The measurement of simulated stealing behaviour and moral judgement — a technique

A technique is described which attempts to measure the responses of children in hypothetical stealing dilemmas. A technique embodying two forms, a so-called “did do” version and a “should do” version, was constructed. The “did do” version was an attempt to represent the child in an “actual” though hypothetical stealing dilemma and through the use of the first person pronoun “I”, contrast this with a situation in which the child could respond in terms of how he or she thought he or she should. A series of highly significant differences within the groups on the “did do” and “should do” versions was noted, together with significant differences between the “delinquent” and “normal” populations. It was argued that such differences indicated that the procedure had good validity as well as acceptable reliability.     

Audiences' reactions to self-enhancing,self-denigrating,and accurate self-presentations

Subjects in three experiments evaluated hypothetical actors whose claims about either an upcoming or past performance and whose performances were system-atically varied from very positive to very negative. Positive, self-enhancing claims were effective in generating favorable evaluations when either the claim was congruent with the performance or the subjects were unaware of how the actor performed. In general, accurate self-presentations were most favorably evaluated, especially when the claim occurred after the performance. The two exceptions to the preference for accurate self-presenters occurred when (a) the actor modestly underestimated a clearly superior prior performance by claiming to have done “only” well or all right, in which case he/she was evaluated more favorably than an accurate but seemingly boastful actor who claimed to have done extremely well, and (b) the actor self-deprecatingly predicted an inferior performance, in which case he/she was disliked even when accurate. Disclaimers about the importance of the performance (e.t., “I did well, but it's no big deal”) were seen as boastful rather than modest and decreased evaluations. The results mirror many of the tactics used by actor-subjects in past experiments, suggesting that people generally vary their self-presentations in optimal fashion to create the most favorable possible impression on the audience.     

“Crunches,” “(K)nots,” and Double Binds—When What Isn't Happening Is the Most Important Thing: Commentary on Paper by Barbara Pizer

This discussion compares Pizer's concept of “relational (k)nots” with “crunches” and double bind impasses. It argues that all of these constructs capture what happens when conventional analytic method—the exploration, elucidation, and interpretation of transference—fails to work. In this context a “last-ditch effort” emerges, a necessary crisis of treatment. The situation is a plea that something must occur “now or never” or the “charade of therapy is over.” This plea is extraordinarily challenging since it embodies contradictory elements wherein the patient's very call for involvement with the analyst is embedded in a process that obfuscates their connection. Notably this sets the stage for the “damned if one ‘gets it’ and damned if one doesn't” experience that is a part of the paradox of recognition/mis-recognition that befuddles many analyses.

Extrication from such impasses requires the analyst's recognition that she is colluding in a kind of avoidance or distraction from recognizing their disconnection. Her second act involves meta-communication about their process. That is how their “relational knot” both binds them together while negating their connection. While this observation may be necessary it is recognized as insufficient on its own. Thus her third move out of the impasse requires her to enter into a state of improvisation. That is, to use some part of herself that must surrender from the one-up one-down impasse position of “either your version of reality or mine.” Instead, she must cultivate through her action a third way in which both she and her patient can think about their impasse and do something about it, including something different from what either one might have imagined before.     

A Unified Account of the Moral Standing to Blame

Recently, philosophers have turned their attention to the question, not when a given agent is blameworthy for what she does, but when a further agent has the moral standing to blame her for what she does. Philosophers have proposed at least four conditions on having “moral standing”: 1. One's blame would not be “hypocritical”. 2. One is not oneself “involved in” the target agent's wrongdoing. 3. One is warranted in believing that the target is indeed blameworthy for the wrongdoing. 4. The target's wrongdoing is some of “one's business”. These conditions are often proposed as both conditions on one and the same thing, and as marking fundamentally different ways of “losing standing”. Here I call these claims into question. First, I claim that conditions (3) and (4) are simply conditions on different things than are conditions (1) and (2). Second, I argue that condition (2) reduces to condition (1): when “involvement” removes someone's standing to blame, it does so only by indicating something further about that agent, viz., that he or she lacks commitment to the values that condemn the wrongdoer's action. The result: after we clarify the nature of the non‐hypocrisy condition, we will have a unified account of moral standing to blame. Issues also discussed: whether standing can ever be regained, the relationship between standing and our “moral fragility”, the difference between mere inconsistency and hypocrisy, and whether a condition of standing might be derived from deeper facts about the “equality of persons”.     

