BRIEF REPORT Self‐reference,ambiguity, and dysphoria

The present study examined two aspects of a dysphoric attentional bias: (1) the role of the emotional tone of the stimuli; and (2) the role of self‐referential processing. A total of 40 nondepressed participants were divided into groups of high and low dysphoria and then primed using a series of formal and self‐referent tasks. Word fragments were presented, using a computer. Each word fragment could be completed with either of two solutions: (i) a word primed through a formal learning process: or (ii) a word primed through a self‐referential process. Results indicated that dysphoric participants; (1) showed a bias towards negative information in general; and (2) showed a bias towards using self‐referent words to complete ambiguous word fragments, independent of the emotional tone of the stimuli. The implications of these findings for both the dysphoric self‐concept and cognitive therapy are discussed.     

Autobiographical memories and views of the future: In relation to dysphoria

The present study investigated dysphoric individuals' self‐referential processing of autobiographical memories and future personal events, in relation to specificity and response latency. Dysphoric individuals (n  =  17) and nondysphoric controls (n  =  17) were selected from a larger sample based on self‐reported depression. Participants completed an autobiographical memory task (AMT) and a future event task (FET), using pleasant and unpleasant (anxiety‐relevant, depression‐relevant) emotional word cues. In response to each emotional cue, participants were required to access and write down a specific personal memory and future event, respectively. Consistent with the hypotheses, dysphoric individuals were less specific in describing pleasant and unpleasant experiences (particularly pleasant), irrespective of time condition. As expected, dysphoric individuals' specificity for distinct depression‐relevant and anxiety‐relevant experiences did not differ significantly. As predicted, all participants were less specific in describing future personal events than in recalling personal memories. As predicted, dysphoric individuals took longer to think of pleasant memories and pleasant future experiences than controls but, as expected, groups did not differ significantly on mean reaction times for past and future unpleasant experiences. Overall, the data showed a degree of consistency in participants' past and future‐oriented processing of self‐referential material. Although considerable research has investigated autobiographical memories in relation to emotional disturbance, the present findings suggest that constructing future emotional experiences is also an important aspect of mental health.     

Affective forecasting and self-rated symptoms of depression, anxiety, and hypomania: evidence for a dysphoric forecasting bias

Emerging research has examined individual differences in affective forecasting; however, we are aware of no published study to date linking psychopathology symptoms to affective forecasting problems. Pitting cognitive theory against depressive realism theory, we examined whether dysphoria was associated with negatively biased affective forecasts or greater accuracy. Participants (n=325) supplied predicted and actual emotional reactions for three days surrounding an emotionally evocative relational event, Valentine's Day. Predictions were made a month prior to the holiday. Consistent with cognitive theory, we found evidence for a dysphoric forecasting bias-the tendency of individuals in dysphoric states to overpredict negative emotional reactions to future events. The dysphoric forecasting bias was robust across ratings of positive and negative affect, forecasts for pleasant and unpleasant scenarios, continuous and categorical operationalisations of dysphoria, and three time points of observation. Similar biases were not observed in analyses examining the independent effects of anxiety and hypomania. Findings provide empirical evidence for the long-assumed influence of depressive symptoms on future expectations. The present investigation has implications for affective forecasting studies examining information-processing constructs, decision making, and broader domains of psychopathology.     

内隐自我正面偏见的机制及可变性

自我正面偏见是指对大多数个体来说, 其自我相关信息与正性情绪效价联系紧密, 个体倾向于把正面结果或特质归因于自我内部稳定的人格特征, 而认为负面结果或特质与自己的人格特征不相关。本项目从自我正面偏见的文化相对论与文化普遍论之争出发, 采用行为和认知神经科学技术, 试图证实集体主义文化下自我正面偏见的存在, 并对照外显自我正面偏见, 考察内隐层面上的自我正面偏见及其可变性, 探索抑郁个体的内隐自我相关信息加工的改善, 了解其大脑神经基础, 揭示内隐自我正面偏见的性质与特征, 验证和完善自我相关信息与情绪信息的功能加工层次模型。研究结果不仅有助于从内隐层面上了解自我与情绪的复杂关系, 而且还将对其神经基础做出重要探索, 更深入地解读中国人的自我的本质。     

Affective forecasting and self-rated symptoms of depression,anxiety, and hypomania: Evidence for a dysphoric forecasting bias

