EUTHYPHRO AND THE GOODNESS OF GOD INCARNATE

A familiar problem is here viewed from an unfamiliar angle. The familiar problem is the Euthyphro dilemma: if God wills something because it is good, then goodness is independent of God, so God becomes, morally speaking, de trop. On the other hand, if something is good because God wills it, then, given the absence of constraint on what God may will, moral truths are – counterintuitively – contingent. An examination of the kinds of necessity and possibility at work in this conundrum leads us to the most promising solution: there is a metaphysical connection between God and goodness. What he wills is an expression of his nature. But (and this is the unfamiliar angle), that solution now poses an acute problem for an understanding of the Incarnation. For if God is constitutive of goodness, and Christ is God incarnate, then Christ is constitutive of goodness. But Christ, as a human, is subject to external moral evaluation and obligation, which entails that he is not constitutive of goodness. This metaethical difficulty is not easily met by the usual strategies by which Christ is understood to have two natures. Reflection on our moral relations to our past selves, however, suggests a way forward.     

THE MYSTERY OF GOD AND THE SUFFERING OF HUMAN BEINGS1

The proper theological response to the problem of reconciling human suffering with the Christian belief in a God of infinite wisdom, power, and goodness is not to try to solve the unsolvable, but to preserve the mystery of God. The concept ‘mystery’ as attributed to God signifies intelligibility — inexhaustible intelligibility — not contradiction. Mystery suggests the range and limits of a human being's knowledge of God. We cannot know why God permits suffering in this particular instance or the character of God's response to someone in the throes of suffering. We can know in a general way the necessary conditions of the possibility for the realization of God's purpose because we know the purpose of God's activity through revelation. This paper argues that if God created the universe so that creatures could share in the fullness of God's life, God could not have achieved God's purpose without any human suffering. This argument upholds the inexhaustible intelligibility of God's activity and thus preserves the mystery of God, for if God could have achieved God's purpose without any suffering, yet willed the suffering of creatures, then the eternal plan of providence and the actual unfolding of salvation history would be arbitrary and irrational.     

Confession and Forgiveness: A Pastoral Reading of <Emphasis Type="Italic">A Father’s Son</Emphasis> by Lionel Dahmer

This paper offers a pastoral reading of the memoir written by Lionel Dahmer, the father of the serial killer Jeffrey Dahmer. I suggest that the literary genre of the memoir provided Lionel with a means of confession that enabled him to process three particular experiences related to his son—namely, grief, shame, and regret. I also suggest that the writing of this confession enabled Lionel to forgive his son for his son’s various failures and, potentially, to forgive himself for his own failures as a father, though this latter point can only be offered speculatively. This memoir is inherently pastoral and theological because it deals with the themes of confession and forgiveness, and, theologically, the memoir also may be viewed as a work of penance. One theological upshot, based on Lionel’s experience, entails challenging the idea that God the Father abandoned God the Son on the cross: A more divine model of fatherhood would be one in which a father could embrace the shame of standing by his son when the chips are down.     

Luther and Kierkegaard: Theologians of the Cross

The theologies of Kierkegaard and Luther begin with hiddenness as a necessary qualification of deity. Because God is transcendent and human reason is fallen, he cannot be directly known. To reveal himself, God must wrap himself in sensuous media that veil his deity while manifesting it. The indirect character of revelation implies a negative principle of cognition: God's nature is not recognizable in its transcendent glory, but rather in the lowliness and suffering of the cross. This epistemological principle yields virtually identical results for Kierkegaard and Luther alike, such that the term 'theologian of the cross' aptly describes each.     

Suffering, meaning, and bioethics.

