Children's internal representations,empathy, and fantasy play: a validity study of the SCORS-Q

The authors investigated relationships among internal representations, empathy, and affective and cognitive processes in fantasy play to test the validity of the Social Cognition and Object Relations Scale Q-Sort (SCORS-Q; D. Westen, 1995) with children. Eighty-six 8-10-year-olds were administered 8 Thematic Apperception Test cards, a standardized play task, and a self-report empathy measure. Teachers rated children's empathy and helpfulness. As predicted, internal representations were related to empathy, helpfulness, and quality of fantasy play. Developmental differences on the SCORS-Q were consistent with object relations theory and with results from the original SCORS. The findings support the value of internal representations as a means of understanding children's interpersonal functioning and contribute to the validity of the SCORS-Q for use with children.     

Children's emotional responsiveness and sociomoral understanding and associations with mothers' and fathers' socialization practices

Sixty‐two preschoolers (55% boys) were presented hypothetical dilemmas about moral transgressions. Responses were evaluated in terms of children's emotional responsiveness, prosocial motives, and readiness to intervene. Mothers and fathers reported separately on their use of victim‐oriented inductions, teaching reparations, power assertion, and love withdrawal. Four years later, parents reported on children's behavioral problems, emotion‐regulation ability, and empathy. Mothers reported using more victim‐oriented inductions than did fathers, and girls responded with more personal distress and reported more rule‐oriented motives. Maternal love withdrawal was a positive predictor of empathy and motives of concern. For fathers, teaching reparations were positively related to children's sympathy. Interestingly, mothers' power assertion was negatively related to sympathy at high levels of fathers' power assertion, but not at low levels. Maternal power assertion during the preschool years was negatively associated with children's long‐term empathy scores. School‐age outcomes also were meaningfully predicted by earlier sociomoral competence.     

Childhood fantasy play relates to adult socio-emotional competence

Childhood fantasy play and creation of imaginary companions are thought to confer socio-emotional benefits in children, but little is known about how they relate to socio-emotional competence in adulthood. A total of 341 adults (81 males) aged 18 and above (M = 31.47, SD = 12.62) completed an online survey examining their fantasy play as a child, their childhood imaginary companion status, and their adult socio-emotional competence. Adults who reported higher levels of childhood fantasy play were found to be significantly more prosocial, empathetic, and emotionally intelligent than their counterparts after controlling for demographic factors. Recall of a childhood imaginary companion, however, was significantly related only to higher scores for perspective-taking and did not explain unique variance in any adult competence measure. Findings suggest that engagement in fantasy play during childhood may be a precursor to later socio-emotional competence, while benefits previously associated with imaginary companions specifically may not extend into adulthood.     

Children's active play imagery

ObjectiveThe purpose of the present study was to examine how children's use of imagery in their active play can facilitate Deci and Ryan's (2002) three basic psychological needs (i.e., competence, relatedness, and autonomy) in their active play. A secondary purpose was to examine the content of children's mental images associated with their active play.DesignFocus Groups.MethodOne hundred and four participants (male and female) aged 7–14 years old were recruited from various summer camps.ResultsThe results indicated children use active play imagery and their use of imagery facilitates the satisfaction of the three basic needs (i.e., imagery → behaviour → need satisfaction). With respect to autonomy, children imaged activities that are their favourite, enjoyable, and they do often. For relatedness they imaged friends, family, and others (e.g., professional athletes), while for competence they imaged themselves being good at the activity. Age and gender differences emerged for relatedness and competence. Furthermore, the content of children's images included when participants imaged as well as the speed of their images (i.e., slow motion, real time, or fast).ConclusionThese findings may enable the development of imagery interventions to increase children's motivation to be physically active.     

