A modified mark test for own-body recognition in pig-tailed macaques (Macaca nemestrina)

Classic mirror self-recognition mark tests involve familiarizing the subject with its mirror image, surreptitiously applying a mark on the subject’s eyebrow, nose, or ear, and measuring self-directed behaviors toward the mark. For many non-human primate species, however, direct gaze at the face constitutes an aggressive and threatening signal. It is therefore possible that monkeys fail the mark test because they do not closely inspect their faces in a mirror and hence they have no expectations about their physical appearance. In the current study, we prevented two pig-tailed macaques (Macaca nemestrina) from seeing their own faces in a mirror, and we adopted a modified version of the classic mark test in which monkeys were marked on the chest, a body region to which they normally have direct visual access but that in the current study was visible only via a mirror. Neither monkey tried to touch the mark on its chest, possibly due to a failure to understand the mirror as a reflective surface. To further the monkeys’ understanding of the mirror image, we trained them to reach for food using the mirror as the only source of information. After both monkeys had learned mirror-mediated reaching, we replicated the mark test. In this latter phase of the study, only one monkey scratched the red dye on the chest once. The results are consistent with other findings suggesting that monkeys are not capable of passing a mark test and imply that face and body recognition rely on the same cognitive abilities.     

Sneaking a peek: pigeons use peripheral vision (not mirrors) to find hidden food

A small number of species are capable of recognizing themselves in the mirror when tested with the mark-and-mirror test. This ability is often seen as evidence of self-recognition and possibly even self-awareness. Strangely, a number of species, for example monkeys, pigs and dogs, are unable to pass the mark test but can locate rewarding objects by using the reflective properties of a mirror. Thus, these species seem to understand how a visual reflection functions but cannot apply it to their own image. We tested this discrepancy in pigeons—a species that does not spontaneously pass the mark test. Indeed, we discovered that pigeons can successfully find a hidden food reward using only the reflection, suggesting that pigeons can also use and potentially understand the reflective properties of mirrors, even in the absence of self-recognition. However, tested under monocular conditions, the pigeons approached and attempted to walk through the mirror rather than approach the physical food, displaying similar behavior to patients with mirror agnosia. These findings clearly show that pigeons do not use the reflection of mirrors to locate reward, but actually see the food peripherally with their near-panoramic vision. A re-evaluation of our current understanding of mirror-mediated behavior might be necessary—especially taking more fully into account species differences in visual field. This study suggests that use of reflections in a mirrored surface as a tool may be less widespread than currently thought.     

Discrimination of moving video images of self by pigeons (<Emphasis Type="Italic">Columba livia</Emphasis>)

The ability to recognize self has been known to be limited to some animal species, but previous research has focused almost exclusively on the animal's reaction to a mirror. Recent studies suggest that the temporal contingency between a subject's action and the corresponding visual scene reflected in a mirror plays an important role in self-recognition. To assess the roles of visual-proprioceptive contiguity in self-recognition, we explored whether pigeons are able to discriminate videos of themselves with various temporal properties. We trained five pigeons to respond to live video images of themselves (live self-movies) and not to video filmed during previous training sessions (pre-recorded self-movies). Pigeons learned to peck trial-unique live self-movies more frequently than pre-recorded self-movies. We conducted two generalization tests after pigeons learned to discriminate between the two conditions. First, discrimination acquired during training sessions was transferred to a test session involving live self-movies and new pre-recorded self-movies. Second, the same pigeons were tested in extinction procedure using delayed live self-movies and new pre-recorded self-movies. Although pigeons responded to delayed presentations of live self-movies more frequently than to new pre-recorded self-movies, the relative response rate to delayed presentation of live self-movies gradually decreased as the temporal discrepancy between pigeons' own behavior and the corresponding video increased. These results indicate that pigeons' discrimination of self-movies with various temporal properties was based on the temporal contiguity between their behavior and its visual feedback. The methodology used in the present experiment is an important step toward improving the experimental analysis of self-recognition in non-human animals.     

Visual self-recognition in mirrors and live videos: Evidence for a developmental asynchrony

Three experiments (N = 123) investigated the development of live-video self-recognition using the traditional mark test. In Experiment 1, 24-, 30- and 36-month-old children saw a live video image of equal size and orientation as a control group saw in a mirror. The video version of the test was more difficult than the mirror version with only the oldest children's performance approaching ceiling. In Experiment 2, most 24-month-olds showed self-recognition when presented with a TV-set that featured a mirror in place of a screen. This finding does not substantiate the possibility that expectations about what appears on TV are responsible for the asynchrony. In Experiment 3, children were given a mark-test involving only their legs. Again, a video version was more difficult than previously reported performance with mirrors, suggesting that the impossibility of eye-contact in video cannot explain this developmental asynchrony. The findings suggest that self-recognition can be added to the growing list of contexts in which 2-year-olds display what has been called a “video deficit” [Anderson, D. R., & Pempek, T. A. (2005). Television and very young children. American Behavioral Scientist, 48, 505–532].     

