Knowing the limits of one's understanding: the development of an awareness of an illusion of explanatory depth

Adults overestimate the detail and depth of their explanatory knowledge, but through providing explanations they recognize their initial illusion of understanding. By contrast, they are much more accurate in making self-assessments for other kinds of knowledge, such as for procedures, narratives, and facts. Two studies examined this illusion of explanatory depth with 48 children each in grades K, 2, and 4, and also explored adults' ratings of the children's explanations. Children judged their understanding of mechanical devices (Study 1) and procedures (Study 2). Second and fourth graders showed a clear illusion of explanatory depth for devices, recognizing the inaccuracy of their initial impressions after providing explanations. The illusion did not occur for knowledge of procedures.     

Unintended embodiment of concepts into percepts: Sensory activation boosts attention for same-modality concepts in the attentional blink paradigm

This study shows that sensory priming facilitates reports of same-modality concepts in an attentional blink paradigm. Participants had to detect and report two target words (T1 and T2) presented for 53 ms each among a series of nonwords distractors at a frequency of up to 19 items per second. SOA between target words was set to 53 ms or 213 ms, with reduced attention expected for T2 under the longer SOA (attentional blink) and for T1 under the shorter SOA (lag-1 sparing). These effects were found but reduced when the sensory modality of the concepts matched that of a sensory stimulation occurring prior to the detection trial. Hence, sensory activation increased report for same-modality concepts. This finding reveals that grounded cognition effects (1) are involved in conceptual processing as soon as a word has reached the point of lexical identification and (2) occur independent of intentional access to sensory properties of concepts.     

Overestimation of Knowledge About Word Meanings: The “Misplaced Meaning” Effect

Children and adults may not realize how much they depend on external sources in understanding word meanings. Four experiments investigated the existence and developmental course of a “Misplaced Meaning” (MM) effect, wherein children and adults overestimate their knowledge about the meanings of various words by underestimating how much they rely on outside sources to determine precise reference. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that children and adults show a highly consistent MM effect, and that it is stronger in young children. Study 3 demonstrates that adults are explicitly aware of the availability of outside knowledge, and that this awareness may be related to the strength of the MM effect. Study 4 rules out general overconfidence effects by examining a metalinguistic task in which adults are well calibrated.     

The Essentialized Self: Implications for Motivation and Self‐Regulation

Persuasion attempts are more likely to stick and less likely to be counterargued if they fit the ways people naturally make sense of themselves and their world. One way to do that is to yoke persuasion to the social categories people experience as “true” and “natural.” Gelman and Echelbarger's (2019) integrative review of essentialism outlines the emergence of essentialism in children's reasoning. Connecting their discussion with identity‐based motivation theory (D. Oyserman, 2015) and a culture‐as‐situated cognition (D. Oyserman, 2017) perspective, this commentary addresses how an essentialized self can facilitate or impair motivation and self‐regulation and potentiate or undermine persuasive efforts.     

The science of religious beliefs

Why have humans, throughout history and across cultures, shown a strong tendency to believe in the existence of superhuman intentional agents and attached this belief to notions of morality, misfortune, and the creation of the world? The answer emerging from the cognitive science of religion appears to be that explicit beliefs are informed and constrained by the natural and cross-culturally recurrent operation of implicit cognitive systems. Successful god concepts resonate with the expectations of these implicit systems but also have attention-demanding and inferentially-rich properties that allow their integration into various areas of human concern. Theological concepts may deviate from these natural cognitive moorings but require special cultural scaffolding, such as Whitehouse's two Modes of Religiosity, to do so and constitute additions to, rather than replacements of the religious beliefs supported by implicit cognitive systems.     

The illusion of knowledge: When more information reduces accuracy and increases confidence

Intuition suggests that having more information can increase prediction accuracy of uncertain outcomes. In four experiments, we show that more knowledge can decrease accuracy and simultaneously increase prediction confidence. Participants were asked to predict basketball games sampled from a National Basketball Association season. All participants were provided with statistics (win record, halftime score), while half were additionally given the team names. Knowledge of names increased the confidence of basketball fans consistent with their belief that this knowledge improved their predictions. Contrary to this belief, it decreased the participants’ accuracy by reducing their reliance on statistical cues. One of the factors contributing to this underweighting of statistical cues was a bias to bet on more familiar teams against the statistical odds. Finally, in a real betting experiment, fans earned less money if they knew the team names while persisting in their belief that this knowledge improved their predictions.     

