Out of one's mind: a study of involuntary semantic memories

The study of memories that pop into one's mind without any conscious attempt to retrieve them began only recently. While there are some studies on involuntary autobiographical memories (e.g., ) research on involuntary semantic memories or mind-popping is virtually non-existent. The latter is defined as an involuntary conscious occurrence of brief items of one's network of semantic knowledge. The recall of these items (e.g., a word, a name, a tune) is not accompanied by additional contextual information and/or involvement of self-a standard feature of involuntary autobiographical memories. The paper reports several diary and questionnaire studies which looked into the nature and frequency of occurrence of these memories. The data show that people do experience involuntary semantic memories which tend to occur without any apparent cues while being engaged in relatively automatic activities. Possible mechanisms of involuntary semantic memories are discussed (e.g., very long-term priming), and the results of the study provide information on the possible duration of the priming effects in everyday life. Related theoretical and methodological issues and future avenues of research in this neglected area are outlined.     

How the mind shapes action: Offline contexts modulate involuntary episodic retrieval

Involuntary retrieval of previous stimulus–response episodes is a centerpiece of many theories of priming, episodic binding, and action control. Typically it is assumed that by repeating a stimulus from trial n–1 to trial n, involuntary retrieval is triggered in a nearly automatic fashion, facilitating (or interfering with) the to-be-executed action. Here we argue that changes in the offline context weaken the involuntary retrieval of previous episodes (the offline context is defined to be the information presented before or after the focal stimulus). In four conditions differing in cue modality and target modality, retrieval was diminished if participants changed the target selection criterion (as indicated by a cue presented before the selection took place) while they still performed the same task. Thus, solely through changes in the offline context (cue or selection criterion), involuntary retrieval can be weakened in an effective way.     

There is more to mind reading than having theory of mind concepts: new directions in theory of mind research

For more than 30 years, researchers have focused on the important transition that children undergo between the ages of 3 and 5, when they start to solve mind‐reading problems that require reasoning about complex mental states, such as beliefs. The main question for debate has been whether, during that transition, children acquire new concepts about how the mind works (i.e. a more sophisticated ‘theory of mind’) or whether their more general cognitive abilities improve and help them deal with the general task demands. Recently, researchers have started to explore mind‐reading abilities in individuals outside of the classic 3–5 age span, showing early theory of mind abilities in ever‐younger children and infants, but also far from flawless performance in adults. In this article, we show how the results of these two new lines of research converge on the idea that there is more to mind reading than having theory of mind concepts: there are various processes required to efficiently implement theory of mind concepts in our reasoning, and there may be, in fact, multiple mind‐reading routes available. We then highlight the emergent new directions for future research. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Chernobyl: Nobody's to blame?

Sarcophagus, by Vladimir Gubaryev, trans. Michael Glenny, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1987, 81 pages, pb £3.50     

Episodic remembering creates access to involuntary conscious memory: Demonstrating involuntary recall on a voluntary recall task

The idea that involuntary memory retrieval might occur during voluntary memory retrieval can be traced back to Ebbinghaus (1885/1964). However, methodological challenges have stood in the way of testing this idea. Recent diary studies of naturally occurring involuntary memories have provided insights into how this idea could be tested (Berntsen, 1998; Mace, 2005b, 2006). These studies have shown that the contents of an involuntary memory sometimes trigger additional involuntary memories, a process called chaining. It was hypothesised that chaining should also occur on autobiographical memory tasks, and this was tested in the present study by asking participants in an autobiographical memory task to report the presence of involuntary memories while they were performing the task. The results showed that involuntary memories did occur when participants were recalling the past. The results also showed involuntary memories dissociating from voluntary memories on two independent measures, thereby enhancing the credibility of the results.     

Episodic remembering creates access to involuntary conscious memory: demonstrating involuntary recall on a voluntary recall task

The idea that involuntary memory retrieval might occur during voluntary memory retrieval can be traced back to Ebbinghaus (1885/1964). However, methodological challenges have stood in the way of testing this idea. Recent diary studies of naturally occurring involuntary memories have provided insights into how this idea could be tested (Berntsen, 1998; Mace, 2005b, 2006). These studies have shown that the contents of an involuntary memory sometimes trigger additional involuntary memories, a process called chaining. It was hypothesised that chaining should also occur on autobiographical memory tasks, and this was tested in the present study by asking participants in an autobiographical memory task to report the presence of involuntary memories while they were performing the task. The results showed that involuntary memories did occur when participants were recalling the past. The results also showed involuntary memories dissociating from voluntary memories on two independent measures, thereby enhancing the credibility of the results.     

A contingency approach to consistency: A challenge to prevalent views

Two types of consistency have been distinguished in the literature: internal consistency and person-environment congruence. It is generally assumed that the lower the consistency, the more dysfunctional the outcomes. This study challenged the prevalent unqualified approach to consistency by presenting a contingency approach based on activation theory. It predicted an interactive effect, that is, that in congruent situations internal consistency would be associated with higher individual outcomes compared to inconsistency, but in incongruent situations it would be associated with lower individual outcomes compared to inconsistency. Four individual career outcomes were used as dependent variables—organizational commitment, professional commitment, job satisfaction, and job involvement. The sample included 175 professionals from various occupations. The predicted interactive effects were found in the analyses which used a perceived P-E congruence scale. The analyses which used actual P-E congruence did not yield definite results. The findings are discussed in terms of differences in cognitive appraisals mediating the response to incongruence. It is suggested that the functionality of inconsistency and incongruence needs to be reestablished.     

