Revisiting the crisis in Freud's libido theory and Abraham's concept of the oral‐sadistic phase as a way out of it

The now available unabridged correspondence between Freud and Abraham leads to a re‐evaluation of the significance of Abraham's work. The author proposes the thesis that clinical observations by Karl Abraham of the ambivalence of object relations and the destructive‐sadistic aspects of orality have an important influence on the advancement of psychoanalytical theory. The phantasy problem of the Wolf Man and the question of the pathogenic relevance of early actual, or merely imagined traumata led Freud to doubt the validity of his theory. He attempted repeatedly to solve this problem using libido theory, but failed because of his problematic conception of oral erotics. The pathogenic effect of presymbolic traumatizations cannot be demonstrated scientifically because of the still underdeveloped brain in the early stage of the child's development. Consequently, the important empirical evidence of a scientific neurosis theory could not be provided. A revision of the theory of the instincts thus became necessary. With Abraham's clinical contributions and other pathologic evidence, Freud was, with some reservation, forced to modify his idea of oral erotics by ascribing to it a status of a merely constructed and fictive phase of oral organization. A solution was eventually facilitated via recognition of non‐erotic aggression and destruction, thereby opening libido theory to fundamental revisions. Driven by the desire to develop a scientific theory, Freud initially had, in his first theory of the instincts, assumed a strongly causal‐deterministic view on Psychic Function. His third revision of theory of the instincts, Beyond the Pleasure Principle including the death instinct hypothesis, considered the hermeneutic aspect of psychoanalytic theory, which had previously existed only implicitly in his theory. Further development of the death instinct hypothesis by Melanie Klein and her successors abandoned quantitative‐economic and causal‐deterministic principles, and instead focused on the practical utility of the psychoanalytic theory.     

Something Was Lost in Freud’s <Emphasis Type="Italic">Beyond the Pleasure Principle</Emphasis>: A Ferenczian Reading*

Freud’s Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) brought a lot of new possibilities to psychoanalytic theory, but also a series of losses. While I recognize the importance of the death drive as a metapsychological construct, I argue that the first thing that went missing with the arrival of this groundbreaking Freudian text is the theorization of the ego instincts or the self-preservative drives. Freud never articulated some plausible inheritors of the ego instincts. I follow the Budapest School, and especially the voice of Sándor Ferenczi, for addressing this loss. The second thing that went missing after Beyond the Pleasure Principle is our openness in thinking through repetition. With the seductive formulation of the “daemonic” repetition in this 1920 text, our theoretical imagination around repetition seems to have been affected. I draw on the work of Sándor Ferenczi for exploring new forms of repetition. Finally, I offer a Ferenczian re-reading of the Freudian Nachträglichkeit, which I see as crucial in the process of pluralizing our thinking on repetition.     

The life instinct

In psychoanalytic writing an oversimplified interpretation of Freud's concept of the life and death instincts sometimes colours the presentation. Roughly, there is an implication that the life instinct is 'good' and the death instinct 'bad'. Freud however is clear that: "Neither of these instincts is any less essential than the other; the phenomena of life arise from the concurrent or mutually opposing action of both"(1933b, p. 209). In this paper I look in detail at the characteristics of the life instinct as conceptualized by Freud, and draw on Bion's work 'on linking' to elaborate Freud's view that binding is the life instinct's key characteristic. I suggest that there are pathological forms of both the life and death instinct if defused (separated off) from the other, and I explore a pathological variation of the life instinct in which binding is without the negation, rest, limit or end provided by the 'opposing action' of the death instinct. I consider an instance of the kind that any analyst might meet clinically, in which an inhibited patient experiences severe anxiety that life-giving connections threaten to proliferate indiscriminately and to an overwhelming intensity and size.     

Notes on ‘Bemächtigungstrieb’ and Strachey’s translation as ‘instinct for mastery’

This short paper looks at Freud’s use of the term ‘Bemächtigungstrieb’ and its translation by Strachey as ‘instinct for mastery’ when Freud was describing the motives behind his grandson’s game with the wooden reel and string in Beyond the Pleasure Principle. The word ‘Macht’ [power], which is contained in the word ‘Bemächtigung’ points to Freud’s difficult relationship with Alfred Adler, whose early theories on the aggressive drive and later theories on ‘striving for power’ were initially rejected by Freud. Looking at the changes in Freud’s reception of Adlerian terms, some of which he later integrated into his own theory, throws light on his choice of the word ‘Bemächtigungstrieb’ in 1920, when he was just beginning to introduce his thoughts on the death instinct. A slightly different translation of the word ‘Bemächtigungstrieb’, one which takes these historical and theoretical aspects into account, could make these connections clearer for the English reader.     