A social cichlid fish failed to pass the mark test

Since the pioneering work in chimpanzees, mirror self-recognition (MSR), the ability to recognise oneself in a mirror, has been reported in great apes, Asian elephants, dolphins, and some social birds using the mark test, in which animals that possess MSR touch an imperceptible mark on their own bodies only when a mirror is present. However, giant pandas, which are solitary, failed to pass the mark test, suggesting that MSR evolved solely in highly social animals. In contrast to the increasing evidence of MSR in mammals and birds, little is known about MSR in fish. A Tanganyikan cichlid, Neolamprologus pulcher, is a good candidate for study because these fish live in highly social groups and recognise conspecifics about as rapidly as primates. We examined their responses to a mirror image and tested whether N. pulcher could pass the mark test. When the mirror was first exposed, they stayed in front of the mirror and exhibited aggressive behaviour towards the mirror image. These social behaviours suggested that the focal fish perceived the mirror image as an unfamiliar conspecific. The social responses decreased over the following days, as has generally been the case in animals with MSR. After mark injection, we found no increase in scraping behaviour or prolonged observation of the marked side. These results show a lack of contingency checking and mark-directed behaviours, meaning that N. pulcher failed to pass the mark test and did not recognise their self-image in the mirror.     

Social awareness and early self-recognition

Self-recognition by 86 children (14-52months) was assessed using the mirror mark test in two different social contexts. In the classic mirror task condition, only the child was marked prior to mirror exposure (Classic condition). In the social norm condition, the child, experimenter, and accompanying parent were marked prior to the child's mirror exposure (Norm condition). Results indicate that in both conditions children pass the test in comparable proportion, with the same increase as a function of age. However, in the Norm condition, children displayed significantly more hesitation while removing the mark, often touching it without removing it or, if so, promptly putting the mark back onto their forehead. In the Classic condition, only one child showed such hesitation. These results suggest that from the outset, mirror self-recognition can refer to social awareness. This link is interpreted as the trademark of human self-consciousness, a deeply rooted "looking glass" self-awareness.     

自我表征的可塑性:基于橡胶手错觉的研究

自我识别是人类自我觉知的行为标记。传统方法认为稳定的自我表征是自我识别的基础。随着对橡胶手错觉及一系列自我表征和自我识别错觉的揭示,这一能让人将外部客体感知为自身一部分的错觉研究使得我们能够以多感官整合的方式来研究自我表征和自我识别。拥有感和自主感被认为是我们进行自我识别的两类基本体验,本文对一系列橡胶手错觉范式研究的系统回顾表明,拥有感和自主感会发生改变,这说明人的自我表征是可变的和可塑的。     

自闭症幼儿的视觉性自我认知实验研究

通过对平均心理年龄为23个月的6名自闭症幼儿的实验研究．甄别他们是否能从视觉上进行自我与他人的分化认知并进一步探索自闭症幼儿对镜像自我认知与录像自我认知上的差异;以秒为单位．对实验结果和过程进行了编码分析。结果表明：这6名幼儿在看自己的录像时,比看同伴的表现出更多的关注和喜悦;对录像的自我进行认知寸表现出更大的关注和积极情绪。由此推断他们已具有初步的自我认知。     

Distinguishing three levels in explicit self-awareness

This paper focuses on the development of explicit self-awareness in children. Mirror self-recognition has been the most popular paradigm used to assess this ability in children. Nevertheless, according to Rochat (2003), there are, at least, three different levels of explicit self-awareness. We therefore designed three different self-recognition tasks, each corresponding to one of these levels (a mirror self-recognition task, a picture self-recognition task and a masked self-recognition task). We observed a decrease in performance across the three tasks. This supports a developmental scale in self-awareness. Besides, the masked self-recognition performance makes it possible to assess the final and the most sophisticated level of self-awareness, i.e. the external self. To our best knowledge, this task is the first attempt to evaluate the external self in preverbal children. Our results indicate that 22-month old children show awareness of their external self or, at least, that this ability is in the process of being acquired.     

