MORTALITY,INTEGRITY, AND PSYCHOANALYSIS (WHO ARE YOU TO ME? WHO AM I TO YOU?)

The author narrates her experience of mourning her therapist's sudden death. The profession has neglected implications of the analyst's mortality: what is lost or vulnerable to loss? What is that vulnerability's function? The author's process of mourning included her writing and her becoming an analyst. Both pursuits inspired reflections on mortality in two overlapping senses: bodily (the analyst is mortal and can die) and character (the analyst is mortal and can err). The subject thus expands to include impaired character and ethical violations. Paradoxically, the analyst's human limitations threaten each psychoanalytic situation, but also enable it: human imperfection animates the work. The essay ends with a specific example of integrity.     

THE VALUE OF UNCERTAINTY

The author discusses some of the characteristics of Roy Schafer's contributions to psychoanalysis that he finds most valuable, such as his openness to uncertainty, his anti‐reductive view of analytic constructions, his unique formulation of the analyst's role, and his close attention to how the patient engenders particular emotional reactions in the analyst. The author also presents a clinical vignette illustrating the value of the analyst's tolerance of uncertainty in the face of the patient's push for interpretations, explanations, and reassurance.     

Shades of Mark Twain: Commentary on Paper by Steven H. Cooper

The author considers Cooper's notion of the pluralistic third from several angles as Cooper's use of the term covers a range of applications from that of an internal supervisor to the use of ideas from psychoanalytic traditions other than one's own in evaluating one's clinical work. The impression created of the American situation is contrasted with the institutionalized pluralism of the British Psychoanalytical Society since the Second World War. The author believes that the theoretical question of the analyst's accountability to a professional authority is overdetermined in the paper because the clinical material is dominated by the patient's problems in facing up to parental authority. A crucial enactment is seen as starting at the analyst's first contact with the patient, which seems to subvert the analyst's capacity to be an authority figure. The analyst finds a working relationship with his own psychoanalytic authority in the second session of the analysis but seems to lose it through an overextension of the ideas of “play,” self-questioning, and the seeking of agreement between patient and analyst. The author considers the clinical material from the point of view that his peer supervision group would take.     

A disturbance of interpreting,of symbolisation and of curiosity in the analyst‐analysand relationship: (The patient without insight)1

The author examines the function of the analyst who may distort the unconscious communication with the patient by means of the expression of his countertransference. He studies a disturbance in curiosity and in symbolisation in a patient with a narcissistic pathology. Both problems were related to this failure in interpreting. The curiosity of the patient, which initially seemed to be non‐existent, was found to be directed towards investigating the mind of the analyst, this being his sole purpose. The disturbance in symbolisation was manifested as a constant verbal acting out, which was expressed as verbal communication empty of meaning. A change in the interpretative attitude enabled a modifi cation in the objective of the curiosity, which became focused on investigating his own inner world, and the emptiness of the verbal communication was replaced by representations. This change in communication allowed the analyst to relate the facts of the psychoanalytic relationship both with the patient's phantasy and with the events in his history. An idealised identifi cation with destructive aspects of the mother towards the father was discovered. This idealisation had been sustained by the analyst by means of his errors in interpreting. The author explores disturbances in symbol formation and in the use of symbols, and he considers the different states of emptiness.     

“You Must Remember This”

The question of a theory of analytic change is approached through a consideration of analytic impasse. Impasse is considered in relation to impasse in the analyst, linked to an impasse in some forms of mourning in the analyst. The analyst's impasse is considered in the light of character formation, the relation of analytic vocations to early attachment, and object ties in the analyst leading to problems with omnipotence. Impasse then is tied to various processes and defenses that shape and contribute to the analyst's countertransference. Analytic change is considered then in the context of theories of nonlinear development, models of speech practice, and mutative action. These ideas are explored through case material.     

