The copredication argument

The standard view of truth-conditional semantics is that it is world-involving in the sense that a theory that specifies truth conditions eo ipso is a theory that specifies the way the world must be if the target sentences are to be true. It would appear to follow that the semantic properties of expressions, such as nominals, specify the very worldly objects that make true or false the sentences that host the nominals. Chomsky and others have raised a fundamental complaint against this thought: perfectly quotidian nominals, such as London or book, may occur copredicatively as a single argument of categorically mismatched predicates, which prima facie preclude a coherent uniform construal of the nominal argument. The argument has hitherto been presented via examples that challenge the standard view. My aim here is to present the argument explicitly, defend it against some likely counterclaims, and resolve what might appear to be a decisive consideration against the conclusion of the argument, viz., if nominals as copredicatively occurring do not contribute uniform worldly entities, then how can the copredicative constructions be counted as true?     

Judgments of grammaticality of sentences violating the principle of full interpretation: a further exploration

54 Japanese speakers judged isolated simple bitransitive sentences involving an unnecessary extra argument in addition to three legitimate arguments. Two variables were manipulated, with one variable concerning the role the extra argument assumed in a sentence, subjective, dative, or objective and the other concerning the relation it bore with the legitimate argument. The sentences with the extra arguments were judged to be an average grammaticality of about 3 on a 7-point scale. This score, although still lower than that obtained for sentences involving only the legitimate arguments, suggests that speakers' judgments are not fully consistent with the judgments expected if they might possess and demonstrate the knowledge of the principle of Full Interpretation.     

Patterns of comprehension performance in agrammatic Broca's aphasia: a test of the Trace Deletion Hypothesis

We tested the core prediction of the Trace Deletion Hypothesis (TDH) of agrammatic Broca's aphasia, which contends that such patients' comprehension performance is normal for active reversible sentences but at chance level for passive reversible sentences. We analyzed the comprehension performance of 38 Italian Broca's aphasics with verified damage to Broca's area, who completed sentence-to-picture matching tasks using active and passive reversible sentences as stimuli. The results failed to confirm the predictions made by TDH: only a small minority (15%) performed at chance on passive sentences and better than chance on active sentences. Furthermore, the distribution of the 38 subjects' performance on passive sentences differed from that predicted by the TDH since many more subjects performed at better-than-chance levels than expected. We discuss the implication of these results for claims about the distribution of language processing mechanisms in the brain.     

Judgments of Grammaticality of Japanese Sentences Violating the Principle of Full Interpretation

Two experiments investigated the linguistic intuition of Japanese speakers in which they judged the grammaticality of sentences violating Chomsky's principle of Full Interpretation. Experiment 1 used bitransitive sentences, which included an extra argument that assumed a role of either subjective, dative, or objective on the one hand and that specified semantically a preceding argument or stood in par with it on the other. Findings showed that the speakers judged ungrammatical sentences involving a dative or an objective extra argument as more grammatical than those involving a subjective extra argument. Ungrammatical sentences with an extra specified argument were judged more grammatical than those with an extra par argument when the extra argument was objective. Experiment 2 used sentences that included a verbal noun (VN) comprising a noun followed by a verb, shita (did). Ungrammatical VN sentences contained two arguments given the same objective marker. These sentences were judged to be highly grammatical despite the violation of the principle. Findings suggest that speakers' actual knowledge of language is not fully consistent with the knowledge they are alleged by Chomsky to possess, including the principle of Full Interpretation.     

Word category and verb--argument structure information in the dynamics of parsing

One of the core issues in psycholinguistic research concerns the relationship between word category information and verb-argument structure (e.g. transitivity) information of verbs in the process of sentence parsing. In two experiments (visual versus auditory presentation) using event-related brain potentials (ERPs), we addressed this question by presenting sentences in which the critical word simultaneously realized both a word category and a transitivity violation. ERPs for sentences with both types of violation clustered with the patterns for sentences with a word category violation only, but were different from the patterns elicited by argument structure violations in isolation, since only the latter elicited an N400 ERP component. The finding that an argument structure violation evoked an N400 only if the phrase structure of the respective sentence was correct suggests that a successful integration of the word category information of a verb functionally precedes the application of its argument structure information.     