Emerging research has examined individual differences in affective forecasting; however, we are aware of no published study to date linking psychopathology symptoms to affective forecasting problems. Pitting cognitive theory against depressive realism theory, we examined whether dysphoria was associated with negatively biased affective forecasts or greater accuracy. Participants (n=325) supplied predicted and actual emotional reactions for three days surrounding an emotionally evocative relational event, Valentine's Day. Predictions were made a month prior to the holiday. Consistent with cognitive theory, we found evidence for a dysphoric forecasting bias—the tendency of individuals in dysphoric states to overpredict negative emotional reactions to future events. The dysphoric forecasting bias was robust across ratings of positive and negative affect, forecasts for pleasant and unpleasant scenarios, continuous and categorical operationalisations of dysphoria, and three time points of observation. Similar biases were not observed in analyses examining the independent effects of anxiety and hypomania. Findings provide empirical evidence for the long-assumed influence of depressive symptoms on future expectations. The present investigation has implications for affective forecasting studies examining information-processing constructs, decision making, and broader domains of psychopathology.     

Valence, comparison focus and self-positivity biases: does it matter whether people judge positive or negative traits?

The present research questions whether mere valence affects self-other comparisons in the domain of trait characteristics. While some previous studies have reported greater positivity bias for the self when traits were positive than when traits were negative, we suggest that this is an ambiguous finding, because valence and content were confounded. When we unconfounded content and valence, valence had no effect on the magnitude of self-positivity bias displayed. We also replicate several findings for our unconfounded set of traits. Firstly, comparing others to the self, rather than comparing the self to others, lowered self-positivity for positive and negative traits (focus effect). Secondly, extremely positive and negative traits triggered greater positivity bias than did more moderately evaluated ones. Finally, we suggest that comparative self-positivity biases may be based on a general positivity bias.     

Dysphoria and the prediction and experience of emotion

Depression and dysphoria have been characterised by dampened positive emotional experiences. However, it remains unclear whether dysphoria is also characterised by dampened expectancies about positive emotional experiences. In the present study, participants with (dysphoric group; n=36) and without (non-dysphoric group; n=36) dysphoria reported on their expected and actual emotional responses to winning and losing money in a computer task. Results showed the dysphoric group predicted and experienced less happiness and contentment after winning money than the non-dysphoric group. Results also showed the dysphoric group predicted and experienced as much negative emotion after losing money as the non-dysphoric group. Moreover, the dysphoric group predicted they would experience more happiness after winning money than they actually did, whereas the non-dysphoric group experienced as much happiness as they had predicted. Results suggest that disturbances in positive emotional responding are characteristic of people experiencing dysphoria.     

Reversed mnemic neglect of self-threatening memories in dysphoria

Previous research has suggested that people have difficulties remembering information which is threatening to the self—an effect known as mnemic neglect. Three experiments are presented that examined mnemic neglect in dysphoria and whether dysphoric individuals show enhanced memory for self-threatening information. Pilot work determined that dysphoric participants rated central negative traits as more important than nondysphoric participants. In Experiment 1, dysphoric participants were found to have better memory for self-threatening information than nondysphoric participants. Enhanced recall of self-threatening memories was also found for unmodifiable (Experiment 2), and highly diagnostic (Experiment 3) self-threatening traits. The findings suggest that dysphoric participants show reversed mnemic neglect effects indicating enhanced access to negative information relating to the self.     

Self-guides, autobiographical memory, and anxiety and dysphoria: toward a cognitive model of vulnerability to emotional distress.

Several aspects of a cognitive model of vulnerability to emotional disorders based on self-discrepancy theory were tested. Anxious, dysphoric, anxious/dysphoric, and control subjects participated in 3 studies over a 4-month period: screening, assessment of self-guides and self-discrepancies, and an autobiographical memory task in which different types of retrieval cues (including self-guides) were presented and subjects reported childhood memories as they came to mind. Actual:ideal discrepancy was associated with persistent dysphoria, whereas actual:ought discrepancy was associated with persistent anxiety. Self-guide cues resulted in more efficient retrieval and greater unintended negative emotional content than comparable cue types. The groups were differentiated only by negative affect content in response to self-guide cues.     

Avoiding Anxiety,Being in Denial,or Simply Stroking Self‐Esteem: Why Self‐Positivity?

