The effect of Obama saliency on individual-level racial bias: Silver bullet or smokescreen?

President Obama's election has been construed as a potentially positive force for intergroup relations, but this issue has not been previously addressed experimentally. In experiment 1, conducted 4-5 months after the election, White participants were primed with either President Obama or nature before completing a variety of race-related measures. Results indicated that priming Obama did not influence implicit racial bias or internal motivation to control prejudice. However, consistent with exemplar and symbolic racism theories, participants primed with President Obama expressed greater agreement with the tenets of symbolic racism and were more reluctant to accept the possibility that they personally harbored subtle racial bias. Experiment 2, conducted 21 months after the election, replicated the Obama effects from experiment 1 and showed that priming another Black exemplar (Oprah) also increased symbolic racism. Results suggest that highly successful Black exemplars currently serve as a smokescreen for symbolic and subtle racial biases.     

How implicit racial bias and concern about appearing racist shape K-12 teachers’ race talk with students

Social Psychology of Education - Researchers and educators have increasingly recognized the importance of classroom discussions about race and racism—race talk—for student development,...     

What kind of bias is hindsight bias?

When people are asked to recollect a former response after having received feedback information, their recollection tends to approach the feedback answer. This phenomenon is referred to as hindsight bias. Recently, Erdfelder and Buchner proposed a multinomial model designed to independently measure the contributions of reconstruction and recollection processes. On its basis, they only found firm evidence for the contribution of reconstruction biases to hindsight effects. In the present study, we tried to experimentally enhance the probability of recollection biases by (a) reducing the depth of processing of the original estimate, (b) minimizing the distinctness of the original estimate and feedback, and (c) combining both treatments. The empirical data were analyzed using a variant of the Erdfelder and Buchner model which allows for the experimental manipulation of the feedback answer. This model is shown to adequately describe the data of our experiment. Moreover, although both treatments were effective in that the first one reduced correct recollections in general and the second one diminished differences between original estimates and recalled estimates, the parameter estimates indicate that the probability of recollecting the original estimate is not hampered by feedback information, even under conditions which are thought to enhance memory impairments. Received: 10 December 1995 / Accepted: 29 October 1997     

Individual differences and weight bias: Do people with an anti-fat bias have a pro-thin bias?

While levels of weight bias vary among individuals, it is not clear why one person possesses stronger anti-fat attitudes than another person. This investigation examined whether individual differences commonly associated with greater anti-fat bias are also associated with a greater preference for thinness among people of varying levels of weight. Young adults (62% women; 84% Caucasian) recruited from psychology classes (N = 308) rated four male and female figures with approximate BMIs of 18.5, 25, 30, and 40, on measures of dislike and personality characteristics and completed measures assessing weight controllability, attitudes toward the obese, and perceptual reliance. Greater negative attitudes, weight controllability beliefs, and perceptual reliance were positively associated with greater dislike and negative personality attributes among obese/severely obese figures, but inversely related among low normal weight figures. Individuals who judge others based on physical features or who view obesity as controllable evidence greater weight bias and a stronger preference for thin body types.     

Motivation to inflate performance ratings: Perceptual bias or response bias?

In a laboratory experiment support was found for the idea that inflated performance evaluations may be due to a self-serving bias — the tendency for raters to highly evaluate subordinates' performance so that they may themselves appear to be successful. Two hundred sixteen students evaluating another's work gave higher ratings of performance quantity and quality to employees they counseled about their work than to others with whom they had either only social contact or no contact at all. This effect remained even when raters were not being evaluated by an authority figure, suggesting that the inflated ratings were the result of an interest in enhancing one's own self-image (a perceptual bias) rather than cultivating the favorable impression of another (a response bias). The conceptual and practical implications of these findings are discussed.The author acknowledges the helpful comments of Robert Heneman on an earlier draft of this article. A preliminary report of this experiment was presented at the meeting of the Academy of Management, San Diego, August 1985. This work was supported, in part, by grant INT-8304375 from the National Science Foundation.     

The effects of perceived phenotypic racial stereotypicality and social identity threat on racial minorities’ attitudes about police

This study examines the role of perceived phenotypic racial stereotypicality and race-based social identity threat on racial minorities’ trust and cooperation with police. We hypothesize that in police interactions, racial minorities’ phenotypic racial stereotypicality may increase race-based social identity threat, which will lead to distrust and decreased participation with police. Racial minorities (Blacks, Latinos, Native Americans, and multi-racials) and Whites from a representative random sample of city residents were surveyed about policing attitudes. A serial multiple mediation model confirmed that racial minorities’ self-rated phenotypic racial stereotypicality indirectly affected future cooperation through social identity threat and trust. Due to the lack of negative group stereotypes in policing, the model did not hold for Whites. This study provides evidence that phenotypic stereotypicality influences racial minorities’ psychological experiences interacting with police.     

Is handedness just response bias?

