Adult brains don't fully overcome biases that lead to incorrect performance during cognitive development: an fMRI study in young adults completing a Piaget‐like task

A current issue in developmental science is that greater continuity in cognition between children and adults may exist than is usually appreciated in Piaget‐like (stages or ‘staircase’) models. This phenomenon has been demonstrated at the behavioural level, but never at the brain level. Here we show with functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), for the first time, that adult brains do not fully overcome the biases of childhood. More specifically, the aim of this fMRI study was to evaluate whether the perceptual bias that leads to incorrect performance during cognitive development in a Piaget‐like task is still a bias in the adult brain and hence requires an executive network to overcome it. Here, we compared two numerical‐judgment tasks, one being a Piaget‐like task with number–length interference (called ‘INT’) and the other being a control task with number–length covariation (‘COV’). We also used a colour‐detection task to control for stimuli numerosity, spatial distribution, and frequency. Our behavioural results confirmed that INT remains a difficult task for young adults. Indeed, response times were significantly higher in INT than in COV. Moreover, we observed that only in INT did response times increase linearly as a function of the number of items. The fMRI results indicate that the brain network common to INT and COV shows a large rightward functional asymmetry, emphasizing the visuospatial nature of these two tasks. When INT was compared with COV, activations were found within a right frontal network, including the pre‐supplementary motor area, the anterior cingulate cortex, and the middle frontal gyrus, which probably reflect detection of the number/length conflict and inhibition of the ‘length‐equals‐number’ response strategy. Finally, activations related to visuospatial and quantitative processing, enhanced or specifically recruited in the Piaget‐like task, were found in bilateral posterior areas.     

Welfare,Autonomy, and the Autonomy Fallacy

In this article, I subject the claim that autonomous choice is an intrinsic welfare benefit to critical scrutiny. My argument begins by discussing perhaps the most influential argument in favor of the intrinsic value of autonomy: the argument from deference. In response, I hold that this argument displays what I call the ‘Autonomy Fallacy’: the argument from deference has no power to support the intrinsic value of autonomy in comparison to the important evaluative significance of bare self‐direction (autonomous or not) or what I call ‘self‐direction tout court’. I defend the claim that the Autonomy Fallacy really is a fallacy, and show that my examination of the argument from deference has wider reverberations. Once we clearly distinguish between autonomy and self‐direction tout court, it becomes much less plausible to say that autonomy of itself is an intrinsic welfare benefit.     

Routes for Roots: A Mapping Shorthand Symbolism with Reference to Nelson Goodman’s Hidden Ars Combinatoria

A shorthand symbolism for the relational mapping of categories (MSS) is introduced and developed on the basis of Nelson Goodman's structural methodology. Through a reconstruction of extensional isomorphism that Goodman introduces as a criterion for definitional accuracy, and a brief reminder of the argument structure behind his ‘new riddle of induction’, Goodman's radical ontological relativism is turned into a protological principle of what I call ‘domain constituting philosophy’. MSS is demonstrated with reference to Goodman's symbol theory, particularly his notion of exemplification, as well as in a final structured comparison of Frege's ‘sense’ with Goodman's straightforward construction of ‘secondary extension’.     

Empirical Theology: inter‐ or intra‐disciplinary?

This article seeks to reflect on the methodology of what has come to be called ‘empirical theology’. In particular it considers the question of how theology might relate to the social sciences. The more established expression is what is called the ‘inter‐disciplinary’ approach. This has been advocated by both sociologists and religious educationalists. In contrast, Johannes van der Ven, Professor of Practical Theology at the Catholic University of Nijmegen, advocates an ‘intra‐disciplinary’ approach. This approach is innovative in seeking to incorporate social science methods within a theological framework. The contention of the article is that while some forms of inter‐disciplinary approaches are potentially more rigorous they are not without difficulty. Theologians, however, have been given a valuable model of how theology might relate to the social sciences by means of van der Ven's approach. It now remains for the practical theological community of scholars to assess it.     

Epistemicism,Distribution, and the Argument from Vagueness

This paper consists of two parts. The first concerns the logic of vagueness. The second concerns a prominent debate in metaphysics. One of the most widely accepted principles governing the ‘definitely’ operator is the principle of Distribution: if ‘p’ and ‘if p then q’ are both definite, then so is ‘q’. I argue however, that epistemicists about vagueness (at least those who take a broadly Williamsonian line) should reject this principle. The discussion also helps to shed light on the elusive question of what, on this framework, it takes for a sentence to be borderline or definite. In the second part of the paper, I apply this result to a prominent debate in metaphysics. One of the most influential arguments in favour of Universalism about composition is the Lewis‐Sider argument from vagueness. An interesting question, however, is whether epistemicists have any particular reasons to resist the argument. I show that there is no obvious reason why epistemicists should resist the argument but there is a non‐obvious one: the rejection of Distribution argued for in the first part of the paper provides epistemicists with a unique way of resisting the argument from vagueness.     

