Scotopic contrast hues displaced toward red

Stabell, B. & Stabell, U. Scotopic contrast hues displaced toward red. Scand. J. Psychol., 1973, 14, 316–319.-The displacement of scotopic contrast hues toward red, contrary to predictions based on the opponent color theory of Hering, is explained on the assumption that the violet receptor system has a negligible sensitivity at the yellow cardinal point, while all the receptor systems are activated at the blue cardinal point.     

Scotopic and photopic afterimages

Stabell, U. & Stabell, B. Scotopic and photopic afterimages. Scand. J. Psychol., 1973, 14, 210–212.MdashThe curves of photopic and scotopic afterimages were found to coincide, confirming the suggestion that disposition for scotopic contrast hue is controlled basically by the ratio of hue-related processes initiated upon chromatic prestimulation of cones, while the achromatic test-stimulation is a constant stimulus, regardless of test variables.     

Chromatic rod vision VIII. Simultaneous contrast

Stabell, U. & Stabell, B. Chromatic rod vision. VIII. Simultaneous contrast. Scand. J. Psychol., 1973, 14, 1619.-Compared with the curve of additive opponent hue, the curve of scotopic hue of simultaneous contrast was found to be displaced toward blue in the orange and green-yellow regions of inducing field. The results are explained on the assumptions that (a) change of disposition for scotopic hue reflects variation in ratio of primary hue-related processes of inducing field, and (b) the chromatic-related opponent processes, in a dark-adapted and chromatically neutral eye, are of equal magnitude within the photochromatic interval.     

CHROMATIC ROD VISION III. Duration of pre-stimulation varied

S tabell B. & S tabell U. Chromatic rod vision. III. Duration of pre-stimulation varied. Scand. J. Psychol ., 1972, 13 , 136–140.—The scotopic contrast hue was determined as a function of duration of pre-stimulation, together with the additive opponent hue. It is concluded that the red/blue ratio which has to be added to the additive opponent hue to produce the scotopic contrast hue, may change as a function of both wavelength and duration of pre-stimulation.     

TRANSITION FROM ROD TO CONE VISION:III. Successive contrast anew

S tabell , U. & S tabell , B. Transition from rod to cone vision. III. Successive contrast anew. Scand. J. Psychol ., 1969, 10 , 140–144—The relation between the specific threshold level and the upper limit of the scotopic contrast color was investigated. The achromatic interval between the scotopic and the photopic component increased when time in darkness increased, and when pre-stimulation was reduced as regards intensity, duration, or cone/rod ratio. The results are interpreted on the basis of the opponent theory of color vision.     

CHROMATIC ROD VISION

S tabell B. & S tabell U. Chromatic rod vision. IV. Time between pre-and test-stimulation varied. Scand. J. Psychol ., 1972, 13 , 141–144.—The scotopic contrast hue was determined as a function of time between pre-and test-stimulation. As the interval increased, the scotopic hue was found to change from orange toward yellow in the 440–475 nm region of pre-stimulation and from violet-blue toward violet in the 550–595 nm region. It is concluded that (1) depending on wavelength of pre-stimulation, the processes in the red-green substance may revert to the mid-valued state faster or slower than the processes in the yellow-blue substance, and (2) the red/blue ratio of the violet hue which has to be added to the additive opponent hue to produce the scotopic contrast hue, may change as a function of time between pre- and test-stimulation.     

Mechanisms of long-term dark adaptation

It has previously been suggested that long-term dark adaptation is controlled by bleaching signals that regulate the activity of an allosteric, positively cooperative protein (Stabell et al., 1986a, b). Recent biochemical evidence strongly supports this assumption, indicating that the primary regulator of the light-sensitive channels in the plasma membrane of the outer segments of the photoreceptors is a homo-oligomeric, allosteric, positively cooperative protein. In this report, we discuss the possibility that signals from bleached photopigments may control the dark-adaptation process through the allosteric protein of the plasma membrane. It is suggested that the concentrations of the bleached photopigment and of the allosteric effector are reciprocal quantities.     

Dark-adaptation mechanisms of the long-wave foveal cones

The ordinary long-term rod and cone dark-adaptation curves have generally been assumed to follow a single exponential rate of recovery. However, in two previous papers on rod dark-adaptation (Stabell et al., 1986a, b), the recovery curve was found to consist of three different sections. The results of the present paper show the same type of recovery function with three different sections for the long-term dark-adaptation curve of the long-wave cone system. During the major, middle section log cone threshold, like log rod threshold, is linearly related to the logarithm of the concentration of bleached photopigment. Presupposing that the bleached cone photopigment acts as a ligand, the change in threshold level obtained during the middle section of the dark-adaptation curve is well described by the change in activity rate of an allosteric, postively cooperative enzyme built as a dimer.     