Children's emotional false memories

Eight- and 12-year-old children were presented with neutral and negative emotional Deese-Roediger-McDermott lists equated on familiarity and associative strength. Both recall and recognition (A') measures were obtained. Recall measures exhibited the usual age increments in true and false recollection. True neutral items were better recalled and recognized than true negative emotional items. Although the children showed more false recall for neutral than for negative emotional lists, false recognition was higher for negative emotional than for neutral items. A' analyses also showed that whereas true neutral information and false neutral information were easily discriminated by children regardless of age, the same was not the case for true and false negative emotional information. Together, these results suggest that although children may be able to censor negative emotional information at recall, such information promotes relational processing in children's memory, making true and false emotional information less discriminable overall.     

How fantasy benefits young children's understanding of pretense

Sobel and Lillard (2001) demonstrated that 4-year-olds' understanding of the role that the mind plays in pretending improved when children were asked questions in a fantasy context. The present study investigated whether this fantasy effect was motivated by children recognizing that fantasy contains violations of real-world causal structure. In Experiment 1, 4-year-olds were shown a fantasy character engaged in ordinary actions or actions that violated causal knowledge. Children were more likely to say that a troll doll who was acting like but ignorant of the character was not pretending to be that character when read the violation story. Experiment 2 suggested that this difference was not caused by a greater interest in the violation story. Experiment 3 demonstrated a similar difference for characters engaged in social and functional violations that were possible in the real world. These data are consistent with the hypothesis that preschoolers use actions and appearance more than mental states to make judgments about pretense, but that those judgments can be influenced by the context in which the questions are presented.     

Children's understanding of reputations

In the present study, the authors investigated age differences in children's understanding (a) that a person's behavior may contribute to the formation of a shared opinion within the peer group and (b) that origins of a reputation can be direct or indirect. The authors read stories in which a target character engaged in either prosocial or antisocial interactions with peers to children in kindergarten, 2nd, and 4th grade. They then asked the children to judge how various peers viewed the target character. Children's explanations indicated that children in all of those age groups understood that firsthand experience influenced peers' opinions, and by 2nd grade, children understood that indirect experience or gossip also might have contributed to an individual's reputation.     

Children's understanding of interpretation

The prevailing view in the study of children's developing theories of mind is that the 4-year-old's newfound understanding of false belief is the single developmental milestone marking entry into an adult “folk psychology.” We argue instead that there are at least two such watershed events. Children first develop a “copy theory” that equates the mind with a recording device capable of producing either faithful or flawed representations of reality and according to which mental states are determined entirely by the flow of information into the mind. Only later, in the early school years, do children come to appreciate, as do adults, that the mind itself can contribute to the content of mental states. This later-arriving “Interpretive Theory of Mind” allows an appreciation of the capacity for constructively interpreting and misinterpreting reality. The main finding from the six studies reported here is that children who otherwise demonstrate a clear understanding that beliefs can be false (and so deserve to be credited with a theory of mind), can nevertheless fail to appreciate even the most basic aspects of interpretation: that despite exposure to precisely the same information, two persons can still end up holding sharply different opinions about what is the self-same reality. What these studies reveal is that an interpretive theory of mind is different from, and later arriving than, an appreciation of the possibility of false belief, and contrary to competing claims, this interpretive theory actually makes its first appearance during, but not before, the early school years.     

Children's understanding of counting

This study examines the abstractness of children's mental representation of counting, and their understanding that the last number word used in a count tells how many items there are (the cardinal word principle). In the first experiment, twenty-four 2- and 3-year-olds counted objects, actions, and sounds. Children counted objects best, but most showed some ability to generalize their counting to actions and sounds, suggesting that at a very young age, children begin to develop an abstract, generalizable mental representation of the counting routine. However, when asked "how many" following counting, only older children (mean age 3.6) gave the last number word used in the count a majority of the time, suggesting that the younger children did not understand the cardinal word principle. In the second experiment (the "give-a-number" task), the same children were asked to give a puppet one, two, three, five, and six items from a pile. The older children counted the items, showing a clear understanding of the cardinal word principle. The younger children succeeded only at giving one and sometimes two items, and never used counting to solve the task. A comparison of individual children's performance across the "how-many" and "give-a-number" tasks shows strong within-child consistency, indicating that children learn the cardinal word principle at roughly 3 1/2 years of age. In the third experiment, 18 2- and 3-year-olds were asked several times for one, two, three, five, and six items, to determine the largest numerosity at which each child could succeed consistently. Results indicate that children learn the meanings of smaller number words before larger ones within their counting range, up to the number three or four. They then learn the cardinal word principle at roughly 3 1/2 years of age, and perform a general induction over this knowledge to acquire the meanings of all the number words within their counting range.     

