Effective ways to dispose of unwanted time and money with a laboratory computer

Four general types of mistakes are presented that are commonly made in choosing, purchasing, and setting up a laboratory computer. These are: avoiding advice, building your own hardware, buying from a fly-by-night manufacturer, and being ignorant of your machine.     

Pathological gamblers, with and without substance use disorders, discount delayed rewards at high rates

Pathological gambling is classified as a disorder of impulse control, yet little research has evaluated behavioral indices of impulsivity in gamblers. The rates at which rewards delayed in time are subjectively devalued may be a behavioral marker of impulsivity. This study evaluated delay discounting in 60 pathological gamblers and 26 control participants. Gamblers were divided into those with (n = 21) and without (n = 39) substance use disorders. A hypothetical $1,000 reward was delayed at intervals ranging from 6 hr to 25 years, and immediate rewards varied from $1 to $999. Pathological gamblers discounted delayed rewards at higher rates than control participants, and gamblers with substance use disorders discounted delayed rewards at higher rates than non-substance-abusing gamblers. These data provide further evidence that rapid discounting of delayed rewards may be a feature central to impulse control and addictive disorders, including pathological gambling.     

The mental accounting of sunk time costs: why time is not like money

The sunk‐cost effect, an irrational attention to non‐recoverable past costs while making current decisions, has been documented widely in the domain of monetary costs. In this paper, I study the effect of past time investments on current decisions. In three experiments using choice situations, I demonstrate that the sunk‐cost effect is not observed for past investments of time, but the effect reappears when the investments are expressed as monetary quantities. I further propose that this ‘pseudo‐rationality’ is due to the fact that individuals lack the ability to account for time in the same way as they account for money. In two additional experiments, I facilitate the accounting of time and show that the irrational sunk‐cost effect reappears. In a final experiment, I test my propositions in a setting where subjects make real investments of time and subsequently make real choices. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When time is money: The effect of hourly payment on the evaluation of time

Empirical research shows decisions about time are often made differently than decisions about money, belying the oft-quoted maxim that “time is money”. However, there are organizational practices such as payment on the basis of time that can make the equivalence of time and money salient and are associated with an economic evaluation of time. Study 1 showed that people paid by the hour applied mental accounting rules to time that are typically only applied to money. Using data from a nationally representative survey, Study 2 documented that people paid by the hour weighed economic returns more strongly in making tradeoffs between time and money. Study 3 showed that participants’ prior exposure to hourly payment was associated with a greater willingness to trade more time for money and that participants randomly assigned to calculate their hourly wage rate expressed greater willingness to trade more time for money. The interaction of prior experience with whether or not participants calculated an hourly wage in predicting participants’ willingness to trade more time for money was fully mediated by the salience of economic criteria in participants’ decision-making.     

Affective state and preference for immediate versus delayed reward

Fifty-two 9-year-olds were randomly assigned to success and failure treatment conditions involving acceptance or rejection of a drawing made for an art show. In a pilot study, this treatment was shown to influence significantly subjects' affective states. Just after treatment, subjects were presented with choices between pairs of small immediate and large delayed rewards. As predicted, subjects who had experienced success chose more often the large delayed reward than those who failed (p < .02). Prior expectancy for success and sex were not significantly related to choice behavior. The influence of affective state on various parameters of the choice paradigm was discussed, and other evidence was cited indicating that affective state is a major determinant of self-gratification behavior.     

Psychoticism and signalled versus unsignalled reaction time

Considering the findings that schizophrenics have been found to show relatively slow reaction times (RTs), and often do not benefit from ordinarily helpful information (e.g. a warning signal), the present study investigated the relationship between these variables and psychoticism (P). One hundred and three male Ss were administered a questionnaire which provides a measure of P. In addition, all Ss were tested on an RT task under unsignalled (i.e. no warning signal) and signalled conditions. The results showed that the expected improvement in reaction speed with a warning signal was of a lesser magnitude for those high on P. Furthermore, the difference was due to the faster RTs for high P scorers in the unsignalled condition. The data suggest that high P scorers are like schizophrenics in that they show less benefit from a warning signal, but are dissimilar in terms of reaction speed in an unsignalled task.     