Suffering evokes moral and metaphysical reflection, the bioethics of suffering concerns the proper ethos of living with suffering. Because empirical and philosophical explorations of suffering are imprisoned in the world of immanent experience, they cannot reach to a transcendent meaning. Even if religious and other narratives concerning the meaning of suffering have no transcendent import, they can have aesthetic and moral significance. This understanding of narratives of suffering and of their custodians has substantial ecumenical implications: chaplains can function as general custodians of narratives and sustainers of a generic religious meaning. This understanding is contrary to traditional Christianity, which discloses a transcendent significance of human suffering found in a very particular history involving particular persons: Christ as the second Adam through the submission of the second Eve has taken on our nature so that we can be united with God. Human suffering is tied to human sin, not simply as a punishment for sin, much less as an opportunity to discharge a supposed temporal punishment due to sin. Human suffering is the result of our rebellious free choices. It provides an opportunity for humility and submission, so that, united to the cross of Christ, sin can be forgiven and suffering set aside in the Resurrection. Knowledge of this framing context for all human suffering is accessible not through rational argument. It is a knowledge garnered through repentance, purification of the heart, illumination by God's grace, and unification with God. Christian bioethics is embedded in the narrative of suffering, which is part of the history of salvation and which encompasses and places all of medicine in its terms.     

Hope: Being Human in the Anthropocene

Given the calamities involved in climate change and the impact it is having – and will continue to have, on lives driven towards subsistence – what can be said about the goodness of creation? This essay explores how privileged theologians might rethink the notion of the common good in a situation where the majority are under-privileged. It argues for a need for imaginative investment to develop empathy, not sympathy; a need to listen in ways that are attentive and tending; and for a learning to accompany, such that dependence can be empowering when recognised and practised as mutual. Theologically, the sharing and accompaniment necessary has to be appreciated as inhering to the existence of all things, such that relationality and dependence are living expressions of the goodness of creation. Such sharing and accompaniment are expressions and incarnations of the uncreated goodness of the Triune God, operating in and through the ongoing processes of creation.     

Reaping the Right Fruits: Luther's Meditation on the 'Earnest Mirror, Christ'

Abstract:  To meditate aright, for Luther, is not to arouse in us an emotive piety for the crucified, but to be acquainted with the knowledge of our sinnerhood, and be devastated by it. Thus there is no natural knowledge of sin. The knowledge of sin flows directly from Christ, whom he called 'the earnest mirror'. This mirror causes sin to surface in our conscience so that it might cause it to disappear from it. This is made possible in Christ's atoning efficacy, where Christ, after exposing our sins, appears to us as our sin-bearer, the one who suffers our sins but suffers them into defeat in his cross and resurrection, if only we believe. The mirror then leads us beyond Christ's heart to the friendly heart of God, the one and same heart, which from eternity beats with such earnest love for us. Thus to grasp God aright, as the mirror reveals, is to grasp him not in his power and majesty, which might be terrifying, but in his opposites, that is, in his weakness and humility. God's way of being 'most himself' is by being for us ( pro nobis ), bearing and suffering the judgement of sin, and eventually dying on the cross. Then our faith and salvation stand immovably certain.     

“More Splendid than the Sun”: Christ’s Flesh among the Reasons for the Incarnation

This article defends two arguments proposed by Robert Grosseteste for the view that the Incarnation is logically prior to the Fall. Each of them is motivated by the goodness of Christ as a creature who is nonetheless worthy of worship, though the first considers this fact as an intrinsic good, and the second considers it as instrumentally good, by virtue of its making possible fleshly communion between God and his creatures. I will then consider Bonaventure’s reasons for rejecting these arguments, which turn on the worry that they posit a divine obligation to become Incarnate. I show that while Bonaventure’s concern is reasonable, he addresses it at the unacceptable cost of denying important aspects of the Incarnation’s purpose in the actual world. However, Bonaventure accepts that the Incarnation and Passion are “necessary” for human redemption in a way that is consistent with divine freedom, an intuition which Aquinas brings to particularly clear expression by analyzing the Incarnation as necessary in the sense of being the most fitting means of salvation. Applying this line of thought to Christ’s flesh, considered as the fitting instrument by which God has elected to perfectly beatify humanity, allows us to reconcile Grosseteste’s insistence on the Incarnation’s priority to the Fall with Bonaventure’s insistence on its absolute gratuity.     

Illness theodicies in the New Testament

The New Testament writers advocate or at least mention six different religious explanations for the origin of sickness. First, Satan may thus victimize the innocent. Second, God may send sickness as a punishment for the sufferer's sins. Third, God may send sickness to punish one's parents' sins. Fourth, God may so punish one's own sins committed in a previous life. Fifth, God may inflict illness in order to show his power by subsequent healing. Sixth, God may inflict illness in order to show his power by sustaining the sufferer through the illness instead of healing it.     