Variability in the early development of visual self-recognition

A study was conducted to evaluate the (1) developmental course and (2) the temporal sequencing of visual (mirror, photo) and verbal (personal pronoun use) measures of self-recognition as well as the ability to locate a toy from its mirror image in relation to the child's own mirror image. A microgenetic approach was adopted to assess 10 toddlers biweekly between 15 and 23 months of age and for comparison, a cross-section of children tested once across the same age range. Longitudinal data indicated that visual self-recognition emerged gradually and showed wide variability in expression prior to becoming stable, a finding masked in the cross-sectional data where performance appeared to improve abruptly. Both cross-sectional and longitudinal data confirmed that mirror self-recognition was the earliest precursor of the indices of self-recognition to emerge followed by the use of personal pronouns and photo identification. Implications for the emergence and integration of the self are discussed.     

Development of self-recognition in chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes).

Chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) demonstrate the ability to recognize themselves in mirrors, yet investigations of the development of self-recognition in chimpanzees are sparse. Twelve young chimpanzees, grouped by age, were given mirror exposure and tested for self-recognition and contingent movement. All 6 juveniles, 4 and 5 years old, exhibited mirror-guided, mark-directed behavior and clear evidence of self-recognition. In contrast, among the infants, only the oldest group of 2 1/2-year-olds exhibited clear evidence of self-recognition. All chimpanzees exhibited both self-directed behaviors and contingent movements. These results suggest that self-recognition occurs at a slightly older age in chimpanzees than in human infants. In humans, self-recognition is linked with other cognitive abilities. The results conform to the general pattern that great apes exhibit many cognitive skills comparable to those of 2-year-old humans.     

The Alienating Mirror: Toward a Hegelian Critique of Lacan on Ego-Formation

This article brings out certain philosophical difficulties in Lacan’s account of the mirror stage, the initial moment of the subject’s development. For Lacan, the “original organization of the forms of the ego” is “precipitated” in an infant’s self-recognition in a mirror image; this event is explicitly prior to any social interactions. A Hegelian objection to the Lacanian account argues that social interaction and recognition of others by infants are necessary prerequisites for infants’ capacity to recognize themselves in a mirror image. Thus mutual recognition with another, rather than self-recognition in a mirror, is what makes possible subsequent ego-formation and self-consciousness. This intersubjective critique suggests that many of the psychoanalytic consequences that Lacan derives from the mirror stage (e.g., alienation, narcissism, and aggressivity) may need to be rethought.

Consciousness and Self in Animals: Some Reflections

In this essay I argue that many nonhuman animal beings are conscious and have some sense of self. Rather than ask whether they are conscious, I adopt an evolutionary perspective and ask why consciousness and a sense of self evolved—what are they good for? Comparative studies of animal cognition, ethological investigations that explore what it is like to be a certain animal, are useful for answering this question. Charles Darwin argued that the differences in cognitive abilities and emotions among animals are differences in degree rather than differences in kind, and his view cautions against the unyielding claim that humans, and perhaps other great apes and cetaceans, are the only species in which a sense of self‐awareness has evolved. I conclude that there are degrees of consciousness and self among animals and that it is likely that no animal has the same highly developed sense of self as that displayed by most humans. Many animals have a sense of “body‐ness” or “mine‐ness” but not a sense of “I‐ness.” Darwin's ideas about evolutionary continuity, together with empirical data (“science sense”) and common sense, will help us learn more about consciousness and self in animals. Answers to challenging questions about animal self‐awareness have wide‐ranging significance, because they are often used as the litmus test for determining and defending the sorts of treatments to which animals can be morally subjected.     

Tracking responses related to self-recognition: a frequency comparison of responses to mirrors, photographs, and videotapes by cotton top tamanins (Saguinus oedipus)

The frequency of responses cotton top tamarins (Saguinus oedipus) emitted indicative of self-recognition to a mirror was compared with the frequencies of responses emitted to digitized photographs of tamarins (Experiment 1) and to videotapes of real-time or prior tamarin action (Experiment 2). Results indicated more attentional responses toward the mirror in both studies, but behavioral indices of self-recognition were not consistently generated by the mirror. The 2 experiments confirmed that real-time self-reflection is a condition that generates heightened attention and rare examples of particular mirror-specific behaviors in tamarins.     

Imitative learning from a third-party interaction: relations with self-recognition and perspective taking

Young children’s ability to learn something new from a third-party interaction may be related to the ability to imagine themselves in the third-party interaction. This imaginative ability presupposes an understanding of self-other equivalence, which is manifested in an objective understanding of the self and an understanding of others’ subjective perspectives. The current study measured imitative learning of a novel action seen only in a third-party interaction, mirror self-recognition, and perspective taking in a group of 48 18- to 20-month-olds. Patterns of performance suggest that understanding self-other equivalence is related to third-party learning.     

