A view of the world through the bat's ear: the formation of acoustic images in echolocation

Echolocating bats perceive objects as acoustic images derived from echoes of the ultrasonic sounds they emit. They can detect, track, identify, and intercept flying insects using sonar. Many species, such as the big brown bat, Eptesicus fuscus, emit frequency-modulated sonar sounds and perceive the distance to targets, or target range, from the delay of echoes. For Eptesicus, a point-target's image has a sharpness along the range axis that is determined by the acuity of echo-delay perception, which is about 10 ns under favorable conditions. The image as a whole has a fine range structure that corresponds to the cross-correlation function between emissions and echoes. A complex target- which has reflecting points, called "glints", located at slightly different distances and reflects echoes containing overlapping components with slightly different delays--is perceived in terms of its range profile. The separation of the glints along the range dimension is encoded by the shape of the echo spectrum created by interference between overlapping echo components. However, Eptesicus transforms the echo spectrum back into an estimate of the original delay separation of echo components. The bat thus converts spectral cues into elements of an image expressed in terms of range. The absolute range of the nearest glint is encoded by the arrival time of the earliest echo component, and the spectrally encoded range separation of additional glints is referred to this time-encoded reference range for the image as a whole. Each individual glint is represented by a cross-correlation function for its own echo component, the nearest of which is computed directly from arrival-time measurements while further ones are computed by transformation of the echo spectrum. The bat then sums the cross-correlation functions for multiple glints to form the entire image of the complex target. Range and shape are two distinct features of targets that are separately encoded by the bat's auditory system, but the bat perceives unitary images that require fusion of these features to create a synthetic psychological dimension of range. The bat's use of cross-correlation-like images reveals neural computations that achieve fusion of stimulus features and offers an example of high-level operations involved in the formation of perceptual "wholes".     

What’s Wrong with the Online Echo Chamber: A Motivated Reasoning Account

In this ‘age of information’, some worry that we get our news from online ‘echo chambers’, news feeds on our social media accounts that contain information from like-minded sources. Filtering our information in this way seems prima facie problematic from an epistemic perspective. I vindicate this intuition by offering an explanation of what is wrong with online echo chambers that appeals to a particular kind of motivated reasoning, or bias due to one’s interests. This sort of bias affects, not which evidence one is exposed to, but how one makes use of the evidence that one has, on the basis of one’s interests. I argue that consulting an online echo chamber often facilitates and amplifies this bias. I then draw some general conclusions about the potential downside of having ready access to so much information.     

Human Echolocation as a Basic Form of Perception and Action

In this article we discuss known and possible uses of echolocation by humans. We argue that echolocation may be a basic perception-action ability of humans. We review studies which suggest that both blind and sighted humans are capable of substantial precision in the perception of properties of distal objects, such as distance, size, shape, substance, and relative motion. We analyze relations between acoustic pulse and echo that may provide information to support these percepts and others. Our analysis predicts echolocation-based sensitivity in humans and other animals to a number of properties of the animal-environment interaction. We also discuss echolocation-based acoustic specification of time-to-contact. We develop a new variable that provides this information and discuss acoustic Τs recently developed by Shaw, McGowan, and Turvey (1991) and by Lee, van der Weel, Hitchcock, Matejowsky, and Pettigrew (1992).Our analysis suggests that there may be important insights to be gained from an ecological study of echolocation in humans and other species. We end with suggestions for research derived from our analysis.     

Yes,no, maybe so: a veritistic approach to echo chambers using a trichotomous belief model

I approach the study of echo chambers from the perspective of veritistic social epistemology. A trichotomous belief model is developed featuring a mechanism by which agents will have a tendency to form agreement in the community. The model is implemented as an agent-based model in NetLogo and then used to investigate a social practice called Impartiality, which is a plausible means for resisting or dismantling echo chambers. The implementation exposes additional factors that need close consideration in an evaluation of Impartiality. In particular, resisting or dismantling echo chambers requires the selection of sufficiently low levels of doxastic entrenchment, but this comes with other tradeoffs.     

