nietzsche by looking at the origins and development of “faith” as a mode of belief. In particular, we trace the former’s development as a type from a basic mode of faith. As such, we begin by looking at the psychological origins of this kind of belief in “decadence”, and why Nietzsche is critical of this. However, we will then discuss the emergence of a more positive faith in the form of Buddhism, and see how this represents an analogue for Jesus’s faith. Continuing, we will see how Jesus signifies a similar problematic development, but also “overcoming”, of initial decadence faith. And we will argue, also, that this overcoming is rooted in his emphasis on the immediacy of lived experience. Finally though, we will look at how Christianity returns Jesus’s more productive relation to the world again to a primitive mode of faith. In other words, we will see how Christianity converts the fluid, lived, “faith” of Jesus into something again based on transcendent belief. And lastly, we will ask what new light this point sheds on Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity, and his affinity with Jesus the man.     

Ninian Smart

Mary Douglas has invited historians of religion to test her hypothesis about the social meaning of body symbols. Her view that body symbolism always points in the direction of social concerns and that efforts to separate body and spirit indicate sentiments of revolt and alienation has proved fruitful in several areas. Of course there is nothing particularly novel in the proposal that the body can be seen as a symbol of wider realities. The Stoics spoke of the universe as a body; Paul could describe individual Christian congregations as a body; and Priscillian referred to the human body in depreciating terms as a figura mundi. Victor Turner has shown that the body symbols of the Ndembu in Zambia are part of a wider pattern which uses ‘an aspect of human physiology as a model for social, cosmic and religious ideas and processes’, including, he adds, ‘the human body [as] … a microcosm of the universe,’⁵⁷ There is even a considerable literature on the subject.⁵⁸ Indeed, one cannot help but be struck by the fact that with the great abundance of work devoted to body symbols in general, so little has been done with early Christianity.

What distinguishes Douglas from other theoreticians of body symbolism is her Durkheimian orientation. By taking seriously the social dimension of body symbols and by positing the revolutionary character of symbols which separate body and spirit, she is able to uncover latent dimensions of doctrinal controversy and to restore flesh to the dry bones of theological debate. In her own preliminary studies, she has limited herself to one symbol, i.e. incarnation, and one controversy, i.e. the Arian. In extending her initiative to other symbols and controversies, I have proceeded on the assumption that body symbols of different sorts should reflect the same condensed message about society. I would argue that this effort has been largely successful. Expectations of imminent resurrection or views of the resurrection which deny the physical aspect are regularly associated in early Christianity with separatist-sectarian behaviour generally. The recession of hopes for an imminent resurrection accompanied the transition of Christianity from sect to church. Conversely, and this would warrant further study, subsequent sectarian movements within Christianity seem to be accompanied by a return of hopes for physical resurrection. Particular sorts of sectarianism, especially those which stress individualism and spiritualism, are prone to view the resurrection in other than physical terms. Even the mainstream of Christianity refused to abandon altogether the doctrine of a future resurrection. Orthodox believers could always point to the denial of resurrection as an unmistakable signpost of heresy. At one level we may treat this doctrinal survival as little more than a memory of Christianity's sectarian pedigree, as a vaguely disquieting memory. At another level, however, its very survival, against heavy odds, may also be seen as a permanent symbolic indicator of Christianity's ultimate refusal to identify itself completely with the secular order. Beyond this, the survival of belief in resurrection has meant the persistence of a latent symbol of protest, alienation and transformation. For in the final analysis, it is not the case that symbols merely reflect social reality. As symbols, they also possess the power to shape it.