Language as gesture

Language can be understood as an embodied system, expressible as gestures. Perception of these gestures depends on the “mirror system,” first discovered in monkeys, in which the same neural elements respond both when the animal makes a movement and when it perceives the same movement made by others. This system allows gestures to be understood in terms of how they are produced, as in the so-called motor theory of speech perception. I argue that human speech evolved from manual gestures, with vocal gestures being gradually incorporated into the mirror system in the course of hominin evolution. Speech may have become the dominant mode only with the emergence of Homo sapiens some 170,100 years ago, although language as a relatively complex syntactic system probably emerged over the past 2 million years, initially as a predominantly manual system. Despite the present-day dominance of speech, manual gestures accompany speech, and visuomanual forms of language persist in signed languages of the deaf, in handwriting, and even in such forms as texting.     

The Sounds of Silence: Inferences from the Absence of Word‐of‐Mouth

While past work has explored some of the reasons why people themselves may remain silent in a group, almost no research has examined the mirror image of this question: How do consumers construe the silence of others? Do they project the opinions of the speakers in a conversation onto the silent individuals, assuming that silence signals agreement? Do they have a usual or “default” naïve theory of silence that they use to explain it across multiple contexts—i.e., “silence usually signals disagreement?” Or does silence act as a mirror, reflecting observers’ own opinions back at them? Three experiments contrasted perceivers’ estimates of conversational silence with their estimates of unknown opinions outside the conversation. Estimates of opinions outside the conversation generally followed an agreement‐with‐the‐speakers rule—the more an opinion was expressed in the group, the more consumers assumed others would support it too. In contrast, silence inside the conversation was interpreted very differently, serving as a mirror for participants’ own thoughts, even when the vocal majority favored the opposite position. Results suggest a process whereby observers project the reason they personally would have been silent in the group (given their opinion) onto silence, leading to an inference that the silents agree with the self.     

Mirror self-recognition in ghost crab (Ocypode quadrata)

Animal Cognition - Mirror self-recognition has been examined primarily in vertebrate species, largely through the use of a mirror mark test. Recently, however, there has been growing interest in...     

Origins of Self-Perception in Infancy

Most accounts of the origins of the self-concept in humans rely on the mirror self-recognition (rouge removal) task whereby the infant is credited with self-awareness at about 15 months, once it is able to use the mirror reflection to locate a dab of rouge on the nose. But mirror self- recognition may require relatively advanced cognitive abilities and may reveal relatively little about the ontogenetic origins of self-knowledge. The aim of this article is to consider the antecedents of self-knowledge in processes of sensory perception during infancy. J. J. Gibson' s ecological approach to sensory perception asserts that there is information for the distinction between self and nonself inherent in perception. Evidence from human infants who are too young to recognize themselves in mirrors is reviewed for a sensory perceptual basis for the existential self (the I) and for the categorical self (the me) in William James' s terminology. Studies of the visual proprioceptive control of posture in babies may be interpreted to support an inherent distinction between self and nonself in infantperception, rather than the traditional account of an "adualistic confusion." Similarly, various aspects of bodily self-awareness manifested even by fetuses demonstrate some basis for a categorical self as an original aspect of experience. Self-specification in perception is also indicated in recent research on imitation in very young infants, a possible mechanism for the essentially social component of self-concept development. Although a case for early self-specification in perception can readily be made, it is much more difficult to explain how self-perception gives rise to self-conception. One possibility briefly discussed is that a process of representation and re-representation of information originally obtained through interaction with physical and social objects gives rise to reflective self- awareness and the particularly autobiographical knowledge of self which we take to be species- typical of humans.     

镜像神经元是认知科学的“圣杯”吗?

镜像神经元作为近二十年来神经科学领域内最重要的发现之一,相关的一系列研究掀起了一场"理解社会行为的革命"。然而,通过系统考察镜像神经元最初的操作性定义、基本功能及其实验证据,发现许多研究者对于镜像神经元的定义存在误解,人类脑中是否存在镜像神经元及其功能依然是当前学术界的争议焦点。迄今仍然缺乏令人信服的证据表明镜像神经元(或系统)就是动作理解、动作模仿、共情以及读心的直接神经机制。因此,将镜像神经元视为"认知科学的圣杯"的主张是一种落后的模块论意识形态,只能催生新的"神经神话"。