Spinoza’s Critique of Humility in the Ethics

In the Ethics Spinoza denies that humility is a virtue on the grounds that it arises from a reflection on our lack of power, rather than a rational understanding of our power (Part IV, Proposition 53, Demonstration). He suggests that humility, to the extent that it involves a consideration of our weakness, indicates a lack of self‐understanding. However, in a brief remark in the same demonstration he also allows that conceiving our lack of power can be conducive to self‐understanding and an increase in power, on the condition that we “conceive [it] because [we] understand [intelligit ] something more powerful than [ourselves].” Unfortunately, Spinoza does not flesh out this remark, nor does he specify the name of the affect that arises from thus conceiving our weakness. Commentators have not been much help in this regard either. What does it mean, in the Spinozistic framework, to conceive our weakness because we understand something more powerful than ourselves? And what exactly is the difference between this instance of conceiving our lack of power and the one that is involved in humility? This paper will examine the nature of this difference by analyzing its metaphysical and epistemological underpinnings, as well as its ethical implications within Spinoza’s Ethics . In doing so, it will highlight the ethical importance and epistemological conditions of recognizing our weakness in the Spinozistic universe. Abraham Wolf takes Spinoza’s denial of humility’s virtue in the Ethics to imply that “the rational man should think of what he can do, not of what he cannot do.” While I agree with Wolf’s remark, my reading in this paper will show that as the rational person thinks of her power and what she can do, she never loses sight of her ineliminable weakness as a finite mode.     

Attention and Narration to Micro-Moment Registrations of Embodied Dialogue in the Clinical Interaction: How Are We Doing?

ABSTRACT

This article offers a comparison between two different strategies for clinical attention. The author compares his lens shaped by a musical metaphor of “polyrhythmic patterning” on embodied registrations which he describes as “fluidity” in contrast to a lens of structures or categories of experience. He then contrasts this lens to that offered by Lewis which she describes with the metaphor of an “imaginary camera” with which she creates “snapshots” as representations of unbearable (and often unformulated) trauma shaped by the patient's narrative and her own trauma history. Acknowledging the exquisite connection between analyst and patient, the author uses 2 clinical moments to further illustrate the benefits of each metaphoric lens for possible analytic work.     

Guilty knowledge versus innocent associations: Effects of trait anxiety and stimulus context on skin conductance

A simulated lie detection procedure was used to investigate skin conductance responsivity among self-reported skin responders. Subjects were grouped according to reported trait anxiety as measured by Lykken's Activity Preference Questionnaire and then engaged in either a mock crime or a neutral activity. The “crime” gave subjects “guilty knowledge,” and the neutral task provided “innocent associations” to relevant stimuli imbedded in each scenario. Subjects were then interrogated using Lykken's Guilty Knowledge technique. Anxiety classification, guilty vs. innocent treatment, and type of stimulus were manipulated in a 2 × 2 × (2) factorial design. Results for differential responsivity scores showed significant main and interaction effects. Low-anxiety subjects showed almost no effects, but highly anxious subjects responded strongly in the “guilty” rather than the “innocent” treatment. Contrary to previous findings, results showed a substantial—but qualified—relationship between self-reported anxiety and electrodermal responsivity. Also, the Guilty Knowledge technique with rank scoring yielded 97.5% correct classification.     

Selective involvement of the auditory-verbal modality in an acquired communication disorder: Benefit from sign language therapy

A 39-year-old female suffered bitemporal infarctions and exhibited an unusual behavioral syndrome of muteness and impaired auditory comprehension, with milder aphasic deficits in reading and writing. The anatomic basis of this modality-selective communication disorder appeared to involve both peripheral perceptual and motor as well as “central” language mechanisms. The patient's ability to communicate was greatly aided by instruction in Amerind and Ameslan Sign Language, in which she learned more than 100 signs. Patients whose acquired language deficits spare modalities of input or output may be ideal candidates for sign language therapy.     