Two faces of Thanatos: Broken flowers (2005) and Ai no corrida (1976)1

Since Freud formulated the death instinct concept, it has received widely diverse interpretations. Even Freud advanced two versions. The concomitant analyses of two films, Ai no corrida (1976) [ In the realm of the senses (1977)] and Broken flowers (2005) evince Thanatos's two faces: the cold death of decathexis of an object, in the case of Don (in Broken flowers) and the hot death of the subject‐object fusion in Sada's case ( Ai no corrida). In our analysis, we elaborate two possible vicissitudes of the death instinct: in Broken flowers, the main character finds an ‘analyst’ and is cured. In Ai no corrida, the protagonist meets a complementary object and goes mad.     

The Activities of The Scandinavian Societies

Freud's concept of the death instinct has given rise to many different interpretations which have often been contradictory. It is in fact already possible to discern two diametrically opposite meanings of this concept in Freud's work from 1920—Beyond the Pleasure Principle—in which he first introduced the concept of the death instinct. In this paper, it is argued that both these meanings are relevant in describing psychical life, although only one of these meanings actually qualifies for the concept “death instinct”. Beyond the Pleasure Principle was written in order to try to understand some everyday, as well as clinical phenomena which could not be explained by the so-called pleasure principle. Freud postulated something beyond the pleasure principle, which initially seemed to have to do with binding energy. I will preserve this idea and attempt to develop it within the context of a phenomenological analysis of time. The temporalization of the subject involves a very basic affirmation of existence, in that the subject experiences something constant, something that can be said to possess the quality of a gestalt. I propose that that which is beyond the pleasure principle—this binding of energy—should be understood as the opposite of the idea of a primordial death instinct striving towards death. In this case, that which is beyond the pleasure principle reflects an original affirmation of existence, which could be said to correspond to Freud's first meaning of the death instinct. The second meaning—for which the name “death instinct” seems to be applicable—concerns the discharge of energy, which from a temporal point of view shows itself as a tendency to dissolution. The concept of the death instinct in its various meanings is discussed in connection with phenomenological reflections on time, which is a different approach from Freud's attempt to ground the death instinct in biology.     

Winnicott's rejection of the basic concepts of Freud's metapsychology1

In this paper, the author attempts to show how Winnicott rejected the basic concepts of Freud's metapsychology, namely the concepts of Trieb(instinct/drive), psychical apparatus and libido. To that purpose, he first elucidates what metapsychology is, according to Freud. Freud describes metapsychology as a speculative superstructure of psychoanalysis in which the aforementioned concepts correspond to the dynamic, topographical and economic viewpoints. The author then presents an explanation of what metapsychology means in Winnicott's view, and examines his criticism of this kind of speculative theorization in psychoanalysis, as well as his suggested substitute for each of those basic concepts. Subsequent analysis shows that Winnicott replaced the main concepts of the metapsychological theory, which have no correlation whatsoever in the phenomenal world, with a set of other, non‐speculative concepts, thereby favouring a factual theorization.     

The Freud–Ferenczi dialogue after the formulation of the Second Topic

The author proposes to examine the scientific dialogue established by Freud and Ferenczi between 1920 and 1933 after Freud’s formulation of the Second Topic, the Pleasure Principle. It is very informative to explore the closeness of some formulations of Freud with the more important clinical and metapsychological intuitions of Ferenczi. The role of repetition, the value of affects, the second theory of anxiety, the elasticity of the psychoanalytical technique and the problem of traumatism are some of aspects developed in this paper.

     

The Aging Process as Forward Movement and the Case for Detours and Backward Steps

This article focuses on Pruyser's (Pastor Psychol 24:102-118, 1975) view presented in his article titled "Aging: Downward, Upward, or Forword?" that the later stages of aging are not a downward movement from a higher peak but the continuation of a forward movement, and that manifestations of gains as well as losses in older adulthood support this view. While expressing agreement with this view I draw on Sigmund Freud's discussion of the death instinct in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Freud 1920/1959) to suggest that the later stages of the aging process may involve an increase in detours and backward movements. Suggesting that these detours and backward steps are potentially beneficial, I conclude that Freud provides guidelines for how we may view and evaluate the losses and gains that Pruyser identifies as characteristic of the later stages of the aging process.     