Although most people prefer to use the right hand for unimanual tasks, it is unknown whether handedness arises from response bias. Whether it does is a question inspired by signal detection theory. We drew on the framework of signal detection theory to assess bias and sensitivity in hand choice by asking right-handers to choose between two tasks—one performed with the left hand, and one performed with the right. For some participants, the left-hand task stayed constant while the right-hand task was varied. For other participants, the right-hand stayed constant while the left-hand task was varied. We reasoned that if hand preference only reflected bias, participants would choose the generally preferred hand to the same degree, regardless of whether its task was constant or varied. Our participants followed this strategy only to some extent, suggesting that bias and sensitivity both contribute to hand preference.     

Does anxiety-linked attentional bias to threatening information reflect bias in the setting of attentional goals,or bias in the execution of attentional goals?

Heightened anxiety vulnerability is characterised by an attentional bias that favours the processing of negative information. However, this anxiety-linked attentional bias is amenable to two quite different explanations. One possibility is that it reflects anxiety-linked bias in the setting of attentional goals that favours setting the goal of attending towards negative information over the alternative goal of attending away from such information. Another possibility is that it reflects anxiety-linked bias in the execution of attentional goals that enhances the execution of the former attentional goal compared to the latter. The present study introduces a novel methodology designed to discriminate the validity of these competing hypotheses, by examining anxiety-linked attentional bias under two conditions. One condition left attentional goals unconstrained. The other condition imposed the attentional goal of either attending towards more negative or more benign emotional stimuli. The finding that anxiety-linked attentional bias was observed only under the former condition supported the hypothesis that anxiety is characterised by a bias favouring the setting attentional goals involving vigilance rather than avoidance of negative information, while giving no support to the hypothesis that anxiety is characterised by a bias reflecting enhanced execution of the former attentional goal compared to the latter.     

What ‘biological racial realism’ should mean

A curious ambiguity has arisen in the race debate in recent years. That ambiguity is what is actually meant by ??biological racial realism??. Some philosophers mean that ??race is a natural kind in biology??, while others mean that ??race is a real biological kind??. However, there is no agreement about what a natural kind or a real biological kind should be in the race debate. In this article, I will argue that the best interpretation of ??biological racial realism?? is one that interprets ??biological racial realism?? as ??race is a genuine kind in biology??, where a genuine kind is a valid kind in a well-ordered scientific research program. I begin by reviewing previous interpretations of ??biological racial realism?? in the race debate. Second, I introduce the idea of a genuine kind and compare it to various notions of natural and real biological kinds used in the race debate. Third, I present and defend an argument for my view. Fourth, I provide a few interesting consequences of my view for the race debate. Last, I provide a summary of the article.     

Hindsight bias and outcome bias in judging directors’ liability and the role of free will beliefs

Following a corporate disaster such as bankruptcy, people in general and damaged parties, in particular, want to know what happened and whether the company's directors are to blame. The accurate assessment of directors’ liability can be jeopardized by having to judge in hindsight with full knowledge of the adverse outcome. The present study investigates whether professional legal investigators such as judges and lawyers are affected by hindsight bias and outcome bias when evaluating directors’ conduct in a bankruptcy case. Additionally, to advance our understanding of the mechanisms underlying these biases, we also examine whether free will beliefs can predict susceptibility to hindsight bias and outcome bias in this context. In two studies (total N = 1,729), we demonstrate that legal professionals tend to judge a director's actions more negatively and perceive bankruptcy as more foreseeable in hindsight than in foresight and that these effects are significantly stronger for those who endorse the notion that humans have free will. This contribution is particularly timely considering the many companies that are currently going bankrupt or are facing bankruptcy amidst the COVID-19 pandemic.     

How do ordered questions bias eyewitnesses?

ABSTRACT

Background: Suggestive techniques can distort eyewitness memory (Wells & Loftus, 2003, Eyewitness memory for people and events. In A. M. Goldstein (Ed.), Handbook of psychology: Forensic Psychology, Vol. 11 (pp. 149–160). Hoboken, NY: John Wiley & Sons Inc). Recently, we found that suggestion is unnecessary: Simply reversing the arrangement of questions put to eyewitnesses changed what they believed (Michael & Garry, 2016, Ordered questions bias eyewitnesses and jurors. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 23, 601–608. doi:10.3758/s13423-015-0933-1). But why? One explanation might be that early questions set an anchor that eyewitnesses then adjust away from insufficiently. Methods: We tracked how eyewitness beliefs changed over the course of questioning. We then investigated the influence of people’s need to engage in and enjoy effortful cognition. This factor, “Need for Cognition,” (NFC) affects the degree to which people adjust (Cacioppo, Petty, & Feng Kao, 1984, The efficient assessment of need for cognition. Journal of Personality Assessment, 48, 306–307. doi:10.1207/s15327752jpa4803_13; Epley & Gilovich, 2006, The anchoring-and-adjustment heuristic: Why the adjustments are insufficient. Psychological Science, 17, 311–318. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.01704.x). Results: In our first two experiments we found results consistent with an anchoring-and-adjustment account. But in Experiments 3 and 4 we found that NFC provided only partial support for that account. Conclusions: Taken together, these findings have implications for understanding how people form beliefs about the accuracy of their memory.     

