Culture and basic psychological processes--toward a system view of culture: comment on Oyserman et al. (2002)

D. Oyserman, H. M. Coon, and M. Kemmelmeier (2002) provide a most comprehensive review of empirical studies that used attitudinal surveys to capture cultural variations in individualism and collectivism. In the present article, the author suggests that the cross-cultural validity of attitudinal surveys can no longer be taken for granted. Moreover, the meta-theory underlying this literature (called the entity view of culture) is called into question. The author presents an alternative meta-theory (called the system view of culture) and discusses its implications for future work in cultural and cross-cultural psychology.     

Bringing culture to basic psychological theory--beyond individualism and collectivism: comment on Oyserman et al. (2002)

D. Oyserman, H. M. Coon, and M. Kemmelmeir (2002) offered a comprehensive literature review on individualism and collectivism that forwards valuable suggestions for ways to enhance future research conducted within this framework. The author argues that although their criticisms of much contemporary social psychological research on individualism and collectivism are valid, even more fundamental problems need to be recognized as characterizing work within this tradition, such as the insufficiently subtle nature of the views held of culture, the limited attention given to meanings, and the downplaying of contextual variation. The author suggests adopting more nuanced and process-oriented conceptions of culture and more contextually grounded views of its impact on psychological functioning as a way of realizing the promise of cultural psychology to broaden and provide insight into basic psychological theory.     

On the importance of models in interpreting remember-know experiments: comments on Gardiner et al.'s (2002) meta-analysis

From a meta-analysis of recognition experiments using the remember-know-guess paradigm, Gardiner, Ramponi, and Richardson-Klavehn (2002) reported two findings that they viewed as evidence against the one-dimensional model for that paradigm: (1) Memory strength increased when know responses were added to remember responses, decreasing when guess responses were also included. (2) The accuracy of guess responses was correlated with the location of the old-new criterion in the one-dimensional model for the paradigm, implying that guesses were influenced by decision processes. We question both findings. The first result is contradicted by a signal-detection (SDT) analysis, which shows that both know and guess responses reduced estimated memory strength. The discrepancy results from the properties of A', the measure of accuracy used by Gardiner et al., which we argue is flawed. The second result follows directly from the one-dimensional model, in which accuracy and response criteria are fixed. The authors' reasons for rejecting the one-dimensional model are thus not persuasive, but it can nonetheless be rejected because ROC curves implied by the data are inconsistent with ROCs derived from ratings experiments. A two-dimensional SDT model (Rotello, Macmillan, & Reeder, 2004) accounts for both sets of data. The analysis illustrates the importance of models in interpreting remember--know data.     

Reclaiming the individual from Hofstede's ecological analysis--a 20-year odyssey: comment on Oyserman et al. (2002)

D. Oyserman, H. M. Coon, and M. Kemmelmeier (2002) challenge the stereotype that European Americans are more individualistic and less collectivistic than persons from most other ethnic groups. The author contends that this stereotype took firm empirical root with G. Hofstede's (1980) monumental publication identifying the United States as the most individualistic of his then 40 nations. This empirical designation arose because of challengeable decisions Hofstede made about the analysis of his data and the labeling of his dimensions. The conflation of concepts under the rubric of cultural individualism plus psychologists' unwarranted psychologizing of the construct then combined with Hofstede's empirical location of America to set a 20-year agenda for data collection. Oyserman et al. disentangle and organize this mass of studies, enabling the discipline of cross-cultural psychology to forge ahead in more productive directions, less reliant on previous assumptions and measures.     

On the importance of models in interpreting remember-know experiments: Comments on Gardiner et al.'s (2002) meta-analysis

From a meta-analysis of recognition experiments using the remember-know-guess paradigm, Gardiner, Ramponi, and Richardson-Klavehn (2002) reported two findings that they viewed as evidence against the one-dimensional model for that paradigm: (1) Memory strength increased when know responses were added to remember responses, decreasing when guess responses were also included. (2) The accuracy of guess responses was correlated with the location of the old-new criterion in the one-dimensional model for the paradigm, implying that guesses were influenced by decision processes. We question both findings. The first result is contradicted by a signal-detection (SDT) analysis, which shows that both know and guess responses reduced estimated memory strength. The discrepancy results from the properties of A′, the measure of accuracy used by Gardiner et al., which we argue is flawed. The second result follows directly from the one-dimensional model, in which accuracy and response criteria are fixed. The authors' reasons for rejecting the one-dimensional model are thus not persuasive, but it can nonetheless be rejected because ROC curves implied by the data are inconsistent with ROCs derived from ratings experiments. A two-dimensional SDT model (Rotello, Macmillan, & Reeder, 2004) accounts for both sets of data. The analysis illustrates the importance of models in interpreting remember-know data.     

