The Markan Community, Myth or Maze? Bauckham's The Gospel for All Christians Revisited

This study is a follow-up to Richard Bauckham's thesis thatthe canonical Gospels were composed for Christians in generaland not for isolated communities. The study focuses on Mark'sGospel and argues that scepticism is warranted against any postulationof a so-called ‘Markan community’ because no linkbetween the Gospel of Mark and a particular community can befirmly established and that even if a Markan community did existit is impossible to identify its situation and location withany degree of certainty.     

'Under Law' in Galatians: A Pauline Theological Abbreviation

This essay explores the meaning of the expression ‘underlaw’ in Galatians (3:23; 4:4, 5, 21; 5:18). It is arguedthat the expression serves as rhetorical shorthand for ‘underthe curse of the law’ (3:10, 13). After a brief discussionof criteria with which to identify the use of rhetorical shorthand,several reasons are offered as to why Paul may have chosen touse ‘under law’ as shorthand for ‘under thecurse of the law’. The bulk of the essay is devoted toa close exegetical study of the five uses of the expressionin Galatians. The essay concludes by responding to a few possibleobjections to this thesis and drawing out some implications.     

Oh {delta}{iota}{alpha with oxia}! How is Romans 4:25 to be Understood?

How are we to understand the difficult expression ‘raisedfor our justification’ (Romans 4:25b)? The clue lies intaking seriously the two + accusatives in Romans 4:23. Therethey express a parallel between the promise of righteousness‘for him (Abraham)’ and the same kind of promise,still valid ‘for us’. This same emphasis shouldbe taken into 4:25, ‘for us ... for us.’ Such areading is not only backed up by the Isaiah 53 echo and thecontents of Romans 5, it also serves to explain the meaningof Romans 4:25b. Abraham was given an opportunity for ‘righteousness-producingfaith’ through a tension between ‘under-realizedreality’ and God's faithfulness (vv.18–22). Throughthe resurrection of Jesus Christ, the same opportunity is nowafforded to ‘us’.     

Luke 2:2: Making Sense of the Date of Jesus' Birth

The suggestion made in this note is that in Luke 2:2 we shouldread ‘Quintilius’ instead of ‘Quirinius’.The evidence is primarily that of Tertullian, and the conclusionis that Luke 2:2 as emended confirms that the evangelist orhis source held that Jesus was born not in AD 6, but in 7 or6 BC, in line with other evidence in Luke himself and in Matthew.Further textual suggestions as to how we could make sense ofthe census are appended.     

Symbols of Wisdom in James 1:17

Although scholars have often recognized that wisdom is the ‘gift’mentioned in Jas. 1:17, they have not given much attention tohow the giving of wisdom answers the problem of persecutionas discussed in the preceding verses. The best solution to thispuzzle is to adopt the understanding of wisdom's role that wefind in 4 Maccabees: wisdom is a sort of direct antidote topersecution. An investigation of the religious background ofthe language of Jas. 1:17 supports this interpretation. Philospeaks of divine wisdom as a shadowless light, in terms verysimilar to James, while the Qumran scrolls evince a fully developedtheology of the priestly oracles (Urim and Thummim) as symbolsof divine wisdom. Not only does the Qumranic profile of theUrim and Thummim answer to the theme of wisdom and to James'spleonastic use of ‘lights’ and ‘perfect’,but the Qumran scrolls also enlist the operation of the urimand thummim as a sort of bulwark or antidote against persecution,similarly to how wisdom functions for James.     

