The emotional self: Embodiment,reflexivity, and emotion regulation

Current dominant trends in the biological and psychological sciences tend to put emphasis on the role of the brain, cognition, and consciousness in realising emotional states and attempting to regulate them. In this article, I suggest an alternative approach with the idea that emotions emerge within social relations and give meaning and value to the situations in which we are located. Humans are understood as embodied emotional selves for who thought and emotion are intertwined. However, individuals can get caught in obsessive and compulsive thinking and feeling traps where the self loses touch with its emotions, and because of this also loses contact with the social situation and the ability to skilfully navigate it. In such circumstances, the self gets overwhelmed by emotion and loses its poise in the social setting. I consider Buddhist meditation as a technique through which people can develop a more reflexive emotional self, where reflexivity is not about control of emotion but owning one's feelings and being able to respond more sensitively and skilfully in various situations.     

GETTING UNDER MY SKIN: WILLIAM JAMES ON THE EMOTIONS, SOCIALITY, AND TRANSCENDENCE

“You are really getting under my skin!” This exclamation suggests a series of psychological, philosophical, and metaphysical questions: What is the nature and development of human emotion? How does emotion arise in social interaction? To what extent can interactive situations shape our embodied selves and intensify particular affective states? With these questions in mind, William James begins to investigate the character of emotions and to develop a model of what he terms the social self. James's studies of mimicry and his interest in phenomena now often investigated using biofeedback begin to explain how affective states develop and how it might be possible for something to “get under one's skin.” I situate these studies in the history of psychology between the psychological schools of structuralism and behaviorism. More important, I suggest continuity between James's Psychology and recent research on mirror neurons, reentrant mapping, and emotional mimicry in the fields of clinical psychology and cognitive neuroscience. This research supports and extends James's initial claims in regard to the creation of emotions and the life of the social self. I propose that James's work in the empirical sciences should be read as a prelude to his metaphysical works that speak of a coordination between embodied selves and wider environmental situations, and his psychological studies should be read as a prelude to his reflections on spiritual transcendence.     

Connecting embodiment,emotion and gentrification: An exploration through the practice of yoga in Toronto

Emotion and embodiment have rarely been identified as dimensions of gentrification processes, despite greater attention to the role of emotions in urbanization and to the mutual constitution of bodies and cities in geographic literature. This paper has two aims: to chart the ways that emotion and embodiment have been considered in gentrification research and theory to date, and to suggest further theoretical strategies for attending to the role that embodied practices and emotions play in marking, reproducing and consolidating gentrification. The latter aim is pursued through a personal reflection on the experience of yoga – as a practice that calls explicit attention to the body and its feelings in place – in Toronto, a city that is no stranger to gentrification. While this paper will not attempt to document in general how yoga and gentrification may be linked in Toronto or other places experiencing gentrification, it will suggest that as an increasingly popular embodied practice tied into middle-class consumption patterns and present in landscapes of urban revitalization, yoga practice affords relevant moments of reflection through which the embodied and emotional dimensions of gentrification can be clarified and/or problematized. My argument is that the body and its emotions are critical sites for the study of gentrification as a complex social and economic process. Embodied practices define the landscape of reproduction; bodies form a symbolic terrain over which struggles for urban space are fought; and the dynamics of emotional, embodied contact produce geographies of social and spatial exclusion.     

Embodiment, ownership and disownership

There are two main pathways to investigate the sense of body ownership, (i) through the study of the conditions of embodiment for an object to be experienced as one's own and (ii) through the analysis of the deficits in patients who experience a body part as alien. Here, I propose that E is embodied if some properties of E are processed in the same way as the properties of one's body. However, one must distinguish among different types of embodiment, and only self-specific embodiment can lead to feelings of ownership. I address issues such as the functional role and the dynamics of embodiment, degrees and measures of ownership, and shared body representations between self and others. I then analyse the interaction between ownership and disownership. On the one hand, I show that there is no evidence that in the Rubber Hand Illusion, the rubber hand replaces the biological hand. On the other hand, I argue that the sense of disownership experienced by patients towards their body part cannot be reduced to the mere lack of ownership.     

