Do rotation coordinates provide the substrate for a mental protractor?

In previous studies, we have found that the accuracy in judging collinearity of lines or dots varies considerably from one subject to another as a function of the relative angle of the stimulus elements. A model of errors generally shows large excursions across several subranges of angular position. These do not appear to be motor errors, at least not ones that are well separated from perceptual mechanisms. The errors are most likely generated at primary visual cortex, or beyond. We examined and modeled accuracy in judging collinearity of dot pairs, varying the angular position of the dots through 360 degrees, the distance between the dots (stimulus span), and the distance at which the subject was required to respond (response span). Subjects manifested idiosyncratic profiles of error across angular positions, as reported previously. But across the tested range of spans, from 4 to 8 deg, the errors tended to be the same, irrespective of stimulus or response span. This suggests that the judgments are based on a radial (angular) measure of spatial position. We discuss these results in the context of proposals that the brain maps spatial position using rotation coordinates. These new data are consistent with the hypothesis that subjects use the z-axis coordinates as a mental protractor for judging angular position and collinearity.     

Individual differences in collinearity judgment as a function of angular position

Previous research indicates that perceived orientation and/or alignment of segments and points can vary as a function of the angular position of the stimulus elements. Several studies show that the variability of the responses is least and accuracy of judgment is greatest where segments and dots are aligned with a cardinal axis. Additionally, some report assimilation of judgments toward the nearest cardinal axis--that is, the segments (or dots) are seen as being closer to the horizontal or vertical than is true. The present research confirms that judgments of collinearity are least variable and most accurate when the segment being judged is aligned with a cardinal axis. However, we do not find any consistent tendency for cardinal axis assimilation. Plotting the collinearity error (delta) as a function of angular position (phi), we find a distinctive profile of oscillation for each subject. Furthermore, subjects who were evaluated in two sessions showed very similar profiles of delta oscillation from Day 1 to Day 2. Harmonic analysis indicated a wide-ranging pattern of significant components. The components at the 4th harmonic and below were more likely to be significant, but each subject showed differential loadings in terms of which of the components were significant, as well as in the sign and amplitude of significant components. These results may reflect idiosyncratic fixation tendencies, or individual differences in the design of neural mechanisms that encode the angular positions of stimuli.     

Idiosyncratic profiles of collinearity error using segments and dot pairs

It is well known that judgments of oblique line segments are more variable and less accurate than are judgments of horizontal or vertical segments, i.e., the “oblique effect.” A prior study from our laboratories confirmed these differentials for a task in which the collinearity of segments at various angular positions was judged. Further, that study found that each observer manifests a distinct, idiosyncratic profile of errors across the 360° range. These error tendencies are conspicuous in models derived by harmonic analysis, and we describe significant excursions of a given model as “delta errors.” The present experiments found complex profiles of delta error with various stimulus and test conditions. A given subject manifested similar models of delta error when judging collinearity of dot pairs versus line segments. In the prior work the segments to be judged were asymmetrically positioned upon the test sheet. However, the asymmetric positioning is not responsible for the errors, as the present work found errors excursions with a round display field. Similar profiles of delta error were found when subjects were allowed to mark an open space, versus being required to respond at a specific distance (indicated by a target circle). This addresses questions of whether the error should be measured as an angle. In the two final experiments, we present evidence that the source of delta error within the nervous system is at the point of binocular synthesis of the information from the two eyes, or beyond, and the effects are not due to errors of reaching. Potential neural substrates for these complex, idiosyncratic error tendencies are discussed. Received: 16 June 2000 / Accepted: 10 March 2001     

Evaluating models of collinearity judgment for reliability and scale.