Children's understanding of inferential knowledge

The understanding of inference as a source of knowledge for 4- and 6-year-old children was investigated. Children and a puppet were shown 2 toys of different colors. The toys were hidden in separate plastic cans. After the puppet looked into 1 of the cans, 6-year-olds, but not 4-year-olds, usually judged that the puppet knew the color of the toy in the other can as well. The finding that 6-year-olds attributed inferential knowledge to another observer is interpreted as evidence that children begin to understand the role of cognitive processes in knowledge acquisition around the age of 6 years.     

Children's understanding of posterior probability

Do young children have a basic intuition of posterior probability? Do they update their decisions and judgments in the light of new evidence? We hypothesized that they can do so extensionally, by considering and counting the various ways in which an event may or may not occur. The results reported in this paper showed that from the age of five, children's decisions under uncertainty (Study 1) and judgments about random outcomes (Study 2) are correctly affected by posterior information. From the same age, children correctly revise their decisions in situations in which they face a single, uncertain event, produced by an intentional agent (Study 3). The finding that young children have some understanding of posterior probability supports the theory of naive extensional reasoning, and contravenes some pessimistic views of probabilistic reasoning, in particular the evolutionary claim that the human mind cannot deal with single-case probability.     

Children's understanding of habitual behaviour

Research into the development of Theory of Mind (ToM) has shown how children from a very early age infer other people's goals. However, human behaviour is sometimes driven not by plans to achieve goals, but by habits, which are formed over long periods of reinforcement. Habitual and goal‐directed behaviours are often aligned with one another but can diverge when the optimal behavioural policy changes without being directly reinforced (thus specifically hobbling the habitual learning strategy). Unlike the flexibility of goal‐directed behaviour, rigid habits can cause agents to persist in behaviour that is no longer adaptive. In the current study, all children predict agents will tend to behave consistently with their goals, but between the ages of 5 and 10, children showed an increasing understanding of how habits can cause agents to persistently take suboptimal actions. These findings stand out from the typical way the development of social reasoning is examined, which instead focuses on children's increasing appreciation of how others' beliefs or expectations affect how they will act in service of their goals. The current findings show that children also learn that under certain circumstances, people's actions are suboptimal despite potentially ‘knowing better.’     

Children's understanding of drivers' intentions

To become more skilled as pedestrians, children need to acquire a view of the traffic environment as one in which road users are active agents with different intentions and objectives. This paper describes a simulation study designed to explore children's understanding of drivers' intentions. It also investigated the effect of training children's sensitivity, through peer discussion and adult guidance, to the cues by which drivers signal their intentions. Results confirmed that children's ability to accurately predict drivers' intentions improves with age and that sensitizing children through training to the options for action available to drivers when signalling a manoeuvre improves their accuracy in predicting drivers' intentions. Training was also found to shift children's focus from contextual infrastructural features of the traffic environment (e.g. traffic signals, stop signs) by which to judge drivers' likely intentions to the explicit cues that drivers use to signal their imminent actions (e.g. slowing down, moving into the kerb). Training on the simulation was also shown to transfer to practical decision making at the roadside.     

Children's understanding of ownership transfers

An understanding of ownership entails the recognition that ownership can be transferred permanently and the ability to differentiate legitimate from illegitimate transfers. Two experiments explored the development of this understanding in 2-, 3-, 4- and 5-year olds, using stories about gift-giving and stealing. The possibility that children use simple biases to identify owners, such as a first possessor, current possessor or a loan bias, was also investigated. Five-year olds appropriately acknowledged a permanent transfer of ownership in the case of giving but not stealing. Four-year olds allowed permanent transfers but struggled to differentiate legitimate from illegitimate transfers. Many 4-year olds allowed adults, but not children, to keep property that had been stolen. Two- and 3-year olds exhibited a first possessor bias for both stories. We conclude that, by 5 years of age, children possess a mature understanding of ownership transfer whereas younger children are prone to biases.     

