Representation of Game Algebras

We prove that every abstractly defined game algebra can be represented as an algebra of consistent pairs of monotone outcome relations over a game board. As a corollary we obtain Goranko's result that van Benthem's conjectured axiomatization for equivalent game terms is indeed complete.     

刻板印象激活的行为效应

刻板印象激活的行为效应是指刻板印象激活后个体所产生的行为变化。本文介绍了西方关于刻板印象激活的行为效应的两种主要机制,即刻板印象威胁理论和观念运动理论,并对两种理论进行了分析和比较。     

自发社会比较中的威胁效应及自我平衡策略

个体通常利用社会比较进行自我评价, 而比较对象的选择及其对个体自我的影响是一个内隐的过程, 研究基于选择通达理论, 通过三个实验考察了个体自发比较时威胁效应的来源及其消解, 结果表明：(1)威胁效应来源于自主条件下比较对象的选择。个体在比较后的自我评价过程中激活了周围优秀人物的信息, 比较后自我评价水平降低, 引发社会比较的威胁; (2)中国文化背景下的个体在比较后存在威胁“泛化”现象, 不论操作任务是否与自我相关, 均会出现社会比较的威胁效应; (3)与周围优秀人物进行比较所导致的威胁效应, 可以通过自我肯定策略得以缓解, 使个体的整体自我系统重新恢复平衡。     

个体的政治倾向及其变化机制

政治倾向是个体在意识形态上的定位, 可以分为自由主义和保守主义, 政治倾向使个体在认知和行为等方面存在显著差异。虽然个体的政治倾向相对稳定, 但也会受威胁的影响而变化。动机性社会认知理论认为威胁使所有人都变得更加保守, 恐惧管理理论认为威胁使个体更坚信自己原有的文化世界观, 使原有政治倾向更加明显。本文在深入分析讨论的基础上, 指出两种理论分歧的原因在于忽略了外部威胁与内部威胁的不同。内部威胁可加强人们原有的政治倾向, 外部威胁可使人们更趋向保守。未来研究应在内外部威胁影响政治倾向变化的机制、政治倾向的本土化研究以及促进不同政治倾向个体间的和谐关系上做出努力。     

Dostoevsky’s enigmas: An analysis of violent men

For the calculating male adult criminal, violent acts would appear largely counterproductive. Scholarly disagreements about these behaviors are substantial, although recent ethnographic reports emphasize the subjective sense of the experience. These reports have an existential aspect, focusing on the meaning of violent, anarchic acts to the identities of perpetrators. The earliest and best known existentialist writer on criminality is Fyodor Dostoevsky whose violent characters Smerdiakov, Svidrigailov, and Stavrogin, are enigmas to their fictional counterparts, much as violent American contemporaries are to authorities and the general public. Dostoevsky’s three enigmatic characters are reckless publicity seekers; like aliens in their own land, they habitually deceive, intimidate, and exploit while still considering themselves to be decent individuals. These depictions are congruent with Yochelson and Samenow’s much more recent forensic observations and reinforce an antisocial prototype. Bogg (1994) offers a behavioral communality for this class of violent men: patterns of self-aggrandizing gaming developed in childhood. The game player derives extraordinary pleasure from victories, although this orientation effectively counters socialization. From Dostoevsky’s views an existential nihilistic construct can be derived. This construct depicts the persona of an inveterate violent game player and is consistent with Durkheimian theory and with ethnographic and forensic/clinical observations. The prevention of a gaming orientation is feasible but appears to require parental skills and community resources.     

A one-person doxastic characterization of Nash strategies

Within a formal epistemic model for simultaneous-move games, we present the following conditions: (1) belief in the opponents’ rationality (BOR), stating that a player believes that every opponent chooses an optimal strategy, (2) self-referential beliefs (SRB), stating that a player believes that his opponents hold correct beliefs about his own beliefs, (3) projective beliefs (PB), stating that i believes that j’s belief about k’s choice is the same as i’s belief about k’s choice, and (4) conditionally independent beliefs (CIB), stating that a player believes that opponents’ types choose their strategies independently. We show that, if a player satisfies BOR, SRB and CIB, and believes that every opponent satisfies BOR, SRB, PB and CIB, then he will choose a Nash strategy (that is, a strategy that is optimal in some Nash equilibrium). We thus provide a sufficient collection of one-person conditions for Nash strategy choice. We also show that none of these seven conditions can be dropped.     