Negative Theology and Meaningless Suffering

This article attempts an exploration of the limits of our capacity to weave suffering into patterns of meaning. I try to show that something like an apophatic moment in our response to some kinds of suffering is both necessary and difficult to sustain. From this emerges a question about the relationship between this ‘something like apophasis’ before suffering, on the one hand, and unknowing in face of the mystery of God, on the other. I argue against a tendency in some modern theology to elide one into the other – against a tendency to absorb the ‘mystery of suffering’ into the ‘mystery of God.’ The article concludes with the suggestion that in order to avoid such an elision, and other forms of false reconciliation with suffering, Christian theology needs to maintain a commitment to a future-oriented eschatology, a real – if unimaginable – eschatological hope.     

EXTINCTION,NATURAL EVIL,AND THE COSMIC CROSS

Did the God of the Bible create a Darwinian world in which violence and suffering (disvalue) are the means by which the good (value) is realized? This is Christopher Southgate's insightful and dramatic formulation of the theodicy problem. In addressing this problem, the Exeter theologian rightly invokes the Theology of the Cross in its second manifestation, that is, we learn from the cross of Jesus Christ that God is present to nonhuman as well as human victims of predation and extinction. God co‐suffers with creatures in their despair, abandonment, physical suffering, and death. What I will add with more force than Southgate is this: the Easter resurrection is a prolepsis of the eschatological new creation, and it is God's new creation which retroactively determines past creation. Although this does not eliminate the theodicy question, it lessens its moral sting.     

GOD,CHRIST, AND ANIMALS

One of the most significant contributions to the field in recent times, David Clough's work On Animals: Volume 1, Systematic Theology, should ensure that theologies of creation, redemption, and eschatological fulfillment give proper attention to animals. In a landmark study, he draws upon resources in Scripture and tradition to present a systematic theology that is alert to the place of animals in the divine economy. Amidst his relentless criticism of all forms of anthropocentrism, however, it is asked whether some unresolved tensions emerge in relation to the traditional doctrine of God, the use of the category of the “personal” in theology, and the incarnation of the Word of God as a human creature.     

Is penal substitution unjust?

Penal substitution in a theological context is the doctrine that God inflicted upon Christ the suffering which we deserved as the punishment for our sins, as a result of which we no longer deserve punishment. Ever since the time of Faustus Socinus, the doctrine has faced formidable, and some would say insuperable, philosophical challenges. Critics of penal substitution frequently assert that God’s punishing Christ in our place would be an injustice on God’s part. For it is an axiom of retributive justice that it is unjust to punish an innocent person. But Christ was an innocent person. Since God is perfectly just, He cannot therefore have punished Christ. Virtually every premiss in this argument is challengeable. Not all penal substitution theories affirm that Christ was punished for our sins. The argument makes unwarranted assumptions about the ontological foundations of moral duty independent of God’s commands. It presupposes without warrant that God is by nature an unqualified negative retributivist. It overlooks the possibility that the prima facie demands of negative retributive justice might be overridden in Christ’s case by weightier moral considerations. And it takes it for granted that Christ was legally innocent, which is denied by the classic doctrine of imputation. It thus fails to show any injustice in God’s punishing Christ in our place.     

We Preach Christ Crucified: Rejecting the Prosperity Gospel and Responding to Feminist Criticism Using Luther's Second Theology of the Cross

Abstract :  This article affirms that Luther's theology of the cross should serve as a counterpoint to ideologies like the prosperity gospel that encourage adherents to amass personal wealth while remaining indifferent to the suffering of others. To employ Luther's theology of the cross responsibly, however, one must take into consideration the feminist critique that it potentially encourages passive suffering and abuse, especially on the part of women in abusive situations who are told to 'bear their cross' and simply endure what they suffer. A second theology of the cross implicit in Luther's writings, one that portrays God not as the cause of suffering but as the healing power that brings life out of suffering and death that already exists, provides the basis for a rejection of the prosperity gospel while meeting (at least partially) the concern of feminist critics.     