The intersubjective links in perversion1

The author studies the intersubjective links which the pervert maintains with analyst or partner, attempting to indicate the differences between the investments in each case. Rather than accepting that empathy towards these patients is impossible to achieve and disturbs the countertransference profoundly, it attempts to show that these difficulties may be overcome if they are reinterpreted in the light of the theory of the intersubjective link. The author examines the theories and the practice of intersubjectivity and gives a definition of his approach to the link between two subjects. He applies these ideas to the case of a sexually masochistic female patient. The countertransference is marked successively by indifference, rejection and smothering. The analysis of the analyst's dream allows the situation to evolve. Failures in primary identification can result in domination over others and utilitarianism. The author examines the place of the challenge to the ‘Law’ and the father (in the attempt by the patient to put a theory to the test) in order to identify the figure of the witness in the pervert's intersubjective links. The desire of the transference would be marked by the figure of the witness rather than by that of the analyst as accomplice.     

Commentary on Paper by Hilary Hoge

In this discussion the author raises the question of the analyst's freedom to sustain paradoxical viewpoints, specifically with regard to dream interpretation and related links to internal objects and the self as they appear in the transference. Paradox allows for the creation of multiple, coexisting meanings that can be played with by patient and analyst. Paradox also makes possible an experience of decentering and destabilization pursuant to Bion's catastrophic change. The risk inherent in the emotional experience of catastrophic change may limit and at times foreclose both patient's and analyst's freedom to tolerate and sustain the effects of paradox.     

From “disciplined subjectivity” to “taming wild thoughts”: Bion's elaboration of the analysing instrument

Abstract

Freud encouraged the analyst to use his unconscious “as an instrument of the analysis,” but did not elaborate on how this should be done. This recommendation opened the door to a consideration of unconscious communication between the analyst and patient as an intersubjective exchange. Both Wilfred Bion and Erik Erikson emphasised the importance of the analyst's intuition, and the author compares and contrasts these two approaches. Erikson advocated a more cautious attitude regarding the analyst's subjectivity, while Bion promoted a broader application of the analyst's various private reactions to the analysand. A brief vignette from the analysis of a five-year-old boy is offered to illustrate the importance of the analyst's reveries, the mutual process of containment and transformation between analyst and patient, and the co-creation of an analytic narrative.     

The analyst's countertransference to the psychoanalytic process1

There is countertransference, not just to individual patients, but to the process of psychoanalysis itself. The analytic process is a contentious topic. Disagreements about its nature can arise from taking it as a unitary concept that should have a single defi nition whereas, in fact, there are several strands to its meaning. The need for the analyst's free associative listening, as a counterpart to the patient's free associations, implies resistance to the analytic process in the analyst as well as the patient. The author gives examples of the self‐analysis that this necessitates. The most important happenings in both the analyst's and the patient's internal worlds lie at the boundary between conscious and unconscious, and the nature of an analyst's interventions depends on how fully what happens at that boundary is articulated in the analyst's consciousness. The therapeutic quality of an analyst's engagement with a patient depends on the freeing and enlivening quality, for the analyst, of the analyst's engagement with his or her countertransference to the analytic process.     

The mental pain of the psychoanalyst: A personal view

Abstract

Mental pain is a common concern of psychoanalysts in their professional life. Combining her clinical experience with previous contributions by others, the author presents a personal overview of the patient-triggered mental pain of the analyst. Countertransference is considered to be the major source of the analyst's work-derived mental pain. This type of mental pain is not to be avoided or discarded by the analyst. Rather, the analyst will benefit from tolerating and even welcoming professional mental pain: in most cases, mental pain will bring with it rich clinical material that, upon interpretation, will help him or her to offer previously intolerable contents back to the patient in a transformed version that now becomes acceptable. The analyst's mental pain may emerge in his dreams; clinical examples of this phenomenon are presented. It is suggested that there is an increased chance of the analyst undergoing mental pain when treating patients suffering from severe psychopathology, and a clinical case is reported to illustrate this assertion. The author proposes that a lifelong effort is to be expected from analysts in terms of enhancing their threshold of tolerance to professional mental pain. In situations of mental pain, analysts must be particularly aware of the need to modulate their interpretations before transmitting them to the patient. The capacity of analysts to transform their mental pain (Ta, according to Bion) will depend on the plasticity of their container functions, the quality of their transformation abilities and, in particular, their threshold of tolerance to mental pain.     