对话心智与身体：具身认知的内感受研究转向

具身认知观念试图强调心智是根植于身体的,身体经验会对认知过程产生重要影响。但对于心智与身体的对话是如何进行的？身体通过何种渠道如何影响心智？等问题困扰着具身认知的支持者。传统的具身认知研究遭遇可重复性危机,身体状态改变影响高级认知的结论受到质疑。近年来,越来越多的证据表明内感受与身体表征、具身情绪以及社会认知等存在着密切的联系,因而内感受很有可能在身体加工和高级认知过程中起着重要的调节作用。     

具身视角下的社会认知

摘 要：由于第一代认知科学存在着身心剥离的缺憾,具身化作为第二代认知科学的主要特征得到研究者的广泛关注,并且得到了来自神经科学领域的支持。随着研究的深入,具身学派提出,社会认知是否也应是具身的。现有研究发现具身性对个体评价、反应速度、言语理解、人际交往等方面都有不小的作用。但上述以身体模拟为主的证据仍不足以证明社会认知是具身的,具身学派还需解决诸如明确具身的定义、实验论证、明显区别于传统认知观等问题。     

The narrative self,distributed memory,and evocative objects

In this article, I outline various ways in which artifacts are interwoven with autobiographical memory systems and conceptualize what this implies for the self. I first sketch the narrative approach to the self, arguing that who we are as persons is essentially our (unfolding) life story, which, in turn, determines our present beliefs and desires, but also directs our future goals and actions. I then argue that our autobiographical memory is partly anchored in our embodied interactions with an ecology of artifacts in our environment. Lifelogs, photos, videos, journals, diaries, souvenirs, jewelry, books, works of art, and many other meaningful objects trigger and sometimes constitute emotionally laden autobiographical memories. Autobiographical memory is thus distributed across embodied agents and various environmental structures. To defend this claim, I draw on and integrate distributed cognition theory and empirical research in human-technology interaction. Based on this, I conclude that the self is neither defined by psychological states realized by the brain nor by biological states realized by the organism, but should be seen as a distributed and relational construct.     

Face the noise: embodied responses to nonverbal vocalizations of discrete emotions

Extensive prior research has shown that the perception of an emotional facial expression automatically elicits a corresponding facial expression in the observer. Theories of embodied emotion, however, suggest that such reactions might also occur across expressive channels, because simulation is based on integrated motoric and affective representations of that emotion. In the present studies, we examined this idea by focusing on facial and experiential reactions to nonverbal emotion vocalizations. In Studies 1 and 2, we showed that both hearing and reproducing vocalizations of anger, disgust, happiness, and sadness resulted in specific facial behaviors, as well as congruent self-reported emotions (Study 2). In Studies 3 and 4, we showed that the inhibition of congruent facial actions impaired listeners' processing of emotion vocalizations (Study 3), as well as their experiences of a concordant subjective state (Study 4). Results support the idea that cross-channel simulations of others' states serve facilitative functions similar to more strict imitations of observed expressive behavior, suggesting flexibility in the motoric and affective systems involved in emotion processing and interpersonal emotion transfer. We discuss implications for embodiment research and the social consequences of expressing and matching emotions across nonverbal channels.     

Connectionism and Self: James,Mead, and the Stream of Enculturated Consciousness

William James conceptualized I, the self as subject as a stream of consciousness. When this conception is augmented with George Herbert Mead's view of self as a radically socialized and enculturated process, a result is the James-Mead model of dynamic self as a stream of enculturated consciousness. In this paper, we argue that connectionism is best suited to theorize this challenging notion. Based on the view that a connectionist model should describe psychological processes that carry out psychological functions grounded in a biological living system, we propose the I-SELF (Imitative and Sequence Learning Functional) model, which is designed to capture the temporal dynamics of a stream of consciousness whose content can be acquired via symbolically mediated social interaction with others in society. We identify four implications of the James-Mead model of dynamic self (embodiment, narrative and self, individual and collective self, and culture and self), and report computer simulations to show the utility of I-SELF in conceptualizing the dynamic self-processes in the contemporary social psychological literature. Theoretical and metatheoretical implications of the connectionist approach to self are discussed.     

The Heart on the Sleeve and the Secret Self: Estimations of Hidden Emotion in Self and Acquaintances

ABSTRACT This research investigated how estimations of subjectively experienced emotion and estimations of displayed emotion varied with the familiarity of the target person Subjects imagined themselves, a close friend, a moderate friend, or a casual acquaintance in a series of brief affect-eliciting situations, and then estimated the degree to which the designated person would both feel and display specific emotions Subjects consistently estimated that people, including themselves, would feel more emotion than they displayed This discrepancy between experienced feeling and displayed feeling increased as a linear function of familiarity with the person The amount of undisplayed affect–the estimated “secret self”–was generally smallest for a casual acquaintance, greater for a moderate friend, still greater for a close friend, and greatest of all for the self The magnitude of this familiarity effect, however, varied with the social desirability of the emotion If an emotion was socially desirable, subjects estimated that familiar persons would both feel the emotion more and display it more than less familiar others would If an emotion was socially undesirable, subjects also estimated that familiar others would feel it more than unfamiliar others would However, they estimated that familiar and less familiar others would display socially undesirable emotions to about the same degree, and estimated that they themselves would display these emotions significantly less than others Consequently, although subjects always perceived     