This article studies the presence, resilience, and direction of the self‐positivity bias under various conditions to examine the role of self‐esteem maintenance as an important antecedent for the bias. Experiment 1 manipulates the perceptions of the uncontrollability of cancer and presence of base‐rate information as independent variables that together eliminate the self‐positivity bias in perceptions of the risk of cancer. Experiment 2 shows the same effects using 4 life events that differ in terms of valence and perceived controllability; that is, base‐rate information affects self‐estimates for uncontrollable life events, reducing the self‐positivity bias, but does not affect self‐estimates for controllable events. Experiment 3 shows that these effects only apply to optimistic individuals who fail to incorporate base‐rate information into their self‐perceptions for controllable events. In contrast, pessimists use base rates to update their self‐estimates irrespective of the controllability of the event. Overall, the pattern suggests that self‐positivity is attenuated in conditions that implicate self‐esteem. Implications for health care marketing are discussed.     

Gaze behavior predicts memory bias for angry facial expressions in stable dysphoria

Interpersonal theories suggest that depressed individuals are sensitive to signs of interpersonal rejection, such as angry facial expressions. The present study examined memory bias for happy, sad, angry, and neutral facial expressions in stably dysphoric and stably nondysphoric young adults. Participants' gaze behavior (i.e., fixation duration, number of fixations, and distance between fixations) while viewing these facial expressions was also assessed. Using signal detection analyses, the dysphoric group had better accuracy on a surprise recognition task for angry faces than the nondysphoric group. Further, mediation analyses indicated that greater breadth of attentional focus (i.e., distance between fixations) accounted for enhanced recall of angry faces among the dysphoric group. There were no differences between dysphoria groups in gaze behavior or memory for sad, happy, or neutral facial expressions. Findings from this study identify a specific cognitive mechanism (i.e., breadth of attentional focus) that accounts for biased recall of angry facial expressions in dysphoria. This work also highlights the potential for integrating cognitive and interpersonal theories of depression.     

Systems of coping associated with dysphoria, anxiety and depressive illness: a multivariate profile perspective

As numerous coping strategies to deal with stressors can be used concurrently or sequentially, it may be productive to consider coping from a broad, systemic perspective. Using profile analysis and multivariate techniques, we demonstrated that coping profiles comprising multiple strategies distinguished between various mood states (dysphoria, anxiety, major depression, dysthymia and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD)). Generally, affective disturbances were associated with increased levels of rumination, cognitive distraction and emotion-focused coping (emotional expression, other-blame, self-blame, emotional containment and passive resignation) coupled with diminished problem solving and social support seeking. These coping profiles, however, varied as a function of anxiety vs. dysphoria, and severity of dysphoric symptoms, although the profile of dysphoric individuals was similar to that of clinically diagnosed dysthymic and major depressive patients. While coping profiles were generally stable over time (6 months), improvement or deterioration of mood was accompanied by corresponding alterations of coping profiles. Importantly, coping profile was not simply a correlate of dysphoric mood, but was also found to be an antecedent condition that favored the evolution of more severe affective problems. It is suggested that a multidimensional approach may prove useful in understanding coping as a dynamic system, and may have implications for clinical intervention.     

Mood-congruent attention and memory bias in dysphoria: Exploring the coherence among information-processing biases

Recent studies indicate that depression is characterized by mood-congruent attention bias at later stages of information-processing. Moreover, depression has been associated with enhanced recall of negative information. The present study tested the coherence between attention and memory bias in dysphoria. Stable dysphoric (n = 41) and non-dysphoric (n = 41) undergraduates first performed a spatial cueing task that included negative, positive, and neutral words. Words were presented for 250 ms under conditions that allowed or prevented elaborate processing. Memory for the words presented in the cueing task was tested using incidental free recall. Dysphoric individuals exhibited an attention bias for negative words in the condition that allowed elaborate processing, with the attention bias for negative words predicting free recall of negative words. Results demonstrate the coherence of attention and memory bias in dysphoric individuals and provide suggestions on the influence of attention bias on further processing of negative material.     

