A Law of One's Own: Self‐Legislation and Radical Kantian Constructivism

Radical constructivists appeal to self‐legislation in arguing that rational agents are the ultimate sources of normative authority over themselves. I chart the roots of radical constructivism and argue that its two leading Kantian proponents are unable to defend an account of self‐legislation as the fundamental source of practical normativity without this legislation collapsing into a fatal arbitrariness. Christine Korsgaard cannot adequately justify the critical resources which agents use to navigate their practical identities. This leaves her account riven between rigorism and voluntarism, such that it will not escape a paradox that arises when self‐legislation is unable to appeal to external normative standards. Onora O'Neill anchors self‐legislation more firmly to the self‐disciplining structures of reason itself. However, she ultimately fails to defend sufficiently unconditional practical norms which could guide legislation. These endemic problems with radical constructivist models of self‐legislation prompt a reconstruction of a neglected realist self‐legislative tradition which is exemplified by Christian Wolff. In outlining a rationalist and realist account of self‐legislation, I argue that it can also make sense of our ability to overcome anomie and deference in practical action. Thus, I claim that we need not make laws but can make them our own.     

Changing One's Mind: Self‐Conscious Belief and Rational Endorsement

Self‐consciously attempting to shape one's beliefs through deliberation and reasoning requires that one stand in a relation to those beliefs that might be signaled by saying that one must inhabit one's beliefs as one's own view. What does this amount to? A broad swath of philosophical thinking about self‐knowledge, norms of belief, self‐consciousness, and related areas assumes that this relation requires one to endorse, or be rationally committed to endorsing, one's beliefs. In fact, however, fully self‐conscious adherence to epistemic norms requires the ability to self‐consciously hold a belief without endorsing that belief as true, as well‐supported by the evidence, or as meeting some other epistemic standard, and there are cases in which no such commitment is rationally required. This ability is necessary if there is to be any such thing as a fully self‐conscious process of changing one's mind.     

XII—Escaping One's Own Notice Knowing: Meno's Paradox Again

The complex way Meno's paradox is presented in the Meno forces reflection on both the external conditions on inquiry—its objects—and its internal conditions—the state of mind of the person who inquires. The theory of recollection does not fully account for the internal conditions—as Plato makes clear in the critique of Meno's puzzle to be found in the Euthydemus. I conclude that in the Euthydemus Plato is inviting us to reject the externalist account of knowledge urged on Socrates by the sophists in favour of a more richly internalist epistemology.     

When Interrogative Self‐talk Improves Task Performance: The Role of Answers to Self‐posed Questions

Nearly all the self‐talk cues studied so far have been self‐statements. However, the findings of Senay, Albarracin, and Noguchi suggest that interrogative self‐talk produces better task performance than declarative one. Two of the experiments reported here were meant to replicate that study, but the expected differences were not confirmed. Experiment 3 showed that if a self‐posed question about future behavior was answered positively, task performance was better than in groups exposed either to the self‐statement ‘I will do it’ or to a negative answer following the question. However, these differences occurred only in those who self‐reported the awareness of the impact of self‐talk on their thought processes. This effect and the possible reasons why between‐group differences were not found in Experiments 1 and 2 are discussed. An alternative explanation for the results of Experiment 3 is also proposed beside that stressing the impact of internal answer. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Self‐Injurious Behaviors: Assessment and Diagnosis

This article examines the diagnosis and assessment of self‐injurious behaviors. A classification model for conceptualizing self‐injury is discussed, and the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (4th ed., text revision; American Psychiatric Association, 2000) diagnoses associated with self‐injury are addressed. Assessment questions and issues to consider when assessing clients who self‐injure are provided.     

Why Reasons Skepticism is Not Self‐Defeating

Abstract: Radical meta‐normative skepticism is the view that no standard, norm, or principle has objective authority or normative force. It does not deny that there are norms, standards of correctness, and principles of various kinds that render it possible that we succeed or fail in measuring up to their prerogatives. Rather, it denies that any norm has the status of commanding with objective authority, of giving rise to normative reasons to take seriously and follow its demands. Two powerful transcendental arguments challenge this view. First, skepticism is said to be self‐defeating: Settling what to accept, and in particular whether to accept skepticism, appears to be a reason‐guided enterprise. How can skeptics coherently support their view by citing reasons in their favor after they just rejected them throughout? Second, there is the practical‐deliberative version, most recently developed by David Enoch: We are essentially deliberative creatures. Yet deliberation appears to require that there are correct answers in the form of normative reasons to our practical questions. Thus confidence in the sensible nature of deliberation should inspire confidence in reasons. The essay undermines both transcendental arguments by demonstrating, first, how to support skepticism without deserting its tenets, and, second, how to deliberate in skeptical fashion.     

Skill Level,Self‐Views and Self‐Theories as Sources of Error in Self‐Assessment

People's impressions of the quality of their performances are often surprisingly inaccurate. In this paper, I discuss three specific factors that contribute to error in self‐assessment. First, at a most basic level, individuals must possess a certain level of knowledge to simply distinguish weak from strong performances. Thus, a lack of skill can contribute to erroneous self‐assessments. Second, even those who possess skill might rely on the wrong information to evaluate their performances. I discuss how relying on preexisting self‐views can lead estimates of one's performance astray. Third, I discuss how motivational forces can play an indirect role in overconfidence. In particular, theories of intelligence that inspire people to think well of themselves also inspire behaviors that contribute to overconfident impressions of how well one has performed on a task. Finally, I discuss how we can draw on this research to improve accuracy in self‐assessments.     