God’s moral goodness and supererogation

What do we understand by God’s goodness? William Alston claims that by answering this question convincingly, divine command theory can be strengthened against some major objections. He rejects the idea that God’s goodness lies in the area of moral obligations. Instead, he proposes that God’s goodness is best described by the phenomenon of supererogation. Joseph Lombardi, in response, agrees with Alston that God does not have moral obligations but says that having rejected moral obligation as the content of divine goodness, Alston cannot help himself to supererogation as a solution to the content of God’s moral goodness. If God has no moral obligations and does not perform supererogatory acts, Lombardi suggests that God’s goodness may be explicated through concentrating on God’s benevolence, but he does not develop this theme. I propose that Alston’s idea of divine supererogation without obligation is sustainable, but that a reshaping of the concept of supererogation is required; one in which love, rather than benevolence, plays an important part. If the love associated with supererogation is characterised in a certain way, I suggest this adds a new angle to the understanding of divine goodness.     

Luther's Heidelberg Disputation and identity formation

Luther's famous Ninety‐five Theses overshadowed his twenty‐eight theses of the Heidelberg Disputation. This is regrettable insofar as Luther broke in Heidelberg with the traditional scholastic method and introduced for the first time publicly his influential theology of the cross. Luther's existential emphasis in this Disputation is particularly significant, because he answers here the big questions for us: Who am I really in the sight of God? What is my true identity in Christ? Luther radically exposes our self‐centeredness and calls us to look at the world, God, and ourselves through “suffering and the cross,” as only in this way will we be able to perceive clearly and “say what a thing is.” He encourages us to become theologians of the cross who have given up on themselves and discovered that “everything is already done.” Luther's passionate plea to put the cross of Christ at the center of our lives is a welcome reminder for us today, even five hundred years later, as we seek to find out who we are, who God is, and what God is accomplishing in and through us. Rescuing Luther's Heidelberg Disputation from oblivion is vital for the health of both church and academia today.     

Gregory of Nyssa and Divine Simplicity: A Conceptualist Reading

Andrew Radde‐Gallwitz probes Gregory of Nyssa on divine simplicity, a topic that Radde‐Gallwitz treated earlier in a book‐length monograph and takes further here in response to critics. As he notes, the Cappadocians and their opponents shared belief in divine simplicity. But for Gregory, simplicity functions as part of affirming the co‐equal divinity of the Father and Son, against his opponents. Radde‐Gallwitz lists six negative claims that Gregory’s understanding of divine simplicity supports: (1) God is immaterial; (2) God is without parts; (3) God does not possess any perfection “by acquisition”; (4) God does not possess any perfection “by participation”; (5) in God, there is no mixture or conflux of qualities, especially opposite qualities; (6) in God, there are no degrees of more or less. Yet with regard to positive statements about God’s perfections—for example the relation of God’s goodness to God’s wisdom—things are more difficult, as Radde‐Gallwitz shows. Interpreters of Gregory have differed sharply on this issue, in part because Gregory does not make his position crystal clear. Radde‐Gallwitz himself earlier held that Gregory considers God to have real but non‐definitive perfections distinct from the divine essence. Indebted to Richard Cross, however, Radde‐Gallwitz here adjusts his view, distinguishing more firmly between the divine essence itself and our limited concepts. He draws upon the Platonic distinction between natural and conventional naming, which differ in their accounts of what makes words meaningful. Arguing that Gregory is a “naturalist,” he reads Gregory’s texts on divine simplicity in this light.     

受苦的上帝与人的解放──莫尔特曼的政治神学

莫尔特曼的政治神学是其希望神学的逻辑延伸与必要组成部分。政治神学的特点是面向实践。它是关于复活与十字架受难的辩证和谐统一。政治神学的上帝是被钉十字架的、受苦的上帝。奥斯维辛之后的上帝不再是战无不胜的。上帝与不信神的、被上帝遗弃者结合。解放是指从政治偶像及焦虑中解放出来。拯救不仅仅是传统所谓从罪中救赎。除了罪以外,人还有无缘无故地遭受的苦难。上帝站在无辜受难者一边,并亲自受苦。这是新的神正论。人的解放不仅包括宗教偶像的破除,也包括政治偶像的破除。注重行动与成就,使人变得冷漠,对人缺乏同情,缺乏激情。现代神学的趋势是与社会现实结合更密切。