直觉和分析在不同任务条件下的逃生决策效果

目的：探讨针对简单和复杂逃生任务时, 直觉和分析在不同判断依据条件下的逃生决策效果。方法：采用两个主实验和两个预备实验。实验一和实验二的被试人数分别为：85人和87人。两个主实验均采取2 (思维方式：直觉和分析) × 2 (判断依据：简单和复杂)组间实验设计。主要结果：(1)针对简单逃生任务, 直觉组和分析组在不同判断依据条件下的逃生决策效果差异不明显; (2)针对复杂逃生任务, 在简单判断依据条件下分析决策优于直觉决策; 在复杂判断依据条件下直觉决策优于分析决策。主要结论：直觉性和分析性逃生决策的效果主要与决策任务的复杂程度有关, 而与判断依据的复杂程度关系不大。     

逃生决策中的信息源直觉和分析对采纳偏向的影响

选取82名被试,探讨在突发危急事件的逃生判断和决策中人们对不同信息源的采纳偏向,同时探讨直觉和分析两种思维倾向以及直觉和分析两种决策风格对逃生判断和决策中信息源采纳的影响。结果：（1）在模拟突发危急事件的逃生判断和决策中人们对不同信息源的采纳倾向存在明显差异,来自权威、熟悉以及具有高信任度的信息源更容易被采纳;（2）直觉性思维倾向启动条件下和分析性思维倾向启动条件下的信息源采纳倾向差异不明显;（3）直觉型决策风格对信息源的采纳倾向具有明显预测性,而分析型决策风格对信息源的采纳倾向不具有明显预测性。主要结论     

真实火灾和模拟火灾情境下小鼠的逃生决策比较*

探讨并比较真实火灾和模拟火灾情境下小鼠是否采用直觉性逃生决策。研究包括一个预备训练和两个主实验。预备训练的目的：首先训练小鼠获得有关迷宫路线及出口的经验,然后再经过遗忘处理使它们遗忘相关经验。两个主实验均采用3(情境：真实火灾,模拟火灾,普通情境)×2(记忆：遗忘前和遗忘后)混合实验设计,因变量均为逃生决策。实验组被试为72只经过训练的小鼠,控制组为24只未经过训练的小鼠。通过考察小鼠在不同情境和不同记忆条件下的逃生时间和对逃生出口的选择探测并比较真实火灾和模拟火灾情境下小鼠的逃生决策差异。主要结果：(1)实验组在真实火灾情境下的逃生时间无论遗忘前后都明显比模拟火灾情境下短;(2)实验组在真实火灾和模拟火灾情境下的逃生时间都明显比控制组短;(3)当熟悉和陌生出口均开启同时熟悉出口处有烟雾条件下,真实火灾组在遗忘前后均倾向于选择熟悉出口逃生,其他两组则倾向于选择陌生出口离开。结论：真实火灾和模拟火灾情境下小鼠的逃生决策存在明显差异：真实火灾情境下受过训练的小鼠倾向于直觉性逃生决策;模拟火灾情境下受过训练的小鼠不倾向于直觉性逃生决策。     

图形面积判断任务下信息加工模式和信息呈现方式对吸引效应的影响

研究使用图形面积判断任务取代典型的双属性决策框架, 考察了不同信息加工模式和信息呈现方式对吸引效应的影响。实验1比较了不同信息加工模式对吸引效应的影响, 结果发现, 当被试以直觉的信息加工方式进行面积比较判断时, 吸引效应不显著, 而以分析的信息加工方式判断时吸引效应明显存在, 后者效应强度显著大于前者。实验2通过调整图形排列顺序, 比较了刺激材料呈现方式对吸引效应的影响, 结果表明, 被试以直觉的信息加工方式进行判断时吸引效应依然存在, 但其表现要受信息呈现方式影响, 相对于将目标图形放置于诱引图形和竞争图形之间, 将诱引图形放置于目标图形和竞争图形之间而成为判断背景时, 吸引效应强度更大。研究提出了吸引效应形成的两阶段理论, 认为吸引效应产生的根源同时来自直觉的和分析的两个信息加工阶段, 研究也证实信息呈现方式对被试信息加工方式造成较大影响, 进而影响吸引效应强度。     