Increasing Career Self‐Efficacy for Women: Evaluating a Group Intervention

The study evaluated whether women participating in a career group designed to increase career‐related self‐efficacy would make gains on career decision‐making self‐efficacy and vocational exploration and commitment compared with women in a control group. Thirty‐one women participated in a 6‐week treatment group, and 30 women participated in a no‐treatment control group. Results indicated that, compared with the control group, women in the treatment group improved on career decision‐making self‐efficacy and vocational exploration and commitment, and maintained those gains at 6‐week follow‐up. The discussion focuses on implications for counseling, limitations of the study, and future research.     

The Faulty Magnitude Detector: Why SNARC‐Like Tasks Cannot Support a Generalized Magnitude System

Do people represent space, time, number, and other conceptual domains using a generalized magnitude system (GMS)? To answer this question, numerous studies have used the spatial‐numerical association of response codes (SNARC) task and its variants. Yet, for a combination of reasons, SNARC‐like effects cannot provide evidence for a GMS, even in principle. Rather, these effects support a broader theory of how people use space metaphorically to scaffold their understanding of myriad non‐spatial domains, whether or not these domains exhibit variation in magnitude.     

Assessing Biobehavioural Self‐Regulation and Coregulation in Early Childhood: The Parent‐Child Challenge Task

Researchers have argued for more dynamic and contextually relevant measures of regulatory processes in interpersonal interactions. In response, we introduce and examine the effectiveness of a new task, the Parent–Child Challenge Task, designed to assess the self‐regulation and coregulation of affect, goal‐directed behaviour, and physiology in parents and their preschoolers in response to an experimental perturbation. Concurrent and predictive validity was examined via relations with children's externalizing behaviours. Mothers used only their words to guide their 3‐year‐old children to complete increasingly difficult puzzles in order to win a prize (N = 96). A challenge condition was initiated midway through the task with a newly introduced time limit. The challenge produced decreases in parental teaching and dyadic behavioural variability and increases in child negative affect and dyadic affective variability, measured by dynamic systems‐based methods. Children rated lower on externalizing showed respiratory sinus arrhythmia (RSA) suppression in response to challenge, whereas those rated higher on externalizing showed RSA augmentation. Additionally, select task changes in affect, behaviour, and physiology predicted teacher‐rated externalizing behaviours four months later. Findings indicate that the Parent–Child Challenge Task was effective in producing regulatory changes and suggest its utility in assessing biobehavioural self‐regulation and coregulation in parents and their preschoolers. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Foreign‐Born Therapists: How Acculturation and Supervisors' Multicultural Competence Are Associated With Clinical Self‐Efficacy

The authors examined the associations between acculturation, supervisors' multicultural competence, and clinicians' self‐efficacy in a sample of 153 immigrant therapists currently practicing in the United States. Participants completed a demographic questionnaire and 3 additional questionnaires that examined their levels of acculturation, perceived supervisors' multicultural competence, and clinical self‐efficacy. Results suggested that perceived prejudice, not level of acculturation, was significantly associated with foreign‐born therapists' clinical self‐efficacy. Perceived supervisors' multicultural competence was significantly associated with therapists' clinical self‐efficacy. Recommendations for supervisors working with foreign‐born therapists are provided. Los autores examinaron las asociaciones entre aculturación, competencia multicultural de los supervisores y autoeficacia de los profesionales clínicos en una muestra de 153 terapeutas inmigrantes actualmente en activo en los Estados Unidos. Los participantes completaron un cuestionario demográfico y tres cuestionarios adicionales que examinaron sus niveles de aculturación, la competencia multicultural percibida de sus supervisores y la autoeficacia clínica. Los resultados sugieren que los prejuicios percibidos, no el nivel de aculturación, están asociados de forma significativa con la autoeficacia clínica de los terapeutas nacidos en el extranjero. La competencia multicultural percibida de sus supervisores está asociada significativamente con la autoeficacia clínica de los terapeutas. Se proporcionan recomendaciones para supervisores que trabajan con terapeutas nacidos en el extranjero.     

Systematic Review of Self‐Report Family Assessment Measures

A systematic review of self‐report family assessment measures was conducted with reference to their psychometric properties, clinical utility and theoretical underpinnings. Eight instruments were reviewed: The McMaster Family Assessment Device (FAD); Circumplex Model Family Adaptability and Cohesion Evaluation Scales (FACES); Beavers Systems Model Self‐Report Family Inventory (SFI); Family Assessment Measure III (FAM III); Family Environment Scale (FES); Family Relations Scale (FRS); and Systemic Therapy Inventory of Change (STIC); and the Systemic Clinical Outcome Routine Evaluation (SCORE). Results indicated that five family assessment measures are suitable for clinical use (FAD, FACES‐IV, SFI, FAM III, SCORE), two are not (FES, FRS), and one is a new system currently under‐going validation (STIC).