The threshold model of scientific change and the continuity of scientific knowledge

The continuity thesis of the Pozna school threshold model of the growth of scientific knowledge is considered in the light of the example of Van der Waals' and Boyle-Mariotte's laws. It is argued — using both traditional logical means and the structuralist reconstruction of the example — that the continuity thesis does not hold.A distinction between a historical and a systematic point of view is introduced and it is argued that the continuity thesis of the threshold model presupposes the systematic point of view. However, looking at matters from the systematic point of view need not yield the original theory, looked at from the historical point of view. Applied to the case of Van der Waals/Boyle-Mariotte laws, it turns out that the latter law is not a true idealizing special case of the former, contrary to the continuity thesis.     

Durkheim's sociology of scientific knowledge

Durkheim's thinking on scientific knowledge reveals several contradictions, resulting from the relativist implications of his substantive theory of culture and the positivist assumptions of his metatheoretical definition of scientific methods in sociology. In his explanations of historical and cross-cultural differences in „truthful”︁ representations of reality, Durkheim suggests that logical and conceptual structures of knowledge are determined by social morphology, and that the validity of any truth-claim is limited to cultural contexts in which designated criteria of validation are normatively maintained. However, in epistemological works such as The Rules, Durkheim suggests that social factors are of little importance in constructing scientific knowledge, and that truths of science mirror external reality and so their validity transcends cultural boundaries.     

Epistemic dependence and collective scientific knowledge

I argue that scientific knowledge is collective knowledge, in a sense to be specified and defended. I first consider some existing proposals for construing collective knowledge and argue that they are unsatisfactory, at least for scientific knowledge as we encounter it in actual scientific practice. Then I introduce an alternative conception of collective knowledge, on which knowledge is collective if there is a strong form of mutual epistemic dependence among scientists, which makes it so that satisfaction of the justification condition on knowledge ineliminably requires a collective. Next, I show how features of contemporary science support the conclusion that scientific knowledge is collective knowledge in this sense. Finally, I consider implications of my proposal and defend it against objections.     

Local knowledge and comparative scientific traditions

This article argues that all knowledge is inherently local and that localness provides the basis for comparison between indigenous scientific traditions or knowledge production systems. As collective bodies of knowledge, many of the significant differences between knowledge production systems lie in the work involved in creating assemblages from differing practices. Much of the work can be seen in the social strategies and technical devices employed in creating equivalences and connections whereby otherwise heterogeneous and isolated knowledges are enabled to move in space and time from the local site and moment of their production and application to other places and times. In this way contemporary technosciences are compared with the knowledge systems of the medieval mastermasons, the Anasazi, the Inca, the Australian Aborigines and the Pacific navigators.     

The development of attribute dominance in the knowledge base

Two cuing, free-recall studies were conducted to test Bach and Underwood's (1970) hypothesis that acoustic encoding is dominant among second graders and semantic encoding is dominant among sixth graders. When retrieval cues were presented with to-be-remembered items at both input and output (Experiment 1), and when cues were presented only at output (Experiment 2), semantic cues were more efficient in elevating recall than were acoustic cues for both second and sixth graders. When these and other results generally found using recognition, sorting, incidental learning, and free-recall experimental designs are compared, it seems plausible that item presentation and memory-testing formats interact with age, and that these factors account for the different patterns of attribute dominance found in the literature. The knowledge base cannot be understood by focusing on either subject or task analyses, but only by focusing on interactions between subject and task variables as they change over time. The educational implications for young grade-school children are discussed.     

科学知识社会学相对主义知识观批判

“The Strong Programme” is put forward as a metaphysical theory of sociology by the Edinburgh School (SSK) to study the social causes of knowledge. Barry Barnes and David Bloor are the proponents of the School. They call their programme “the Relativist View of Knowledge” and argue against rationalism in the philosophy of science. Does their relativist account of knowledge present a serious challenge to rationalism, which has dominated 20th century philosophy of science? I attempt to answer this question by criticizing the main ideas of SSK and defending rationalism theories in modern philosophy of science.     

Conventionalism,scientific discovery and the sociology of knowledge*

In this paper the basic aim of the so‐called ‘strong programme’ in the sociology of knowledge is examined. The ‘strong programme’ is considered (and rightly so) as an extreme version of the anti‐realist view of science. While the problem of scientific realism has normally been dealt with from the point of view of the ‘context of justification’ of theories, the paper focuses on the issues raised by law‐discovery. In this context Herbert Simon's views about the existence of a ‘logic of scientific discovery’ are discussed and criticized. The main thesis of the paper is that if the structure of both discovery and prediction is properly understood, then the basic anti‐realist claims become untenable. A fortiori, the ‘strong programme’ appears to be unable to explain some basic features of the structure of science.     

Comparison and the development of knowledge

This paper considers the role of comparison in the development of knowledge. Results show that comparing similar objects makes them appear more similar. Comparing dissimilar objects, on the other hand does not make them appear more similar, and in some circumstances may make them appear less similar. The effect of comparison on similar items was especially striking since participants judged items to be more similar after comparison even if the comparison task was to list differences between the two items. Further, this effect appears specific to comparison and does not appear to be simply due to a "fleshing out" of object representations (listing properties of two objects without comparing the objects themselves served to increase the objects' similarity regardless of whether the objects were similar or dissimilar to start). This suggests that comparison may play a special role in partitioning bits of experience into categories, sharpening categorical boundaries, and otherwise helping us create conceptual structure above and beyond that offered by the world.     