Recognition,Freedom, and the Self in Fichte's Foundations of Natural Right

In this paper I present an interpretation of J. G. Fichte's transcendental argument for the necessity of mutual recognition (Anerkennung) in Foundations of Natural Right. Fichte's argument purports to show that, as a condition of the possibility of self‐consciousness, we must take ourselves to stand in relations of mutual recognition with other agents like ourselves. After reconstructing the steps of Fichte's argument, I present what I call the ‘modal dilemma’, which highlights a serious ambiguity in Fichte's deduction. According to the modal dilemma, the conclusion to Fichte's transcendental argument—that as a condition of the possibility of our self‐consciousness, we must recognize and be recognized by others—expresses either metaphysical or normative necessity. However, no normative conclusion follows from Fichte's premises, and the metaphysical claim that does follow from his argument appears to be implausibly strong. Thus the argument looks like a failure on either interpretation of the conclusion's modality. In the penultimate section of the paper, I propose a new interpretation of the argument that avoids the modal dilemma and provides a normative grounding of Fichte's concept of right.     

IV. Logic and truth‐finding in society and sociology

The question of sociological truth‐finding is posed in the light of the view that logical formalizations, along with other arguments, only acquire relevance in illocutionary contexts, where it is not so much the abstract correctness of a sentence as the stating of it that counts. In order to become a counterfactual an argument requires its antecedent to be recognized as being contrary to the ‘facts’. To this extent there is a clear link with ‘reality’ or with a view of the world that is taken as factually given. Social science develops on the basis not only of generalizations but also of historical facts and political requirements. The question arises: in terms of what world‐view or purpose can we unambiguously declare a conditional to be a counterfactual ‐ and a significant or non‐trivial one at that? Further, can Elster's clarifications help identify political agents and the proper entities within and through which political action is performed? Finally, the problem‐solving capacity of the concept of closeness of one possible world to another or to the actual world, especially with regard to counterfactuals and causality, is questioned.     

The public good that does the public good: A new reading of Mohism

Mohism has long been misrepresented. Mo‐tzu is usually called a utilitarian because he preached a universal love that must benefit. Yet Mencius, who pined the Confucian way of virtue (humaneness and righteousness) against Mo‐tzu's way of benefit, basically borrowed Mo‐tzu's thesis: that the root cause of chaos is this lack of love—except Mencius renamed it the desire for personal benefit. Yet Mo‐tzu only championed ‘benefit’ to head off its opposite, ‘harm’, specifically the harm done by Confucians who with good intent (love) perpetuated rites that did people more harm than good. Mo‐tzu wanted his universal love to be the public good that would actually do the public good (i.e. benefit the collective). And he derived this from Confucius’ teaching of ‘Love (all) men’ and his Golden Rule: Render not what others would not desire. No man desires harm. As a critic of Confucian rites (especially the prolonged funeral), Mo‐tzu worked to replace the blind custom of rites with his rational measure of ‘rightness’: what is right must do good (i.e. benefit the intended recipient). It is not true that Mohists were ‘joyless’ ascetics; they would gladly celebrate a good harvest with wine and folk song—not expensive court music—with the people. Since Mohist discourse is ‘public’ (that is, accountable), it is also only proper that what is ‘right’ should be outer (means‐end efficacy) and not inner as Mencius would insist.     

Grounding: Necessary or Contingent?

Recent interest in the nature of grounding is due in part to the idea that purely modal notions are too coarse‐grained to capture what we have in mind when we say that one thing is grounded in another. Grounding not being purely modal in character, however, is compatible with it having modal consequences. Is grounding a necessary relation? In this article I argue that the answer is ‘yes’ in the sense that propositions corresponding to full grounds modally entail propositions corresponding to what they ground. The argument proceeds upon two substantive principles: the first is that there is a broadly epistemic constraint on grounding, while the second links this constraint with Fine's Aristotelian notion of essence. Many think grounding is necessary in something like the sense specified above, but just why it's necessary is an issue that hasn't been carefully addressed. If my argument is successful, we now know why grounding is necessary.     