Actions and Events: Some Semantical Considerations

Since the publication of Davidson's influential article 'The Logical Form of Action Sentences', semantical considerations are widely thought to support the doctrine that actions are events. I shall argue that the semantics of action sentences do not imply that actions are events. This will involve defending a negative claim and a positive claim, as well as a proposal for how to formalize action sentences. The negative claim is that the semantics of action sentences do not require that we think of actions as events, even if these sentences are best formalized in the manner that Davidson himself favours . The positive claim is that the simplest way of formalizing actions sentences which captures all and only licit inferences requires quantification only , over the results of actions. If this is right, then the argument from semantics evaporates, and the claim that actions are events needs to be freshly argued for – or against.     

Agrammatic Broca's aphasia is not associated with a single pattern of comprehension performance

One influential hypothesis posits that the brain regions implicated in Broca's aphasia are responsible for specific syntactic operations that are necessary for the comprehension and production of sentences (Grodzinsky, 1986, 1990, in press). The empirical basis of this hypothesis is the claim that Broca's aphasics have no difficulty understanding sentences in the active voice (and other "canonical" sentence types, such as subject relatives and clefts with negative predicates), but perform at chance level with passive voice constructions (and other "noncanonical" sentences such as object-gap relatives and object clefts). In the face of well-established results indicating that Broca's aphasics can exhibit several different performance patterns on these sentence types, Grodzinsky, Pi?ango, Zurif, and Drai (1999) argued that these conflicting results do not challenge the theory when the data are analyzed appropriately. They carried out a creative statistical analysis of the comprehension performance of published cases of Broca's aphasia and concluded that all of these cases are in agreement with the predicted pattern: chance on passives and 100% correct on actives. Here we show that the statistical reasoning adopted by Grodzinsky et al. (1999) is flawed. We also show that the comprehension performance of a substantial number of the Broca's aphasics in their own sample does not conform to the pattern required. Rather, contrary to these authors' claim, Broca's aphasia is not associated with a consistent pattern of sentence comprehension performance, but allows for a number of distinct patterns in different patients.     

Negation,anti-realism,and the denial defence

Here is one argument against realism. (1) Realists are committed to the classical rules for negation. But (2) legitimate rules of inference must conserve evidence. And (3) the classical rules for negation do not conserve evidence. So (4) realism is wrong. Most realists reject 2. But it has recently been argued that if we allow denied sentences as premisses and conclusions in inferences we will be able to reject 3. And this new argument against 3 generates a new response to the anti-realist argument: keep 1 and 2, avoiding 4 by rejecting 3. My aim in this paper is to see how much work in the fight against anti-realism this new response can really do. I argue that there is a powerful objection to the response: 2 is in tension with the claim that denied sentences can be premisses and conclusions in inferences. But I show that, even given this objection, the new response has an important role to play.     

Faulty Japanese sentences are judged more grammatical when punctuation is used: negative implications for Chomsky's principle of Full Interpretation

88 adult Japanese speakers judged the grammaticality of isolated simple bitransitive sentences involving an uninterpretable extra argument in addition to three legitimate arguments. The sentences thus violated Chomsky's principle of Full Interpretation which prohibits the structure building of a sentence including uninterpretable elements. The primary variable of interest was the presence or absence of punctuation, i.e., commas, which enclosed the extra argument. Findings showed that sentences with punctuation were judged more grammatical than the ones without punctuation, with an average score of judged grammaticality exceeding 3 on a 7-point scale (1 =least grammatical; 7=most grammatical). This score would not be expected if the speakers possess and judge the sentences in conformity with the principle of Full Interpretation.     