ROD VISION AS CHROMATIC VISION

S tabell , B. Rod vision as chromatic vision. Scand. J. Psychol ., 1968, 9, 282–288.—It was found (I) that the smallest quantity of light of pre-stimula-tion which produces color upon test-stimulation, stands in unique relation to the intensity of the specific threshold, and (2) that the size of the pre-and test-stimulation fields may affect the duration of the after-image. The results are judged to indicate that pre-stimulation of cones creates the disposition for the color-related response, and that the color-related response is generated centrally to the photochemical systems of the receptors.     

Acoustic pre-stimulation modulates startle and postural reactions during sudden release of standing support surface in aging

Falls contribute to injuries and reduced level of physical activity in older adults. During falls, the abrupt sensation of moving downward triggers a startle-like reaction that may interfere with protective response movements necessary to maintain balance. Startle reaction could be dampened by sensory pre-stimulation delivered immediately before a startling stimulus. This study investigated the neuromodulatory effects of pre-stimulation on postural/startle responses to drop perturbations of the standing support surface in relation to age.Ten younger and 10 older adults stood quietly on an elevated computer-controlled moveable platform. At an unpredictable time, participants were dropped vertically to elicit a startle-like response. Reactive drop perturbation trials without a pre-stimulus (control) were alternated with trials with acoustic pre-stimulus tone (PSI). A two-way mixed design analysis of variance comparing condition (control vs. PSI) X group (younger vs. older) was performed to analyze changes in muscle activation patterns, ground reaction force, and joint angular displacements.Compared to younger adults, older adults showed lower neck muscle electromyography amplitude reduction rate and incidence of response. Peak muscle activation in neck, upper arm, and hamstring muscles were reduced during PSI trials compared to control trials in both groups (p < 0.05). In addition, knee and hip joint flexion prior to ground contact was reduced in PSI trials compared to control (p < 0.05). During post-landing balance recovery, increased knee and hip flexion displacement and time to peak impact force were observed in PSI trials compared to control condition (p < 0.05).PSI reduced startle-induced muscle activation at proximal body segments and likely decreased joint flexion during abrupt downward vertical displacement perturbations of the body. Older adults retained the ability to modulate startle and postural responses but their neuromodulatory capacity was reduced compared with younger adults. Further research on the potential of applying PSI as a possible therapeutic tool to reduce the risk of fall-related injury is needed.     

Is egocentric bias evidence for simulation theory?

Revised simulation theory (Goldman 2006) allows mental state attributions containing some or all of the attributor’s genuine, non-simulated mental states. It is thought that this gives the revised theory an empirical advantage, because unlike theory theory and rationality theory, it can explain egocentric bias (the tendency to over attribute ones’ own mental states to others). I challenge this view, arguing that theory theory and rationality theory can explain egocentricity by appealing to heuristic mindreading and the diagnosticity of attributors’ own beliefs, and that these explanations are as simple and consistent as those provided by revised simulation theory.     

Understanding the Influence Theory of Causation: A Critique of Strevens

In this paper, I will first clarify Lewis’s influence theory of causation by relying on his theory of events. And then I will consider Michael Strevens’s charge against the sufficiency of Lewis’s theory. My claim is that it is legitimate but does not pose as serious a problem for Lewis’s theory as Strevens thinks because Lewis can surmount it by limiting the scope of his theory to causation between concrete events. Michael Strevens raises an alleged counterexample to the necessity of Lewis’s theory that, if successful, would have a very important advantage over other alleged counterexamples. But I will assert that it is simply mistaken. My defense of Lewis’s theory will shed interesting light on the relationship between Lewis’s theory and Salmon’s mark theory.     

Theory in Religion,Aging, and Health: An Overview

This paper provides an overview of theory in religion, aging, and health. It offers both a primer on theory and a roadmap for researchers. Four “tenses” of theory are described—distinct ways that theory comes into play in this field: grand theory, mid-range theory, use of theoretical models, and positing of constructs which mediate or moderate putative religious effects. Examples are given of both explicit and implicit uses of theory. Sources of theory for this field are then identified, emphasizing perspectives of sociologists and psychologists, and discussion is given to limitations of theory. Finally, reflections are offered as to why theory matters.     

Modernity and Morality in Habermas's Discourse Ethics

Discourse ethics is originally conceived as a programme of philosophicaljustification of morality. This depends on the formal derivation of the moral principle (U) from non-moral principles. The moral theory is supposed to fall out of a pragmatic theory of meaning. The original programme plays a central role in Habermas's social theory: the moral theory, if true, provides good evidence for the more general theory of modernization. But neither Habermas nor his followers have succeeded in providing a formal derivation. This essay shows how and why Habermas's proposed derivation is impossible. As if aware of the lacuna, Habermas has recently suggested that (U) can be derived by 'abduction' rather than deduction. The proposal draws heavily on modernization theory; hence the only justification for (U) now available to him rests on premises drawn from that theory. The original programme of the justificationof morality has thus given way to the weaker programme of the philosophical elucidationof morality. Further, since Habermas's moral theory is no longer justified independently of modernization theory, but at least partly by it, the moral theory cannot without circularity provide evidence for the modernization theory.     