情绪调节目标的分类与优化

摘要：情绪调节目标决定人们是否调节情绪以及怎样调节情绪。基于情绪调节服务功能的类型差异,可分离出以下类型的调节目标：增加积极体验可满足享乐性需要,社会事务需使用情绪的工具效用,复杂体验的融合可优化自我成长,而情绪体验的文化精致可促进自我与世界的融合。这些目标既可能相互一致,也存在多种冲突,对幸福体验产生综合影响。拓展积极情绪最大化的暂时性适应角色,理解内隐层面的心理因素和文化价值正当性对调节目标的制约,是未来研究的方向。     

Between Embodied Subjects and Objects: Narrative Somaesthetics

Michel Foucault's ethics of embodiment, focusing upon care of the self, has motivated feminist scholars to pursue promising models of embodied resistance to disciplinary normalization. Cressida Heyes, in particular, has advocated that these projects adopt practices of “somaesthetics,” following a program of body consciousness developed by Richard Shusterman. In exploring Shusterman's somaesthetics proposal, I find that it does not account for the subjective challenges of resisting normalization. Based on narrative theories of subjectivity, the role narrative plays in normalization, and a commitment to developing concrete, feminist practices of embodied ethics, I develop a model of “narrative somaesthetics” based on an updated consciousness‐raising model that emphasizes group heterogeneity and narrative conflict that deals with these challenges. Through an analysis of interviews with self‐identified femme lesbians and a “female to femme” transition support group featured in the documentary film, FtF: Female to Femme, I argue that narrative somaesthetics enables the analytical, genealogical work required to identify and weaken normalization's constraints on embodied feminist ethics.     

Three Views of Emotion Regulation and Health

Humans are self‐regulating dynamic systems. Health represents an overall state of the system and emotions play a central role. Understanding emotion, self‐regulation, and health is complicated by the fact that emotion regulation can be conceptualized in at least three ways: (i) emotions can be seen as one component of a general self‐regulatory system that modifies our overall responses in the service of goal‐directed behavior, (ii) the emotion system itself operates through internal feedback processes that help to keep our physical and psychological systems in balance and within an optimal range of functioning, and (iii) emotions can become the target of self‐regulatory efforts. Each of these views of emotion regulation emphasizes somewhat different connections to health. This review considers the meanings of emotion, regulation, and health and presents research relevant to each of the three views of emotion regulation.     

The extended body: a case study in the neurophenomenology of social interaction

There is a growing realization in cognitive science that a theory of embodied intersubjectivity is needed to better account for social cognition. We highlight some challenges that must be addressed by attempts to interpret ‘simulation theory’ in terms of embodiment, and argue for an alternative approach that integrates phenomenology and dynamical systems theory in a mutually informing manner. Instead of ‘simulation’ we put forward the concept of the ‘extended body’, an enactive and phenomenological notion that emphasizes the socially mediated nature of embodiment. To illustrate the explanatory potential of this approach, we replicate an agent-based model of embodied social interaction. An analysis of the model demonstrates that the extended body can be explained in terms of mutual dynamical entanglement: inter-bodily resonance between individuals can give rise to self-sustaining interaction patterns that go beyond the behavioral capacities of isolated individuals by modulating their intra-bodily conditions of behavior generation.     

SELF‐DECEPTION ABOUT EMOTION

In this paper, I address an ignored topic in the literature on self‐deception—instances in which one is self‐deceived about their emotions. Most discussions of emotion and self‐deception address either the contributory role of emotion to instances of self‐deception involving beliefs or assume what I argue is an outdated view of emotion according to which emotions just are beliefs or some other type of propositional attitude. In order to construct an account of self‐deception about emotion, I draw a distinction between two variants of self‐deception about emotion: cognitively motivated self‐deception and phenomenologically motivated self‐deception. After providing an account of each variant, I discuss the importance of the role that perception plays in cases of self‐deception about emotion. I conclude with a comment on the relevance of this discussion for contemporary debates in moral theory.     