Assessment of ADHD symptoms: comment on Gomez et al. (2003)

R. Gomez, G. L. Burns, J. A. Walsh, and M. A. de Moura (2003) examined the degree to which parent and teacher ratings of attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) symptoms are accounted for by trait, source, and error variance. The importance and limitations of Gomez et al.'s findings are discussed in the context of clinical and research assessments of children suspected of having ADHD. Gomez et al.'s findings make clear that multimethod and multisource assessment protocols should be used in diagnosing children with this disorder. Further, clinicians and researchers must avoid relying too heavily on 1 source of data when evaluating the severity and frequency of ADHD symptoms.     

Evolving science in adolescence: comment on Ellis et al. (2012)

Ellis et al. (2012) bring an evolutionary perspective to bear on adolescent risky behavioral development, clinical practice, and public policy. The authors offer important insights that (a) some risky behaviors may be adaptive for the individual and the species by being hard-wired due to fitness benefits and (b) interventions might be more successful if they move with, rather than against, the natural tendencies of an adolescent. Ellis and colleagues criticize the field of developmental psychopathology, but we see the 2 fields as complementary. Their position would be enhanced by integrating it with contemporary perspectives on dynamic cascades through which normative behavior turns into genuinely maladaptive outcomes, dual processes in adolescent neural development, and adolescent decision making. Finally, they rightly note that innovation is needed in interventions and policies toward adolescent problem behavior.     

Depression, autonomic function, and cardiorespiratory fitness: comment on Hughes, et al. (2010)

A recent paper by Hughes and colleagues suggested that dysfunction of the autonomic nervous system in depressed cardiac patients was partly explained by reduced physical activity and fitness. Other data demonstrate that exercise training and improvements in fitness not only lead to improvements in autonomic function in coronary patients but also reduce depression and depression-related increased mortality.     

Handedness and drawing: attempting to complete the picture: a comment on Bruckner, et al. (2011)

In a recent study, Bruckner, Kastner-Koller, Deimann, and Voracek (2011) investigated the relationship between hand preference and drawing during preschool years. The present study offers interpretations in a larger framework which could contribute to the better understanding of that relationship, and provides future directions in this area.     

The critical period: some thoughts on Grimshaw et al (1998)

Grimshaw et al. (1998), based on their study of an adolescent first language acquirer, support the notion of a critical period. This article discusses the findings of Grimshaw et al. in the context of second language acquisition research. The study by Grimshaw et al. is argued to be of potentially significant value in gaining an understanding of age-related differences in language acquisition. Some issues for Grimshaw et al. to address are raised.     

The validity of dietary restraint scales: comment on Stice et al. (2004)

In 4 empirical studies, E. Stice, M. Fisher, and M. R. Lowe calculated the correlations between some widely used dietary restraint scales and food intake. Failing to find substantial negative correlations, they concluded that these scales were invalid. The current article challenges this conclusion. For one thing, there is some evidence that restrained eaters do eat less than do unrestrained eaters under controlled experimental conditions favoring self-control. Dietary restraint is also associated with tendencies toward disinhibition under conditions favoring loss of self-control; such disinhibition often masks (but does not invalidate) the construct of dietary restraint. For these and other reasons, the assessment of food intake at a single eating episode may not capture overall dietary restriction. Finally, how much one eats does not necessarily indicate whether one has eaten less than one desired to eat. The authors suggest that the existing restraint scales do in fact validly assess restriction of food intake, albeit in a more complex fashion than is evident from simple correlations in single episodes.     