A Logical Analysis of Monty Hall and Sleeping Beauty

Hintikka and Sandu’s independence-friendly (IF) logic is a conservative extension of first-order logic that allows one to consider semantic games with imperfect information. In the present article, we first show how several variants of the Monty Hall problem can be modeled as semantic games for IF sentences. In the process, we extend IF logic to include semantic games with chance moves and dub this extension stochastic IF logic. Finally, we use stochastic IF logic to analyze the Sleeping Beauty problem, leading to the conclusion that the thirders are correct while identifying the main error in the halfers’ argument.     

There is no ‘Is’ of constitution

I defend the view that ordinary objects like statues are identical to the pieces of matter from which they are made. I argue that ordinary speakers assert sentences such as ‘this statue is a molded piece of clay’. This suggests that speakers believe propositions which entail that ordinary objects such as statues are the pieces matter from which they are made, and therefore pluralism contradicts ordinary beliefs. The dominant response to this argument purports to find an ambiguity in the word ‘is’, such that ‘is’ in these sentences means the same as ‘constitutes or is constituted by’. I will use standard tests for ambiguity to argue that this strategy fails. I then explore and reject other responses to the argument.     

Maybe There Are No Subject-Predicate Sentences in Chinese

In this essay, I argue for the conclusion that the Chinese sentences that are regularly translated into subject-predicate sentences in English may be understood as all non-subject-predicate sentences. My argument is based on the premise that some grammatical features are crucial to yield the sense of contrast between the completeness of subject and the incompleteness of predicate. The absence of such grammatical features in Chinese makes it impossible to establish any criterion for the distinction between subject and predicate in Chinese.     

Mereology in Aristotle's Assertoric Syllogistic

How does Aristotle think about sentences like ‘Every x is y’ in the Prior Analytics? A recently popular answer conceives of these sentences as expressing a mereological relationship between x and y: the sentence is true just in case x is, in some sense, a part of y. I argue that the motivations for this interpretation have so far not been compelling. I provide a new justification for the mereological interpretation. First, I prove a very general algebraic soundness and completeness result that unifies the most important soundness and completeness results to date. Then I argue that this result vindicates the mereological interpretation. In contrast to previous interpretations, this argument shows how Aristotle's conception of predication in mereological terms can do important logical work.     

Aristotle on the Homonymy of Being

A number of philosophers endorse, without argument, the view that there's something it's like consciously to think that p , which is distinct from what it's like consciously to think that q . This thesis, if true, would have important consequences for philosophy of mind and cognitive science. In this paper I offer two arguments for it.
The first argument claims it would be impossible introspectively to distinguish conscious thoughts with respect to their content if there weren't something it's like to think them. This argument is defended against several objections.
The second argument uses what I call "minimal pair" experiences—sentences read without and with understanding—to induce in the reader an experience of the kind I claim exists. Further objections are considered and rebutted.     

Structural priming among prepositional phrases: Evidence from eye movements

This experiment was designed to determine whether prepositional phrases are treated as a single undifferentiated type, or whether the parser may recognize different subtypes. In the experiment, participants read temporarily ambiguous prime and target sentences that had either agent or instrument prepositional phrases in the syntactically disambiguating position. Agent and instrument primes both led to significant priming effects for agent targets. Agent primes led to a nonsignificant priming effect for instrument targets, and this priming effect was smaller than the effect that instrument primes had on instrument targets. This pattern can be explained if verb argument structure information is used in structural decisions, and if agent but not instrument roles are obligatory for the class of verbs tested here. The data suggest that readers are likely to activate an implicit agent when they read prime sentences that explicitly mention an instrument, but are not likely to activate an instrument when they read prime sentences that explicitly mention an agent. If the structural representations that incorporate activated arguments persist, or are reactivated more quickly following an appropriate prime sentence, this could lead to facilitated processing of sentences that have the same structural configuration.     

