The sense of incredibility in ethics

Philosophical Studies - It is often said that normative properties are “just too different” to reduce to other kinds of properties. This suggests that many philosophers find it...     

Gesture, speech, and computational stages: a reply to McNeill

McNeill (1985) claimed that speech and its accompanying gestures "share a common computational stage" that is located early in the speech production process. This position depends on two crucial arguments that we believe are unsound: first, that gestures "are synchronized with linguistic units in speech" and, second, that gestures "have semantic and pragmatic functions that parallel those of speech." Careful analysis of the relevant data indicated that although the processes underlying gestural production are globally autonomous, they are linked to speech production at more than just one computational stage. An account is offered that explicates these links.     

Out of your hand's reach, out of my eyes' reach

When witnessing another's action, people recruit the same motor resources that enable them to efficiently perform that action, thus gazing at its target well before the agent's hand. But just to what extent does this recruitment help people in grabbing another's action target? If the latter seems to be out of the agent's reach, will this impact on people's gaze behaviour? We recorded proactive eye movements while participants witnessed someone else trying to reach for and grasp objects located either within or outside his reach. Proactivity of gaze was impaired when the targets were just out of the agent's reach. This effect is likely to be due to an interpersonal bodily space representation that allows one to map another's reaching space, thus prompting proactive eye movements towards the target just in case the agent is in the position to act upon it.     

Making sense of powerful qualities

According to the powerful qualities view, properties are both powerful and qualitative. Indeed, on this view the powerfulness of a property is identical to its qualitativity. Proponents claim that this view provides an attractive alternative to both the view that properties are pure powers and the view that they are pure qualities. It remains unclear, however, whether the claimed identity between powerfulness and qualitativity can be made coherent in a way that allows the powerful qualities view to constitute this sort of alternative. I argue here that this can be done, given a particular conception of both the qualitativity and powerfulness of properties. On this conception, a property is qualitative just in the sense that its essence is fixed independently of any distinct properties, and it is powerful just if its essence grounds its dispositional role.

     

Within reach but not so reachable: Obstacles matter in visual perception of distances

A large number of studies have shown that effort influences the visual perception of reaching distance. These studies have mainly focused on the effects of reach-relevant properties of the body and of the objects that people intend to reach. However, any influence of the reach-relevant properties of the surrounding environment remains still speculative. We investigated this topic in terms of the role of obstacle width in perceiving distances. Participants had to estimate the straight-line distance to a cylinder located just behind a transparent barrier of varying width. The results showed that participants perceived the straight-line distance to the cylinder as being longer when they intended to grasp the cylinder by reaching around a wide transparent barrier rather than by reaching around narrower ones. Interestingly, this effect might be due to the anticipated effort involved in reaching. Together, our results show that reach-relevant properties of the surrounding environment influence perceived distances, thereby supporting an embodied view of the visual perception of space.     

The longitudinal associations between personal belief in a just world and teacher justice among advantaged and disadvantaged school students

The Just World Hypothesis states that people need to believe in a just world in which they get what they deserve and deserve what they get. This study examines the longitudinal associations between personal belief in a just world (BJW), the belief that events in one's own life are just and teacher justice in different status groups. It is posited that the more individuals believe in a personal just world, the more they feel they are treated justly by others, and this should be particularly true for students with a low-status background. Longitudinal questionnaire data were obtained from students with German and Turkish/Muslim backgrounds over a period of 3–4 months. The pattern of results revealed that personal BJW was important for the Turkish/Muslim students in evaluating teachers as more just over a given period of time, but not for the German students. That is, the buffering effect of personal BJW was crucial for the disadvantaged students.     

Conventionalism and the world as bare sense-data

We are confident of many of the judgements we make as to what sorts of alterations the members of nature's kinds can survive, and what sorts of events mark the ends of their existences. But is our confidence based on empirical observation of nature's kinds and their members? Conventionalists deny that we can learn empirically which properties are essential to the members of nature's kinds. Judgements of sameness in kind between members, and of numerical sameness of a member across time, merely project our conventions of individuation. Our confidence is warranted because apart from those conventions there are no phenomena of kind-sameness or of numerical sameness across time. There is just ‘stuff’ displaying properties. This paper argues that conventionalists can assign no properties to the ‘stuff’ beyond immediate phenomenal properties. Consequently they cannot explain how each of us comes to be able to wield ‘our conventions’.     