The mind of global human society. A new approach to investigating the future

In this essay, I present a new approach, called “ideometry,” which may lead to a new way of integrating knowledge and investigating the future of scientific conceptions. Conceptions are examined in themselves, independently of the reality they are supposedly describing. This is done formally by means of a new concept, “alterity.” A consequence of this formal consideration is a possible “super‐mind” of global human society, a very large and complex, growing system, analogous to a child's brain.     

How to share a mind: Reconsidering the group mind thesis

Standard accounts in social ontology and the group cognition debate have typically focused on how collective modes, types, and contents of intentions or representational states must be construed so as to constitute the jointness of the respective agents, cognizers, and their engagements. However, if we take intentions, beliefs, or mental representations all to instantiate some mental properties, then the more basic issue regarding such collective engagements is what it is for groups of individual minds to share a mind. Somewhat surprisingly, this very issue has not received much attention in the respective debates and when it has, typically the outlook has been skeptical or outright negative. In this paper, I argue that it is epistemologically possible for a group of individuals to literally share a single mental unit. In particular, I will put forward and defend what I shall call the zombie conception of group minds.     

A mind to go out of: reflections on primary and secondary consciousness

Dreaming and waking are two brain-mind states, which are characterized by shared and differentiated properties at the levels of brain and consciousness. As part of our effort to capitalize on a comparison of these two states we have applied Edelman's distinction between primary and secondary consciousness, which we link to dreaming and waking respectively. In this paper we examine the implications of this contrastive analysis for theories of mental illness. We conclude that while dreaming is an almost perfect model of organic psychosis, it is less so for schizophrenia and major affective disorder where it must serve a primarily heuristic role helping us to model hallucinations and delusions but not the diseases themselves.     

A dual-motive model of scapegoating: displacing blame to reduce guilt or increase control

The authors present a model that specifies 2 psychological motives underlying scapegoating, defined as attributing inordinate blame for a negative outcome to a target individual or group, (a) maintaining perceived personal moral value by minimizing feelings of guilt over one's responsibility for a negative outcome and (b) maintaining perceived personal control by obtaining a clear explanation for a negative outcome that otherwise seems inexplicable. Three studies supported hypotheses derived from this dual-motive model. Framing a negative outcome (environmental destruction or climate change) as caused by one's own harmful actions (value threat) or unknown sources (control threat) both increased scapegoating, and these effects occurred indirectly through feelings of guilt and perceived personal control, respectively (Study 1), and were differentially moderated by affirmations of moral value and personal control (Study 2). Also, scapegoating in response to value threat versus control threat produced divergent, theoretically specified effects on self-perceptions and behavioral intentions (Study 3).     

The group-member mind trade-off: attributing mind to groups versus group members

People attribute minds to other individuals and make inferences about those individuals' mental states to explain and predict their behavior. Little is known, however, about whether people also attribute minds to groups and believe that collectives, companies, and corporations can think, have intentions, and make plans. Even less is known about the consequences of these attributions for both groups and group members. We investigated the attribution of mind and responsibility to groups and group members, and we demonstrated that people make a trade-off: The more a group is attributed a group mind, the less members of that group are attributed individual minds. Groups that are judged to have more group mind are also judged to be more cohesive and responsible for their collective actions. These findings have important implications for how people perceive the minds of groups and group members, and for how attributions of mind influence attributions of responsibility to groups and group members.     

Multiple routes to mind wandering: Predicting mind wandering with resource theories

Three experiments examine individual (attentional capacity) and task-related characteristics leading to mind wandering, and the effect of mind wandering on task performance. Drawing on resource theories, we tested interactive nonlinear effects of these predictors, manipulating task demand using math tests of varying difficulty (Exp 1: N = 143, three levels between-subjects; Exp 2: N = 59, three levels within-subjects; Exp 3: N = 133, four levels within-subjects). Results confirmed that mind wandering was most frequent during extreme task demand levels, although the effect varied somewhat between experiments. Additionally, results from Experiment 3 and an integrated analysis demonstrated that people with relatively higher attentional capacity were less likely to mind wander as task demand increased. Moreover, mind wandering was more detrimental to performance as task demand increased across all experiments. Our findings build on past research by demonstrating the importance of accounting for interactions and nonlinear effects of task demand and attentional capacity in mind wandering research.     

Who's to blame: Attributions regarding causality in spouse abuse

Spouse abuse is examined from the perspective of attribution theory. Aggressors are seen as attributing their violent behavior to external causes, whether by projecting their negative traits onto their spouses or by finding excuses which blame temporary environmental factors. In contrast, victims often attribute the abuse to defects within themselves or situational factors affecting their spouses. The attribution process seems affected by the frequency, intensity and duration of the abuse, with temporal factors playing an important role in the woman's internalizing style. Furthermore, inadequate early coping efforts play a powerful role in establishing cognitive-perceptual patterns that serve to perpetuate the abuse.     

Error management theory: a new perspective on biases in cross-sex mind reading

A new theory of cognitive biases, called error management theory (EMT), proposes that psychological mechanisms are designed to be predictably biased when the costs of false-positive and false-negative errors were asymmetrical over evolutionary history. This theory explains known phenomena such as men's overperception of women's sexual intent, and it predicts new biases in social inference such as women's underestimation of men's commitment. In Study 1 (N = 217), the authors documented the commitment underperception effect predicted by EMT. In Study 2 (N = 289), the authors replicated the commitment bias and documented a condition in which men's sexual overperception bias is corrected. Discussion contrasts EMT with the heuristics and biases approach and suggests additional testable hypotheses based on EMT.