Freud's baby: Beyond autoerotism and narcissism

The prevailing notion in the psychoanalytic literature is that Freud's thinking on neonatal object relations is completely captured in terms of his concepts of autoerotism and primary narcissism. Indeed, for Freud, autoerotism and primary narcissism conceptualize the earliest libido distributions, but these concepts do not exhaust Freud's model of early mental life. In this paper, the author endeavors to show that Freud's hypothetical infant arrives at autoerotism and narcissism at the expense of, and secondary to, primitive object-relatedness. More specifically, an appreciation of Freud's views on primitive object relations in light of the self-preservative instinct demonstrates his view that the infant is born into a state of mutual adaptation with the mother. The author makes detailed use of Freud's writings to show his conception of an infant who, from the inception of neonatal life, has the mental sophistication to maintain complex relations with instinctual objects, the sources of gratification or frustration, part-objects confusedly perceived because of cognitive immaturity and/or fantasy distortion. Such complexity includes the infant's capacity for primitive forms of perception, boundary formation, reality testing, and defensive, splitting-based projections and introjections.     

“AFTER THE EVENT”: FREUD'S UNCANNY AND THE ANXIETY OF ORIGINS

This essay aims to revise Freud's theory of the uncanny by rereading his own essay of that name along with the key material Freud drew on in formulating his theory: E. T. A. Hoffmann's short story “The Sandman” (1816a) and Ernst Jentsch's essay “On the Psychology of the Uncanny” (1906a). While arguing, initially, both that Jentsch's work is fundamentally misconstrued by Freud and that it offers a better account of what happens in Hoffmann's story, the essay moves beyond Jentsch's account to offer a more philosophically oriented theory of the uncanny, one more in line with Freud's ideas in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920a).     

Uroborus: A Review of Jung's Thinking on the Nature of the Psyche and the Transformation of Libido

For Jung, the nature of the psyche derives from its containment within the opposites of biological instinct and archetypal spirit. Jung describes the energy generated by this opposition as disposable psychic energy, and gives it the term libido, another word for which is will. Will denotes consciousness, so Jung concludes that psyche, that which is contained within the opposites of instinct and spirit, equals consciousness. The archetypes are “instinctual images” that organize and regulate consciousness. Their nature is that of spirit, and they form the counter-pole to the biological matter from which the instincts arise. The intimate relationship between instinct and archetype is resolved in the central archetype of wholeness, the self, imaged by Jung as both a color wheel, in which the ultrared of instinct merges into and joins with the ultraviolet of the archetypes, and the uroborus, the tail-eating serpent, in which the spiritual archetype, the head of the serpent, feeds off of and is nourished by instinct, the serpent's tail. Jung postulates that within the individual psyche, libido arising from instinct is transformed away from its original instinctual object by its canalization into an analogue of that object. These analogues arise in the psyche as symbols, and their source is the sphere of the archetypes. The instinctual analogues in the form of symbols are projected upon the environment, and individuation is the process of becoming conscious of the archetypal psychological source of one's projections.     

溃疡性结肠炎的诊断标准与诊断思维

溃疡性结肠炎的诊断条件包括临床表现、结肠镜改变、钡灌肠与肠黏膜组织学等,诊断标准应根据上述条件的不同组合分为疑诊与确诊,结肠镜与黏膜活检最为重要。强调在排除诊断基础上正确应用诊断标准。诊断成立后,应全面评估病情,特别是病变范围、严重度与活动性,以便合理地临床决策与预后判断,提高诊断水平。     

Sabina Spielrein: out from the shadow of Jung and Freud

Abstract: Since the 1982 publication of Aldo Carotenuto's book, A Secret Symmetry: Sabina Spielrein Between Jung and Freud, there has been renewed interest in the life and work of Sabina Spielrein. She was Jung's first psychoanalytic case at the Burghölzli Hospital in 1904, and was referred to several times in The Freud/Jung Letters. Spielrein recovered, enrolled in medical school, and went on to become a Freudian analyst. Her most famous paper, published in 1912, ‘Destruction as a cause of coming into being’, was referred to by Freud in 1920 in relation to his Death Instinct theory. In the few Freudian publications on this controversial theory since 1920, Spielrein's contribution is consistently omitted. Jung also neglected to refer to her ‘Destruction’ paper in his early 1912 version of ‘Symbols of transformation’, even though he had edited her paper and had promised to acknowledge her contribution. He did refer extensively to Spielrein's first paper, her medical thesis, ‘On the psychological content of a case of schizophrenia’, published in 1911, as yet unpublished in English. In her paper Spielrein sought to understand the psychotic delusions of Frau M, a patient at the Burghölzli, much in the style of Jung's ‘Psychology of dementia praecox’ (1907). The purpose of this paper is to explore to what extent Spielrein's Frau M paper, and its companion ‘Destruction’ paper, make an original contribution to both Jung and Freud's emerging theories on the possible creative versus destructive outcomes of neurotic or psychotic introversion, culminating in Jung's concept of the ‘collective unconscious’ (1916) and Freud's concept of a ‘Death instinct’ (1920).     