The just world hypothesis as an argumentative resource in debates about unemployment benefits

The concept of the “just world” is established as a key explanation for how people make sense of inequality so that those deemed to score high in belief in a just world are more likely to hold prejudicial beliefs and to blame people in poverty for their situations. However, this is an inadequate explanation for such complicated and controversial issues. To better understand talk about the just world and the controversial issue of the distribution of unemployment benefits (an issue of inequality), a discursive psychological approach to the just world is used. Therefore, a discourse analysis focusses on 2 feature length British televised discussions about benefit claimants called “The Big Benefit Row: Live” (Channel 5 3/2/2014) and “Benefits Britain: the Debate” (Channel 4 17/2/2014). The analysis demonstrates that people draw on both just and unjust world arguments simultaneously and also topicalise what counts as just so as to support their positions on unemployment benefits, rather than in the consistent way that just world theory would predict. It is therefore argued that the just world should be recast as a cultural value that facilitates arguments about benefits, rather than an internally held belief.     

Why the spontaneous images created by the hands during talk can help make TV advertisements more effective

The design of effective communications depends upon an adequate model of the communication process. The traditional model is that speech conveys semantic information and bodily movement conveys information about emotion and interpersonal attitudes. But McNeill (2000) argues that this model is fundamentally wrong and that some bodily movements, namely spontaneous hand movements generated during talk (iconic gestures), are integral to semantic communication. But can we increase the effectiveness of communication using this new theory? Focusing on advertising we found that advertisements in which the message was split between speech and iconic gesture (possible on TV) were significantly more effective than advertisements in which meaning resided purely in speech or language (radio/ newspaper). We also found that the significant differences in communicative effectiveness were maintained across five consecutive trials. We compared the communicative power of professionally made TV advertisements in which a spoken message was accompanied either by iconic gestures or by pictorial images, and found the iconic gestures to be more effective. We hypothesized that iconic gestures are so effective because they illustrate and isolate just the core semantic properties of a product. This research suggests that TV advertisements can be made more effective by incorporating iconic gestures with exactly the right temporal and semantic properties.     

Vehicle-representationalism and hallucination

This paper is a new defense of the view that visual hallucinations lack content. The claim is that visual hallucinations are illusory not because their content is nonveridical, but rather because they seem to represent when they fail to represent anything in the first place. What accounts for the phenomenal character of visual experiences is not the content itself (content-representationalism), but rather the vehicle of content (vehicle-representationalism), that is, not the properties represented by visual experience, but rather the relational properties of experience (or of the brain) of representing singular contents, namely particular instantiations of properties. I argue that the Russellian particular-involving proposition is the only appropriate model for the representational content of visual experience and hence that visual hallucinations are just like failed demonstrations.

     

Putting Pluralism in its Place

Pluralism about truth is the view that there are many properties, not just one, in virtue of which things are true. Pluralists hope to dodge the objections that face traditional monistic substantive views of truth (such as the correspondence theory), as well as those facing deflationary theories of truth. More specifically, pluralists hope to advance an explanatorily potent understanding of truth that can capture the subtleties of various realist and anti‐realist domains of discourse, all while avoiding the scope problem. I offer a new objection to pluralism that challenges its fundamental commitment to there being a set of alethic properties in virtue of which claims are true. In its place I offer an alternative view that merges standard truthmaker theory with a primitivist conception of truth. This combination of views satisfies the theoretical desires that pluralists claim for themselves, but without taking on pluralism's host of challenges and problems.     

Action or attention in social inhibition of return?

Psychological Research - When two individuals alternate reaching responses to targets located in a visual display, reaction times are longer when responses are directed to where the co-actor just...     

DO WE SEE APPLES AS EDIBLE?

Do we (sometimes) perceive apples as edible? One could argue that it is just a manner of speaking to say so: we do not really see an object as edible, we see it as having certain shape, size and color and we only infer on the basis of these properties that it is. I argue that we do indeed see objects as edible, and do not just believe that they are. My argument proceeds in two steps. First, I point out that Susanna Siegel's influential argument in favor of the claim that we represent sortal properties perceptually does not work. Second, I argue that we can fix this argument if we replace the sortal property in question with the property of being edible, climbable or Q‐able in general.     