Between Causes and Reasons: Sellars,Hegel (and Lewis) on “Sensation”

ABSTRACT

This paper explores Sellars’ and Hegel’s treatment of ‘sensation’ – a notion that plays a central role in the reflections of both authors but which has garnered little scholarly attention. To disentangle the issues surrounding the notion and elaborate its role, function, and fate in their thought, I begin with a methodological question: what kind of philosophical argument leads Sellars and Hegel to introduce the concept of ‘sensation’ into their systems? Distinguishing between their two argumentative approaches, I maintain that Hegel offers what I broadly label a ‘transcendental’ argument for ‘sensation,’ which he presents in the Philosophy of Subjective Spirit and in the corresponding Lectures, whereas Sellars introduces the notion of sensation for what I term empirically ‘explanatory’ reasons. Next, I closely analyze Hegel’s and Sellars’ theories of sensation to produce a textually supported and conceptually coherent reading of their views on the notion. To clarify my methodological distinction and its stakes in Hegel’s and Sellars’ I will reference Lewis’ notion of the given.     

Think‐Aloud Process Superior to Thought‐Listing in Increasing Children's Critical Processing of Advertising

This study develops and tests a model of children's critical processing of advertising. Within this model, 2 paths to reduced advertising susceptibility (i.e., attitude toward the advertised brand) were hypothesized: a cognitive path and an affective path. The secondary aim was to compare these paths for different thought verbalization processes: think‐aloud and thought‐listing. The model was tested on a sample of 8‐ to 12‐year‐old children (N = 163). Structural equation modeling revealed that, for children in the think‐aloud group, both cognitive and affective paths were successful in reducing advertising susceptibility. However, for children in the thought‐listing group, only the affective path was successful. These findings suggest that the think‐aloud process increased children's motivation and ability to critically process advertising messages.     

Visual variability affects early verb learning

Research demonstrates that within‐category visual variability facilitates noun learning; however, the effect of visual variability on verb learning is unknown. We habituated 24‐month‐old children to a novel verb paired with an animated star‐shaped actor. Across multiple trials, children saw either a single action from an action category (identical actions condition, for example, travelling while repeatedly changing into a circle shape) or multiple actions from that action category (variable actions condition, for example, travelling while changing into a circle shape, then a square shape, then a triangle shape). Four test trials followed habituation. One paired the habituated verb with a new action from the habituated category (e.g., ‘dacking’ + pentagon shape) and one with a completely novel action (e.g., ‘dacking’ + leg movement). The others paired a new verb with a new same‐category action (e.g., ‘keefing’ + pentagon shape), or a completely novel category action (e.g., ‘keefing’ + leg movement). Although all children discriminated novel verb/action pairs, children in the identical actions condition discriminated trials that included the completely novel verb, while children in the variable actions condition discriminated the out‐of‐category action. These data suggest that – as in noun learning – visual variability affects verb learning and children's ability to form action categories.     

Five Private Language Arguments

This paper distinguishes five key interpretations of the argument presented by Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations I, §258. I also argue that on none of these five interpretations is the argument cogent. The paper is primarily concerned with the most popular interpretation of the argument: that which that makes it rest upon the principle that one can be said to follow a rule only if there exists a ‘useable criterion of successful performance’ (Pears) or ‘operational standard of correctness’ (Glock) for its correct application. This principle, I suggest, is untrue. The private language argument upon which it rests therefore fails.     

II. A reply to Siegel on Kuhnian relativism

Siegel argues that the Kuhnian relativism presented in ‘Kuhn's Epistemological Relativism’ fails because it neglects the possibility of rational choice in science between rival paradigms’ own incommensurable standards on the basis of ‘paradigm‐neutral external standards’. In reply, it is argued (1) that Siegel has given no reason to believe that there are such external standards in science, (2) that the mere ‘possibility’ of such standards in scientific debate is not sufficient to vitiate Kuhn's relativism, (3) that the actual existence of rational debate concerning the internal standards of rival paradigms does not entail (as Siegel claims) the existence of ‘paradigm‐neutral external standards’, and finally (4) that Kuhn's relativism concerning standards in science does not lead (as Siegel claims) to a ‘reductio’ which undermines the philosophical standards implicit in Kuhn's argument.     

Almost‐Ontology: Why Epistemicism Cannot Help Us Avoid Unrestricted Composition or Diachronic Plenitude

That any filled location of spacetime contains a persisting thing has been defended based on the ‘argument from vagueness.’ It is often assumed that since the epistemicist account of vagueness blocks the argument from vagueness it facilitates a conservative ontology without gerrymandered objects. It doesn't. The epistemic vagueness of ordinary object predicates such as ‘bicycle’ requires that objects that can be described as almost‐but‐not‐quite‐bicycle exist even though they fall outside the predicate's sharp extension. Since the predicates that begin with ‘almost’ are vague as well, epistemicism's ontological backdrop is far from the conservative picture it is thought to enable.     