On shame,countertransference, and analytic style

Some analysands experience a restricted space in the analytic situation with special counter-transferential consequences. The author discusses how shame is involved in these situations, and projected on to the analyst. This leads to an important choice of direction for the analyst regarding counter-transference acting out or conditions for a real analytic situation. Shame plays a special rôle in these choices of direction. The author illustrates the problem with a clinical vignette and shows how integration of shame is accomplished clinically, and continues with a discussion of the connections between the analyst's analytic style, his own communicative style as a defense against shame and the analytic styles of different analytic “schools”. A discussion of Liberman's concept, of “asymmetrical dialogue” and its connection with countertransference acting out and analytic styles, forms a conclusion to the paper.     

Creating an Intersubjective Reality: Commentary on Paper by Arnold Rothstein

The author discusses Arnold Rothstein's paper “Compromise Formation Theory: An Intersubjective Dimension” and challenges his definition of intersubjectivity. She offers a perspective in which the import of intersubjectivity theory is less to dissolve the notion of objectivity than to grasp processes of mutual engagement, regulation, and recognition. While it is true that the recognition that the analyst is also a subject and therefore does not have exclusive knowledge is an important shift in the psychoanalytic paradigm, the author suggests that the intersubjective is far more encompassing than this. Intersubjective theory emphasizes the active creation of consensus or conflict about reality rather than merely the recognition that the analyst's perspective on reality is subjective. This cocreation produces a different emotional experience of connection, not merely a change in the quality of insight. Finally, Rothstein's case illustrates how he responds to the need for recognition and regulation. He shows us how focusing on the procedural allowed him to make an intersubjective shift, not simply an intrapsychic interpretation of compromise formation.     

State of the Hope: The New Bad Object in the Therapeutic Action of Psychoanalysis

Until recently, most psychoanalytic conceptualizations of the analyst as a new object have tended to equate newness with good experience and safety. Recent papers in the relational literature have explored not only the therapeutic value, but also the inevitability of the patient's experience of the analyst as bad, as well as the analyst's participation in this experience. This author examines the multifarious nature of hope, goodness, and badness in the clinical situation. The patient gets to know not only elements of his or her own self that are held by the analyst, but also ways in which the patient holds elements related to the particulars of the analyst's person in the analytic situation. Shifts in American psychoanalysis regarding conceptualizations of the analyst as a new object are examined. Limitations of a bifurcated approach to goodness and badness in clinical conceptualizations are also explored.     

A PREOCCUPATION WITH OBJECT-REPRESENTATION: THE BECKETT-BION CASE REVISITED

Taking issue with the notion of a profound reciprocal influence of Samuel Beckett and his analyst, Wilfred Bion, based on supposition all too often passed as fact, the author refutes the idea that Bion's ‘Attacks on linking’ was based on his later‐to‐be famous patient. Choosing, rather, to apply Bion's concepts of transformation and assaults on verbal thought to Beckett's remarkably visual and highly dissociative writing, she finds in the analyst's work a means of exploring a startling preoccupation with object representation and an anxiety of remembrance constant throughout the writer's texts. Is this fixation attributable only to aesthetic strategy or does it say something about the writer's own inner representational world? Relating the writer's obsession to Bion's concepts and, moreover, its dissociative expression to the decathexis and blank mourning explored by Green, she uncovers within it a reflection of the kind of evocative memory disturbance identified with primary dyadic dysfunction. This application of Bion and Green to Beckett veers distinctly less towards psychohistory, however, than to how sublimation has rendered this object‐relational failure an aesthetic success.     

A psychoanalytical phenomenology of perversion1

After stating that the current tasks of psychoanalytic research should fundamentally include the exploration of the analyst's mental processes in sessions with the patient, the author describes the analytical relation as one having an intersubjective nature. Seen from the outside, the analytical relation evidences two poles: a symmetric structural pole where both analyst and patient share a single world and a single approach to reality, and a functional asymmetric pole that defines the assignment of the respective roles. In the analysis of a perverse patient, the symmetry‐asymmetry polarities acquire some very particular characteristics. Seen from the perspective of the analyst's subjectivity, perversion appears in the analyst's mind as a surreptitious and unexpected transgression of the basic agreement that facilitates and structures intersubjective encounters. It may go as far as altering the Aristotelian rules of logic. When coming into contact with the psychic reality of a perverse patient, what happens in the analyst's mind is that a world takes shape. This world is misleadingly coloured by an erotisation that sooner or later will acquire some characteristics of violence. The perverse nucleus, as a false reality, remains dangling in mid‐air as an experience that is inaccessible to the analyst's empathy. The only way the analyst can reach it is from the ‘periphery’ of the patient's psychic reality, by trying in an indirect way to lead him back to his intersubjective roots. At this point, the author's intention is to explain this intersubjective phenomenon in terms of metapsychological and empirical research‐based theories. Finally, some ideas on the psychogenesis of perversion are set forth.     

