Artificial Intelligence,Responsibility Attribution,and a Relational Justification of Explainability

Science and Engineering Ethics - This paper discusses the problem of responsibility attribution raised by the use of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. It is assumed that only humans can be...     

A Defense of Reductionism about Testimonial Justification of Beliefs

This paper defends reductionism about testimonial justification of beliefs against two influential arguments. One is the empirical argument to the effect that the reductionist justification of our trust in testimony is either circular since it relies on testimonial evidence or else there is scarce evidence in support of our trust in testimony. The other is the transcendental argument to the effect that trust in testimony is a prerequisite for the very existence of testimonial evidence since without the presumption of people's truthfulness we cannot interpret their utterances as testimony with propositional contents. This paper contends that the epistemic subject can interpret utterances as testimony with propositional contents without presupposing the credibility of testimony, and that evidence available to the normal epistemic subject can justify her trust in testimony.     

Shared Reality: Experiencing Commonality With Others' Inner States About the World

ABSTRACT— Humans have a fundamental need to experience a shared reality with others. We present a new conceptualization of shared reality based on four conditions. We posit (a) that shared reality involves a (subjectively perceived) commonality of individuals' inner states (not just observable behaviors); (b) that shared reality is about some target referent; (c) that for a shared reality to occur, the commonality of inner states must be appropriately motivated; and (d) that shared reality involves the experience of a successful connection to other people's inner states. In reviewing relevant evidence, we emphasize research on the saying-is-believing effect , which illustrates the creation of shared reality in interpersonal communication. We discuss why shared reality provides a better explanation of the findings from saying-is-believing studies than do other formulations. Finally, we examine relations between our conceptualization of shared reality and related constructs (including empathy, perspective taking, theory of mind, common ground, embodied synchrony, and socially distributed knowledge) and indicate how our approach may promote a comprehensive and differentiated understanding of social-sharing phenomena.     

Reliability, Justification, and the Problem of Induction

According to the main tradition in epistemology, knowledge is a variety of justified true belief, justification is an undefinable normative concept, and epistemic principles (principles about what justifies what) are necessary truths. According to the leading contemporary rival of the tradition, justification may be defined or explained in terms of reliability, thus permitting one to say that knowledge is reliable true belief and that epistemic principles are contingent. My aim here is to show that either of these approaches will yield a solution to the problem of induction. In particular, either of them makes it possible to ascertain the reliability of induction through induction itself. Such a procedure is usually dismissed as circular, but I shall argue that it cannot be so dismissed if either approach is correct.
As one would expect, the solution based on the traditional approach differs from the one based on the reliabilist alternative, but they have important features in common. The common elements are presented in sections I, II, and III, the elements specific to the reliabilist approach in sections IV, V, and VI, and those specific to the traditional approach in section VII.     

Justification,knowledge, and normality

There is much to like about the idea that justification should be understood in terms of normality or normic support (Smith in Between probability and certainty, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2016; Goodman and Salow in Philosophical Studies 175: 183–196, 2018). The view does a nice job explaining why we should think that lottery beliefs differ in justificatory status from mundane perceptual or testimonial beliefs. And it seems to do that in a way that is friendly to a broadly internalist approach to justification. In spite of its attractions, we think that the normic support view faces two serious challenges. The first is that it delivers the wrong result in preface cases. Such cases suggest that the view is either too sceptical or to externalist. The second is that the view struggles with certain kinds of Moorean absurdities. It turns out that these problems can easily be avoided. If we think of normality as a condition on knowledge, we can characterise justification in terms of its connection to knowledge and thereby avoid the difficulties discussed here. The resulting view does an equally good job explaining why we should think that our perceptual and testimonial beliefs are justified when lottery beliefs cannot be. Thus, it seems that little could be lost and much could be gained by revising the proposal and adopting a view on which it is knowledge, not justification that depends directly upon normality.

     

Social Studies and Ideological Beliefs in Mainland China and Hong Kong

Research in the West suggests that social science education enables students to become more liberal and less prejudiced in their outlook towards other people. This is the first study to test this thesis – the enlightenment thesis – in Chinese societies. Data were collected from 1,221 college students in Mainland China and 1,174 students in Hong Kong enrolled in a total of 29 institutions. The results show that though social science students showed significantly less interest in individualistic explanation and gender role traditionalism than other students, they did not gain from longer stays in college. These findings do not support the enlightenment thesis in Chinese societies. Instead, the findings that Mainland students favored nationalism significantly more and authoritarianism and individualist explanation significantly less than did Hong Kong students are consistent with the dominant ideology thesis.     

Justification,sociality, and autonomy

Theories of epistemically justified belief have long assumed individualism. In its extreme, or Lockean, form individualism rules out justified belief on testimony by insisting that a subject is justified in believing a proposition only if he or she possesses first-hand justification for it. The skeptical consequences of extreme individualism have led many to adopt a milder version, attributable to Hume, on which a subject is justified in believing a proposition only if he or she is justified in believing that there is testimony in favor of the proposition deriving from a reliable source. I argue that this Humean individualism also leads to skepticism in a wide range of cases; it makes it impossible for a layperson to be justified on expert testimony. In addition, I argue that the apparent motivation for the Humean view, an insistence on intellectual autonomy in justification, does not succeed in motivating it. I then explore the contours of a collectivist view of justification on testimony, with special attention to the place of a subject's intellectual autonomy in such justification. I try to bring empirical results of the psychology of persuasion to bear on the epistemological issues.     

The Endorsement of Minority Rights: The Role of Group Position, National Context, and Ideological Beliefs

The present research was conducted in the Netherlands and used an experimental design to examine the endorsement of minority rights among Turkish and Kurdish participants in two framed, national contexts: the Netherlands and Turkey. In the Dutch context, each group is a minority, whereas in the Turkish context the Kurds are an oppressed national minority and the Turks are the national majority. The results showed that the Turks were less in favor of minority rights in the Turkish context than in the Dutch context, whereas the Kurds were more in favor of minority rights in the Turkish than in the Dutch context. In addition, the endorsement of minority rights was related to beliefs about majority rule, state unity, and ingroup identification, as well as to cultural diversity and perceived pervasive discrimination. The associations with the former three measures differed between the two groups and the two national contexts, whereas the latter two measures had main effects on the endorsement of minority rights.     

Objectification and System Justification Impact Rape Avoidance Behaviors

There is little recent research on women’s adoption of rape avoidance behaviors, and there has been no known investigation into how adoption of these behaviors relates to various system justification beliefs or experiences of sexual objectification. We surveyed 294 U.S. women aged 18 to 40 to assess experiences of objectification, belief in a just world, gender-specific system justification, benevolent sexism, rape myth acceptance, and engagement in rape avoidance behaviors. Belief in a just world, gender-specific system justification, and benevolent sexism were conceptualized and analyzed as a “system justification” latent factor due to similarities between constructs regarding how they influence worldview, particularly regarding fairness and relations between dominant and subordinate groups. Our hypothesized model had good fit to the data and illustrated that experiencing objectification was related to increased rape myth acceptance and system justification, which, in turn, were related to implementation of rape avoidance behaviors. Further, system justification was significantly positively related to rape myth acceptance. Results show the continued importance of understanding the role of objectification in the endorsement of rape myths and assessments of societal fairness, as well as how women’s attitudes about society may ultimately affect their assessment of rape myths and their personal behavior. This research provides new information and groundwork for researchers developing rape education programming in addition to those interested in the complex relationship between women’s experiences and behavioral outcomes.