The role of experience in children's developing folk epistemology: review and analysis from the theory–theory perspective

The role of experience in children's developing folk epistemology, specifically in their acquisition of an understanding of belief, is explored from the theory–theory perspective (i.e., the perspective claiming that children's conceptual development can be viewed as analogous to scientific theory development) through a selective review and analysis of extant empirical literature. Three types of investigations are identified: examinations of observed relationships between social experiences and belief understanding, attempts to facilitate the reasoning of children on the verge of belief understanding through experiences intended to compel children to face reasoning inconsistencies; and training studies demonstrating that children can be trained to understand belief over time through specific feedback experiences. A comparison of these studies reveals that experience is defined differently across them, resulting in varying and sometimes ambiguous implications for a theory–theory perspective on development. Implications for future research are discussed.     

Spatial limits on the nonvisual self-touch illusion and the visual rubber hand illusion: Subjective experience of the illusion and proprioceptive drift

The nonvisual self-touch rubber hand paradigm elicits the compelling illusion that one is touching one’s own hand even though the two hands are not in contact. In four experiments, we investigated spatial limits of distance (15 cm, 30 cm, 45 cm, 60 cm) and alignment (0°, 90° anti-clockwise) on the nonvisual self-touch illusion and the well-known visual rubber hand illusion. Common procedures (synchronous and asynchronous stimulation administered for 60 s with the prosthetic hand at body midline) and common assessment methods were used. Subjective experience of the illusion was assessed by agreement ratings for statements on a questionnaire and time of illusion onset. The nonvisual self-touch illusion was diminished though never abolished by distance and alignment manipulations, whereas the visual rubber hand illusion was more robust against these manipulations. We assessed proprioceptive drift, and implications of a double dissociation between subjective experience of the illusion and proprioceptive drift are discussed.     

The illusion of the positive: The impact of natural and induced mood on older adults' false recall

ABSTRACT

Recent research suggests that affective and motivational processes can influence age differences in memory. In the current study, we examine the impact of both natural and induced mood state on age differences in false recall. Older and younger adults performed a version of the Deese–Roediger–McDermott (DRM; Roediger & McDermott, 1995 Roediger III, H. L. and McDermott, K. B. 1995. Creating false memories: Remembering words not presented in lists. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 21: 803–814. doi:10.1037/0278–7393.21.4.803[Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar], Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 21, 803) false memory paradigm in either their natural mood state or after a positive or negative mood induction. Results indicated that, after accounting for age differences in basic cognitive function, age-related differences in positive mood during the testing session were related to increased false recall in older adults. Inducing older adults into a positive mood also exacerbated age differences in false memory. In contrast, veridical recall did not appear to be systematically influenced by mood. Together, these results suggest that positive mood states can impact older adults' information processing and potentially increase underlying cognitive age differences.     

The biological foundations of cognitive science

Cognitive Science originated in reactions against behaviorism that were motivated in significant part by the example of the computer. The computer raised the exciting possibility that mind could be understood almost entirely independently of brain: if the operations of the mind are akin to the execution of a program, then almost all the relevant aspects of mind would be captured by that program, independently of whatever was running it, be it transistors or neurons. This presumed independence of cognitive science from biology has waned considerably in recent decades, but in this paper, I argue that there is at least one crucial aspect of biology that has yet to be appreciated for its relevance to mental and other normative processes—the thermodynamics of living systems. In particular, I argue that the emergence of normativity in general—and normative function and representation in particular—depends on special systems that are far from thermodynamic equilibrium; these form the interface between the factual world of atoms and molecules and the normative world of mind. The nature of that emergence, in turn, imposes strong constraints on how the central nervous system functions, and, therefore, on how cognition is realized.     

