Commentary on Ted Ruffman’s “Belief or not belief: …”

I applaud Ruffman for cautioning us against interpreting early sensitivity to others’ beliefs as evidence for an innate theory of mind and for making room for learning. In turn, however, I caution against his claim that all infants need is to understand that people act depending on what they perceive. Instead, infants may keep experiential records (Perner & Roessler, 2010) for other people or records of what they have registered (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009), which makes it less obvious that all required knowledge can be acquired by statistical learning. As a general criticism I remonstrate with current theory of mind research on its lack of concern that we understand people as acting for reasons which goes beyond detecting lawful regularities in behaviour.     

The exemplarities of artworks: Heidegger, <Emphasis Type="Italic">Shoes</Emphasis>, and <Emphasis Type="Italic">Pixar</Emphasis>

Heidegger’s essays “The Origin of the Work of Art” and “The Question Concerning Technology” provide a revealing insight into the importance of exemplarity to artworks. Originally the notion that exemplarity is essential to art is Kantian: As Kant puts it, since originality can produce “original nonsense, [beautiful art’s] products must be models, i.e. exemplary.” However, what Heidegger recognizes is that even if exemplarity allows us to take art seriously in spite of its excesses, it exposes the artwork to new dangers: on the one hand, to the “world withdrawal of the work” as occurs in consignment to the museum shelf, and on the other, to the conditions of Enframing as “challenging-forth,” under which art is taken as a means to an end—dangers which point to the division of artworks between “fine” art and “popular” art. Since Heidegger’s approach favors the former, we will try to gain new critical insight by considering his arguments in the light of a “popular” work that allows us to formulate an exemplarity of popular art as the necessary complement to that of traditional art. By means of an understanding of the exemplarities (in the plural) of artworks, we will be able to reconsider the significance of Heidegger’s notions of reliability, Enframing, and poiesis for our current technological conditions.

Carnap,Kuhn, and revisionism: on the publication of <Emphasis Type="Italic">Structure</Emphasis> in <Emphasis Type="Italic">Encyclopedia</Emphasis>

In recent years, a revisionist process focused on logical positivism can be observed, particularly regarding Carnap’s work. In this paper, I argue against the interpretation that Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions having been published in the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, co-edited by Carnap, is evidence of the revisionist idea that Carnap “would have found Structure philosophically congenial”. I claim that Kuhn’s book, from Carnap’s point of view, is not in philosophy of science but rather in history of science (in the context of a sharp discovery–justification distinction). It could also explain the fact that, despite his sympathetic letters to Kuhn as editor, Carnap never refers to Kuhn’s book in his work in philosophy of science.     

The “New Cognitive Science of Religion” and Religious Pluralism

Abstract : The “new cognitive science of religion” (Lawson, McCauley, Boyer, Sperber, Tremlin, Pysiäinen, Hinde) finds that certain of the brian's “inference systems” press us to postulate gods or other supernatural agents where knowledge and control are lacking. In this article we explore the implications of this new “explanatory” appraoch for Christian theology, pluralism, and worship life.     

DEFINING “RELIGION” AS NATURAL: A CRITICAL INVITATION TO ROBERT McCAULEY

Previous critics have argued that Robert McCauley defines religion and science selectively and arbitrarily, cutting them to fit his model in Why Religion Is Natural and Science Is Not. McCauley has responded that final definitions are “overrated” and that artificial distinctions can serve an important role in naturalistic investigation. I agree with this position but argue that a genealogy of the category of religion is crucial to the methodology that McCauley describes. Since the inherent ambiguity of religion will undermine any essential claims about its cognitive naturalness, I invite McCauley to consider how his research might investigate scientific and religious cognition in new terms.     

ECONOMY OF “INVISIBLE DEBT” AND ETHICS OF “RADICAL HOSPITALITY”: Toward a Paradigm Change of Hospitality from “Gift” to “Forgiveness”

The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct a Christian theology of “hospitality” through a critical reading of Jacques Derrida and Friedrich Nietzsche as well as through an in‐depth biblical and theological reflection on the ethics of hospitality. Out of this reconstructive investigation, I propose a new Christian ethics of hospitality as a radical kind. As a new paradigm, this radical hospitality is distinguished from other types in that it is no longer conceived on the model of “gift”. The new Christian ethics of hospitality is rather reconstructed on the model of “forgiveness” by critically appropriating the concept of “invisible debt” that lies between the hosting citizens and the migrants in the senses of “you owe us your presence” and “I owe you my security and success.” While the hospitality of the gift defines the relationship between the hosting citizens and the migrants as givers and givees, the new paradigm of hospitality identifies this relationship as between creditors and debtors. In this regard, a new Christian hospitality called for unto citizens of the hosting society is a radical kind that challenges them to transcend the creditor‐debtor consciousness.     