A semiotic model of mind

A theory of signs is presented to arrive at a model of mind that provides a smooth transition from inanimate matter to the thinking brain. Principles of information theory and semiotics are invoked to create a conceptual scheme that can contribute to an understanding of the "mind-body problem." The thesis is pursued that in living systems, as opposed to inorganic ones, there occurs the phenomenon of semiotic transmission of information. The result is a "dualistic-materialist" position; the dualism arises from the fact that at the beginning of life a set of processes comes into being different from those of the inorganic world. This model has implications for psychology and psychoanalysis. It allows for semiotic systems at different levels--e.g., the molecular, the neural network, the language system, and higher mental functions--to be integrated. Analytic concepts such as free association, clinical technique, feedback systems, personality structure, transference, and repetition compulsions can be understood in both biological and semiotic terms. This model interdigitates with linguistic studies already done in psychoanalysis, as well as with biological models extrinsic to the field.     

Rational learning and information sampling: on the "naivety" assumption in sampling explanations of judgment biases

Recent research has argued that several well-known judgment biases may be due to biases in the available information sample rather than to biased information processing. Most of these sample-based explanations assume that decision makers are "naive": They are not aware of the biases in the available information sample and do not correct for them. Here, we show that this "naivety" assumption is not necessary. Systematically biased judgments can emerge even when decision makers process available information perfectly and are also aware of how the information sample has been generated. Specifically, we develop a rational analysis of Denrell's (2005) experience sampling model, and we prove that when information search is interested rather than disinterested, even rational information sampling and processing can give rise to systematic patterns of errors in judgments. Our results illustrate that a tendency to favor alternatives for which outcome information is more accessible can be consistent with rational behavior. The model offers a rational explanation for behaviors that had previously been attributed to cognitive and motivational biases, such as the in-group bias or the tendency to prefer popular alternatives.     

Social phobic interoception: effects of bodily information on anxiety, beliefs and self-processing

It has been suggested that body-state information influences self-perception and negative thinking in social phobia [Clark, D. M., & Wells, A. (1995). A cognitive model of social phobia. In R. G. Heimberg, M. R. Liebowitz, D. A. Hope & F. R. Schneier (Eds.), Social phobia: diagnosis, assessment and treatment (pp. 69-93). New York: Guilford Press.]. This study explored the effects of body-state information on anxiety and cognition in patients with generalised social phobia during a feared social interaction. It was hypothesised that information concerning an increase in pulse rate would lead to increments in anxiety, negative beliefs and self-processing whilst information concerning a decrease in pulse rate would have the opposite effect. The results of this study were generally consistent with the hypotheses. These findings are important as they may help to account for fluctuations in anxiety, negative beliefs and self-processing in social situations that do not present objective social threat. In particular, social anxiety appears to be modulated by body-state information. The implications of the present findings for cognitive therapy of social phobia are briefly discussed.     

Effect of click rate and delay on breakdown of the precedence effect

The precedence effect was tested as a function of echo-click delay and click rate after an abrupt switch in location between leading and lagging clicks. Click trains at three rates, 1/sec, 2/sec, and 4/sec, with delays ranging between 2 and 20 msec, were presented to subjects in an anechoic chamber. Duration of the click train after the switch in location was 12 sec, and echo click perceptibility was assessed throughout this period. The number of echo clicks heard was an increasing monotonic function of delay. The subjects reported a "fade-out" of echo clicks after a set number of clicks at each delay, regardless of rate. This result was interpreted as a buildup in inhibition of echoes produced by the ongoing click train. Suppression of echoes was stronger when the leading click originated from the right side than from the left side.     