In prior work from this laboratory, we have examined how accurately subjects can judge collinearity, i.e. alignment, as a function of the angular position of stimulus elements. In those experiments, subjects were presented with a line segment (or a pair of dots) which varied across the 360 degrees range of angular positions, and were required to select and mark a point which was perceived as being collinear. We found that the models of error for each subject consisted of a complex set of peaks and valleys which are herein described as delta excursions. The error tendencies appeared to be idiosyncratic, in that each subject manifested a different profile of these excursions. Here we report the results of three experiments. In the first, we tested subjects across five sessions, and found that the five models of error were fairly comparable for a given subject. In the second and third experiments, we tested at close intervals of angular position, and found evidence for localized sources of error. We continue to find that the error model for each subject is idiosyncratic, and argue that the excursions may be due to defects in a system which combines responses from position-encoding fields that vary in size.     

Development and Testing of an Abbreviated Numeracy Scale: A Rasch Analysis Approach

Research has demonstrated that individual differences in numeracy may have important consequences for decision making. In the present paper, we develop a shorter, psychometrically improved measure of numeracy—the ability to understand, manipulate, and use numerical information, including probabilities. Across two large independent samples that varied widely in age and educational level, participants completed 18 items from existing numeracy measures. In Study 1, we conducted a Rasch analysis on the item pool and created an eight‐item numeracy scale that assesses a broader range of difficulty than previous scales. In Study 2, we replicated this eight‐item scale in a separate Rasch analysis using data from an independent sample. We also found that the new Rasch‐based numeracy scale, compared with previous measures, could predict decision‐making preferences obtained in past studies, supporting its predictive validity. In Study, 3, we further established the predictive validity of the Rasch‐based numeracy scale. Specifically, we examined the associations between numeracy and risk judgments, compared with previous scales. Overall, we found that the Rasch‐based scale was a better linear predictor of risk judgments than prior measures. Moreover, this study is the first to present the psychometric properties of several popular numeracy measures across a diverse sample of ages and educational level. We discuss the usefulness and the advantages of the new scale, which we feel can be used in a wide range of subject populations, allowing for a more clear understanding of how numeracy is associated with decision processes. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The underestimation of egocentric distance: evidence from frontal matching tasks

There is controversy over the existence, nature, and cause of error in egocentric distance judgments. One proposal is that the systematic biases often found in explicit judgments of egocentric distance along the ground may be related to recently observed biases in the perceived declination of gaze (Durgin & Li, Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, in press), To measure perceived egocentric distance nonverbally, observers in a field were asked to position themselves so that their distance from one of two experimenters was equal to the frontal distance between the experimenters. Observers placed themselves too far away, consistent with egocentric distance underestimation. A similar experiment was conducted with vertical frontal extents. Both experiments were replicated in panoramic virtual reality. Perceived egocentric distance was quantitatively consistent with angular bias in perceived gaze declination (1.5 gain). Finally, an exocentric distance-matching task was contrasted with a variant of the egocentric matching task. The egocentric matching data approximate a constant compression of perceived egocentric distance with a power function exponent of nearly 1; exocentric matches had an exponent of about 0.67. The divergent pattern between egocentric and exocentric matches suggests that they depend on different visual cues.     

What's Wrong with Rex? Hegel on Animal Defect and Individuality

In his Logic, Hegel argues that evaluative judgments are comparisons between the reality of an individual object and the standard for that reality found in the object's own concept. Understood in this way, an object is bad (ugly, etc.) insofar as it fails to be what it is according to its concept. In his recent Life and Action, Michael Thompson has suggested that we can understand various kinds of natural defect (i.e., defects in living things) in a similar way, and that if we do, we can helpfully see intellectual and moral badness—irrationality and vice—as themselves varieties of natural defect. In this paper, I argue that Hegel's position on animal individuality denies the claim that irrationality and vice are forms of natural defect. Hegel's account of the individuality proper to the animal organism in the Philosophy of Nature clearly disallows evaluative judgments about animals and thereby establishes a well‐defined conceptual distinction between natural defect and intellectual or ethical—i.e., broadly spiritual or geistliche—defect. Hegel thus provides a way of maintaining the difference between nature and spirit within his broader commitment to a post‐Kantian conception of substantial form.     

