Is statistical learning a mechanism?

Philosophers of science have offered several definitions of mechanism, most of which have biological or neuroscientific roots. In this paper, I consider whether these definitions apply equally well to cognitive science. I examine this question by looking at the case of statistical learning, which has been called a domain-general learning mechanism in the cognitive scientific literature. I argue that statistical learning does not constitute a mechanism in the philosophical sense of the term. This conclusion points to significant limitations in the scope of the mechanist philosophy when it comes to accounting for explanation in cognitive science.     

Spearman's law of diminishing returns: A statistical artifact?

Spearman's Law of Diminishing Returns (SLODR) is the idea that the structure of human cognitive ability is more differentiated and g a weaker determinant of cognitive performance at higher levels of ability. In this study, we distinguish between ‘traditional’ methods of testing SLODR and ‘contemporary’ methods of testing SLODR. It is the former set of methods from which the vast majority of the evidence base for SLODR derives. We demonstrated that it is easy to mimic SLODR and reverse SLODR effects in these traditional methods of assessing SLODR by using data with skewed observed variable distributions. The skewness magnitudes did not need to be large to produce these effects and they fell well within the range of values that are usually considered unproblematic for parametric statistic analysis. In simulated datasets, positive subtest skewness resulted in SLODR and negative subtest skewness resulted in reverse SLODR. In contemporary methods of testing SLODR, non-linear g-loadings or a skewed g are assumed to reflect evidence for SLODR. When we applied contemporary methods of testing SLODR to these data, there was evidence of heteroscedastic residuals but no evidence of non-linear g-loadings or skewed g distributions. We broadly replicated the effects of subtest skew from these simulated datasets in real data from the Minnesota Study of Twins Reared Apart. Results imply that traditional methods of assessing SLODR cannot distinguish between effects due to subtest characteristics that have nothing to do with differences in ability structure at different levels of g and true SLODR effects. This calls into question the empirical support for SLODR.     

Is compliance a professional virtue of researchers? Reflections on promoting the responsible conduct of research

Evidence exists that behavioral and social science researchers have been frustrated with regulations and institutional review boards (IRBs) from the 1970s through today. Making matters worse, many human participants protection instruction programs--now mandated by IRBs--offer inadequate reasons why researchers should comply with regulations and IRBs. Promoting compliance either for its own sake or to avoid penalties is contrary to the developmental aims of moral education and may be ineffective in fostering the responsible conduct of research. This article explores the concept of professional virtue and argues that compliance is capable of becoming a professional virtue like scientific honesty. This requires, however, that regulatory and IRB demands contribute to human well-being and to the aims of research as a profession and that researchers, therefore, internalize the norms that underlie regulatory and IRB demands. This, in turn, requires a series of changes in the way society develops, promulgates, and enforces regulatory and IRB rules. The challenge is, simply put, to embed compliance into the world of living morality.     

Is the match/mismatch model based on a statistical artefact?

In the match/mismatch model, recently formulated by Rachman and coworkers, it is stated that incorrectly predicted aversive experiences are generally followed by an immediate adjustment of the predictions concerning aversiveness of the next experience. This model can be considered to reflect a psychological process of the formation of expectations. In the present article it is argued that a simple H0 model, assuming that predictions are completely randomly generated by the subject, may account for the same effects. This H0 model is used in a stringent test of empirical data to determine if there are any effects of the discrepancy between prediction and experience on next prediction that exceed the effects explained by the H0 model. Although the H0 model produces effects very similar to the empirically observed effects, there is clear support for the hypothesized influence of the discrepancy between prediction and experience. Therefore, the model appears to reflect 'real' psychological processes and not chance findings.     

Is the Problem of Divine Hiddenness a Problem for the Reformed Epistemologist?

The problem of divine hiddenness, currently a much‐discussed topic in analytic philosophy of religion, can be (roughly) summarized in the question, ‘Why is God not more obvious or apparent?’ Sometimes the problem is used to undermine theistic belief. Here we seek to add a unique contribution to the growing debate on this theme from the perspective of Reformed epistemology, particularly Alvin Plantinga's construal; moreover, we do so in a way that is theologically relevant. We conclude, with assistance from Scripture and from Plantinga, that the problem of divine hiddenness is not a problem for the Reformed epistemologist.     