What the precedence effect tells us about room acoustics

Sound produced in a room is typically followed by numerous reflected sounds from nearby surfaces; yet we perceive a single sound source. This perceptual phenomenon, known as the precedence effect, has long been assumed to involve echo suppression, but the nature of this suppression remains unclear. In two experiments, we investigated whether information about the lagging sound's location was perceived. Our hypothesis was that such information is critical because reflected sound can function to inform the listener about objects and structures in the room. Listeners reported hearing more echoes under a stimulus situation that simulated sudden, unexpected changes in the location of the lagging sounds, as compared with stable stimulus conditions. Placement of lagging sounds' locations proved to be critical in that a sudden shift per se did not disrupt the fusion aspect of the precedence effect; the new location had to occupy a site that specified a new reflecting surface. Perception of echoes appears to be modulated by room acoustic information contained in reflected sound and listeners' expectations about this.     

Echo suppression and discrimination suppression aspects of the precedence effect

The precedence effect is a phenomenon that may occur when a sound from one direction (the lead) is followed within a few milliseconds by the same or a similar sound from another direction (the lag, or the echo). Typically, the lag sound is not heard as a separate event, and changes in the lag sound’s direction cannot be discriminated. The hypothesis is proposed in this study that these two aspects of precedence (echo suppression and discrimination suppression) are at least partially independent phenomena. Two experiments were conducted in which pairs of noise bursts were presented to subjects from two loudspeakers in the horizontal plane to simulate a lead sound and a lag sound (the echo). Echo suppression threshold was measured as the minimum echo delay at which subjects reported hearing two sounds rather than one sound; discrimination suppression threshold was measured as the minimum echo delay at which subjects could reliably discriminate between two positions of the echo. In Experiment 1, it was found that echo suppression threshold was the same as discrimination suppression threshold when measured with a single burst pair (average 5.4 msec). However, when measured after presentation of a train of burst pairs (a condition that may produce “buildup of suppression”), discrimination suppression threshold increased to 10.4 msec, while echo suppression threshold increased to 26.4 msec. The greater buildup of echo suppression than of discrimination suppression indicates that the two phenomena are distinct under buildup conditions and may be the reflection of different underlying mechanisms. Experiment 2 investigated the effect of the directional properties of the lead and lag sounds on discrimination suppression and echo suppression. There was no consistent effect of the spatial separation between lead and lag sources on discrimination suppression or echo suppression, nor was there any consistent difference between the two types of thresholds (overall average threshold was 5.9 msec). The negative result in Experiment 2 may have been due to the measurements being obtained only for single-stimulus conditions and not for buildup conditions that may involve more central processing by the auditory system.     

The magical number seven and some other features of category scaling: Properties of a model for absolute judgment

A model for absolute judgment is presented. This is derived from a theory of the processes which set and maintain response criteria (M. Treisman & T. C. Williams, 1984, Psychological Review, 91, 68–111) which has been applied to a number of problems in psychophysics. A Thurstonian model is assumed as a basis for absolute judgment, and criterion-setting theory is applied to the criteria in this model. The question is then considered, to what extent can such a model account for the main findings that have been obtained in category scaling? The range of explanations that the model can provide is investigated by means of computer simulation. It appears that features such as the upper limit on information transmission as the number of stimuli increases, the effect of stimulus range on information transmission, the accuracy edge effect, the resolution edge effect, the central tendency of judgment, stimulus and response dependencies, and related phenomena can be reproduced by simulations of the model.     

Defining the cortical visual systems: "what", "where", and "how"

The visual system historically has been defined as consisting of at least two broad subsystems subserving object and spatial vision. These visual processing streams have been organized both structurally as two distinct pathways in the brain, and functionally for the types of tasks that they mediate. The classic definition by Ungerleider and Mishkin labeled a ventral "what" stream to process object information and a dorsal "where" stream to process spatial information. More recently, Goodale and Milner redefined the two visual systems with a focus on the different ways in which visual information is transformed for different goals. They relabeled the dorsal stream as a "how" system for transforming visual information using an egocentric frame of reference in preparation for direct action. This paper reviews recent research from psychophysics, neurophysiology, neuropsychology and neuroimaging to define the roles of the ventral and dorsal visual processing streams. We discuss a possible solution that allows for both "where" and "how" systems that are functionally and structurally organized within the posterior parietal lobe.     