Parallel processing of shape and texture in haptic search

In a haptic search task, one has to determine the presence of a target among distractors. It has been shown that if the target differs from the distractors in two properties, shape and texture, performance is better than in both single-property conditions (Van Polanen, Bergmann Tiest, & Kappers, 2013). The search for a smooth sphere among rough cubical distractors was faster than both the searches for a rough sphere (shape information only) and for a smooth cube (texture information only). This effect was replicated in this study as a baseline. The main focus here was to further investigate the nature of this integration. It was shown that performance is better when the two properties are combined in a single target (smooth sphere), than when located in two separate targets (rough sphere and smooth cube) that are simultaneously present. A race model that assumes independent parallel processing of the two properties could explain the enhanced performance with two properties, but this could only take place effectively when the two properties were located in a single target.     

Two Conceptions of Sparse Properties*

Abstract: Are the sparse properties drawn from all the levels of nature, or only the fundamental level? I discuss the notion of sparse property found in Armstrong and Lewis, show that there are tensions in the roles they have assigned the sparse properties, and argue that the sparse properties should be drawn from all the levels of nature. The issue has direct bearing on reductionism. If the sparse properties are drawn from all the levels of nature, then macro‐scientific properties are just as primary as micro‐scientific properties, and do not need to be reduced to them.     

Professional Paternalism

This article points out how far-reaching the changes in our public life would actually have to be if we wanted to avoid paternalism altogether. For example, the widespread view that only a physician with training at a recognized institution should be allowed to perform surgery or that only an educated lawyer may provide legal council is clearly paternalistic. In fact, many professional regulations, not just in medicine and law, but also in engineering and many other areas of expertise, have a strongly paternalistic function. Moreover, this problem is located in a sphere that is neither clearly private, nor seems to be part of a state-legislated public sphere. Professional organizations are neither governments, nor necessarily democratic, but they are often state-certified and produce binding regulations for issues of public interest. The author bites the bullet and accepts professional paternalism, while insisting that special care should be placed on how to design an appropriate professional code of conduct.     

The Vices of Argument

What should a virtue theory of argumentation say about fallacious reasoning? If good arguments are virtuous, then fallacies are vicious. Yet fallacies cannot just be identified with vices, since vices are dispositional properties of agents whereas fallacies are types of argument. Rather, if the normativity of good argumentation is explicable in terms of virtues, we should expect the wrongness of bad argumentation to be explicable in terms of vices. This approach is defended through analysis of several fallacies, with particular emphasis on the ad misericordiam.     

Extended Sex: An Account of Sex for a More Just Society

We propose an externalist understanding of sex that builds upon extended and distributed approaches to cognition, and contributes to building a more just, diversity‐sensitive society. Current sex categorization practices according to the female/male dichotomy are not only inaccurate and incoherent (attributing nonreproductive properties to differences in vaguely defined reproductive roles), but they also ground moral and political pressures that harm and oppress people. We argue that a new understanding of sex is due, an understanding that would acknowledge the variability and, most important, the flexibility of sex properties, as well as the moral and political meaning of sex categorization. We propose an externalist account of sex, elaborating on extended and distributed approaches to cognition that capitalize on the natural capacity of organisms to couple with environmental resources. We introduce the notion of extended sex, and argue that properties relevant for sex categorization are neither exclusively internal to the individual skin, nor fixed. Finally, we spell out the potential of extended sex to support an active defense of diversity and an intervention against sex‐based discrimination.     

Action‐oriented Perception

Abstract: When I throw a ball at you, do you see it as catch‐able? Do we perceive objects as edible, climbable or Q‐able in general? One could argue that it is just a manner of speaking to say so: we do not really see an object as edible, we only infer on the basis of its other properties that it is. I argue that whether or not an object is edible or climbable is indeed represented perceptually: we see objects as edible, and do not just believe that they are. My argument proceeds in two steps. First, I argue that in order to perform an action Q with respect to an object, we need to represent this object as Q‐able and, second, I argue that we represent objects as having these properties perceptually.