“PURE” VERSUS “PRACTICAL” EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

Abstract: In this article I distinguish a type of justification that is “epistemic” in pertaining to the grounds of one's belief, and “practical” in its connection to what act(s) one may undertake, based on that belief. Such justification, on the proposed account, depends mainly on the proportioning of “inner epistemic virtue” to the “outer risks” implied by one's act. The resulting conception strikes a balance between the unduly moralistic conception of William Clifford and contemporary naturalist virtue theories.     

What the Problem with Russell Isn't

Mark Nelson thinks that Bertrand Russell's well-known criticisms of St. Thomas Aquinas turn on Russell's acceptance of a highly implausible epistemic principle (DAM), and that my previous objection to this claim depends upon the attribution to Russell of an even more implausible Insincerity Objection. While I agree that Russell's criticisms do not turn on the Insincerity Objection, I argue that my previous rejection of the attribution of (DAM) to Russell is well-justified: there is a plausible reading of Russell that requires neither (DAM) nor the Insincerity Objection.     

Subject‐Involving Luck

In recent years, philosophers have tended to think of luck as being a relation between an event (taken in the broadest sense of the term) and a subject; to give an account of luck is to fill in the right‐hand side of the following biconditional: an event e is lucky for a subject S if and only if ____. We can call such accounts of luck subject‐relative accounts of luck, since they attempt to spell out what it is for an event to be lucky relative to a subject. This essay argues that we should understand subject‐relative luck as a secondary phenomenon. What is of philosophical interest is giving an account of subject‐involving luck, i.e., filling in the right‐hand side of this biconditional: it is a matter of luck that S ?s iff ____. The essay argues that one of the upshots of focusing on subject‐involving luck is that lack of control accounts of luck (LCALs) become more attractive. In particular, a range of counterexamples to LCALs of subject‐relative luck do not apply to LCALs of subject‐involving luck.     

THE PROBLEM OF “GOD” IN PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION: LONERGAN'S “COMMON SENSE” (RELIGION) VERSUS “THEORY” (THEOLOGY)

The emphasis on God in American psychology of religion generates the problem of explaining divine‐versus‐natural causality in “spiritual experiences.” Especially “theistic psychology” champions divine involvement. However, its argument exposes a methodological error: to pit popular religious opinions against technical scientific conclusions. Countering such homogenizing “postmodern agnosticism,” Bernard Lonergan explained these two as different modes of thinking: “common sense” and “theory”—which resolves the problem: When theoretical science is matched with theoretical theology, “the God‐hypothesis” explains the existence of things whereas science explains their natures; and, barring miracles, God is irrelevant to natural science. A review of the field shows that the problem is pervasive; attention to “miracles”—popularly so‐named versus technically—focuses the claims of divine‐versus‐natural causality; and specifications of the meaning of spiritual, spirituality, science, worldview, and meaning itself (suffering that same ambiguity: personal import versus cognitive content) offer further clarity. The problem is not naturalism versus theism, but commonsensical versus theoretical thinking. This solution demands “hard” social science.     

“To‐be‐forgotten” statements become less true: Memory processes involved in selection and forgetting lead to truthfulness changes of ambiguous sentences

What happens when people try to forget something? What are the consequences of instructing people to intentionally forget a sentence? Recent studies employing the item‐method directed forgetting paradigm have shown that to‐be‐forgotten (TBF) items are, in a subsequent task, emotionally devaluated relative to to‐be‐remembered (TBR) items, an aftereffect of memory selection (Vivas, Marful, Panagiotidou & Bajo, 2016). As such, distractor devaluation by attentional selection generalizes to memory selection. In this study, we use the item‐method directed forgetting paradigm to test the effects of memory selection and inhibition on truth judgments of ambiguous sentences. We expected the relative standing of an item in the task (i.e., whether it was instructed to be remembered or forgotten) to affect the truthfulness value of that item, making TBF items less valid/truthful than TBR items. As predicted, ambiguous sentences associated with a “Forget” cue were subsequently judged as less true than sentences associated with a “Remember” cue, suggesting that instructions to intentionally forget a statement can produce changes in the validity/truthfulness of that statement. To our knowledge, this is the first study to show an influence of memory processes involved in selection and forgetting on the perceived truthfulness of sentences.     

Philosophy of Science in the Twenty‐First Century

Philosophy of science in the past half century can be seen as a reaction against logical empiricism's focus on modern logic as the format in which debates should be expressed and on physics as the canonical science. These reactions have resulted in a fragmentation of the field. Although this provides ways forward for disparate philosophies of various sciences, it threatens the very possibility of general philosophy of science. The debate that most obviously continues to be conducted at the general level—the debate about scientific realism—only does so because of a dangerous naïveté. Nevertheless, this article suggests that there is a place for general work not by starting at the highest level of abstraction but instead by abstracting general lessons from actual science.     