Older (but not younger) preschoolers understand that knowledge differs between people and across time

We examined 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds' understanding of general knowledge (e.g., knowing that clocks tell time) by investigating whether (1) they recognize that their own general knowledge has changed over time (i.e., they knew less as babies than they know now), and (2) such intraindividual knowledge differences are easier/harder to understand than interindividual differences (i.e., Do preschoolers understand that a baby knows less than they do?). Forty‐eight 3‐ to 5‐year‐olds answered questions about their current general knowledge (‘self‐now’), the general knowledge of a 6‐month‐old (‘baby‐now’), and their own general knowledge at 6 months (‘self‐past’). All age groups were significantly above chance on the self‐now questions, but only 5‐year‐olds were significantly above chance on the self‐past and baby‐now questions. Moreover, children's performance on the baby‐now and self‐past questions did not differ. Our findings suggest that younger preschoolers do not fully appreciate that their past knowledge differs from their current knowledge, and that others may have less knowledge than they do. We situate these findings within the research on knowledge understanding, more specifically, and cognitive development, more broadly.     

‘Can’ and the Consequence Argument

The consequence argument is a powerful incompatibilist argument for the conclusion that, if determinism is true, what one does is what one must do. A major point of controversy between classical compatibilists and incompatibilists has been over the use of ‘can’ in the consequence argument. Classical compatibilists, holding that abilities to act are dispositions, have argued that ‘can’ should be analyzed as a conditional. But such an analysis of ‘can’ puts compatibilists in a position to grant the premises of the argument while denying the conclusion. Incompatibilists remain unconvinced, and this corner of the debate over free will has reached a dialectical impasse. The present paper has two aims. First, to offer a new dialectical point of entry into this dispute on behalf of incompatibilists. By making use of Angelika Kratzer's influential semantic work on ‘can’ and ‘must’, I argue that incompatibilists are in a position to offer a plausible, positive treatment of ‘can’ that favors their view. Second, even if one does not think incompatibilism is thereby true (for as we shall see there are places to push back), the Kratzer semantics yields a number of important insights concerning the consequence argument that should be of broad interest. ¹      

Children's Moods,Fears and Worries Questionnaire: Validity with Young Children at Risk for Internalizing Problems

This study tested psychometric properties of the Children's Moods, Fears and Worries Questionnaire (CMFWQ) with a population sample of children at risk for developing internalizing problems. The CMFWQ was completed by 489 parents of 5‐year‐old children who had been screened for temperamental inhibition in preschools across eight government areas of Melbourne, Australia. Parents also completed the Strengths and Difficulties Questionnaire (SDQ) and Anxiety Diagnostic Interview Schedule (ADIS‐P‐IV). In this inhibited sample of children, the CMFWQ showed high internal consistency of items (α = .95). The CMFWQ demonstrated convergent validity with the SDQ ‘emotional symptoms’ subscale and discriminant validity with the ‘conduct problems’ subscale. Supporting criterion validity, the CMFWQ significantly distinguished between groups of inhibited children with versus without ADIS anxiety disorders. Psychometric properties of the CMFWQ now extend to young inhibited children who are at risk for developing internalizing problems as they grow. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Heidegger's Descartes and Heidegger's Cartesianism

Abstract: Heidegger's Sein und Zeit (SZ) is commonly viewed as one of the 20^th century's great anti‐Cartesian works, usually because of its attack on the epistemology‐driven dualism and mentalism of modern philosophy of mind or its apparent effort to ‘de‐center the subject’ in order to privilege being or sociality over the individual. Most who stress one or other of these anti‐Cartesian aspects of SZ, however, pay little attention to Heidegger's own direct engagement with Descartes, apart from the compressed discussion in SZ §§19–21. I here show through a careful reading of Heidegger's lectures on Descartes from the years immediately preceding SZ that, while he has sharp criticisms of Descartes and certain ‘Cartesian’ aspects of modern philosophy along the lines commonly recognized, he also aims to disclose what he calls the ‘positive possibilities’ in Descartes and the philosophy he inspired. I detail a number of these and then show that they force us to see Heidegger's own early project as largely unconcerned with dualism and mentalism per se, and much more with questions of the philosophical methodology that gives rise to them. Moreover, I show that a careful reading of Heidegger's treatment of the cogito makes clear that he is no serious way attempting to ‘de‐center the subject’ and that the fundamental question of the ‘analytic of Dasein’ is one that takes Descartes as an immediate jumping off point: how can I articulate what I understand myself to be as the general kind of entity I am, and on what besides me does my being depend?