Basic Emotions, Natural Kinds, Emotion Schemas, and a New Paradigm

ABSTRACT— Research on emotion flourishes in many disciplines and specialties, yet experts cannot agree on its definition. Theorists and researchers use the term emotion in ways that imply different processes and meanings. Debate continues about the nature of emotions, their functions, their relations to broad affective dimensions, the processes that activate them, and their role in our daily activities and pursuits. I will address these issues here, specifically in terms of basic emotions as natural kinds, the nature of emotion schemas, the development of emotion–cognition relations that lead to emotion schemas, and discrete emotions in relation to affective dimensions. Finally, I propose a new paradigm that assumes continual emotion as a factor in organizing consciousness and as an influence on mind and behavior. The evidence reviewed suggests that a theory that builds on concepts of both basic emotions and emotion schemas provides a viable research tool and is compatible with more holistic or dimensional approaches.     

Emotions beyond brain and body

The emerging consensus in the philosophy of cognition is that cognition is situated, i.e., dependent upon or co-constituted by the body, the environment, and/or the embodied interaction with it. But what about emotions? If the brain alone cannot do much thinking, can the brain alone do some emoting? If not, what else is needed? Do (some) emotions (sometimes) cross an individual's boundary? If so, what kinds of supra-individual systems can be bearers of affective states, and why? And does that make emotions “embedded” or “extended” in the sense cognition is said to be embedded and extended? Section 2 shows why it is important to understand in which sense body, environment, and our embodied interaction with the world contribute to our affective life. Section 3 introduces some key concepts of the debate about situated cognition. Section 4 draws attention to an important disanalogy between cognition and emotion with regard to the role of the body. Section 5 shows under which conditions a contribution by the environment results in non-trivial cases of “embedded” emotions. Section 6 is concerned with affective phenomena that seem to cross the organismic boundaries of an individual, in particular with the idea that emotions are “extended” or “distributed.”     

Embodied Cultural Cognition: Situating the Study of Embodied Cognition in Socio‐Cultural Contexts

Embodiment research has demonstrated that cognition is grounded in bodily interactions with the environment and that abstract concepts are tied to the body’s sensory and motor systems. Building upon this embodiment perspective and advancing our understanding, we discuss the extension of embodied cultural cognition. We propose that some associations between bodily experiences and abstract concepts are not randomly formed; rather, the development of such associations is situated in a socio‐cultural context, informed by cultural imperatives, values, and habits. We draw evidence supporting this view of embodied cultural cognition in body–mind linkages manifested in construal of emotions, time perception, person perception, social power, and moral reasoning. To further extend this research avenue that synthesizes the studies of embodied cognition and culture, we also suggest potential future research directions inspired by this view. This embodied cultural cognition account is useful in understanding and organizing accumulating discoveries of cultural variations in embodiments; it also highlights the social situatedness of embodied cognition and is, therefore, highly compatible with theorizing and research in social and cultural psychology.     

The semantic pointer theory of emotion: Integrating physiology,appraisal, and construction

Emotion theory needs to explain the relationship of language and emotions, and the embodiment of emotions, by specifying the computational mechanisms underlying emotion generation in the brain. We used Chris Eliasmith’s Semantic Pointer Architecture to develop POEM, a computational model that explains numerous important phenomena concerning emotions, including how some stimuli generate immediate emotional reactions, how some emotional reactions depend on cognitive evaluations, how bodily states influence the generation of emotions, how some emotions depend on interactions between physiological inputs and cognitive appraisals, and how some emotional reactions concern syntactically complex representations. We contrast our theory with current alternatives, and discuss some possible applications to individual and social emotions.     

Narrative self-appropriation: embodiment,alienness, and personal responsibility in the context of borderline personality disorder

It is often emphasised that persons diagnosed with borderline personality disorder (BPD) show difficulties in understanding their own psychological states. In this article, I argue that from a phenomenological perspective, BPD can be understood as an existential modality in which the embodied self is profoundly saturated by an alienness regarding the person’s own affects and responses. However, the balance of familiarity and alienness is not static, but can be cultivated through, e.g., psychotherapy. Following this line of thought, I present the idea that narrativising experiences can play an important role in processes of appropriating such embodied self-alienness. Importantly, the notion of narrative used is that of a scalar conception of narrativity as a variable quality of experience that comes in degrees. From this perspective, narrative appropriation is a process of gradually attributing the quality of narrativity to experiences, thereby familiarising the moods, affects, and responses that otherwise govern ‘from behind’. Finally, I propose that the idea of a narrative appropriation of embodied self-alienness is also relevant to the much-debated question of personal responsibility in BPD, particularly as this question plays out in psychotherapeutic contexts where a narrative self-appropriation may facilitate an increase in sense of autonomy and reduce emotions of guilt and shame.