信息呈现顺序对公平判断形成的影响

在公平启发理论的基础上,以130名大学生为被试采用实验室实验探讨了信息呈现顺序对公平判断形成的影响。结果表明：（1）信息呈现顺序能够影响人们的公平判断——当结果适宜性信息更早获得时,结果公平对公平判断的影响要大于结果适宜性信息较晚呈现时的影响;（2）公平形式偏好对公平判断的信息效应具有调节作用,即当高偏好信息先于低偏好信息出现时,公平判断的顺序效应会得到加强;而在低偏好信息先于高偏好信息出现的情况下,公平判断的顺序效应会被减弱。     

沃尔夫假说的新证据:范畴内和范畴间颜色辨别难度相同时语言范畴也会影响注意前颜色知觉

该研究探讨了当范畴内和范畴间颜色的辨别难度相同时,语言范畴是否会影响注意前颜色知觉。实验中,采用渐变且相邻者差别阈限数相当的A、B、C、D四种颜色（前两者为绿色,后两者为蓝色）为刺激材料,并让被试接受视觉Oddball脑电测试。脑电测试分视野给被试呈现标准刺激,以及与标准刺激属同一语言范畴（即颜色词绿色或蓝色）或不同语言范畴的偏差刺激。结果发现：在左视野呈现时,范畴内偏差刺激比范畴间偏差刺激诱发了边缘显著更大的视觉失匹配负波（vMMN）,在右视野呈现时,两类偏差刺激诱发的vMMN无显著差异;范畴内偏差刺激在不同视野呈现时诱发的vMMN无显著差异,范畴间偏差刺激则在右视野呈现时诱发了显著更大的vMMN。这一结果表明,当范畴内和范畴间颜色的辨别难度相同时,语言范畴也会影响早期的、注意前颜色知觉,支持了沃尔夫假说。     

道德直觉决策及其机制探析

道德直觉决策研究是从直觉思维角度探讨决策者在道德境遇下的决策。道德直觉决策是道德情境下的直觉反应, 其理论基础包括躯体标记假说、社会直觉模型、双加工理论、事件特征情感复合体系以及双系统理论; 道德直觉决策机制至少包括：无意识加工、情绪加工和直觉加工三个基本的心理加工过程, 与之对应的神经系统则至少存在三个可能的脑神经回路：无意识加工的道德脑区、情绪加工的道德脑区和直觉加工的道德脑区。研究主要从客观和主观两方面分析了道德直觉决策的一般性影响因素--文化、道德境遇、经验、情绪和道德直觉; 揭示了道德直觉决策的加工机制。未来研究应在加强理论建构的基础上, 通过更缜密细致的实验设计去探究决策过程中各因素的交互作用, 并明确道德脑区之间的联结。     

“先扬后抑”vs.“先抑后扬”:反馈顺序对决策信心建构的影响

本研究采用2×3被试内设计,通过操纵不同性质信息的反馈比例和反馈顺序,重点考察了反馈顺序对决策信心动态建构的影响。结果表明:(1)在不同反馈比例条件下,当个体接收到的正性反馈多于负性反馈时,个体的决策信心上升,反之则下降;当个体接收到的正性反馈等于负性反馈时,个体的决策信心下降,表现出"负性偏向";(2)"先扬后抑"与"先抑后扬"的信息反馈顺序对决策信心的动态建构产生了不同影响,表现出类似于"近因效应"的现象,"惊讶假设(surprise hypothesis)"可为此提供解释。本研究表明,在决策信心的动态建构过程中,信息的反馈顺序发挥着重要作用。     

如何用行为经济学应对不确定性：拓展有效助推的范围

本文提出了决策中不确定性的五种类型及其行为学和心理学的应对机制：用简捷启发式替代加权求和应对信息不确定性, 用直觉应对认知不确定性, 用价值观预测选择偏好应对行为不确定性, 用决策参照点的权重替代概率应对结果不确定性, 用时间换时间以降低延迟折扣应对未来不确定性。新行为经济学应当通过“为什么”的功能性分析, 找到行为助推的心理杠杆。化解不确定性本身就是一种有效的行为助推; 化繁为简是行为助推的关键所在。     