Accuracy of Social Perception: An Integration and Review of Meta‐Analyses

This review examines the overall accuracy of social perception across several research topics and identifies factors that influence the accuracy of social perception. Findings from 14 meta‐analyses examining topics such as social/personality judgments, health judgments, legal judgments, and academic/vocational judgments were obtained. Social perception accuracy was generally moderate, yielding an average effect size (r) of .32. However, individual meta‐analytic effects varied widely, with some topics yielding small effects (e.g., lie detection, eyewitness identification) and other topics yielding large effects (e.g., educational judgments, health judgments). Several moderators of social perception accuracy were identified, including the nature of the information source, familiarity of the target, type of personality trait, and severity of the outcome being judged. These findings provide a comprehensive summary and novel integration of disparate findings on the accuracy of social perception. Concluding remarks highlight avenues for future research and call for cross‐disciplinary collaborations that would enhance our understanding of social perception.     

When Fluency Signals Truth: Prior Successful Reliance on Fluency Moderates the Impact of Fluency on Truth Judgments

Repeated statements are more frequently judged to be true. One position relates this so‐called “truth effect” to metacognitive experiences of fluency, suggesting that repeated statements are more frequently judged to be true because they are processed more fluently. Although most prior research focused on why repetition influences truth judgments, considerably less is known about when fluency is used as information. The present research addresses this question and investigates whether reliance on fluency is moderated by learning experiences. Specifically, we focus on changes in the reliance on fluency over the course of time. A series of experiments reveals that fluency is more likely to be used in truth judgments when previous reliance on fluency has resulted in valid judgments, compared with when previous reliance on fluency was misleading. These findings suggest that reliance on fluency in judgments is a finely tuned process that takes prior experiences with fluency‐based judgments into account. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Grammaticality,Acceptability, and Probability: A Probabilistic View of Linguistic Knowledge

The question of whether humans represent grammatical knowledge as a binary condition on membership in a set of well‐formed sentences, or as a probabilistic property has been the subject of debate among linguists, psychologists, and cognitive scientists for many decades. Acceptability judgments present a serious problem for both classical binary and probabilistic theories of grammaticality. These judgements are gradient in nature, and so cannot be directly accommodated in a binary formal grammar. However, it is also not possible to simply reduce acceptability to probability. The acceptability of a sentence is not the same as the likelihood of its occurrence, which is, in part, determined by factors like sentence length and lexical frequency. In this paper, we present the results of a set of large‐scale experiments using crowd‐sourced acceptability judgments that demonstrate gradience to be a pervasive feature in acceptability judgments. We then show how one can predict acceptability judgments on the basis of probability by augmenting probabilistic language models with an acceptability measure. This is a function that normalizes probability values to eliminate the confounding factors of length and lexical frequency. We describe a sequence of modeling experiments with unsupervised language models drawn from state‐of‐the‐art machine learning methods in natural language processing. Several of these models achieve very encouraging levels of accuracy in the acceptability prediction task, as measured by the correlation between the acceptability measure scores and mean human acceptability values. We consider the relevance of these results to the debate on the nature of grammatical competence, and we argue that they support the view that linguistic knowledge can be intrinsically probabilistic.     

Time order error and position effect of a standardized stimulus in discrimination of short time duration

In comparison judgments of two successively presented time intervals ranging from 30 to 70 msec a time-order error (TOE) as well as a systematic effect depending on the constant position error (CPE) were demonstrated. The effects proved to be independent. Contrary to Vierordt's law, a negative TOE was found. When presenting the standard interval first, an increased hit rate resulting in a positive CPE was established. Furthermore, a test statistic is introduced that allows analysis of experiments utilizing all available information of a subject's psychometric function.     

