Loving People for Who They Are (Even When They Don't Love You Back)

The debate on love's reasons ignores unrequited love, which—I argue—can be as genuine and as valuable as reciprocated love. I start by showing that the relationship view of love cannot account for either the reasons or the value of unrequited love. I then present the simple property view, an alternative to the relationship view that is beset with its own problems. In order to solve these problems, I present a more sophisticated version of the property view that integrates ideas from different property theorists in the love literature. However, even this more sophisticated property view falls short in accounting for unrequited love's reasons. In response, I develop a new version of the property view that I call the experiential view. On this view, we love a person not only in virtue of properties shaped by and experienced in a reciprocal loving relationship, but also in virtue of perspectival properties, whose value can be properly assessed also outside of a reciprocal loving relationship. The experiential view is the only view that can account not only for reciprocated love's reasons, but also for unrequited love's reasons.     

You Are What They Eat: The Influence of Reference Groups on Consumers’ Connections to Brands

The set of associations consumers have about a brand is an important component of brand equity. In this article, we focus on reference groups as a source of brand associations, which can be linked to one's mental representation of self to meet self‐verification or self‐enhancement goals. We conceptualize this linkage at an aggregate level in terms of self‐brand connections, that is, the extent to which individuals have incorporated a brand into their self‐concept. In 2 studies, we show that brands used by member groups and aspiration groups can become connected to consumers’ mental representation of self as they use these brands to define and create their self‐concepts. Results from Experiment 1 show that the degree to which member group and aspiration group usage influences individual self‐brand connections is contingent on the degree to which the individual belongs to a member group or wishes to belong to an aspiration group. In Experiment 2, we found that for individuals with self‐enhancement goals, aspiration group brand use has a greater impact on self‐brand connections; for individuals with self‐verification goals, on the other hand, member group use has a greater impact.     

We Are the World—and They Are Not: Prototypicality for the World Community,Legitimacy, and Responses to Global Inequality

The relation between developed and developing countries is characterized by inequalities that sometimes hinder actions against worldwide problems. The current research presents an intergroup approach, based on the ingroup projection model, towards an analysis of psychological processes that perpetuate global inequality on a social group level. Precisely, we argue that people from developed countries perceive their group as more prototypical for the world population than they perceive people from developing countries. These perceptions of ingroup prototypicality should in turn relate to legitimacy beliefs and predict unfavorable behavioral intentions towards developing countries. We present two studies that corroborate our hypotheses: In Study 1, participants from a developed country perceived their ingroup as more prototypical for the superordinate group (i.e., world population) than the outgroup (i.e., developing countries), which in turn was related to beliefs that global inequality is legitimate. This finding was replicated in Study 2, and the predicted effect of ingroup prototypicality on behavioral intentions was mediated by legitimacy beliefs. These findings demonstrate that intergroup processes can contribute to perpetuating global inequality.     

Who,What and Where (WWW) Problems in Scientific Communities

Science and Engineering Ethics - The results of the National Higher Education Entrance Examination (Gaokao, in Chinese) have a life-long effect on most Chinese by labeling them clever or not. Some...     

What you don’t know won’t hurt me: Costly (but quiet) exit in dictator games

We used simple economic games to examine pro-social behavior and the lengths that people will take to avoid engaging in it. Over two studies, we found that about one-third of participants were willing to “exit” a $10 dictator game and take $9 instead. The exit option left the receiver nothing, but also ensured that the receiver never knew that a dictator game was to be played. Because most social utility models are defined over monetary outcomes, they cannot explain choosing the ($9, $0) exit outcome over the dominating $10 dictator game, since the game includes outcomes of ($10, $0) and ($9, $1). We also studied exiting using a “private” dictator game. In the private game, the receiver never knew about the game or from where any money was received. Gifts in this game were added innocuously to a payment for a separate task. Almost no dictators exited from the private game, indicating that receivers’ beliefs are the key factor in the decision to exit. When, as in the private game, the receivers’ beliefs and expectations cannot be manipulated by exit, exit is seldom taken. We conclude that giving often reflects a desire not to violate others’ expectations rather than a concern for others’ welfare per se. We discuss the implications of our results for understanding ethical decisions and for testing and modeling social preferences. An adequate specification of social preferences should include “psychological” payoffs that directly incorporate beliefs about actions into the utility function.     

Evolutionary Psychology,Ethology, and Essentialism (Because What They Don't Know Can Hurt Us)

In 2002, Evolution and Human Behavior published a study purporting to show that the differences in toy preferences commonly attributed to girls and boys can also be found in male and female vervet monkeys, tracing the origin of these differing preferences back to a common ancestor. Despite some flaws in its design and the prima facie implausibility of some of its central claims, this research received considerable attention in both scientific circles and the popular media. In what follows, I survey some of the problems with this study that seem to be characteristic of research into sex differences in a particular research program in evolutionary psychology. I suggest that an epistemology of ignorance is at work that suppresses the methods and insights of an earlier research program, which emphasized the complexity and contingency that ultimately grounds the variety of human behaviors, in favor of one that has been widely criticized as empirically flawed and politically pernicious. I conclude with some speculative remarks on the persistence of this problematic research program in evolutionary psychology.     

Social Identification and Interpersonal Communication in Computer‐Mediated Communication: What You Do Versus Who You Are in Virtual Groups

This study investigates the influence of interpersonal communication and intergroup identification on members’ evaluations of computer‐mediated groups. Participants (N= 256) in 64 four‐person groups interacted through synchronous computer chat. Subgroup assignments to minimal groups instilled significantly greater in‐group versus out‐group identification. One member in each group was instructed to exhibit interpersonally likable or dislikable behavior. Analysis revealed that confederates acting likably were more attractive than those acting dislikably regardless of their in‐group or out‐group status. Further results indicated that interpersonal behavior interacted with subgroup membership on identification shifts following online discussions. Interpersonal dynamics generally provided stronger effects on members in virtual groups than did intergroup dynamics, in contrast to predictions from previous applications of social identification to computer‐mediated communication.     