Intellectual disabilities and developmental EEG transition to alpha band: a comment on Shibagaki, et al. (2006)

In 2006 Shibagaki, et al. estimated mean chronological age at which dominant EEG frequency reached alpha band in 11 children with intellectual disabilities (M age, 15 yr.). Consistent with previous studies, the results showed a delay in the critical age relative to healthy children and earlier maturation at posterior scalp sites, with the exception of several children who persistently showed EEG slower than alpha band. A flaw in the study might be that having only 2 children younger than 10 yr. was insufficient. A remaining problem for researchers would be to identify whether the developmental delay in EEG correlates with IQ in intellectually disabled children.     

Intrahemispherical activation,visuomotor transmission,and the Simon effect: comment on Wascher et al. (2001)

On the basis of 3 experiments E. Wascher, U. Schatz, T. Kuder, and R. Verleger (2001) concluded, "The variety of tasks subsumed under the term Simon effect turned out to be heterogeneous" (p. 749). This comment critically evaluates the validity of their conclusion by considering their hypotheses methodology, specific conclusions, and proposed broader implications. Although the Simon effect is a behavioral phenomenon, E. Wascher et al. relied heavily on physiology in hypothesis generation, methodology, and interpretation of results. Moreover, methodological differences from most previous studies, combined with limited statistical support, nonreplication of previously reported behavioral phenomena inconsistencies in results across experiments, and evidence against a contribution of intrahemispherical activation by visuomotor pathways, strongly suggest that their conclusion should be viewed with caution.     

An evaluation of a computational model of lexical access: comment on Dell et al. (1997)

The computational model of lexical access proposed by G. S. Dell, M. F. Schwartz, N. Martin, E. M. Saffran, and D. A. Gagnon (1997) is evaluated. They argued that fits of their model to naming data obtained from normal and brain-damaged patients support assumptions regarding interactivity in the lexicon, global damage in aphasia, and continuity between normal and aphasic naming behavior. Additional analysis reveals that the model fits the empirical data poorly and that the claims Dell et al. made on the basis of the model's performance would not follow even if the model were accurate. Although use of a novel automatic regression procedure improved the model's fit, it cannot account for 5 of Dell et al.'s 21 patients (24%), and its limitations were found to be inherent in its design. It is argued that claims such as those made by Dell et al. can only be addressed by considering evidence from multiple related tasks and by comparing multiple computational models.     

Mediated and convergent lexical priming in language production: a comment on Levelt et al. (1991)

Levelt et al. (1991) argued that modular semantic and phonological stage theories of lexical access in language production are to be preferred over interactive spreading-activation theories (e.g., Dell, 1986). As evidence, they show no mediated semantic-phonological priming during picture naming: Retrieval of sheep primes goat, but the activation of goat is not transmitted to its phonological relative, goal. This research reconciles this result with spreading-activation theories and shows how the absence of mediated priming coexists with the convergent priming necessary to account for mixed semantic-phonological speech errors. The analysis leads to the proposal that the language-production system may best be characterized as globally modular but locally interactive.     

Personal standards and evaluative concerns dimensions of "clinical" perfectionism: a reply to Shafran et al. (2002, 2003) and Hewitt et al. (2003)

Shafran, Cooper, and Fairburn (2002, 2003) provided a cognitive-behavioral analysis of "clinical" perfectionism, a construct they considered to involve both the determined pursuit of self-imposed standards and extremely vulnerable self-evaluation. They argued against a multidimensional perspective to studying perfectionism. We respond to Shafran et al. (2002, 2003) and Hewitt, Flett, Besser, Sherry, and McGee's (2003) reply to Shafran et al. (2002) by considering the theoretical, empirical, and clinical implications of findings identifying two higher-order dimensions of perfectionism reflecting personal standards (PS) and self-critical evaluative concerns. Analyses of data from two diverse study groups, a college student sample (N = 527) and a clinical sample of patients with binge eating disorder (N = 236), revealed that self-criticism accounts for the relation between perfectionism measures and depressive, anxious, and eating disorder symptoms. We conclude that possessing high PS is not by itself maladaptive. Rather, self-critical evaluative tendencies are more relevant than PS to the critical processes Shafran et al. (2002) suggested contribute to the maintenance of clinical perfectionism.