Judgments of grammaticality of Japanese simple sentences involving two arguments in a whole-part relation: a further examination of Chomsky's principle of Full Interpretation

Adult Japanese speakers judged the grammaticality of simple ungramatical sentences involving two arguments, each related with a single verb. The arguments were attached to the same case marker playing the same thematic role in the sentences. Thus the sentences violated Chomsky's principle of Full Interpretation. The two arguments were manipulated such that, on the one hand, one argument (the part-argument) constituted a part of the other argument (the whole-argument) and that, on the other, a part-argument either preceded or followed a whole-argument. Participants rated the sentences using either a conventional 7-point rating scale or magnitude estimation. Findings showed that irrespective of rating method sentences in which the whole-argument preceded the part-argument were judged more grammatical than sentences in which the part-argument preceded the whole-argument. Such an empirical phenomenon is inconsistent with the prediction derived from Chomsky's principle of Full Interpretation, while interestingly it is consistent with the grammar of classical Japanese used about 900 years ago.     

Does morphology make the difference? Agrammatic sentence comprehension in German

This study examines the syntactic comprehension of seven German agrammatic speakers. The German language allows the study of the interaction of syntactic principles and morphological devices in the comprehension process. In addition, due to its relatively free word order, German allows the study of strictly minimal pairs of canonical and non-canonical sentences in addition to the rather controversial active-passive contrast. A central research question was whether the pattern of agrammatic comprehension predicted by the trace deletion hypothesis (TDH, Grodzinsky, 1990, 1995), relatively normal comprehension performance of canonical sentences and chance performance on non-canonical sentences, can be found in a language with richer morphology than English. The generalisability of the TDH-pattern to morphologically rich languages is not obvious, given that case morphology in particular can provide explicit cues to the detection of the agent and patient roles in a sentence. The results of this study indicate that morphology does not make a difference. Furthermore, the group results are in line with the TDH-predictions only for number marked sentences but not for case marked sentences. However, single case analysis reveals different patterns of syntactic comprehension in agrammatic patients, a spectrum that encompasses near-normal comprehension of canonical and non-canonical sentences, overall chance performance, and TDH-like profiles.     

Material Implication and General Indicative Conditionals

This paper falls into two parts. In the first part, I argue that consideration of general indicative conditionals, e.g., sentences like If a donkey brays it is beaten , provides a powerful argument that a pure material implication analysis of indicative if p, q is correct. In the second part I argue, opposing writers like Jackson, that a Gricean style theory of pragmatics can explain the manifest assertability conditions of if p, q in terms of its conventional content – assumed to be merely ( p ⊃ q ) – and the conversational implicature contents which utterance of if p, q may gain in certain contexts. I also defend the pragmatic approach against a recent objection by Edgington that appeal to pragmatics cannot explain what we are inclined to say about the believability conditions, as opposed to the assertability conditions, of indicative if p, q.     

'DEMONSTRATIVE' COLOUR CONCEPTS: RECOGNITION VERSUS PRESERVATION

Arguments for and against the existence of demonstrative concepts of shades and shapes turn on the assumption that demonstrative concepts must be recognitional capacities. The standard argument for this assumption is based on the widely held view that concepts are those constituents of propositional attitudes that account for an attitude's inferential potential. Only if demonstrative concepts of shades are recognitional capacities, the standard argument goes, can they account for the inferential potential of demonstrative judgements about shades. Shades are conceived as colour universals. Shade a is different from shade b iff it is possible to distinguish a from b visually. In this paper I will argue that the standard argument is based on a mistaken view of inference. We can correctly draw inferences from a demonstrative judgement about something x , even if we are not able to recognise or re-identify the previously demonstrated x during our reasoning. We are prima facie entitled to rely on our preservative memory as retaining our initial demonstrative apprehension of x . The fact that preservative memory entitles us to assume sameness of referent over time is linguistically manifest in the use of anaphoric pronouns: if we can no longer recognise and demonstrate our original demonstratum, we can use anaphoric expressions to pick it up, thereby ensuring sameness of reference. ('That is a nice bird. Now it has vanished. So there is a nice bird that has just vanished.') Since preservation of the initial episode of apprehending x grounds our reasoning from demonstrative judgements, there is no longer a reason to require demonstrative concepts to be recognitional capacities. The standard argument does not get off the ground. ¹