Extrapolating human judgments from skip-gram vector representations of word meaning

There is a growing body of research in psychology that attempts to extrapolate human lexical judgments from computational models of semantics. This research can be used to help develop comprehensive norm sets for experimental research, it has applications to large-scale statistical modelling of lexical access and has broad value within natural language processing and sentiment analysis. However, the value of extrapolated human judgments has recently been questioned within psychological research. Of primary concern is the fact that extrapolated judgments may not share the same pattern of statistical relationship with lexical and semantic variables as do actual human judgments; often the error component in extrapolated judgments is not psychologically inert, making such judgments problematic to use for psychological research. We present a new methodology for extrapolating human judgments that partially addresses prior concerns of validity. We use this methodology to extrapolate human judgments of valence, arousal, dominance, and concreteness for 78,286 words. We also provide resources for users to extrapolate these human judgments for three million English words and short phrases. Applications for large sets of extrapolated human judgments are demonstrated and discussed.     

Development and validation of a scale of social and moral judgments (ABB scale) and its use in prison settings

IntroductionThe traditional approach to value judgments involves determining the position of an individual on a scale designed to evaluate the underlying mechanisms and dimensions of judgments.ObjectiveThe purpose of this study was to develop and validate a scale among a general population and to apply it to individuals particularly affected by, or directly involved in, acts of transgression.MethodThe scale comprises three types of behavior involving an expression of personal values (atypism or idiosyncratic behavior) or a violation of moral or conventional standards. Subjects were asked to assess a range of actions and behaviors on three dimensions (Likert format): seriousness, excusability and rejection of the transgressor.Results and conclusionAs predicted, factor analysis shows a clear hierarchy of values. The results demonstrate the multidimensional nature of the instrument and indicate good reliability. Tolerance and severity indices were developed to understand the underlying dynamics of social and moral judgments. The study found that inmates’ judgments of violations and transgressions differed in some respects from the judgments made by the general population. The influence of context and the role of group membership as an explanatory factor are examined from the point of view of the identity strategies used.     

Calibration processes in a serial talent test

ObjectivesIn the beginning of serial evaluations, raters assess performances without knowledge about following performances. We assume that judges must observe a certain number of performances to calibrate their judgment scale, leading to systematic biases (avoidance of extreme judgments) in the beginning of judgment series. The present experiment investigates how many performance observations are necessary to calibrate internal judgment scales, leading to consistent judgments.DesignA between-group design was used.MethodVideos of a talent-test were presented in different orders. Every performance was presented in early, medium, and late positions. Thirty participants rated these series and we assessed the effect of performance position on performance evaluations.ResultsWe found calibration biases within the first nine performances; after that, evaluations remained stable and consistent.ConclusionCalibration processes are completed after a specific number of judgments; this implies interesting interventions for consistent judgments independent of the position in a series.     

Examination of apparent extent as an explanation of the Poggendorff effect

The explanation of apparent misalignment in the Poggendorff figure, based on underestimation of the intertransversal distance, was investigated in two experiments. In Experiment 1, subjects judged the intertransversal distance in the traditional Poggendorff figure and two of its variants. The size of the acute angle and the intertransversal distance were manipulated. Half of the subjects made the judgments with the method used by Wilson and Pressey (1976) and the other half made their judgments with the method used by Greist-Bousquet and Schiffman (1981). The results indicated that perceived intertransversal distance was greater with the former method. In Experiment 2, subjects adjusted the transversals to apparent collinearity in the same displays as were used in Experiment 1. The collinearity judgments were transformed to allow comparison with the results of Experiment 1. Comparison of the collinearity judgments with the distance judgments indicated that they did not follow similar trends. For each Poggendorff variant, proportional distance judgments increased as the size of the acute angle increased, and decreased as the intertransversal distance increased. Collinearity judgments did not vary as a function of intertransversal distance. As the size of the acute angle increased, collinearity judgments increased for two of the Poggendorff variants but decreased for the third. It was concluded that the findings did not support the explanation of apparent misalignment based on underestimation of the intertransversal distance.     