Rawls and Research on Cognitively Impaired Patients: A Reply to Maio

In his paper, “The Relevance of Rawls’ Principle of Justice for Research on Cognitively Impaired Patients” (Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 23 (2002):45–53), Giovanni Maio has developed athought-provoking argument for the permissibility of non-therapeutic research on cognitively impaired patients. Maio argues that his conclusion follows from the acceptance of John Rawls’s principles of justice, specifically, Rawls’s “liberty principle” Maio has misinterpreted Rawls’s “libertyprinciple” – correctly interpreted it does notsupport non-therapeutic research on cognitivelyimpaired patients. Three other ‘Rawlsian’ arguments are suggested by Maio’s discussion –two “self-respect” arguments and a “presumed consent” argument – but none of them are convincing. However, an alternative argument developed from Rawls’s discussion of “justice in health care” in his most recent book, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, may justify certain kinds of non-therapeutic research on some cognitively impaired patients in special circumstances. We should not expect anything more permissive from a liberal theory of justice. This revised version was published online in June 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The Roots of a 'Libertine' Slogan in 1 Corinthians 6:18

Taking as its starting point Jerome Murphy-O’Connor'sthesis that 1 Cor. 6:18b (‘every sin that a person commitsis outside the body’) represents a Corinthian slogan,this essay suggests that a social, cultural, and religious matrixexisted at Corinth from which the Corinthians could easily haveconstructed a slogan similar to that which Murphy-O’Connorenvisages. Available evidence suggests that this slogan wasdeveloped, in part, by the convergence of at least two majortributaries: (a) a non-Christian or Hellenistic-Roman stream(including popular philosophy and incipient Gnosticism), and(b) a Christian or Jesuanic current, flowing most probably fromPaul.     

The Meaning of syriacalaphsyriaclamadhsyriacshin in Theodore of Mopsuestia's Sixteenth Catechetical Lecture and the Silent Recitation of the Eucharistic Prayer

Georg Kretschmar cited Theodore of Mopsuestia, Catechesis 16in support of his thesis that part of the eucharistic prayercould be recited silently by the end of the fourth century.This note points out that the use of the Syriac verb , to ‘desist’or to ‘be silent’, in this text does not supportKretschmar's interpretation.     

On Overrating Oneself. . . and Knowing it

When it comes to evaluating our own abilities and prospects, most (non-depressed) people are subject to a distorting bias. We think that we are better – friendlier, more well-liked, better leaders, and better drivers – than we really are. Once we learn about this bias, we should ratchet down our self-evaluations to correct for it. But we don’t. That leaves us with an uncomfortable tension in our beliefs: we knowingly allow our beliefs to differ from the ones that we think are supported by our evidence. We can mitigate the tension by waffling between two belief states: a reflective state that has been recalibrated to take into account our tendency to overrate ourselves, and a non-reflective state that has not.     

An Apocalyptic and Magical Interpretation of Paul's 'Beast Fight' in Ephesus (1 Corinthians 15:32)

This article argues that Paul's mention of a fight with ‘wildanimals’ during his time in Ephesus (1 Cor. 15:32) shouldbe understood as a reference to the evil spirits, or ‘beasts’,at work in the demon-possessed, sorcerers, and idolaters ofthe city. Two major arguments are given. First, in Jewish apocalypticcircles, o was commonly used in reference to evil spirits andsupernatural monsters. This connects with the magical tendencyof referring to daimones as wild animals, a practice that Paulmay well have encountered in Ephesus. Secondly, the book ofActs remembers Paul's time in Ephesus as characterized by exorcisms,magical rivalries, and conflict with idolatry—an accountthat fits with other historical information. The early receptionof the verse is also discussed, with particular attention beingpaid to the interpretation of Origen.     

Reviews

Book reviewed in this article:
THE NEW JERUSALEM BIBLE, edited by Henry Wansbrough.
AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO: SELECTED WRITINGS, Trans. and ed. by Mary T. Clark.
RATIONALITY AND RELATIVISM. IN SEARCH OF A PHILOSOPHY AND HISTORY OF ANTHROPOLOGY by I.C. Jarvie.
OLD TESTAMENT CRITICISM IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY: ENGLAND AND GERMANY by John Rogerson.
RESURRECTION: NEW TESTAMENT WITNESS AND CONTEMPORARY REFLECTION by Pheme Perkins. Geoffrey Chapman
THE INFANCY NARRATIVES. Pp. 145. THE PASSION NARRATIVES. Pp. 192. THE RESURRECTION NARRATIVES. Pp. 150. THE SERMON ON THE MOUNT. Pp 210. Studies in the Synoptic Gospels by Herman Hendrickx. Geoffrey Chapman .
GOD IN FRAGMENTS, by Jacques Pohier, trans. by John Bowden.     