Conditioned reinforcement versus time to reinforcement in chain schedules.

Pigeons were trained on three-component chain schedules in which the initial component was either a fixed-interval or variable-interval schedule. The middle and terminal components were varied among fixed-interval fixed-interval, variable-interval variable-interval, and an interdependent variable-interval variable-interval schedule in which the sum of the durations of the two variable-interval components was always equal to the sum of the fixed-interval fixed-interval components. At issue was whether the response rate in the initial component was controlled by its time to primary reinforcement or by the temporal parameters of the stimulus correlated with the middle terminal link. The fixed-interval initial-link schedule maintained much lower response rates than the variable-interval initial-link schedule regardless of the schedules in the middle and terminal links. Nevertheless, the intervening schedules played some role: With fixed-interval schedules in the initial links, response rates were consistently highest with independent variable-interval schedules in the middle and terminal links and intermediate with the interdependent variable-interval schedules; these initial-link differences were predicted by the response rates in the middle link of the chain. With variable-interval schedules in the initial links, response rates were lowest with the fixed-interval fixed-interval schedules following the initial link and were not systematically different for the two types of variable-interval variable-interval schedules. The results suggest that time to reinforcement itself accounts for little if any variance in initial-link responding.     

Personality,time of day and delayed memory for tv news

An experiment was conducted to test the effects of time of day on delayed memory for televised news stories. Three groups received the same sequence of 6 news stories at 09.30, 13.30 and 16.30, respectively. Unexpected tests of free recall, cued recall and recognition were given about 2 hr after news presentation. Results showed that memory performance improved slightly across the day on tests of recall, and significantly so on recognition. Personality differences were also examined. In general, introverts remembered more than extraverts and differences between them were most marked during the late-afternoon session especially on free recall and when minimal cuing was provided. The results support previous time-of-day findings for delayed retention of complex learning materials. Personality differences observed here are consistent with predicted introvert-extravert differences in memory performance predicted by Eysenck's modified action-decrement hypothesis.     

The effects of aging on time reproduction in delayed free-recall

The experiments presented here demonstrate that normal aging amplifies differences in time production occurring in delayed free-recall testing. Experiment 1 compared the time production ability of two healthy aged groups as well as college-aged participants. During the test session, which followed a 24-h delay and omitted all feedback and examples of the two target intervals, the two groups of aged participants' over-produced a 6s interval. This effect is similar in form to errors shown by young participants, but twice the magnitude. Productions of a 17 s interval were generally accurate overall. However, further analysis indicated that the majority of aged participants over-produced the 17 s interval while a minority greatly under-produced the 17 s interval. Furthermore, aged participants showed violations of the scalar property of timing variability in the training session, while in the test session, only those who under-produced the 17 s interval showed this tendency. In contrast, training session performance was good for all participants. Experiments 2 and 3 investigated the ability of the participants in Experiment 1 to reproduce the length of a line from memory, under conditions analogous to those of the time production experiments. These experiments provided tests of the specificity of the errors observed in Experiment 1. Performance in the older participants was accurate, if more variable, compared to the young participants, in contrast to the time production results, indicating that production inaccuracy in free-recall is specific to interval timing in the current context.     

Effects of reward on delayed reaction time task performance of hyperactive children

This experiment was designed to investigate the effects of continuous, partial, and noncontingent schedules of reward, as well as the withdrawal of rewards, on the performance of hyperactive and normal control children on a delayed reaction time task. Although noncontingent reward resulted in faster reaction times for control subjects, performance of hyperactives deteriorated under noncontingent reward and improved when it was withdrawn. Also, reaction times of controls during extinction remained superior to baseline, whereas performance of hyperactives returned to baseline level. It was suggested that these and other findings reviewed point to an unusual sensitivity to rewards in hyperactive children.     