Is reflective practice an essential component of becoming a professional teacher?

This paper explores the concept of reflective practice and its role in the professionalisation of student teachers. There is an examination of the requirements to become a qualified teacher and how these requirements have determined practice. After looking at the recent evolution of state requirements for initial teacher education, in England, it investigates the place of reflective practice within that process and to what extent reflective practice is still needed to become a teacher. It presents the different interpretations of reflective practice and the role of professionalism in the journey to qualified teaching status (QTS).     

Is there a dilemma for the truthmaker non-maximalist?

Mark Jago has presented a dilemma for truthmaker non-maximalism—the thesis that some but not all truths require truthmakers. The dilemma arises because some truths that do not require truthmakers by the non-maximalist’s lights (e.g., that Santa Claus does not exist) are necessitated by truths that do (e.g., that Barack Obama knows that Santa Claus does not exist). According to Jago, the non-maximalist can supply a truthmaker for such a truth only by conceding the primary motivation for the view: that it allows one to avoid positing strange ‘negative’ entities without adopting a non-standard account of the necessary features of ordinary things. In this paper, I sketch out and defend two plausible non-maximalist proposals that evade Jago’s dilemma.     

Is Satan a Lover of the Good?

There are, apparently, two inherited stories of intentional action. On the motivational story, intentional agents are pursuers of goals. On the evaluative story, intentional agents are pursuers of value. In a spirit of unification, we might try to supplement the motivational story with the evaluative one – or even collapse the former into the latter. The problem with such moves is that they cannot accomodate certain pathologies of agency. Thus, they convert apparently perverse agents – like Satan and self-haters – into closet lovers of the good. I argue that pathological agents like Satan and self-haters are not lovers of the good. They are just lovers of success in action. We can make sense of such agents as practical reasoners because the cares that constitute us as practical reasoners are plural.     

Is amenorrhea a clinically useful criterion for the diagnosis of anorexia nervosa?

Aim of the study was to evaluate the clinical characteristics and the treatment outcome of underweight patients with eating disorder (ED) not otherwise specified without amenorrhea (EDNOS-WA), compared with classical anorexia nervosa (AN) cases. Seventy-three consecutive female patients (57 AN, and 16 EDNOS-WA) were evaluated before and after a 20-week cognitive behaviour inpatient treatment (CBT-I). Assessment included anthropometry, the Eating Disorder Examination (EDE), the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI), the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI), and the Temperament and Character Inventory (TCI). At logistic regression analysis, amenorrhea was only predicted by baseline BMI and intense exercise, not by psychopathological variables. Response to CBT-I was good and similar between groups, without differences in the dropout rate or time-to-dropout. Our data lend support to the hypothesis that the criterion “amenorrhea” is of no clinical utility in the diagnosis and treatment of AN and could be removed in the forthcoming DSM-V proposal.     

What does the character of medicine as a social practice imply for professional conscientious objection?

The dispute over professional conscientious objection presumes a picture of medicine as a practice governed by rules. This rule-based conception of medical practice is identifiable with John Rawls’s conception of social practices. This conception does not capture the character of medical practice as experienced by practitioners, for whom it is a sensibility or “form of life” rather than rules. Moreover, the sensibility of medical practice as experienced by physicians is at best neutral, and at worst hostile, to the demands of those who would override physician conscientious objection to the provision of currently contested services. That being so, calls for overriding physician conscientious objection are much more demanding of the medical profession than they appear in light of Rawls’s view. As such overriding may entail the forcible transformation of medicine’s form of life, the author contends that it would be more prudent to provide contested services by circumventing the medical profession than by compelling it.     

Is the worldview of qualitative inquiry a proper guide for psychological research?