In this observation lies perhaps an explanation for the fact that our effort has not been fully successful. We have not found it to be true in every case that statements of protest in one symbolic medium, say, asceticism, will inevitably be replicated in other media, say, incarnation and resurrection. This does occur often enough to be interesting and more than coincidental. The Testimony of Truth from Nag Hammadi is a paradigm case. Paul's Corinthians, Paul himself and Arius come close. The ascetics of Egypt are the most interesting ‘deviants’. The connection between their asceticism and the message of alienation and protest is clear. Their views of the resurrection have not been much studied, but in view of the symbolic function of their bodies and their view of ascetic practice as a means of restoring the natural state of Eden, it is not too much to suggest that their conception of resurrection would have emphasized the restored and purified nature of the resurrection body in contrast to the orthodox view of the absolute identity of that body with the present physical one. As for their views of the incarnation, there is some evidence of leanings in this direction. While those who held to docetic christologies generally favoured asceticism, the reverse was not always true. Part of the reason for the absence of docetic views of the incarnation among the ascetics—assuming, of course, that they should have been docetists—is that they say so little about doctrines of any kind. Part may also be due to the orthodoxy of those who wrote about the monks. Part may be due to the fact that the primary target of ascetic protest was not the physical universe, or matter as such, or even the world of social and political reality, but rather the church in and of the world—a differentiated and thus moderated protest. But part may also be due to a more or less conscious decision to draw a line between expressions of alienation, so to speak, a symbolic quid pro quo. The quid was the recognition by the church at large that ascetic piety could not be proscribed by the successor generations of the martyrs. The pro quo would then take the form of doctrinal orthodoxy. Thus the absence of docetic christologies among the ascetics would result not just from the imposition of episcopal authority but from the power of doctrine to shape reality.

Body symbols thus provide us with a new thread for tracing the transformation of Christianity from an obscure cluster of sects in Palestine to an institution of unparalleled spiritual and political power in the Roman empire. Of course, not everyone accepted this transformation as an act of divine providence. Some reacted by denying that God had taken on a human body in the person of Jesus; others tortured their bodies; and from time to time in succeeding centuries still others gathered in small communities to await the resurrection of the body and with it the birth of a new world.     

“THE GOD WITH CLAY”: THE IDEA OF DEEP INCARNATION AND THE INFORMATIONAL UNIVERSE

This article explores the relations between the idea of deep incarnation and scientific ideas of an informational universe, in which mass, energy, and information belong together. It is argued that the cosmic Christologies developed in the vein of Cappadocian theology (fourth century) and the Franciscan theologian Bonaventure (thirteenth century) can be interpreted as precursors of an informational worldview by consistently blending “formative” and “material” aspects of creativity. Reversely, contemporary sciences of information can enlarge the scope of the contemporary view of deep incarnation. I propose three hypotheses for showing how and why. First, mass, energy, and information have an equal causal importance for explaining reality. Second, just as transformation presupposes communication, so communication presupposes information. Third, contemporary science can elucidate seminal concerns of the idea of deep incarnation, insofar as informational structures pave the way for information capture, communication, and transformation. At the level of organismic life, new features of embodied cognition and emotion come up, important for understanding the organismic depth of the concrete incarnation in Jesus of Nazareth.     

Nobody's perfect: A qualitative examination of African American maternal caregivers’ and their adolescent girls’ perceptions of body image

Using semi-structured interviews, we explored African American maternal caregivers’ and their adolescent girls’ (N = 25 dyads) perceptions about the adolescent's body using Grounded Theory. Caregivers and adolescent girls (M_age = 13.42) were asked what the adolescent girls liked most/least about their bodies and how peers and media may affect adolescent girls’ perceptions. While some adolescent girls reported overall body satisfaction, others described features they would like to change. Belief in God, body acceptance, and appreciation for average/moderate features helped the adolescent girls maintain their positive body image. The body-related messages that adolescent girls received from caregivers and peers included compliments, pressure to lose weight, teasing, and advice. Adolescent girls also reported being either influenced by or skeptical of the images presented in the media. Programs that promote caregiver–adolescent communication about body perceptions and that build on the adolescent girls’ media skepticism may prove useful for their health-related attitudes and behaviors.     

The Place of Growth in the Theology of Karl Barth

It is often wondered whether Karl Barth’s doctrine of sanctification preserves space for a sufficient account of growth in the Christian life. Such concerns arise, at least in part, from Barth’s radical claim that the sanctification of all humanity is totally and effectively established in Jesus Christ, a claim that appears to exclude more familiar notions of cumulative regeneration. This essay seeks to complement other responses to this critique by delving into Barth’s most explicit discussion of growth in Church Dogmatics: §67.2 ‘The Growth of the Community’. A close reading of this subsection will demonstrate that Barth can happily employ the language of growth albeit interpreted in light of his understanding of the Christian life as an ongoing encounter with Jesus Christ.