Verbal versus manual reaction time in schizophrenic and normal subjects

On the assumption that schizophrenia involves a disturbance in interpersonal relations it is predicted that the verbal reaction time responses of schizophrenic subjects should have disproportionately longer latencies than manual reaction time responses as compared to normal subjects. Using data presented in this Journal by Venables and O'Connor (1959). the prediction is confirmed for patients whose reaction time level is relatively fast, but not in those with relatively slow reaction times. Several possible mechanisms are postulated to account for the results, including differential reinforcement, amount of practice, and complexity of verbal responses, and degree of pathology of the patients.     

Worry propensity and the perception of risk

This paper examines how the tendency to worry impacts risk estimation for an upcoming, stressful event. Students in a statistics class completed worry, anxiety, and subjective risk questionnaires on the first day of class. State-anxiety and subjective risk questionnaires were again administered immediately before their first examination. Subjects showed significant increases in anxiety and the perceived risk of poor academic performance in the class. Risk domains unrelated to the examination (e.g., physical threats) remained stable across measurement periods. Regression analysis was used to determine the independent contribution of worry propensity in predicting elevations in the perceived risk of poor academic performance. The analysis showed that worry propensity predicted subjective risk bias, even after variance attributable to current mood and trait anxiety had been removed. Results from a second series of regression equations suggested subjective risk biases partially mediated the relationship between worry propensity and current mood. These results are used to argue that the elevations in state anxiety observed when worriers are confronted with a stressful event are largely a function of risk inflation.     

Molar optimization versus delayed reinforcement as explanations of choice between fixed-ratio and progressive-ratio schedules.

In a discrete-trials procedure, pigeons chose between a fixed-ratio 81 schedule and a progressive-ratio schedule by making a single peck at the key correlated with one or the other of these schedules. The response requirement on the progressive-ratio schedule began at 1 and increased by 10 each time the progressive-ratio schedule was chosen. Each time the fixed-ratio schedule was chosen, the requirement on the progressive-ratio schedule was reset to 1 response. In conditions where there was no intertrial interval, subjects chose the progressive-ratio schedule for an average of about five consecutive trials (during which the response requirement increased to 41), and then chose the fixed-ratio schedule. This ratio was larger than that predicted by an optimality analysis that assumes that subjects respond in a pattern that minimizes the response-reinforcer ratio or one that assumes that subjects respond in a pattern that maximizes the overall rate of reinforcement. In conditions with a 25-s or 50-s intertrial interval, subjects chose the progressive-ratio schedule for an average of about eight consecutive trials before choosing the fixed-ratio schedule. This change in performance with the addition of an intertrial interval was also not predicted by an optimality analysis. On the other hand, the results were consistent with the theory that choice is determined by the delays to the reinforcers delivered on the present trial and on subsequent trials.     

Time for action versus action in time: time estimation differs between motor preparation and execution

Theories relating to time perception and motor performance predict very different temporal distortions depending on the synchronisation or succession of temporal processing and motor behaviour. However, our knowledge about the temporal difference between motor preparation and execution is still scarce. In order to expand on prior studies, two different time reproduction tasks were utilised to measure motor preparation and motor execution. We found that motor preparation of a planned action allows participants to complete the time reproduction task more accurately and, in short duration trials, less variably than for motor execution. Furthermore, under-reproduction was found in motor preparation compared to motor execution, which may be caused by increased temporal information processing. According to the attentional gate theory, more attention allocated to time processing and reduced motor distraction leads to less temporal distortion in the motor preparation. The findings are also important for designing to study consciousness, temporal and visual processing.     

Power, propensity to negotiate, and moving first in competitive interactions

Five experiments investigated how the possession and experience of power affects the initiation of competitive interaction. In Experiments 1a and 1b, high-power individuals displayed a greater propensity to initiate a negotiation than did low-power individuals. Three additional experiments showed that power increased the likelihood of making the first move in a variety of competitive interactions. In Experiment 2, participants who were semantically primed with power were nearly 4 times as likely as participants in a control condition to choose to make the opening arguments in a debate competition scenario. In Experiment 3, negotiators with strong alternatives to a negotiation were more than 3 times as likely to spontaneously express an intention to make the first offer compared to participants who lacked any alternatives. Experiment 4 showed that high-power negotiators were more likely than low-power negotiators to actually make the first offer and that making the first offer produced a bargaining advantage.