Qualitative methods are becoming increasingly popular in psychology. Although the distinction between qualitative and quantitative often is stated in terms of methods, the real distinction is between worldviews: that favored by most qualitative methodologists, which emphasizes subjective experience and multiple realities, and that commonly accepted in science. The worldview accepted by most adherents of qualitative inquiry suggests the exclusive use of methods that include verbal reports of lived experience. Qualitative methods serve an important function in psychology, but their use as recommended by their adherents is limited in 2 respects: The adherents use a narrow and unconventional approach to qualitative methods that differs from that normally understood, and they favor use of a restricted range of qualitative methods over other qualitative methods and quantitative methods. If qualitative inquiry is to make a greater contribution to psychology, researchers in that tradition must acquire a better understanding of contemporary science, correct their misunderstandings of the rationale for quantitative methods, and address the apparent limitations of their methods emphasizing reported experience.     

Is Mathematics a Domain for Philosophers of Explanation?

In this paper we discuss three interrelated questions. First: is explanation in mathematics a topic that philosophers of mathematics can legitimately investigate? Second: are the specific aims that philosophers of mathematical explanation set themselves legitimate? Finally: are the models of explanation developed by philosophers of science useful tools for philosophers of mathematical explanation? We argue that the answer to all these questions is positive. Our views are completely opposite to the views that Mark Zelcer has put forward recently. Throughout this paper, we show why Zelcer’s arguments fail.     

Is World Poverty a Moral Problem for the Wealthy?

This article discusses the question of poverty and wealth in light of several theses put forward by Larry Temkin. The claim that there is a sort of cosmic injustice involved when great disparities of ability or of wealth are found. He is concerned especially about disparities that are undeserved. It is agreed that this is unfortunate, but not agreed that they are unjust in a sense that supports the imposition of rectification on anyone else. Nor is poverty typically undeserved in the only really relevant sense: the poor simply do not produce enough to earn them high incomes, and probably correct incomes they derive are indeed what such efforts are worth in the circumstances. That persons with very low incomes may merit our sympathy is accepted, but sympathy leads to charity, rather than to the involuntary exploitation of the better off. The essay concludes with further observations about the relevance of free markets, and points to the iniquities of the restrictions on commerce that are the most potent source of perpetuated poverty today.     

Is World Poverty a Moral Problem for the Wealthy?

This article discusses the question of poverty and wealth in light of several theses put forward by Larry Temkin. The claim that there is a sort of cosmic injustice involved when great disparities of ability or of wealth are found. He is concerned especially about disparities that are undeserved. It is agreed that this is unfortunate, but not agreed that they are unjust in a sense that supports the imposition of rectification on anyone else. Nor is poverty typically “undeserved” in the only really relevant sense: the poor simply do not produce enough to earn them high incomes, and probably correct incomes they derive are indeed what such efforts are worth in the circumstances. That persons with very low incomes may merit our sympathy is accepted, but sympathy leads to charity, rather than to the involuntary exploitation of the better off. The essay concludes with further observations about the relevance of free markets, and points to the iniquities of the restrictions on commerce that are the most potent source of perpetuated poverty today.     

Is the Reasonable Person a Person of Virtue?

Res Publica - The ‘reasonable person standard’ (RPS) is often called on in difficult legal cases as the last resource to be appealed to when other solutions run out. Its complexity...     

Is the Expiration of Intellectual Property Rights a Problem for Non-consequentialist Theories of Intellectual Property?

The expiration of intellectual property rights has been seen to amount to a problem for non-consequentialist theories of intellectual property. In this article, I assess whether the difficulty is real. I maintain that, as things are at least, there is no sufficient reason to believe that the termination of intellectual property rights is an insurmountable problem for non-consequentialist theories of intellectual property rights.     

Structure of the Dospert: Is There Evidence for a General Risk Factor?

The Domain‐specific Risk‐taking scale was designed to assess risk taking in specific domains. This approach is unconventional in personality assessment but reflects conventional wisdom in the decision community that cross‐situational consistency in risk taking is more myth than reality. We applied bifactor analysis to a large sample (n = 921) of responses to the Domain‐specific Risk Taking. Results showed that, in addition to domain‐specific facets, there does appear to be evidence for a general risk‐taking disposition. And this general appetite for risk appears to be useful for predicting real‐world outcomes. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.