Préservation d’une image positive de soi dans un cadre de vie « à risque »

According to social identity theory (Tajfel, 1972), individual try to maintain a positive self-image. Places at which he/she is attached contribute to identity building (Proshansky et al., 1983; Twigger-Ross & Uzzell, 1996). Therefore, individual will try to maintain a positive a positive and stable image of such places. Our study is interested in what is the representation of their living area for individuals living in coastal area considered as exposed to erosion/flood risk, and attached to it. We are focused on how this representation influences their perception to coastal risk. We assume that individual attached to a place which he/she consider as “at risk” will put in place a strategy to preserve the positive image of this place and of himself/herself. Analyzing answers to a questionnaire, results demonstrate that individuals considering a place which they are attached as “at risk” mitigate the danger impact on that space. Thus, they conciliate probability of such negative event on place which they identifying themselves with positive image of this place and, by extension, of themselves.     

Forms of Our Life: Wittgenstein and the Later Heidegger

The paper argues that an internal debate within Wittgensteinian philosophy leads to issues associated rather with the later philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Rush Rhees's identification of the limitations of the notion of a “language game” to illuminate the relation between language and reality leads to his discussion of what is involved in the “reality” of language: “anything that is said has sense‐if living has sense, not otherwise.” But what is it for living to have sense? Peter Winch provides an interpretation and application of Rhees's argument in his discussion of the “reality” of Zande witchcraft and magic in “Understanding a Primitive Society”. There he argues that such sense is provided by a language game concerned with the ineradicable contingency of human life, such as (he claims) Zande witchcraft to be. I argue, however, that Winch's account fails to answer the question why Zande witchcraft can find no application within our lives. I suggest that answering this requires us to raise the question of why Zande witchcraft “fits” with their other practices but cannot with ours, a question of “sense” which cannot be answered by reference to another language game. I use Joseph Epes Brown's account of Native American cultures (in Epes Brown 2001) as an exemplification of a form of coherence that constitutes what we may call a “world”. I then discuss what is involved in this, relating this coherence to a relation to the temporal, which provides an internal connection between the senses of the “real” embodied in the different linguistic practices of these cultures. I relate this to the later Heidegger's account of the “History of Being”, of the historical worlds of Western culture and increasingly of the planet. I conclude with an indication of concerns and issues this approach raises, ones characteristic of “Continental” rather than Wittgensteinian philosophy.     

Response to Safran: The Development of Critical Psychoanalytic Sensibility

Jeremy D. Safran feels that my views regarding the relative merits of case studies and systematic empirical research are unnecessarily polarizing. I feel that, on the contrary, I'm offering bridges between my perspective and those of researchers on psychoanalytic process and outcome in two ways. One is through my own constructivist critique of traditional positivist case studies and theorizing based upon clinical experience. The second is through conceptualizing the place of systematic research within a constructivist paradigm. I am arguing that its place can be no different than that of case studies. Both generate possibilities for any particular analyst or analytic therapist to have in mind as he or she works with a particular patient at a particular moment. Safran locates the destructive effects of scientism with “biologically oriented researchers and cognitive therapists.” In my view, it might be convenient if the problem could be located exclusively with them, but the fact is that psychoanalytic researchers, as I demonstrate, are working largely within the same paradigm as their adversaries in the research world. That paradigm erroneously privileges systematic research as hypothesis-testing, whereas case studies are relegated to the status of anecdotal, hypothesis-generating work. I describe what I call “nonlinear constructivist learning” as the kind of “generalization” that case studies can yield and that is optimal for our field.     

The Failure of Clara Thompson’s Ferenczian (Proxy) Analysis of Harry Stack Sullivan*

After hearing Ferenczi’s talks on theory and practice in New York in 1926, psychiatrist Harry Stack Sullivan urged his friend and colleague Clara Thompson to get analyzed by Ferenczi so they could learn his technique. After saving for 2 years Thompson was a patient of Ferenczi for three summers and then moved to Budapest full-time for analysis until Ferenczi’s death. Two years after she returned to New York she attempted to analyze Sullivan. Analysis was broken off in anger by Sullivan after 14 months. Before the promised Ferenczian analysis began Thompson discovered Wilhelm Reich’s Character Analysis (1933) and she tried an aggressive attack on character with Sullivan rather than Ferenczian trauma-oriented “relaxation” and “neocathartic” therapy. Sullivan could not tolerate this. Because of their own unhealed trauma both individually and in relation to each other, neither Thompson nor Sullivan was able to advance Ferenczi’s views on trauma or its healing in America.     