A comment on the functional localization of the phonological storage subsystem of working memory.

Working memory, as defined by Baddeley and Hitch, is an interactive set of cognitive processes responsible for holding information online and available for analysis. Part of that system is a specialized subsystem devoted to maintaining verbal information; the verbal "slave" subsystem has as a core component a phonological store. For many years, the anatomical locus of the phonological store has been thought to be in the supramarginal and angular gyri of the speech dominant hemisphere, and functional neuroimaging studies provide broad support for this localization. However, a finer grained analysis of published experiments reveals two possible foci for the phonological store within the parietal lobe, neither of which has a pattern of functional activation that is fully consistent with the Baddeley and Hitch model. The purpose of the present paper is to review several studies relevant to the question of the localization of the phonological store and to suggest possible reasons the results are discrepant.     

Mental model construction in linear reasoning: Evidence for the construction of initial annotated models

According to the mental model theory, reasoners build an initial model representing the information given in the premises. In the context of relational reasoning, the question arises as to which kind of representation is used to cope with indeterminate or multimodel problems. The present article presents an array of possible answers arising from the initial construction of complete explicit models, partial explicit models, partial implicit models, a single "isomeric" model, or a single annotated model. Predictions generated from these views are tested in two experiments that vary the problem structure and the number of models consistent with the premises. Analyses of the premise processing times, answering times and accuracy show that the annotated model yields the best fit of the data. Implications of these findings for the mental model theory as developed for relational reasoning are discussed.     

Similarity information versus relational information: differences in the time course of retrieval

Two experiments are reported that examine the time course of retrieval in a sentence matching procedure. Subjects learned lists of active and passive sentences and were tested with sentences in active or passive, correct or incorrect versions; for example, if "John hit Bill" was a studied sentence, "Bill hit John" would be an incorrect active test sentence. A response signal procedure was used so that accuracy could be measured as a function of time. The data show that sentences containing words from studied sentences are discriminable early in processing from sentences containing all new words, but discrimination of correct from incorrect versions of studied sentences occurs only later in processing (after 600-700 ms). These results demonstrate that different kinds of information are available at different points during the time course of retrieval and so suggest that modifications are required of models that provide only a unitary value for the amount of match between a test probe and information in memory. Early in processing, the growth of accuracy can be explained by a simple model that assumes independent contributions to total amount of match for each of the content words of a sentence, but this independent processing model cannot account for discrimination later in processing. Several, more general, memory models are examined with respect to their abilities to produce independent item information early in processing and relational information later in processing.     

Application of a trace model to the retention of information in a recognition task

A stochastic model is proposed to account for the behavior of subjects in recognition tasks in which stimuli are presented, one at a time, in a protracted sequence. The basic assumption is that the memory trace resulting from the presentation of a particular stimulus not only fades away during the presentation of subsequent stimuli but also diffuses in such a way as to become decreasingly stimulus specific. An account is thereby provided for both (a) the increase in the probability of false recognition with the total number of stimulus presentations and (b) the departure of curves of forgetting from the previously proposed simple exponential decay functions. An expression for the amount of information carried along when the number of stimulus presentations becomes large is then derived for subjects who conform with the model.The author has benefited from discussions of this work with J. W. Tukey, J. R. Pierce, E. N. Gilbert, and D. Slepian of the Bell Telephone Laboratories and with G. A. Miller of Harvard University.     