The role of perspective in locating position in a real‐world,unfamiliar environment

This paper reports an exploration of how perspective information contributes to localizing and orienting oneself in a real‐world, unfamiliar environment. Participants were asked to recognize their positions on a three‐dimensional map by observing real buildings from different perspectives set at viewpoints between 0° and 180° from a starting position. Results showed that participants were able to use remembered perspective information to locate their subsequent, different position in the correct area of space. They also showed a linear increase in rotation times as the angular distance increased between initially perceived perspective and test position. This finding suggests that the representation of the spatial information acquired from a real world large‐scale environment is orientation dependent. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effect of normative beliefs on anticipated emotions.

In 3 experiments, Ss were asked how they would or should make hypothetical decisions and how they would react emotionally to the options or outcomes. The choices were those in which departures from proposed normative models had previously been found: omission bias, status quo bias, and the person-causation effect. These effects were found in all judgments, including judgments of anticipated emotion. Arguments against the departures affected judgments of anticipated emotion as well as decisions, even though the arguments were entirely directed at the question of what should be done. In all but one study, effects of these arguments on anticipated emotion were as strong as their effects on decisions or normative beliefs. Thus, in many situations, people think that their emotional reactions will fall into line with their normative beliefs. In other situations, some people think that their emotional reactions have a life of their own. It is suggested that both normative beliefs and anticipated emotions affect decisions.     

Determinants of the Bourdon effect

The Bourdon illusion is the apparent inward bending of straight, collinear edges in a solid figure consisting of two elongated triangles meeting at their apexes. This effect was investigated in five experiments. In the first and third experiments, it was shown that the apparent bending is greatest when the apical angles are about 12 deg and the axis of the figure is oriented at about 22 deg from the vertical. The second experiment was a control involving visual acuity for angular departures of two lines from collinearity and served as a basis of selection for subjects in Experiments 3, 4, and 5. Experiments 4 and 5 showed that the illusion occurs strongly in a solid (“filled in”) figure but is notably smaller in outline figures of the same size and shape. It tends to be negative in outline figures with boundaries formed by continuous and broken lines. The relationship between the Bourdon illusion and the “negative” Zöllner illusion is considered.     

Error patterns in judgment and production of horizontal and vertical scale positions

Cyclic error curves are often found when people judge or set the position of a marker on a linear scale, but various different forms of cyclic pattern have been reported. Twelve subjects each made judgments and also made settings, both on a horizontal linear scale and on a vertical one. Analysis of their error patterns showed a strong tendency to generate the opposite pattern when the response mode changed from judgment to production of scale positions. This is interpreted as evidence that the errors arise from perceptual misjudgments rather than from response biases. Error patterns tended to remain constant for changes in scale orientation alone. Thus, the varying scale orientations do not seem to account for the reported discrepancies in pattern. However, it was found that different subjects could have opposite patterns in the same experimental condition. These were real individual differences because subjects’ patterns tended to persist across changes in orientation and to reverse with changes in response mode. It seems likely that the reported differences in pooled error trends reflect different assortments of subjects who differ fundamentally in their perception of linear scale positions.     

EVOLUTION,NATURALISM, AND THE WORTHWHILE: A CRITIQUE OF RICHARD JOYCE'S EVOLUTIONARY DEBUNKING OF MORALITY

Abstract: In The Evolution of Morality, Richard Joyce argues there is good reason to think that the “moral sense” is a biological adaptation, and that this provides a genealogy of the moral sense that has a debunking effect, driving us to the conclusion that “our moral beliefs are products of a process that is entirely independent of their truth, … we have no grounds one way or the other for maintaining these beliefs.” I argue that Joyce's skeptical conclusion is not warranted. Even if the moral sense is a biological adaptation, developed moralities (such as Aristotelian eudaimonism) can “co‐opt” it into new roles so that the moral judgments it makes possible can come to transcend the evolutionary process that is “entirely independent of their truth.” While evolutionary theory can shed much light on our shared human nature, moral theories must still be vindicated, or debunked, by moral arguments.