Operants Were Never "Emitted," Feeling Is Doing, And Learning Takes Only One Trial: A Review Of B. F. Skinner's Recent Issues In The Analysis Of Behavior

This final collection of Skinner's papers was intended for the professional, although other readers will find much of interest. The first five chapters are devoted to what Skinner called “theoretical issues” and include clear presentations of his positions on “feelings” and on the “self” as an apparent agent of volition. Skinner skillfully discusses thinking, the origins of cognitive-mediational theories, and a favorite topic: the similarity of processes occurring in the histories of species and of individuals. The next four chapters cover what he called “professional issues,” including the often-misunderstood philosophy known as radical behaviorism as well as the operant aspects of behavior therapy and attempts to influence educational practices. He seemed disappointed in the lack of acceptance of programmed learning methods and pessimistic about the possibility of improving education practices. This pessimism was evident in the final section, “personal issues,” in which he expressed doubt that the powerful and self-serving forces of government, business, and religion will ever permit the changes that could be wrought by the application of behavior analysis to the great problems of society. Two other chapters in the last section will be useful to historians who are curious about the influence of logical positivism on Skinner's thinking (apparently there was not much influence) and to sophisticated readers who are interested in Skinner's retrospective consideration of his work.     

Organizing concepts in family therapy

Abstract

Harry Stack Sullivan (1953, p. 11) spoke fondly of the time when therapy would become “easy.” By that he meant he looked forward to the day practitioners would know precisely what to do to help their clients regardless of the symptoms they presented. He was wise enough to know, of course, that the time he anticipated would not arrive soon, for he said he would be a long-forgotten myth before it came. Those who practice in the third decade after Sullivan's demise know that we are probably no closer to the halcyon conditions he longed for than he and his associates were in the 1940's. In fact, psychotherapy is under stronger attack for lack of precision (effectiveness) now than at any time in the recent past.     

Introduction to Group-Analytic Psychotherapy by S. H. Foulkes

This article will explore special leader issues that emerge in psychodynamically oriented therapy groups with adult children of alcoholics. Particular focus will be on countertransference feelings that get stirred up in group leaders and techniques for dealing with some of these special dilemmas. Specific issues include (a) assumption of sameness between the therapist and the patient (the therapist assuming that he or she “understands” because of having also grown up in an alcoholic family); (b) the “will to restore,” which may be destructive when the therapist, whose own self-esteem is dependent on the patient's progress in therapy, forces a “rush to recovery” on the patient; (c) other personal issues in the life of the therapist that may also resonate with experiences of the patient; (d) “countertransference goodness and availability” as it affects therapists' abilities to set reasonable limits on their patients, as well as reasonable expectations for themselves; and (e) special issues regarding therapist transparency and self-disclosure.     

“Not with me you don't”: A story of narrative practice and dissociative disorder

This paper discusses issues relating to therapeutic practice based upon the narrative metaphor. A case of someone suffering the effects of Dissociative Identity disorder is used to illustrate the difficulties that clients can experience with the “expert” knowledge conception of therapy. The value of the “respectful” and “non-expert” emphasis of Narrative Practice emerges even when the therapist believes that he or she lacks expertise in the client's apparent “condition.” Three themes emanating from the case form the basis for the discussion: the client's experience of being recruited into accepting the diagnostic label of Dissociative Identity Disorder; the effects of being forced to accept a contract to eliminate self-abusive behaviour; and the therapist's dealing with a gun in the therapy room.     

Activity, Passivity, Self-Denigration, and Self-Promotion: Toward an Interactionist Model of Interpersonal Dependency

ABSTRACT Although dependency in adults is inextricably linked with passivity and submissiveness in the minds of many theoreticians, clinicians, and researchers, evidence has accumulated which suggests that in certain situations, dependency is actually associated with high levels of activity and assertiveness. Three experiments were conducted to test the hypothesis that when a dependent person is concerned primarily with getting along with a peer, he or she will “self-denigrate” (i.e., will utilize strategies that ensure that a peer will be evaluated more positively than he or she is on a laboratory task), but when a dependent person is concerned primarily with pleasing an authority figure, he or she will “self-promote” (i.e., will adopt strategies that increase the likelihood that he or she will be evaluated more positively than a peer on a laboratory task). This hypothesis was supported in all three experiments. Theoretical implications of these findings are discussed, and an interactionist model of interpersonal dependency is briefly described.