Prolegomena to Dynamic Logic for Belief Revision

In ‘belief revision’ a theory is revised with a formula φ resulting in a revised theory . Typically, is in , one has to give up belief in by a process of retraction, and φ is in . We propose to model belief revision in a dynamic epistemic logic. In this setting, we typically have an information state (pointed Kripke model) for the theory wherein the agent believes the negation of the revision formula, i.e., wherein is true. The revision with φ is a program *φ that transforms this information state into a new information state. The transformation is described by a dynamic modal operator [*φ], that is interpreted as a binary relation [ [*φ] ] between information states. The next information state is computed from the current information state and the belief revision formula. If the revision is successful, the agent believes φ in the resulting state, i.e., Bφ is then true. To make this work, as information states we propose ‘doxastic epistemic models’ that represent both knowledge and degrees of belief. These are multi-modal and multi-agent Kripke models. They are constructed from preference relations for agents, and they satisfy various characterizable multi-agent frame properties. Iterated, revocable, and higher-order belief revision are all quite natural in this setting. We present, for an example, five different ways of such dynamic belief revision. One can also see that as a non-deterministic epistemic action with two alternatives, where one is preferred over the other, and there is a natural generalization to general epistemic actions with preferences.     

Mental imagery and the third dimension

What sort of medium underlies imagery for three-dimensional scenes? In the present investigation, the time subjects took to scan between objects in a mental image was used to infer the sorts of geometric information that images preserve. Subjects studied an open box in which five objects were suspended, and learned to imagine this display with their eyes closed. In the first experiment, subjects scanned by tracking an imaginary point moving in a straight line between the imagined objects. Scanning times increased linearly with increasing distance between objects in three dimensions. Therefore metric 3-D information must be preserved in images, and images cannot simply be 2-D "snapshots." In a second experiment, subjects scanned across the image by "sighting" objects through an imaginary rifle sight. Here scanning times were found to increase linearly with the two-dimensional separations between objects as they appeared from the original viewing angle. Therefore metric 2-D distance information in the original perspective view must be preserved in images, and images cannot simply be 3-D "scale-models" that are assessed from any and all directions at once. In a third experiment, subjects mentally rotated the display 90 degrees and scanned between objects as they appeared in this new perspective view by tracking an imaginary rifle signt, as before. Scanning times increased linearly with the two-dimensional separations between objects as they would appear from the new relative viewing perspective. Therefore images can display metric 2-D distance information in a perspective view never actually experiences, so mental images cannot simply be "snapshot plus scale model" pairs. These results can be explained by a model in which the three-dimensional structure of objects is encoded in long-term memory in 3-D object-centered coordinate systems. When these objects are imagined, this information is then mapped onto a single 2-D "surface display" in which the perspective properties specific to a given viewing angle can be depicted. In a set of perceptual control experiments, subjects scanned a visible display by (a) simply moving their eyes from one object to another, (b) sweeping an imaginary rifle sight over the display, or (c) tracking an imaginary point moving from one object to another. Eye-movement times varied linearly with 2-D interobject distance, as did time to scan with an imaginary rifle sight; time to tract a point varied independently with the 3-D and 2-D interobject distances. These results are compared with the analogous image scanning results to argue that imagery and perception share some representational structures but that mental image scanning is a process distinct from eye movements or eye-movement commands.     

The Relation Between Perception and Action: What Should Neuroscience Learn From Psychology?

Research in neuroscience is making progress toward understanding the "dorsal" mechanisms responsible for the fast modulation by optical information of actions such as reaching and grasping. The function of "ventral" visual pathways is not to support perception, as distinct from action. Instead, it is to control extended actions that unfold over longer time scales and draw on optical information over larger spatial scales, than simple, fast limb movements. Perception and sensation should be regarded as particular forms of extended communicative actions and not as alternative end points for the use of environmental information. The neural mechanisms involved in controlling extended actions are not yet understood, and psychological theory has a role to play in framing their investigation by neuroscience.     

Volunteer Work,Religious Commitment,and Resting Pulse Rates

Research indicates that greater involvement in volunteer activities is associated with better health. We aim to contribute to this literature in two ways. First, rather than rely on self-reports of health, measured resting pulse rates serve as the dependent variable. Second, an effort is made to see if religious commitment moderates the relationship between volunteering and resting pulse rates. Data that come from a recent nationwide survey (N = 2265) suggest that volunteer work is associated with lower resting pulse rates. The results also reveal that the relationship between engaging in volunteer work and resting pulse rates improves among study participants who are more deeply committed to religion.