The racial subtext in Canada’s immigration discourse

The articulation of race has become subtle and elusive in democratic societies because racism conflicts with principles of equality and non-discrimination. This article examines Canada’s immigration discourse and argues that a racial subtext can be discerned from the discourse by examining its vocabulary, syntax, structure, and implied rationale. The study shows that codified concepts and an implied logic are used to convey racial massages that appear not to be “race”-based. The discourse is further facilitated by opinion polls and academic studies that reify the notion of “race” and legitimize its everyday use as a harmless concept. It is the discourse itself, and not implied differences of “race”, that fragments Canada. The study recommends abandoning the use of racial subtext in academic research and immigration policy development.     

Searching beneath the shelf in macaque monkeys: evidence for a gravity bias or a foraging bias?

The reasons underpinning search biases in 2 species of macaque monkeys (Macaca mulatta and Macaca arctoides) were explored over the course of 3 experiments requiring monkeys to search for a hidden food reward. The results reveal that monkeys are adept at exploiting perceptual cues to locate a food reward but are unable to use physical constraints such as solidity as cues to the reward's location. Monkeys prefer to search for a food reward beneath a solid shelf, not because they have an expectation that the reward should be there, but rather because, in the absence of usable cues, this bias emerges as a default search option. It is hypothesized that this bias may have its roots in a history of competition for food resources.     

Emotion-induced modulation of recognition memory decisions in a Go/NoGo task: Response bias or memory bias?

In recognition memory tests for words, items with negative emotional meaning are more often classified as “old” compared to neutral items, whether or not they are in fact old. Two accounts for this bias have been offered: One proposes that emotions disrupt retrieval and response monitoring processes (executive control account), the other proposes that emotions cause illusory feelings of remembering (memory bias account). We addressed this issue by varying the target signal in a Go/NoGo variant of a recognition memory task for negative, neutral, and positive words and faces: One group of participants was asked to respond to old items whereas the other group was asked to respond to new items. Results showed that the “Go-for-old” group showed the typical emotion-induced response bias shift for both positive and negative words, while the “Go-for-new” group showed the opposite pattern. Results were nonsignificant for faces, but went into the same direction. The findings are clearly inconsistent with the executive control account and speak for a genuine memory illusion induced by emotional arousal.     

Is egocentric bias evidence for simulation theory?

Revised simulation theory (Goldman 2006) allows mental state attributions containing some or all of the attributor’s genuine, non-simulated mental states. It is thought that this gives the revised theory an empirical advantage, because unlike theory theory and rationality theory, it can explain egocentric bias (the tendency to over attribute ones’ own mental states to others). I challenge this view, arguing that theory theory and rationality theory can explain egocentricity by appealing to heuristic mindreading and the diagnosticity of attributors’ own beliefs, and that these explanations are as simple and consistent as those provided by revised simulation theory.     

Does the name-race implicit association test measure racial prejudice?

Research using the Implicit Association Test (IAT) has shown that names labeled as Caucasian elicit more positive associations than names labeled as non-Caucasian. One interpretation of this result is that the IAT measures latent racial prejudice. An alternative explanation is that the result is due to differences in in-group/out-group membership. In this study, we conducted three different IATs: one with same-race Dutch names versus racially charged Moroccan names; one with same-race Dutch names versus racially neutral Finnish names; and one with Moroccan names versus Finnish names. Results showed equivalent effects for the Dutch-Moroccan and Dutch-Finnish IATs, but no effect for the Finnish-Moroccan IAT. This suggests that the name-race IAT-effect is not due to racial prejudice. A diffusion model decomposition indicated that the IAT-effects were caused by changes in speed of information accumulation, response conservativeness, and non-decision time.     

Mitigating racial microaggressions on campus: Documenting targets’ responses

In this qualitative study, the authors examined responses to racial microaggressions among undergraduate Black, Indigenous, and People of Color (BIPOC) (N = 36) at a large Canadian university. To this end, we employed the consensual qualitative research method (CQR; Hill et al., 2005; Hill, Thompson, & Williams, 1997; Hill, 2012) among seven focus groups. Canadian undergraduate student participants, who self-identified as East Asian (n = 7), South Asian (n = 7), Arab (n = 9), Black (n = 7), and Indigenous (n = 6), expressed four strategic responses to racial microaggressions: using humor to mitigate tension, seeking community and solidarity for support, avoiding or withdrawing for protection and confronting perpetrators and challenging stereotypes. Findings demonstrated the dialectic between avoiding and confronting racial microaggressions, the nuanced role of using humor as a response strategy, and the importance of social support for BIPOC students. Findings are consistent with and extend current proposals of microinterventions. Social identity markers and power dynamics influenced students’ response strategies. Implications and directions for future research are discussed.