“Behold,I Make All Things New”

The theme of the 4th Assembly of the World Council of Churches in Uppsala in 1968 was “Behold, I make all things new.” God's great promise in Revelation precisely reflected the fears and hopes of the turbulent 1960s. This promise is realized in the experience of faith, and in this certainty, Christianity goes out to meet the great future of God in the world. The connection between this promised future and the advent of the new creation experienced by Christians was captured in Uppsala by the concept of “anticipation.” This article traces the impetus of the impulse of the Uppsala assembly through the World Student Conference in Finland in 1968 and the Conference on World Mission and Evangelism in Bangkok in 1973–73.     

‘I don't think racism is that bad any more’: Exploring the ‘end of racism’ discourse among students in English schools

In this paper, we present findings on lay constructions of racism from a focus group study (11 groups, n = 72) with a mixed sample of secondary‐school students in England. We show that racism was, on the whole, ‘othered’: It was located in other times, places, and people or was denied altogether. We show that this way of talking about racism had different uses depending on the identity stakes involved in different interactional contexts. Even in the cases where racism was constructed as common, participants worked hard to make an ‘irrefutable’ argument, which suggests that they were anticipating reputational damage by making a claim for the persistence of racism. We discuss these findings with regard to the different levels of analysis involved in constructions of racism (micro‐interactional, local and broader normative context) and with regard to an ‘end of racism’ discourse that appeared to provide the normative framework for participants' accounts.     

“Liturgy emerges from a wound”

Serious academic reflection and scholarship on the Fresh Expressions of Church (FXoC) movement in the United Kingdom is developing significantly, but there exists almost no such work in South Africa. What has been produced deals with scholars reflecting on their experiences of Fresh Expressions in the United Kingdom (Ian Nell and Rudolph Grobler, “An Exploration of Fresh Expressions as Missional Church: Some Practical-Theological Perspectives,” NGTT DEEL 55:3–4 (2017), 747–68). This is an unfortunate situation. While there has been a generous response by many churches, there has been little interest, by and large, from the Anglican Church of Southern Africa (ACSA). FXoC is, then, an under-researched entity in South Africa. This article, part of a larger study, seeks to ask questions about how liturgy might develop from below in a new ecclesial community of marginalized people.     

中国人获得感的结构研究

获得感是一个具有心理内涵与时代特色的新生概念。为了探究获得感的结构内涵,通过自由联想法形成量表的初始项目,先后进行两次预测并根据结果修订量表。然后对量表进行正式施测并检验其信效度,同时采用中文版生活满意度量表和幸福倾向量表进行效标效度检验。结果显示,中国人的获得感是个体对获取自身需求满足的内容、实现途径与所需条件的认知评价以及在此过程中的心理体验,包括获得体验、获得环境、获得内容、获得途径和获得分享五个维度。信效度分析表明,编制的中国人获得感量表符合心理测量学的标准,可用于相关的社会心理研究与应用。     

Batman in the Classroom: Academic Philosophy and “… and Philosophy”

Though the interaction of philosophy with pop culture has so far mostly taken the form of books for nonphilosophers that use various shows and movies as sources of examples to illustrate “traditional” philosophical issues, this article contends that serious engagement with the informal philosophical discussions expressed in popular entertainments constitutes a kind of “ethnophilosophy” and should be considered an important part of the discipline. Our disciplinary responsibility for maintaining and considering the history of philosophy ought to include even the philosophical conversations that occur outside the academy; however unlike “proper” philosophy this material may be, it nonetheless represents engagement—sometimes substantial engagement—with the same issues that concern those of us who are considered “professional” philosophers, and thus is legitimately of interest to us.     

Time‐of‐day variation of visuo‐spatial attention

Time‐of‐day variation of visuo‐spatial attention in relation to body temperature and subjective arousal was assessed. At five different times of day, alertness, covert, and overt orienting of attention were assessed in fifteen healthy subjects. Based on previous studies reporting a tight coupling of alerting and orienting the present study investigates potential attentional asymmetries induced by diurnal variations of arousal. Both covert and overt orienting of attention improved in the course of the day. However, no asymmetries between left and right visual hemifields could be detected. Covert orienting additionally covaried with body temperature, indicating a quite close relation between the attentional arousal and orienting system. Conversely, overt orienting only improved due to repeated testing but did not correlate with body temperature suggesting a partial independence of both modes of attentional orienting. It can be assumed that due to limited diurnal variations of arousal in the participants and practice effects caused by repeated testing, no attentional asymmetries could be provoked.