Cooperation in repeated interactions: A systematic review of Centipede game experiments, 1992–2016

Cooperation is a fundamental form of social interaction, and turn-taking reciprocity one of its most familiar manifestations. The Centipede game provides a formal model of such alternating reciprocal cooperation, but a backward induction (BI) argument appears to prove logically that instrumentally rational players would never cooperate in this way. A systematic review of experimental research reveals that human decision makers cooperate frequently in this game, except under certain extreme conditions. Several game, situational, and individual difference variables have been investigated for their influence on cooperation. The most influential are aspects of the payoff function (especially the social gain from cooperation and the risk associated with a cooperative move), the number of players, repetitions of the game, group vs. individual decisions, and players’ social value orientations (SVOs). Our review of experimental evidence suggests that other-regarding preferences, including prosocial behavioural dispositions and collective rationality, provide the most powerful explanation for cooperation.     

刻板印象威胁：新议题与新争议

刻板印象威胁是指当个体或群体感知到情境中有关所属群体消极刻板印象存在时, 由于担心和焦虑反而会验证自己或所属群体的消极刻板印象这一过程。大量的实证研究证实, 消极刻板印象的存在会损害个体或群体在相关领域的表现。但新近研究在影响因素中出现了许多新的议题, 如外溢效应、交互作用力和系统性等。在刻板印象威胁的应对和干预策略中也突破了以往的研究路线, 围绕认同融合与认同分离、否定策略的适用性、促进效应与窒息效应、角色榜样策略的矛盾性、认同转换策略和弱化群体边界的有效性以及群体互动改善效果等展开了新的讨论与纷争。通过对这些新议题和新讨论的梳理与阐释, 提出了未来研究可尝试的路径。     

Interspecific aggression among female ungulates

Interspecific aggression among captive female ungulates was investigated. Asymmetries in fighting abilities proved to be good predictors of relative levels of aggression between different pairs of species. The resource under dispute also influenced the nature of aggressive encounters. The results of this study were discussed in the light of game theory.     

The Consequences of Terrorism: Disentangling the Effects of Personal and National Threat

The events of 11 September 2001 have led to a higher perceived risk of terrorism in the United States. A better understanding of the political consequences of 9/11 requires a more complete accounting of the nature and consequences of perceived threat. Here, the distinction between perceived personal and national risks is examined in terms of two competing hypotheses: (1) The personal threat of terrorism has a pervasive influence even on national decisions and perceptions, in line with its highly arousing nature. (2) The effects of personal threat are highly circumscribed and overshadowed by the impact of perceived national threat, consistent with findings on the meager impact of self–interest and other personal concerns on public opinion. A survey of 1,221 residents of Long Island and Queens, New York, explored the degree to which personal and national threat affect perceptions of the consequences of, and possible solutions to, terrorism. As expected, there was a clear distinction between perceived personal and national threat, although the two are related. Perceived personal threat did not influence the perceived economic consequences of terrorism, although it had a narrow effect on personal behaviors designed to minimize risk. Overall, the findings imply that the effects of personal threat are circumscribed, consistent with past research on the limited personal basis of political judgments. However, the tests of these hypotheses were constrained by a limited set of dependent variables that included national consequences but not policy solutions designed to limit terrorism.     

不同群际威胁类型对集体自尊的影响:愤怒和自卑的中介作用

现有研究中有关群际威胁对集体自尊是增强作用还是削弱作用存在矛盾结论,可能是不同研究采用了不同类型的群际威胁,且情绪在群际威胁和集体自尊二者之间可能存在某种作用所导致的。本研究通过情景启动的实验发现,现实群际威胁唤起了更高水平的愤怒情绪,愤怒情绪越多,被试的集体自尊越高。而象征群际威胁唤起了更高水平的自卑情绪,自卑情绪越多,被试的集体自尊越低。总之,群际威胁类型的不同对集体自尊产生不同的影响,情绪在其中起中介作用。