Reversed mnemic neglect of self-threatening memories in dysphoria

Previous research has suggested that people have difficulties remembering information which is threatening to the self--an effect known as mnemic neglect. Three experiments are presented that examined mnemic neglect in dysphoria and whether dysphoric individuals show enhanced memory for self-threatening information. Pilot work determined that dysphoric participants rated central negative traits as more important than nondysphoric participants. In Experiment 1, dysphoric participants were found to have better memory for self-threatening information than nondysphoric participants. Enhanced recall of self-threatening memories was also found for unmodifiable (Experiment 2), and highly diagnostic (Experiment 3) self-threatening traits. The findings suggest that dysphoric participants show reversed mnemic neglect effects indicating enhanced access to negative information relating to the self.     

Attentional bias to negative information and 5-HTTLPR genotype interactively predict students' emotional reactivity to first university semester

People strongly differ in their emotional reactions to potentially stressing and challenging environmental circumstances. Two classes of individual differences have independently been reported to contribute to such emotional vulnerability: an attentional bias to negative information and a variation in the serotonin transporter gene (5-HTTLPR). The present study was conducted to investigate the possibility that these cognitive and genetic markers interact in their prospective prediction of emotional reactivity to an extended and mild potential stressor. Changes in dysphoria and anxiety across their first university semester were measured in 120 students. Results indicate that attentional bias toward negative information on Week 1 of the semester significantly predicted cross-semester changes in both anxiety and dysphoria. For the latter, this predictive capacity depended on the 5-HTTLPR genotype. Specifically, only in homozygous carriers of the 5-HTTLPR short allele did attentional bias to negative information on Week 1 significantly predict cross-semester change in dysphoria. These results carry important theoretical and practical implications concerning the ability to identify individuals vulnerable to experiencing elevated emotional reactivity to potentially stressing life-events.     

Effects of dysphoria and induced negative mood on the processes underlying hindsight bias

Hindsight bias is the tendency to overestimate one’s prior knowledge of facts or events once the actual facts or events are known. Several theoretical frameworks suggest that affective states might influence hindsight bias. Nondysphoric participants (n?=?123, BDI?≤?13) in negative or neutral mood, and dysphoric participants (n?=?19, BDI?>?13) generated and recalled answers to difficult knowledge questions. All groups showed hindsight bias, that is, their recalled estimates were closer to the correct answer when this answer was shown at recall. Multinomial modelling revealed, however, that under dysphoria and induced negative mood different processes contributed to hindsight bias. Dysphoria, but not induced negative mood, was associated with a stronger reconstruction bias, compared with neutral mood. A recollection bias appeared in neutral, but neither in induced negative nor dysphoric mood. These findings highlight differences between the cognitive consequences of dysphoria and induced negative mood.     

“You make me a better/worse person”: A two‐dimensional model of relationship self‐change

For better or worse, relationships have the potential to affect individuals' self‐concepts; however, currently no integrative model exists to explain the variety of these self‐concept changes. We propose that self‐concept changes occur along two independent dimensions: direction (increase vs. decrease in content) and valence (positivity vs. negativity of content). These two dimensions combine to create four processes of relationship‐induced self‐concept change: self‐expansion (increasing positive content), self‐contraction (decreasing positive content), self‐pruning (decreasing negative content), and self‐adulteration (increasing negative content). Using community and university samples, we developed a measure of self‐concept change (Study 1) and examined how the four self‐processes were associated with love (Study 1), relationship quality (Studies 2 and 3), and infidelity (Study 3). The self‐concept improvement processes (i.e., self‐expansion and self‐pruning) were associated with greater love and relationship quality, whereas in Study 3 self‐concept degradation processes (i.e., self‐contraction and self‐adulteration) predicted infidelity.     

Theory of mind and attentional bias to facial emotional expressions: A preliminary study

Ribeiro, L. A. & Fearon, P. (2010). Theory of mind and attentional bias to facial emotional expressions: A preliminary study. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology. Theory of mind ability has been associated with performance in interpersonal interactions and has been found to influence aspects such as emotion recognition, social competence, and social anxiety. Being able to attribute mental states to others requires attention to subtle communication cues such as facial emotional expressions. Decoding and interpreting emotions expressed by the face, especially those with negative valence, are essential skills to successful social interaction. The current study explored the association between theory of mind skills and attentional bias to facial emotional expressions. According to the study hypothesis, individuals with poor theory of mind skills showed preferential attention to negative faces over both non‐negative faces and neutral objects. Tentative explanations for the findings are offered emphasizing the potential adaptive role of vigilance for threat as a way of allocating a limited capacity to interpret others’ mental states to obtain as much information as possible about potential danger in the social environment.