关系密切程度以及思维方式和决策风格对风险偏好的影响

研究目的:探讨救援决策者与被救援者的关系密切程度以及思维方式与决策风格对风险偏好的影响。研究方法:实验一采用3(关系密切程度:高、中、低)×2(思维方式:直觉性、分析性)两因素混合实验设计,被试68名;实验二采用3(关系密切程度:高、中、低)×2(思维方式:直觉性、分析性)×2(决策风格:直觉型、分析型)三因素混合实验设计,被试93名。研究结果:(1)救援决策者与被救援者的关系密切程度越高,风险偏好越高;(2)直觉性和分析性思维方式之间的风险偏好无显著差异;(3)直觉型决策风格的风险偏好显著高于分析型;(4)关系密切程度与思维方式的交互作用显著,具体而言,采用直觉性思维方式时,关系密切程度的效应显著,关系密切程度越高,风险偏好越高;采用分析性思维方式时,关系密切程度的效应不显著。结论:直觉与风险偏好的关系更密切。面对关系亲密的被救援者,决策者采用直觉性思维方式时的风险偏好较高。     

Intuition and the correspondence between implicit and explicit self-esteem

Four studies tested whether the perceived validity of intuition increases the correspondence between implicit and explicit self-esteem. Studies 1 and 2 found, with 2 different measures of implicit self-esteem, that people who chronically view their intuition as valid have more consistent implicit and explicit self-esteem. In contrast, people with relatively low faith in their intuition had a negative relation between implicit and explicit self-esteem, suggesting that they may overcorrect their explicit self-views for the potential bias posed by implicit self-esteem. In Studies 3 and 4, participants who were induced to view their intuition as valid reported explicit self-views (self-evaluations made under time pressure, or state self-esteem) that were more consistent with their implicit self-esteem. These results suggest that people experience implicit self-esteem as intuitive evaluations. The correspondence between implicit and explicit self-esteem among individuals who view their intuition as valid may suggest that these individuals incorporate implicit self-esteem into their explicit self-views.     

The moderator role of intuitive versus deliberative decision making for the predictive validity of implicit and explicit measures

The Preference for Intuition and Deliberation (PID) scale aims at capturing stable general individual differences in terms of intuitive versus deliberative preferences in decision making. A study examined the psychometric properties of the English version of the PID, investigated whether the two subscales moderate the validity of implicit and explicit measures for incidental and deliberative evaluations and behaviours concerning fizzy soft drinks, and compared the predictive validity of two new implicit measures (ST‐IAT and ID‐EAST) and an explicit measure. Results showed an asymmetric weak double dissociation pattern only for behaviours. Additionally, a moderation effect suggested that the ST‐IAT better predicted sensory evaluation for people high in intuition and explicit attitudes better predicted benefit evaluation for people high in deliberation. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Mood and trust in intuition interactively orchestrate correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes

The goal of the current research was to subject the prediction that affect and trust in intuition would interactively shape implicit and explicit attitude correspondence to empirical assessment. In four experiments, either trust versus distrust in intuition was measured or manipulated and positive or negative moods were induced. The outcome of interest was correspondence between implicit and explicit academic attitudes (Experiments 1-2) and self-attitudes (Experiments 3-4). As predicted, affect served as information about chronically or temporarily accessible tendencies to trust or distrust their intuitions, with positive affect validating and negative affect invalidating such tendencies, which in turn shaped correspondence between implicit and explicit attitudes. By drawing together these two seemingly unrelated lines of research, these experiments provide important insights into the sometimes mysterious circumstances in which implicit attitudes are translated into explicit attitude reports.     

The influence of affective statements on performance on implicit and explicit memory tasks

Consumers are often exposed to brand names presented concurrently with information such as brand claims and warnings, prior to making product choices. As implicit memory has been implicated in the consumer choice process, two experiments were conducted to assess the influence of additional information, namely simple positive and negative statements, on implicit and explicit memory tasks. In Experiment 1, the mere presence of additional statements at study significantly reduced performance on a two‐alternatives forced recognition task. However, the same manipulation had no effect on implicit preference judgement task performance. The valence of the accompanying information had no effect on either task. In Experiment 2, using modified implicit and explicit choice tasks, performance on the former was unaffected by statement valence, whereas the latter task was. Hence, positive priming was obtained for brand names previously shown with negative information. The results of the experiments are discussed in relation to both implicit memory and consumer choice. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Heart and the Head: On Choosing Experiences Intuitively and Possessions Deliberatively