Bootstrap Confirmation Made Quantitative

Glymour’s theory of bootstrap confirmation is a purely qualitative account of confirmation; it allows us to say that the evidence confirms a given theory, but not that it confirms the theory to a certain degree. The present paper extends Glymour’s theory to a quantitative account and investigates the resulting theory in some detail. It also considers the question how bootstrap confirmation relates to justification.     

Humanism and Morality

A theory of morality acceptable to humanists must be one that can be accepted independently of religion. In this paper, I argue that while there is such a theory, it is a non-standard one, and its acceptance would have some far-reaching consequences. As one might expect, the theory is similar to others in various ways. But it is not the same as any of them. Indeed, it is a radically new theory. Like Hume’s ethics, it is founded on our natural sociability, and feelings of empathy for others. Like Aristotle’s theory, it incorporates an ethics of virtue. Like Kant’s theory, it regards the set of moral principles as those appropriate for a socially ideal society. But unlike Kant’s theory, it is essentially utilitarian. I call it ‘social contractual utilitarianism’.     

The dissemination and research of Laszlo's systems philosophy in China

Since the 1980s, the so‐called “new six‐theory” (Dissipative structure theory, Synergetics theory, Catastrophe theory, Chaos theory, Fractal theory, and Hypercycle theory), different from the traditional “systems theory,” “information theory,” and “cybernetics theory” (the “old three theory") has been introduced into China. With it, Laszlo's systems philosophy has been given close attention by Chinese scholars. The main elements of this work are analyzed in terms of the publication and research of Laszlo's work on systems philosophy, and more specifically on systems philosophy and the theory of knowledge, systems philosophy and general evolution theory, systems philosophy and the theory of value, and systems philosophy and metaphysics.     

Theories and inter‐theory relations in Bošković

During 1745–1755 Bo?kovi? explicitly used the concept of scientific theory in three cases: the theory of forces existing in nature, the theory of transformations of geometric loci, and the theory of infinitesimals. The theory first mentioned became the famous theory of natural philosophy in 1758, the second was published in the third volume of his mathematical textbook Elementorum Universae Matheseos (1754), and the third theory was never completed, though Bo?kovi? repeatedly announced it from 1741 on. The treatment of continuity and infinity in natural philosophy, geometry and infinitesimal analysis brought about inter‐theory relations in Bo?kovi?'s work during his Roman period. The two constructed theories of Bo?kovi?, the theory of forces and the theory of geometric transformations, directly influenced the idea for the construction of his third theory. These written theories refer to understanding and effective application of continuity and infinity in natural philosophy and geometry, and this task, according to Bo?kovi?, requires methodological support from the theory of infinitesimals.     

Contesting (Simonton's) Blind Variation,Selective Retention Theory of Creativity

Over the 50 years since Donald Campbell advanced his Darwinian theory of creative thought, now better known as the blind variation, selective retention (BVSR) theory of creativity, a considerable literature has evolved, involving both support and opposition to the theory. The most prolific support of BVSR theory is due to Dean Keith Simonton. In response to a detailed exposition by Simonton of BVSR theory, a set of cognitive-historical case studies to refute it was presented by Dasgupta; this, in turn, had elicited a response from Simonton. Very recently, Simonton presented an updated version of the theory, which will be called here Simonton's BVSR theory. This article offers two detailed cognitive-historical case studies of actual episodes of technological creativity to challenge and contest BVSR theory as a general theory of creativity.     

On the Possibility of Inference to the Best Explanation

Various proposals have suggested that an adequate explanatory theory should reduce the number or the cardinality of the set of logically independent claims that need be accepted in order to entail a body of data. A (and perhaps the only) well-formed proposal of this kind is William Kneale’s: an explanatory theory should be finitely axiomatizable but it’s set of logical consequences in the data language should not be finitely axiomatizable. Craig and Vaught showed that Kneale theories (almost) always exist for any recursively enumerable but not finitely axiomatizable set of data sentences in a first order language with identity. Kneale’s criterion underdetermines explanation even given all possible data in the data language; gratuitous axioms may be “tacked on.” Define a Kneale theory, T, to be logically minimal if it is deducible from every Kneale theory (in the vocabulary of T) that entails the same statements in the data language as does T. If they exist, minimal Kneale theories are candidates for best explanations: they are “bold” in a sense close to Popper’s; some minimal Kneale theory is true if any Kneale theory is true; the minimal Kneale theory that is data equivalent to any given Kneale theory is unique; and no Kneale theory is more probable than some minimal Kneale theory. I show that under the Craig-Vaught conditions, no minimal Kneale theories exist.