Uses of guilt in the treatment of dehumanization

It is likely that under the impact of impending Nazism, aggression theory in late Freud, as presented in Civilization and its Discontents (1930), left the entirety of guilt to self‐punishment, thus retracting his view that love functions in the superego as remorse and restitution. This change however, essentially withdraws provision for treating victims of abuse, violence and terror. This paper proposes a paradigm shift that reframes Freud's late instinct theory into a theory of dehumanization by recovering reparative and relational components of guilt. This reframe has major implications for the position taken with regard to the role of witnessing and the moral imperative in recovery from dehumanizing experience, which orthodox psychoanalytic theory has essentially bypassed. It is propose that victim treatment, as case examples illustrate, reformulates guilt as drawing on the life instincts to revivify victims’ humanity through analytic witnessing and acknowledgment. Indeed, unless breaches of humanity are confronted by a witness, the life instincts stay merely rhetorical, if not contradictory, by leaving the death instincts to grow unseen and, thus, unopposed. A two‐fold formulation of guilt may better address and redress disorders of dehumanization, whereby ‘death guilt’ (under the sway of aggression) signifies the orthodox, irrevocable guilt of self‐reproach for the bad we may have done, and ‘life guilt’ (under the sway of a moral imperative) the redeemable guilt for the good we have still to do.     

Oedipus and Cain: Brothers in arms

Abstract

It is widely known that Freud gives Oedipus a central place in both his psychoanalytic theory and praxis. Freud introduces the Oedipus myth as the crucial key for understanding the tragedy of human life. One of the most problematic issues innate to the human condition is aggression. This paper argues: (1) that Freud's insights into human aggression can at the very least be viewed as one-sided and problematic; and (2) that the heuristic potential of the Oedipus myth is, correspondingly, limited. It considers how the Hungarian psychiatrist and analyst, Lipót Szondi, tries to bridge this gap using the myth of Cain and Abel. The aim of this paper is to explore how Szondi's interpretation of this myth offers a much more subtle approach to human aggression. Szondi's alternative and distinctive look at aggressive phenomena offers an exciting and fruitful addition to Freud's interpretation as exclusively referring to sadism and/or the death instinct. This contribution wants to highlight Szondi's amendment to Freud's Oedipus and aims to show that psychoanalysis can benefit from taking into account the mythical figures of Cain and Abel.     

The dual impact of Freud's death and Freud's death instinct theory on the history of psychoanalysis

Since I have ranged over a rather large territory in this presentation I will summarize my main points. I claim that the very way Freud created psychoanalysis made it impossible for it to continue to grow and develop as a unified movement after his death. Unlike other sciences, psychoanalysis had no way of differentiating its basic findings from what is yet to be discovered. I then reintroduced my differentiation between heretics, modifiers, and extenders, claiming that after Freud’s death there was less opportunity for heretics and more space for modifiers. I assigned a crucial role to the fact that Anna Freud did not succeed in expelling the Kleinians. In the second part of the paper I presented the view of those who made use of Freud’s death instinct theory and those who opposed it. Many analysts preferred to ignore dealing with it rather than state their opposition. My presentation was biased in favor of those who chose to work with the death instinct as a clinical reality,highlighting Ferenczi’s construction. I made the claim, so far as I know never made before, that Freud’s death instinct theory had a traumatic impact on the psychoanalytic movement because it greatly limited the belief in the curative power of our therapeutic work. After his announcement of the dual-instinct theory Freud withdrew his interest in psychoanalysis as a method of cure. By doing so he inflicted a narcissistic wound on psychoanalysis. I believe that the creativity of psychoanalysis will improve if we face this difficult chapter in our history.     

The death instinct and the mental dimension beyond the pleasure principle in the works of Spielrein and Freud

In ‘Destruction as Cause of Come‐into‐being’, Spielrein argues for the need of postulating the existence of a death instinct in mental functioning. The idea that she thus anticipated the concept of death instinct Freud introduced in 1920 is often found in psychoanalytic literature. But the specific meaning of Spielrein's hypothesis is seldom discussed, as well as the extent to which she anticipated Freud's concept. In fact, there are important differences between their views. Besides, a closer analysis of Spielrein's text reveals other ideas that come close to fundamental aspects of Freud's theories from 1920 onwards, particularly the assumption of a more primordial mental functioning than the one regulated by the pleasure principle. But also here there are important differences between the views sustained by both authors. With this in view, the objective of this paper is firstly to discuss some hypotheses formulated by Spielrein in her 1912 work in order to elucidate her concept of death instinct as well as her hypothesis of the existence of a more primitive mental functioning than the one governed by the pleasure principle. Next, the question of the possible similarities and differences with regard to Freud's concepts is also addressed.