Anger and Authoritarianism Mediate the Effects of Fear on Support for the Far Right—What Vasilopoulos et al. (2019) Really Found

In an important study of popular support for the National Front following the November 13, 2015 terrorist attacks in France, Vasilopoulos, Marcus, Valentino, and Foucault (2019) argue that (1) anger—rather than fear—explains support for the Far Right and (2) the effect of fear on support for the Far Right is negative, rather than positive, as previous work (including my own) would suggest. However, these conclusions are based on statistical models that adjust for anger (but no other emotional variables) when investigating the effects of fear, and the results indicate the presence of a suppression effect. Following a collegial exchange with the authors, I share evidence (which they provided) that (1) the effect of fear on support for the Far Right is in fact positive and significant (rather than negative) and (2) anger and authoritarianism both mediate the effect of fear on support for the Far Right. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed.     

African Americans’ and European Americans’ Mutual Attributions: Adjective Generation Technique (AGT) Stereotyping1

The Katz/Braly line of research is reviewed, along with efforts to improve stereotype measurement. Mutual stereotyping by African Americans and European Americans and in-group bias effects were examined employing the Adjective Generation Technique (AGT). Results showed that each group's conception of the other differed from its own-group conception. Both groups saw European Americans as tending to be inventive, educated, smart, rich, and greedy, but African Americans added corrupt and prejudiced, while European Americans added lazy. African Americans were seen by both groups as tending to be corrupt, funny, friendly, independent, and poor. While mostly African Americans saw their own group as smart and strong, mostly European Americans attributed athletic, humorous, and loud to African Americans. The in-group bias effect was confirmed for both groups in terms of FAVorability and ANXiety values assigned to generated words. However, African Americans showed a stronger bias effect on the FAV measure. The expectation that in-group members would have more constructs applicable to their own group than to the other group was supported only for African Americans. There was also evidence that the powerless know the powerful more than the other way around. Implications for the study of stereotype content, the in-group bias effect, intergroup anxiety, and strength of own group identity are discussed.     

Supporters Are Not Necessary for the Home Advantage: Evidence From Same‐Stadium Derbies and Games Without an Audience

The home advantage is the phenomenon in sports whereby the home team wins more often than the visiting team. The current data show that home crowd support is not a necessary precondition for the home advantage. In soccer games where no audience was present, the home team still had a home advantage. Furthermore, in some same‐stadium derbies (games played between 2 teams that share a stadium; e.g., AC Milan vs. Internazionale in soccer), the home team always has more crowd support, but in these games no home advantage existed. Together, these findings suggest that crowd support is not a necessary condition for a home advantage to occur. The phenomenon might thus be much broader than assumed so far.     

A Reply to Uttl and Morin’s (2010) Commentary of

In response to a commentary provided by Uttl and Morin (2010) regarding the recent study by Hughes and Nicholson (2010), we evaluate their suggestion to modify our study’s design to reduce ceiling effects (similar to that of Rosa, Lassonde, Pinard, Keenan, &; Belin, 2008). Also, the commentators failed to take into account our data on reaction times (a measure that is arguably less affected by ceiling effects), which help substantiate our conclusions regarding self-face and self-voice recognition. This rejoinder encourages readers to consider the relevance of the ecological validity of Hughes and Nicholson’s findings.     

Dissimilation and differential assimilation in social influence (situations of ‘normalization’)

We have presented two experiments on the processes of normalization (appraisal of an ambiguous stimulus). In the first experiment, pairs of subjects were taken from natural groups whose structure and functioning we had previously studied; the subjects were paired off in terms of (a) sociometric choices which they had put forward and (b) difference in hierarchical position in the ordinary life of the group. In the second experiment a definite image of the other ‘subject’ (an accomplice) was created in the subject such that he appeared very similar or very different to him (in areas in no way connected with the task). Furthermore, in the ‘collective’ phase of the estimation the accomplice replied exactly like the subject or in a way which was remote or very remote from the subject's replies. We did not observe the contrast phenomenon described by some authors, but we were able to show that the patterns of interaction of everyday life, stabilized social relationships or images of the other which are unconnected with the tasks to be performed play a role in the influence that the replies of one subject have on those of another. Apart from differential assimilation we have shown a process of dissimilation, these two phenomena being, in our opinion, rooted in the structures of action of the social agents' lives. Negotiation in influence is rarely something symmetrical, even in situations of normalization where the dissymmetry of everyday life can be transfered. We have shown, too, that in these types of situations the subjects do not always try to minimize conflict since when they are in agreement (there is nothing to negotiate) they can diverge from one another. It can thus be said that subjects are not rational in the usual sense and are quite clearly something different from logicians or statisticians. The explanation which we have outlined shows how notions of social identity, differentiation and otherness are brought into play.     

What Does (Not) Count as Violence: On the State of Recent Debates About the Inner Connection Between Language and Violence

This paper raises the question whether language and violence are internally connected. It starts from the experience of violence and from its theoretical interpretation as violence in the context of political forms of life which are challenged by complaints about violence. Such forms of life have to confront this issue because they are supposed to be responsive to claims and demands of others who articulate violence as an experience of violation. Whether a kind of responsive ethos may be based on the suspected inner connection between language and violence is being discussed at the end.