An enduring question in the field of judgment and decision making is when people are likely to choose on the basis of intuition and when they are likely to pursue a more deliberative decision strategy. Here, we attempt to shed light on that question by examining whether people tend to weight intuition more heavily when making experiential purchases, and to weight deliberation more heavily when making material purchases. Results from seven studies indicate that they do. In Study 1 (and a replication), participants expressed an explicit preference for choosing experiential purchases intuitively and material purchases analytically. In Study 2 (and a replication), participants anticipated experiencing more regret after going against reason for material purchases and going against intuition for experiential purchases. Participants in Study 3 who were asked to think about an experiential purchase wanted to see the relevant information presented by alternative, which facilitates intuitive/holistic processing, more than did those who were asked to consider a material purchase. In two additional studies, participants who were induced to think intuitively chose experiential purchases more often (Study 4) and reported a higher willingness to pay for them (Study 5) compared with participants induced to think analytically. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Of two minds: forming and changing valence-inconsistent implicit and explicit attitudes

Because different processes underlie implicit and explicit attitudes, we hypothesized that they are differentially sensitive to different kinds of information. We measured implicit and explicit attitudes over time, as different types of attitude-relevant information about a single attitude object were presented. As expected, explicit attitudes formed and changed in response to the valence of consciously accessible, verbally presented behavioral information about the target. In contrast, implicit attitudes formed and changed in response to the valence of subliminally presented primes, reflecting the progressive accretion of attitude object-evaluation pairings. As a consequence, when subliminal primes and behavioral information were of opposite valence, people formed implicit and explicit attitudes of conflicting valence.     

情绪对内隐态度和外显态度联结的调节作用

不同的情绪在内隐态度与外显态度表现过程中塑造着不同的心理环境, 调节内隐态度和外显态度的一致性。正性情绪增加了内隐态度与外显态度的联结, 然而负性情绪对内隐态度与外显态度联结的调节作用表现并不一致。单一考虑情绪的正负效价不足以解释具体情绪影响的差异性, 情绪的确定性、情绪与直觉信任的交互作用均会对内隐态度与外显态度的联结产生影响。理论方面, 联结性-推理性评价模型及情绪-信息模型对情绪调节内隐态度与外显态度联结的内在机制进行了解释。未来研究可进一步探索特定情绪对内隐态度与外显态度联结的调节作用, 并考察情绪是否会对内隐刻板印象与外显刻板印象的联结产生调节作用, 以及采用认知神经科学技术揭示情绪调节内隐态度与外显态度联结的神经机制。     

Input- and output-monitoring in implicit and explicit memory

Previous experiments have shown that the procedure of questioning subjects retrospectively about the input and output status of information (input and output monitoring) is a useful method for assessing the awareness states of subjects during implicit and explicit memory tasks. The main purpose of the present study was to investigate whether the previous findings could be extended to other implicit and explicit memory tasks. We were especially interested in whether differences in input- and output-monitoring performance can be observed when both the implicit and explicit memory tasks are conceptual ones. In a final test phase, the target items from the study phase and new distractor items were presented. In a recognition-like situation, subjects had to decide whether an item had been presented in the study phase (input status), as well as whether they had produced the item in the memory-test phase (output status). In all three experiments judgments about the input status - but only for those items that had been produced in the implicit or in the explicit memory test - were more precise after explicit than after implicit memory testings. This finding was not influenced by the distinction between perceptual and conceptual-memory tasks (Exp. 1), and was obtained under conditions in which the implicit and the explicit memory tasks were both conceptual and differed only in test instructions (Exps. 2 and 3). These results suggest that not only subjects performing a perceptual test of implicit memory, but also subjects in a conceptual implicit test were less aware of using information from a previous study episode than subjects who received memory instructions. It is concluded that requiring judgments about the input status of information is a good method for assessing subjects test awareness and is preferable to the use of a questionnaire (Exp. 3). In contrast, in all three experiments no differences were found with the output-monitoring measure between implicit and explicit test conditions.