The fitting attitudes analysis of value: an explanatory challenge

This paper is concerned with the implication from value to fittingness. I shall argue that those committed to this implication face a serious explanatory challenge. This argument is not intended as a knock-down argument against FA but it will, I think, show that those who endorse the theory incur a particular explanatory burden: to explain how counterfactual (dis)favouring of actual (dis)value is possible. After making two important preliminary points (about one of the primary motivations behind the theory and what this implies, respectively) I briefly discuss an objection to FA made by Krister Bykvist a few years ago. The point of discussing this objection is to enable me to more easily present my own, and I believe stronger, version of that objection. The overall argument takes the form of, simply, a counterexample which can be constructed on the back of (an acceptance) of my two preliminary points. Throughout the paper I try to respond to various objections.

     

A taste of words: linguistic context and perceptual simulation predict the modality of words

Previous studies have shown that object properties are processed faster when they follow properties from the same perceptual modality than properties from different modalities. These findings suggest that language activates sensorimotor processes, which, according to those studies, can only be explained by a modal account of cognition. The current paper shows how a statistical linguistic approach of word co-occurrences can also reliably predict the category of perceptual modality a word belongs to (auditory, olfactory-gustatory, visual-haptic), even though the statistical linguistic approach is less precise than the modal approach (auditory, gustatory, haptic, olfactory, visual). Moreover, the statistical linguistic approach is compared with the modal embodied approach in an experiment in which participants verify properties that share or shift modalities. Response times suggest that fast responses can best be explained by the linguistic account, whereas slower responses can best be explained by the embodied account. These results provide further evidence for the theory that conceptual processing is both linguistic and embodied, whereby less precise linguistic processes precede precise simulation processes.     

The illusion of nonmediation in telecommunication: Voice intensity biases distance judgments to a communication partner

The illusion of nonmediation is an experience in mediated communication where individuals respond as if the medium is not there. It is frequently associated with advanced media technology, such as virtual environments and teleconference systems. In this paper, we investigate whether people experience an illusion of nonmediation during interactions as simple as making a phone call. In three experiments, participants were asked to listen to someone's voice on a mobile phone (Experiment 1) or through VoIP software (Experiment 2 and 3) before guessing the location of the person and indicating this location on a map. Results consistently demonstrated that louder voices were judged to be closer, as if the technical mediation was ignored. Combining the three experiments, a small-scale meta-analysis yielded an effect size estimate of d = 0.37 for the ‘louder-as-closer’ effect. Implications of the results and suggestions for future research are discussed.     

Correction to: The fitting attitudes analysis of value: an explanatory challenge

Philosophical Studies - Few errors were identified in the original publication of the article. The corrections are as follows.     

On Fodor's First Law of the Nonexistence of Cognitive Science

In his enormously influential The Modularity of Mind, Jerry Fodor (1983) proposed that the mind was divided into input modules and central processes. Much subsequent research focused on the modules and whether processes like speech perception or spatial vision are truly modular. Much less attention has been given to Fodor's writing on the central processes, what would today be called higher‐level cognition. In “Fodor's First Law of the Nonexistence of Cognitive Science,” he argued that central processes are “bad candidates for scientific study” and would resist attempts at empirical analysis. This essay evaluates his argument for this remarkable claim, concluding that although central processes may well be “messier” than input modules, this does not mean that they cannot be studied and understood. The article briefly reviews the scientific progress made in understanding central processes in the 35 years since the book was published, showing that Fodor's prediction is clearly falsified by massive advances in topics like decision making and analogy. The essay concludes that Fodor's Law was not based on a clear argument for why the complexities of central systems could not be studied but was likely based on intuitions and preferences that were common in psychology at the time.     

Structural alterations of an ambiguous musical figure: The scale illusion revisited

The scale illusion (Deutsch, 1975) shows the importance of frequency range in the perceptual organization of a sequence of notes. This paper includes three experiments on the scale illusion. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated that if the structure of the pattern of notes used in the original scale illusion study is altered slightly, by adding or subtracting a pair of notes from the ends of the sequence, there is a significant decrease in the rate of frequency-based responses, suggesting a weaker illusion. Experiment 3 investigated two features of the note patterns that may have led to this change. Specifically, it asked whether the decrease in the strength of the illusion is due to (1) the nature of the notes at the extremes of the frequency range and/or (2) the nature of the notes at the crossing point of the two scales. While both sources were found to affect the strength of the scale illusion, the former had a greater influence.