'The Doers of the Law Will Be Justified': The Exegetical Origins of Martin Bucer's Triplex Iustificatio

This essay seeks to sketch the profile of Martin Bucer's viewson the doctrine of justification as developed in his 1536 commentaryon Romans, focusing in particular on his idiosyncratic languageof ‘threefold justification’ in his comments onRom. 2:13. This text is taken as a vantage point from whichto survey the history of interpretation of the Pauline conceptof justification within the Augustinian tradition, giving extendedconsideration to exegesis by Augustine and Thomas Aquinas. Bucer'sinitial discussion of the Pauline usage of o in the praefatato his commentary is examined next, and it is concluded thathis understanding of justification falls more or less withinthe trajectory charted by previous medieval interpreters. Turningthen to Bucer's comments on Rom. 2:13, it is argued that thenotion of ‘threefold justification’ arises as anattempt to integrate the early evangelical appropriation ofthe Scotist language of ‘divine acceptation’ withina traditional Augustinian account of justification as both eventand process. The resulting formula collapses predestinationinto justification, making the latter the unifying concept inBucer's soteriology. It is hoped that this essay will contributeto deepening our understanding of an oft-neglected reformerwhile at the same time broadening our understanding of earlyevangelical teaching on a central doctrinal locus.     

On the Conditional Analysis of Phenomenal Concepts

Zombies make trouble for physicalism. Intuitively, they seem conceivable, and many take this to support their metaphysical possibility – a result that, most agree, would refute physicalism. John Hawthorne (2002) [Philosophical Studies 109, 17–52] and David Braddon-Mitchell (2003) [The Journal of Philosophy 100, 111–135] have developed a novel response to this argument: phenomenal concepts have a conditional structure – they refer to non-physical states if such states exist and otherwise to physical states – and this explains the zombie intuition. I argue that this strategy fails. The considerations Hawthorne and Braddon-Mitchell adduce in support of their analysis in fact do no such thing. Further, their main argument for the analysis is self-defeating: exactly similar reasoning would undermine the view it is meant to establish. Finally, on closer inspection the conditional analysis is incompatible with the zombie intuition. Thus, not only is the analysis incapable of explaining the intuition: the intuition’s plausibility indicates that the analysis is incorrect. I also suggest that the allure of the conditional-analysis strategy may derive from a questionable view about what explaining the intuition would require. An erratum to this article is available at .     

Animal Mind: Science,Philosophy, and Ethics

Although 20^th-century empiricists were agnostic about animal mind and consciousness, this was not the case for their historical ancestors – John Locke, David Hume, Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and, of course, Charles Darwin and George John Romanes. Given the dominance of the Darwinian paradigm of evolutionary continuity, one would not expect belief in animal mind to disappear. That it did demonstrates that standard accounts of how scientific hypotheses are overturned – i.e., by empirical disconfirmation or by exposure of logical flaws – is inadequate. In fact, it can be demonstrated that belief in animal mind disappeared as a result of a change of values, a mechanism also apparent in the Scientific Revolution. The “valuational revolution” responsible for denying animal mind is examined in terms of the rise of Behaviorism and its flawed account of the historical inevitability of denying animal mentation. The effects of the denial of animal consciousness included profound moral implications for the major uses of animals in agriculture and scientific research. The latter is particularly notable for the denial of felt pain in animals. The rise of societal moral concern for animals, however, has driven the “reappropriation of common sense” about animal thought and feeling.