Children's profiles of addition and subtraction understanding

The current research explored children's ability to recognize and explain different concepts both with and without reference to physical objects so as to provide insight into the development of children's addition and subtraction understanding. In Study 1, 72 7- to 9-year-olds judged and explained a puppet's activities involving three conceptual relations: (a) a+b=c, b+a=c; (b) a-b=c, a-c=b; and (c) a+b=c, c-b=a. In Study 2, the self-reports and problem-solving accuracy of 60 5- to 7-year-olds were recorded for three-term inverse problems (i.e., a+b-b=?), pairs of complementary addition and subtraction problems (i.e., a+b=c, c-b=?), and unrelated addition and subtraction problems (e.g., 3-2). Both studies highlighted individual differences in the concepts that children understand and the role of concrete referents in their understanding. These differences were related to using efficient procedures to solve unrelated addition and subtraction problems in Study 2. The results suggest that a key advance in children's conceptual understanding is incorporating subtractive relations into their mental representations of how parts are added to form a whole.     

Children's developmental understanding of ethnicity and race

Research on children's development of ethnic cognition from preschool through adolescence was reviewed. This review was based on research conducted on (a) children's ethnic cognition, (b) children's social-cognitive development, (c) children's understanding of a variety of social status, and (d) Quintana's model of children's understanding of ethnicity. Four developmental levels were described: Integration of affective and perceptual understanding of ethnicity (level 0), literal understanding of ethnicity (level 1), social and nonliteral perspective of ethnicity (level 2), and ethnic-group consciousness and ethnic identity (level 3). For each developmental level, applied implications were discussed.     

Children's understanding and experience of mixed emotions

Though some models of emotion contend that happiness and sadness are mutually exclusive in experience, recent findings suggest that adults can feel happy and sad at the same time in emotionally complex situations. Other research has shown that children develop a better conceptual understanding of mixed emotions as they grow older, but no research has examined children's actual experience of mixed emotions. To examine developmental differences in the experience of mixed emotions, we showed children ages 5 to 12 scenes from an animated film that culminated with a father and daughter's bittersweet farewell. In subsequent interviews, older children were more likely than younger children to report experiencing mixed emotions. These results suggest that in addition to having a better conceptual understanding of mixed emotions, older children are more likely than younger children to actually experience mixed emotions in emotionally complex situations.     

Children's understanding of anticipatory regret and disappointment

The anticipation of regret and disappointment plays an important role in decision making by adults. The anticipation of regret may also lead to a desire to avoid feedback about likely outcomes of non-chosen courses of action, while the anticipation of disappointment is associated with avoidance of risk-taking and the deliberate dampening of expectations. The present study used the context of a simple game to examine children's understanding of these anticipatory regret and disappointment emotion-regulation strategies. It was found that even though children 7/8 years of age were able to understand the situational factors that produce disappointment and regret, it was not until 9/10 years of age that children exhibited an understanding of anticipatory regret emotion-regulation strategies, and even at this age children did not exhibit an understanding of the use of dampening of expectations as a strategy for coping with the anticipation of disappointment.     

Children's developmental understanding of ethnicity and race

Research on children's development of ethnic cognition from preschool through adolescence was reviewed. This review was based on research conducted on (a) children's ethnic cognition, (b) children's social-cognitive development, (c) children's understanding of a variety of social status, and (d) Quintana's model of children's understanding of ethnicity. Four developmental levels were described: Integration of affective and perceptual understanding of ethnicity (level 0), literal understanding of ethnicity (level 1), social and nonliteral perspective of ethnicity (level 2), and ethnic-group consciousness and ethnic identity (level 3). For each developmental level, applied implications were discussed.