The Analyst's Necessary Vertigo

The euphemistic phrase “the difficult to reach patient” often refers to work with patients who have serious difficulties relating. The author examines the basic construct of “reach,” its pitfalls, and potentials. In the author's view, often we are talking about patients who do not fully experience their own subjective existence or the existence of others. This requires unusual efforts to “reach” the patient in order for the patient to consolidate a sense of self and other, creating the possibility of reflective relating. In contrast to views that see such psychoanalytic “reach” as associated primarily with the analyst's needs or pathology, the author views the analyst's extraordinary efforts as responsive to the patient's need to move the analyst into the foundations of the analyst's own being.     

Field of Vision: Radical Uncertainty and the Analyst's Conduct: Commentary on Paper by Donnel B. Stern

There is a relationship between biography and theory. The analyst's ideas or formulations about his patients—theories really—must be determined, to some degree, by the certain and uncertain impact of his own history. Harry Stack Sullivan brought psychoanalysis squarely into the ambit of the relational/historical world by insisting that the mind is thoroughly and inherently social. In doing so, he staked a claim for the link between history, that is, social experience, and personhood. Our personalities and our theories are social-historical constructions. In relation to this, some differences between the interpersonal/relational and Bionian concepts of field theory are provided. One important difference pertains to the role of the analyst's conduct. Two meanings of conduct—to behave or to organize behavior—are at the center of what distinguishes the interpersonal/relational view of the analyst's position in the field from the Bionian view. For the relational analyst, action in the analytic field, including enactment, is conduct, and conduct is always bidirectional. The analyst, then, is a medium to alter, to reconstruct the self. He does not provide experience, he is experience. The form of an analytic exchange gives shape to the field and its content.     

From acting to communicating: The analysis of a boy with a pathological organization1

The author presents the analysis of an 8 year‐old boy prematurely born after a high‐risk pregnancy, then hospitalized for two weeks. He was never breastfed and presented vomiting, intense activity and inadequate behaviour as symptoms. His highly dysfunctional family is composed of a non‐productive father and a homely, though aggressive, mother. The patient displayed a rigid defensive structure with perverse aspects and a cruel superego. His constant interest in magical characters frequently disguises an avoidance of reality. By means of transference interpretations, a trustworthy link with the analyst now allows him his own mental space, where hidden psychotic states come to light. In the clinical material, this boy's skills for insight mingle with oscillations from severely defensive states to integration and vice versa. The analytic relationship in this often hostile scenario has become strong. The analysis is hampered by constant demands from family and school‐both expect the analyst to prevent his frequent acting out. Whereas some perverse polymorphism is part of childhood and may persist throughout life, it is likely that the patient's pathological organization may yield to reality and facilitate reparation, relinquishing the world of make‐believe as well as the intense projective mental functioning.     

The body of the analyst and the analytic setting: Reflections on the embodied setting and the symbiotic transference

In this paper the author questions whether the body of the analyst may be helpfully conceptualized as an embodied feature of the setting and suggests that this may be especially helpful for understanding patients who develop a symbiotic transference and for whom any variance in the analyst's body is felt to be profoundly destabilizing. In such cases the patient needs to relate to the body of the analyst concretely and exclusively as a setting ‘constant’ and its meaning for the patient may thus remain inaccessible to analysis for a long time. When the separateness of the body of the analyst reaches the patient's awareness because of changes in the analyst's appearance or bodily state, it then mobilizes primitive anxieties in the patient. It is only when the body of the analyst can become a dynamic variable between them (i.e. part of the process) that it can be used by the patient to further the exploration of their own mind.