On the development of procedural knowledge

Amnesic patients demonstrate by their performance on a serial reaction time task that they learned a repeating spatial sequence despite their lack of awareness of the repetition (Nissen & Bullemer, 1987). In the experiments reported here, we investigated this form of procedural learning in normal subjects. A subgroup of subjects showed substantial procedural learning of the sequence in the absence of explicit declarative knowledge of it. Their ability to generate the sequence was effectively at chance and showed no savings in learning. Additional amounts of training increased both procedural and declarative knowledge of the sequence. Development of knowledge in one system seems not to depend on knowledge in the other. Procedural learning in this situation is neither solely perceptual nor solely motor. The learning shows minimal transfer to a situation employing the same motor sequence.     

The development of ordinal numerical knowledge in infancy

A critical question in cognitive science concerns how numerical knowledge develops. One essential component of an adult concept of number is ordinality: the greater than and less than relationships between numbers. Here it is shown in two experiments that 11-month-old infants successfully discriminated, whereas 9-month-old infants failed to discriminate, sequences of numerosities that descended in numerical value from sequences that increased in numerical value. These results suggest that by 11 months of age infants possess the ability to appreciate the greater than and less than relations between numerical values but that this ability develops between 9 and 11 months of age. In an additional experiment 9-month-old infants succeeded at discriminating the ordinal direction of sequences that varied in the size of a single square rather than in number, suggesting that a capacity for non-numerical ordinal judgments may develop before a capacity for ordinal numerical judgments. These data raise many questions about how infants represent number and what happens between 9 and 11 months to support ordinal numerical judgments.     

Robert Boyle's epistemology: The interaction between scientific and religious knowledge 1

Boyle distinguished clearly between the areas which we would call scientific and theological. However, he felt that they overlapped seamlessly, and that the truths we discovered (or which were revealed to us) in one of these areas would be relevant to us in the other. In this paper I outline and discuss Boyle's views on the limitations of human knowing, Boyle's arguments in favour of accepting the revelations of the Christian faith, and his views on the kind of epistomological standing that scientific knowledge claims have. Given this background I then consider the relation between hypotheses, theories and facts in Boyle's work, and consider a particular case, that of Boyle's Law, as an exemplification of the claims made in the rest of the paper.     

Pluralism, scientific knowledge, and the fallacy of overriding values

The paper examines one implication of pluralism, the view that all values are conditional and none are overriding. This implication is that since scientific knowledge is one of the conditional values, there are circumstances in which the pursuit of even the most basic scientific knowledge is legitimately curtailed. These circumstances occur when the pursuit of scientific knowledge conflicts with moral and political values which, in that context, are more important than it. The argument focuses on the case for and against space exploration in search of intelligent extraterrestrial life. The widely held supposition that search for pure scientific knowledge cannot be reasonably curtailed is identified as the fallacy of overriding values.     

Separation/divorce sexual assault: The current state of social scientific knowledge

Many contend that the logical solution to woman abuse in marriage/cohabitation is for women to exit through legal separation, divorce, or other means. However, a growing body of empirical work shows that separation or divorce does not necessarily solve the problem of woman abuse. For example, in addition to experiencing lethal or nonlethal forms of physical violence and psychological abuse, many women who try to leave, or who have left their male partners, are sexually assaulted. The main objective of this paper is to critically review the extant empirical and theoretical work on separation/divorce sexual assault. Suggestions for future research and theorizing are also provided.     

Adults' representations of the Earth: Implications for children's acquisition of scientific concepts

When children are asked to draw the Earth they often produce intriguing pictures in which, for example, people seem to be standing on a flat disc or inside a hollow sphere. These drawings, and children's answers to questions, have been interpreted as indicating that children construct naïve, theory‐like mental models of the Earth (e.g. Vosniadou & Brewer, 1992 ). However, recent studies using different methods have found little or no evidence of these mental models, and report that many young children have some scientific knowledge of the Earth. To examine the reasons for these contrasting findings, adults (N = 350) were given the drawing task previously given to 5‐year‐old children. Fewer than half of the adults' pictures were scientific, and 15% were identical to children's ‘naïve’ drawings. Up to half of the answers to questions (e.g. ‘Where do people live?’) were non‐scientific. Open‐ended questions and follow‐up interviews revealed that non‐scientific responses were given because adults found the apparently simple task confusing and challenging. Since children very probably find it even more difficult, these findings indicate that children's non‐scientific responses, like adults', often result from methodological problems with the task. These results therefore explain the discrepant findings of previous research, and support the studies which indicate that children do not have naïve mental models of the Earth.     

Extrasensory perception,near-death experiences,and the limits of scientific knowledge

If mental state can influence the external world, or if alternate dimensions of reality are accessible only in certain mental states, then important aspects of the universe are unknowable with current scientific tools. Near-death studies suggest that both those conditions may occur. Thus the exploration of NDE-like phenomena requires a radically new scientific paradigm.